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Since the first attempt to indict a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter in the 
1920’s,1 legal reform surrounding corporate manslaughter has been discussed in political 
and legal arenas. This research answers the question of whether turning points of 
corporate manslaughter reform in England and Wales were inhibited by reasons of marked 
similarity between 1912 and 1999. 
This will be achieved using a legal research strategy that embraces doctrinal law, legal 
history and archival research which will in turn establish seven turning points of corporate 
manslaughter reform. By addressing the events and disasters that occurred around these 
seven turning points of corporate manslaughter reform, it will be shown that there are 
consistent reasons of marked similarity which inhibited corporate manslaughter reform in 
the twentieth century. 
The outcome of these findings is used to set out the methodological and epistemological 
stance taken through the reasons of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning and the 
use of post-disaster reactive legislation, associated with corporate manslaughter reform. 
Reasons of marked similarity inhibited the type of legal reform considered at the expense 
of other opportunities which would have reflected the changing corporate structure of the 
twenty-first century. The impact of those reasons of similarity on preferred change resulted 
in the introduction of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 in 
April 2008. 
                                                        
1 R v Cory Bros & Co Ltd (1927) 1 KB 810 (KB). 
5 
Consequently, by evidencing the impact of reasons of marked similarity at particular 
turning points of corporate manslaughter reform between 1912 and 1999, the research 
argues that the law will remain defective due to the lack of successful prosecutions against 
large corporations, despite the introduction of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007. 
Until the reasons of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning and the use of post-
disaster reactive legislation – which prevent corporate manslaughter reform – are 
addressed and overcome, it will not be possible to attain the ideal doctrine of corporate 
manslaughter reform and there will be no successful prosecution for the offence of 
corporate manslaughter regardless of the size, structure and type of corporation involved. 
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This thesis addresses the question of whether turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform in England and Wales were inhibited by reasons of marked similarity between 1912 
and 1999. Before considering the concept of a turning point of corporate manslaughter 
reform, the definition of a reason of marked similarity in conjunction with the origins of the 
phrase ‘corporate manslaughter’ will be considered to set the scene.1 The offence of 
corporate manslaughter came into effect on 6 April 2008 pursuant to the enactment of the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (‘CMCHA 2007’).2 However, the 
phrase ‘corporate manslaughter’ emerged in the 1980s and 1990s3 to describe railway, 
aircraft and shipping disasters4 involving the deaths of members of the public and 
employees of the companies involved that were caused by corporate negligence.5 It was at 
this point that ‘the idea of corporate manslaughter had a clear place in popular vocabulary’6 
in response to the press7 and groups representing the victims of disasters and their familiies 
8 seeking answers with regard to the cause of the disasters. 
 However, the actual offence committed by a corporation between 1912 and 1999 
was the common law offence of manslaughter.9 The offence involved ‘the unlawful and 
                                                        
1 Law Commission, Criminal Law: Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com No 135, 1994) para 4.2 (‘Law Com 1994’). 
2 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (‘CMCHA 2007’). 
3 Paul Almond, ‘Regulation Crisis: Evaluating the Potential Legitimizing Effects of Corporate Manslaughter Cases’ (2007) Law & Policy 
285, 285. 
4 “Disaster” is defined as ‘an emergency causing, or threatening to cause, widespread, and serious disruption to community life  
through death, injury, and/or damage to property and/or the environment’. Civil Contingencies Act 2004, ss 1 and 2.  
5 Interpretation Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict c 63), s 2(1) stated that the statutory use of “person” includes a body corporate. The 
Interpretation Act 1889 was repealed and replaced with the Interpretation Act 1978, ss 5 and 11 in conjunction with schs 1 and 2, pt 2, 
para 4(5) “person” is defined to include “a body or persons corporate or unincorporated”.  
6 Celia Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters (Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 166-167. 
7 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com No 237, 1996) para1.10 (‘Law Com 1996’). 
8 David Bergman, The Case for Corporate Responsibility Corporate Violence and the Criminal Justice System (Disaster Action 2000). 
9 Common law refers to the ‘law by which proceedings and determinations in the ordinary courts of justice are guided and directed’. 
William Blackstone, The Student’s Blackstone (Robert Malcolm Kerr (ed), 1858 London) 29; Edmund Wingate, Body of the Common Law 
of England: As It Stood in Force before It Was Altered by Statute, or Acts of Parliament, or State  (1655 London) ch 1. 
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felonious killing of another without any malice either express or implied’.10 The enactment 
of section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 abolished all distinctions between a felony and 
a misdemeanour, which resulted in a change in the definition of manslaughter to ‘the 
unlawful killing of another without any malice express or implied’.11 
Two types of manslaughter existed: voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.12 
Voluntary manslaughter occurred when all of the elements required for murder were 
present, including an intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.13 However, the crime 
could be reduced to manslaughter by reason of the following: (a) provocation;14 (b) 
diminished responsibility;15 or (c) death caused in pursuance of a suicide pact.16 Involuntary 
manslaughter was ‘unlawful killing without intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm’.17 
Involuntary manslaughter could be subdivided further into two classes:18 unlawful act 
manslaughter,19 and manslaughter by gross negligence involving the breach of a duty of 
care.20 Manslaughter arising from an unlawful act occurred when the killing was due to the 
accused’s unlawful act (not his or her lawful omission);21 the unlawful act had to be an act, 
such as assault, that would be considered by a sober and reasonable person to have 
                                                        
10 T R Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia (eds), Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (33rd edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 1954) 923-924 (Please note the title Archbold’s changed to Archbold from 1959 onwards). 
11 T R Fitzwalter Butler and Stephen Mitchell (eds), Archbold: Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (38th edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 1973) para 2531. 
12 James Richardson (ed), Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (66th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2018) paras 19-110-19-111 
(‘Archbold 2018’); John Jervis (ed), Archbold’s Pleading & Evidence in Criminal Cases (18th edn, Sweet and Stevens 1875) 656. 
13 John Jervis (ed), Archbold’s Pleading & Evidence in Criminal Cases (18th edn, Sweet and Stevens 1875) 656; Stephen Mitchell and P J 
Richardson (eds), Archbold: Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (41st edn, Sweet and Maxwell 1982) para 20-47 (‘Archbold 
1982’); Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-110. 
14 Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-54. 
15 Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-79. 
16 Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-99. 
17 P J Richardson (ed), Archbold: Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (Sweet & Maxwell 1997) para 19-98 (‘Archbold 1997’); 
R v Taylor (1834) 2 Lew 216, 168 ER 1133. 
18 Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-111. 
19 Also known as ‘constructive manslaughter’ whereby death resulting from any unlawful act, whether intrinsically likely to injure or 
not, was manslaughter. Archbold 1982 (n 13) para 20-48. 
20 It should be noted that the courts interchanged the terms recklessness and gross negligence to determine fault. The position was 
clarified by the decision of the House of Lords in R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 (HL) 188-189 which affirmed the gross negligence test in 
R v Bateman 19 Cr App R 8 (CCA) in cases of manslaughter by criminal negligence involving a breach of duty. Archbold 1997 (n 17) para 
19-108. 
21 Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-113. 
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subjected the victim to some risk of harm, albeit not serious;22 it was immaterial whether 
or not the accused knew the act was unlawful and dangerous and whether or not he 
intended the harm – the mens rea required was that appropriate to the unlawful act in 
question;23 and harm meant physical harm.24 
 The thesis will address the decisive turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform from 1912 to 1999 through the second class of involuntary manslaughter, the 
common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter.25 During the time frame under 
consideration, the epithet used for the offence changed from ‘culpable neglect of a duty’26 
to ‘straight-forward manslaughter: positive acts’27 and, finally, to ‘gross negligence 
manslaughter’.28 However, the constituent parts of the offence remained the same in 
principle: (1) the defendant was in breach of a duty of care to the victim; (2) on the 
establishment of such a breach of duty it needed to be established whether the breach of 
duty caused the death of the victim; (3) if so, whether it could be deemed to be grossly 
negligent and a crime; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was so bad in all the circumstances 
that it amounted to a criminal act or omission.29 
 Nonetheless, only eleven corporations from 1912 to 1999 were indicted for gross 
negligence manslaughter,30 of which only three were successfully convicted for gross 
negligence manslaughter because of the eventual adoption of the identification doctrine 
                                                        
22 Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-120. 
23 Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-113, 19-120. 
24 Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-121. 
25 Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-122. 
26 William Feilden Craies and Henry Delacombe Roome (eds), Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence, & Practice in Criminal Cases  (24th edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 1910) 855; T R Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia (eds), Archbold Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases 
(36th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 1966) 907 (‘Archbold 1966’). 
27 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (1st edn, Stevens 1978) 224 defined as straightforward manslaughter: positive acts 
whereby ‘the defendant caused the death in question by an act or omission, amounting in either case to gross negligence or 
recklessness (which one is not finally settled) in breach of a duty of care’. 
28 Gross negligence manslaughter is defined as ‘an act of the defendant contains the element of criminal negligence and death results; 
the offence of manslaughter is created’.; Archbold 1982 (n13) para 2551. 
29 Adomako (n 20) applied in R v Misra and Srivastava [2005] 1 Cr App R 21 (CCA) [64]; Archbold 2018 (n 12) para 19-123. 
30 Appendix Three: Unsuccessful manslaughter prosecutions against corporations pursuant to the common law from 1 June 1926 
through to 5 April 2008 in England and Wales. 
29 
using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation.31 A corporation could only be found guilty 
if a person who could be considered to be a ‘directing mind and will’ of the corporation was 
also found guilty of manslaughter.32 Thus, in order for a corporation to be indicted for 
manslaughter, a director or someone deemed to be the ‘directing mind’ had to be 
prosecuted at the same time.33 
 However, before the criminal courts used the identification doctrine using the 
‘directing mind and will’ interpretation to determine corporate criminal liability, the 
criminal courts used identification doctrine reasoning34 from the 1940s to the 1970s, which 
initially used a wide interpretation followed by a narrow interpretation.35 The wide 
interpretation stated that ‘a limited company can, as a general rule, be indicted for the 
criminal acts of its human agents, and for this purpose there is no distinction between an 
intention or function of the mind and any other form of activity’ (my emphasis).36 While, 
the narrow interpretation used by identification doctrine reasoning stated that a limited 
company could only ‘be indicted for the criminal acts of those in control of the company, 
and for this purpose there is no distinction between an intention or function of the mind 
and any other form of activity’ (my emphasis).37 
 Yet it had been procedurally possible to indict a corporation for gross negligence 
manslaughter since 1 June 1926 because of the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 
                                                        
31 Appendix One: Manslaughter convictions against corporations pursuant to the common law from 1 June 1926 through to 5 April 
2008 in England and Wales. 
32 R v P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App R 72 (CCC) 84 (‘P&O Case’). 
33 David Bergman, Death at Work Accidents or Corporate Crime: The Failure of Inquests and the Criminal Justice System (WEA 1991) 74; 
Archbold 1982 (n 13) para 20-48; 1420. 
34 Please note the use of ‘identification doctrine reasoning’ rather than the use of identification doctrine. This is deliberate  because in 
the Three Fraud Cases (DPP v Kent & Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] 1 KB 146 (KB); R. v ICR Haulage Co Ltd [1944] 1 KB 551 (CCA); (1944) 
Cr App R 31; Moore v Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 ER 515 (KB)) there was no mention of the identification doctrine which was created 
Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL) (‘Lennard’s Case’). See Ministry of Justice, Corporate Liability 
for Economic Crime: Calls for evidence (Cmd 9370, 2017). 
35 T R Fitzwalter Butler and Stephen Mitchell (eds), Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases: First Supplement to 31st 
Edition (Sweet & Maxwell and Stevens 1947) 3 (‘Archbold’s 1947’). 
36 Archbold’s 1947 (n 35) 3. 
37 T R Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia (eds), Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (33rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell and Stevens 1954) 12 (‘Archbold’s 1954’). 
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1925.38 However, using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the identification 
doctrine resulted in successful prosecutions for gross negligence manslaughter against 
small corporations,39 where it was possible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they 
were in control of the corporation.40 Hence, the first corporate conviction for gross 
negligence manslaughter only occurred in 1994 in R v OLL Limited & Peter Kite and Joseph 
Stoddart.41 OLL Limited was owned by one man, who was also directly in charge of the 
activity that caused the death of four teenagers in a canoeing tragedy. 
 Lord Cooke of Thorndon introduced the concept of a decisive turning point in the 
common law while speaking at the 48th Hamlyn Lectures in 1996, when he focused 
on four great cases, each beyond doubt a decisive turning point in the evolution of 
the common law. Although in diverse fields of law, they are all familiar in broad 
outline to every lawyer. So the subject can be called trite. Nonetheless, amid the 
overwhelming mass of case law, mushrooming daily beyond the manageable 
compass of anyone, there is value in returning from time to time to truly first 
principles. The eve of the twenty-first century is a good time to think about past 
landmarks and their continuing significance. Of the four cases, one will be a hundred 
years old next week, while the youngest of the others is already approaching thirty. 
Yet their sway is undiminished, indeed growing.42 
Following Lord Cooke of Thorndon’s definition of a decisive turning point in the common 
law, it was also possible to establish decisive turning points connected to corporate 
manslaughter reform in England and Wales from 1912 to 1999 because the corporate 
manslaughter cases deemed to be decisive turning points were also firmly rooted in the 
common law and occurred over a similar period of time.43 Further, the impact and 
significance of the legal principles established in the corporate manslaughter cases were 
decisive and undiminished because alternative reform options connected to the common 
                                                        
38 Criminal Justice Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo 5 c 86), s 33 which came into effect on 1 June 1926. 
39 David Bergman, Disasters-Where the Law Fails: New Agenda for Dealing with Corporate Violence (Herald Charitable Trust 1993). 
40 James Richardson and David Thomas (eds), Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence & Practice, vol 2 (44th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1996) 
para 19-89 with regard to the rules of causation which were less likely to break in a small corporation. 
41 R v OLL Ltd & Peter Kite and Joseph Stoddart (Winchester CC, 8 December 1994) (‘Lyme Bay Case’). 
42 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, The Hamlyn Lectures: Turning Points of the Common Law  (Sweet & Maxwell 1997) 2. 
43 Thorndon (n 42) 1-80. Thorndon highlighted four turning points of the common law over 72 years from 1897 through to 1969 in 
comparison to the period under consideration in the thesis from 1912 through to 1999 which concerned 87 years.  
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law turning points were available which would have made it possible to successfully indict 
a corporation for the offence of gross negligence manslaughter regardless of corporate size 
or structure.44 
 Consequently, the decisive turning points of corporate manslaughter reform that 
occurred between 1912 and 1999 included the creation of the identification doctrine, 
which was forged from philosophical influences to determine corporate criminal liability;45 
the first failed attempt to prosecute a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter;46 
acknowledgement that a corporation could commit the offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter;47 the second failed attempt to prosecute a corporation for gross negligence 
manslaughter;48 a further thirty years of failed attempts to prosecute a corporation (large, 
medium or small)49 for gross negligence manslaughter;50 the first successful prosecution  
against a small corporation for gross negligence manslaughter;51 and finally, an 
unsuccessful attempt to clarify the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter 
by a corporation using the model of aggregation to reflect the changing corporate structure 
of the 1990s.52 
 However, so lasting was the sway of the turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform that the legislature intervened by enacting the CMCHA 2007, which came into force 
on 6 April 2008,53 to address the lack of successful prosecutions against corporations for 
                                                        
44 James Gobert, ‘Corporate killing at home and abroad reflections on the government’s proposals’ (2002) 118 LQR 72, 76; Gary 
Slapper, ‘Corporate manslaughter: An examination of the determinants of prosecutorial policy’ (1993) 2 Social and Legal Studies 423, 
437; See the research of James Gobert and Maurice Punch which detailed an alternative mechanism to attribute corporate criminal 
liability based on four fault models connected to gross negligence manslaughter. James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking 
Corporate Crime (Butterworths 2003) 82. 
45 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL) (‘Lennard’s Case’). 
46 R v Cory Brothers and Company Limited (1927) 1 KB 810 (KB), 96 LJKB 761 (KB), 136 LT 335 (KB), 28 CCC 346 (KB) (‘Cory Bros Case’). 
47 Archbold’s 1947 (n 35) 2-3; DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146 (KB); R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551 (CCA). 
48 R v Northern Strip Construction Co Ltd (Glamorgan Assizes, 4 February 1965) (‘Northern Strip Case’). 
49 Companies Act 2006, ss 382(3) and 465(3) in conjunction with the Companies Act 2006 (Amendment) (Accounts & Reports) 
Regulations 2008, SI 2008/393. 
50 Appendix Three: Unsuccessful manslaughter prosecutions against corporations pursuant to the common law from 1 June 1926 
through to 5 April 2008 in England and Wales. 
51 Lyme Bay Case (n 41). 
52 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796 (CCA) (‘AG Case’). 
53 CMCHA 2007, s 1(5)(a). 
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gross negligence manslaughter.54 Despite the introduction of the CMCHA 2007, the Crown 
Prosecution Service (‘CPS’) and legislation still looked to the common law definition of 
‘grossness’ for guidance when deciding whether to prosecute a corporation for the offence 
of corporate manslaughter.55 In addition, the CMCHA 2007 continued to use a variation of 
the identification doctrine to attribute the acts and the state of mind of the corporation to 
the controlling officers or directing minds under the new heading ‘senior management’.56 
The position could have been very different but for the decisive turning points in 
the evolution of corporate manslaughter reform, because the ideal doctrine of corporate 
manslaughter reform already existed within the common law.57 The concept of an ideal 
doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform, which was used between 1926 and 1999, 
referred to the premise that all corporations with a legal personality, regardless of size, 
structure or type, should be capable of being successfully indicted for the common law 
offence of gross negligence manslaughter.58 Section 2(1) Interpretation Act 1889 stated 
that ‘the expression “person” shall unless a contrary intention appears, include a body 
corporate’. A contrary intention was only inferred in cases in which the penalty for the 
offence was imprisonment or corporal punishment.59 Therefore, as long as the punishment 
involved a fine, the indictment could stand against a corporation.60 Further, by 1926 the 
procedural difficulties surrounding a corporate indictment had already been addressed 
with the implementation of section 33 Criminal Justice Act 1925, whereby a corporation 
                                                        
54 Home Office, Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: The Government’s Proposals (HMSO 2000); Sandra Speares, ‘Rail 
ruling may speed Bill on corporate killing’ Lloyd’s List (London, 8 September 2004). 
55 Rosemary Ainslie, ‘Special Crime Division’ (Health as well as safety conference, Cambridge, 27-28 September 2017) (‘Conference 
2017’) 
56 CMCHA 2007, s 1(4)(b). 
57 Criminal Justice Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo 5 c 86) s 33 in conjunction with ss 5 and 71 Offences Against the Persons Act (24 & 25 Vict c 
100) affirmed in R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551 (CCA) 556; 30 Cr App R 30 (CCA) 36; DDP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] 1 
KB 146 (KB) 157 that a corporation could be indicted for the common law offence and if convicted could be fined.  
58 Archbold’s 1947 (n 35) 2-3; Criminal Justice Act 1925, s 33 which came into effect on 1 June 1926. 
59 Robert Ernest Ross and T R Fitzwalter Butler (eds), Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (28th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell and Stevens 1937) 10. 
60 R v ICR Haulage Co Ltd [1944] KB 551 (CCA) 556; 30 Cr App R 31 (CCA) 36 confirmed manslaughter by a corporation was punishable 
by a fine. 
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could be indicted at the assizes. Thus, the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform 
already existed within the common law by 1926 as long as it could be established that there 
were no contrary intentions, because the provisions of the Interpretation Act 1889 in 
conjunction with the Criminal Justice Act 1925 already supported the indictment of a 
corporation for the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter when it resulted 
in a fine. 
Consequently, in view of these decisive turning points, it would have been possible 
to use the common law to reform the offence of corporate manslaughter to achieve the 
ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform through the use of alternative legal 
mechanisms beyond the identification doctrine and identification doctrine reasoning to 
attribute the acts and the state of mind to employees or agents acting on behalf of the 
corporation.61 However, no successful prosecution against a corporation for gross 
negligence manslaughter occurred until 1994, and the prosecution was only against a small 
corporation because adopting the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the 
identification doctrine was the only means to attribute corporate criminal liability to the 
offence of gross negligence manslaughter.62 
Subsequently, the failure to secure a successful prosecution against a large 
corporation was not an isolated occurrence, as indicated by the turning points of the 
corporate manslaughter reform, because both the legal mechanisms and the legal 
procedures were already in place to facilitate reform through the common law. 
                                                        
61 (1) No legal or procedural impediment to the prosecution of a corporation for manslaughter since 1925 supported by Criminal 
Justice Act 1925, s 33(3); Charles Roger Noel Winn, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations’ (1929) 3 CLJ 398, 407 supported by 
Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 218. (2) Use of the principle of 
aggregation to extend the identification doctrine connected to the AG Case supported by James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking 
Corporate Crime (Butterworths 2003) 83 (3) Alternative methods already used by the criminal judiciary to attribute corporate criminal 
liability outside the scope of the strict construction of penal statutes as established in Eastern Counties Railway Company and 
Richardson v Broom (1851) 6 Exch 314, 155 ER 562, 325, 556-567 (‘Broom Case’); Evans & Co Ltd v London County Council [1914] 3 KB 
315 (KB) 318-320 (‘Evans Case’). 
62 Lyme Bay Case (n 41). 
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Consequently, the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform could have 
accommodated the changing corporate structure through the adaptation of other 
recognised legal mechanisms such as the rule of aggregation, which involves a collective 
approach to attribute corporate criminal liability to both the arms (employees and agents 
working for the corporation) and the controlling mind of the corporation.63 
The common law had already evolved to establish the concept of an ideal doctrine 
of corporate manslaughter reform and could adapt to accommodate changing corporate 
structures by using legal mechanisms applied originally by the criminal judiciary in the early 
twentieth century and by the introduction of alternative legal mechanisms in the mid to 
late twentieth century whereby it would have been possible to successfully indict a 
corporation for gross negligence manslaughter. The question that remained was why was 
this not followed through at the decisive turning points of corporate manslaughter reform 
that occurred from 1912 to 1999? An explanation can be found by considering the 
reasoning behind the choices that were made that inhibited corporate manslaughter 
reform. However, when the explanations can be traced back to a commonality regardless 
of the decade concerned then the inhibiting reasons can be deemed ‘reasons of marked 
similarity’. Consequently, it is possible to define ‘reasons of marked similarity’ as a list of 
explanations within a choice of legal rules64 which in the case of corporate manslaughter 
reform inhibited the attainment of the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform. 
This thesis advances three main arguments connected to the reasons of marked 
similarity which inhibited corporate manslaughter reform at decisive turning points. The 
first reason of marked similarity concerned the inhibitive and negative impact of the 
                                                        
63 Ministry of Justice, Corporate Liability for Economic Crime: Calls for evidence (Cmd 9370, 2017) 16-18. 
64 Brian R Opeskin, 'The Price of Forum Shopping: A Reply to Professor Juenger' (1994) 16(1) Sydney L Rev 14, 19. 
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common law judge with regard to judicial reasoning surrounding corporate manslaughter 
reform.65 The law stated that a corporation could be indicted for the common law offence 
of gross negligence manslaughter and at specific turning points provided both the legal 
mechanism and the procedure by which this could be achieved.66 Nonetheless, reasons of 
marked similarity connected to judicial reasoning were used which inhibited corporate 
manslaughter reform. Some legal commentators referred to the concept of judicial 
reasoning as ‘judicial aversion to corporate liability evidenced in the GWT and P&O trials’67 
and, perhaps more harshly, ‘judicial abdication of responsibility’ when the judge in the AG 
Case refused to consider the use of aggregation to determine corporate liability.68 
However, the impact of judicial reasoning occurred throughout the period between 1912 
and 1999 and persistently inhibited the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform 
by failing to indict corporations regardless of size, structure or type to achieve the ideal 
doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform. Whether the decision to indict a corporation 
for gross negligence manslaughter was inhibited through judicial reasoning, judicial 
aversion or judicial abdication, they have all occurred at different turning points connected 
to corporate manslaughter reform.69 The fact that none of the common law judges 
accepted that a corporation can commit involuntary manslaughter has inhibited corporate 
manslaughter reform, because the impact of judicial reasoning connected to the common 
law offence has had far-reaching effects on the evolution of corporate manslaughter 
reform that can still be felt today. No large corporation has been successfully indicted for 
                                                        
65 James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths 2003) 62; Pinto and Evans (n 61) 6. 
66 Criminal Justice Act 1925, s 33(3). 
67 Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2nd edn, OUP 2001) 124. 
68 James Gobert, ‘Corporate killing at home and abroad reflections on the government’s proposals’ (2002) 118 LQR 72, 76. 
69 Gobert and Punch (n 65) 62 commented on creation of the identification doctrine based on ‘… their own distinctive model of 
corporate criminal liability’; Pinto and Evans (n 61) 6, who commented on early judicial decisions 1912 to 1927; Wells, Corporations 
and Criminal Responsibility (n 67) 124 commenting on two failed corporate manslaughter cases in the 1990s (GWT and P&O); Gobert 
‘Corporate killing at home and abroad reflections on the government’s proposals’ (n 68) 76 commented on the AG Case.(n 52). 
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corporate manslaughter under the CMCHA 2007,70 and the root cause of this can still be 
traced back to the legacy of judicial reasoning in this area, which initially influenced the lack 
of successful indictments under the common law. The subsequent judicial interpretation of 
‘grossness’ following the enactment of CMCHA 2007 still relies on the same principles that 
were established under the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter.71 
The second reason of marked similarity concerns the use of post-disaster reactive 
legislation. A.W. Brian Simpson stated that ‘a book could be written on the general 
influence of disasters upon legal history; … indeed, Professor Robert C. Palmer, in his 
English Law in the Age of the Black Death 1348-1381, has argued that a particular disaster 
had extremely wide-ranging effects upon English law and government’.72 The wide-ranging 
effects, or inhibitive reasons of marked similarity, also existed with regard to corporate 
manslaughter reform because of the implementation of a reactive statute or statutory 
instruments in response to a disaster. Reactive legislation frequently occurred in the 
aftermath of a corporate disaster: ‘if the pressure for reform remains strong, however, and 
if legislative action appears unavoidable, a limited law that is palatable to the corporate 
community may be enacted’.73 Criminologists74 and sociolegal commenters75 have referred 
to social, economic and political forces to explain the implementation and use of regulatory 
statutes or instruments to control the activities of corporations in conjunction with 
discussions surrounding the overriding perception of the seriousness of a crime when 
committed by a corporation rather than a person.76 However, these discussions failed to 
                                                        
70 Appendix Two: Corporate manslaughter convictions pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 from 6 April 2008 to 1 May 2018 in England and 
Wales. 
71 Jeremy Horder, Homicide and the Politics of Law Reform (OUP 2012) 116 and fn 19. 
72 A W Brian Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (OUP 1995) 195. 
73 James Gobert, ‘The Politics of Corporate Manslaughter-The British Experience’ [2005] FJLR 1, 26. 
74 Hazel J Hartley, Exploring Sport and Leisure Disasters: A Socio-Legal Perspective (Cavendish 2001). 
75 Paul Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform: Crime Prevention and Security Management (Palgrave Macmillan 
2012). 
76 Paul Almond, ‘Understanding the seriousness of corporate crime: Some lessons for the new “corporate manslaughter” offence’ [2009] 
9 Criminology and Criminal Justice 145, 148-149. 
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acknowledge how influential the effect of disasters was when measured against the 
influence of the historical development of the corporation, substantive case law connected 
to the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform and the type of corporation and 
industry involved. Therefore, the impact of the disaster in conjunction with the persistent 
use of post-disaster reactive legislation in response to the aftermath reshaped English law 
by directing it away from the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter. 
Consequently, the second argument to be advanced is the existence of a further reason of 
marked similarity which inhibited the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform 
from 1912 to 1999 that related to the influence of the disaster and the implementation of 
reactive statutes and statutory instruments in the aftermath of disasters that aimed to 
regulate corporations in the future. 
Finally, the third main argument considers the combined impact of not addressing 
the reasons of marked similarity connected to judicial reasoning and post-disaster reactive 
legislation which inhibited corporate manslaughter reform from 1912 to 1999 with regard 
to the law surrounding corporate manslaughter. Research into corporate manslaughter 
reform has frequently stated what the law is, why the law is defective, why the proposed 
reform is inadequate and how it can be reformed by suggesting a solution.77 However, this 
thesis advances the argument that the current law is already defective, despite the 
introduction of the CMCHA 2007,78 because credible turning points of corporate 
manslaughter reform were inhibited by reasons of marked similarity connected to judicial 
reasoning and the use of reactive legislation which prevented the attainment of the ideal 
                                                        
77 Hartley (n 74); Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform: Crime Prevention and Security Management  (n 75). 
78 This is evidenced by the lack of prosecution against corporations in the aftermath of the Hillsborough inquests (Hillsborough Inquest 
Court, ‘Transcript of Hearing 26 April 2016: Morning’ (HMCS 2016) 4 and the ‘Latest: Grenfell Tower fire investigation’ (Metropolitan 
Police, 19 September 2017) <http://news.met.police.uk/news/latest-grenfell-tower-fire-investigation-250453> accessed 19 October 
2017. 
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doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform. Consequently, corporate manslaughter reform 
cannot be considered achievable if the same reasons of marked similarity connected to 
judicial reasoning and reactive legislation continue to inhibit corporate manslaughter 
reform. As noted previously, these same reasons of marked similarity connected to judicial 
reasoning and post-disaster reactive legislation had already inhibited the decisive turning 
points of corporate manslaughter reform between 1912 and 1999. Despite the enactment 
of the CMCHA 2007, these same reasons have still not been addressed, as will be 
demonstrated by the eventual outcome of any attempted prosecution for corporate 
manslaughter following the the Grenfell Tower disaster.79 Consequently, unless the 
reasons of marked of similarity connected to judicial reasoning and post-disaster reactive 
legislation are addressed, the law surrounding corporate manslaughter will continue to 
remain defective because the reasons of marked similarity which inhibited the turning 
points of corporate manslaughter reform from 1912 to 1999 are still present and prevent 
the attainment of the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform: a successful 
corporate manslaughter conviction regardless of the size, structure or type of the company 
involved.80 
 The introduction sets out the justification for the thesis within the contextual 
background of the law connected to the common law offence of involuntary manslaughter 
by a corporation from 1912 to 1999 and also considers a brief overview of the reform 
pathway that led to the introduction of the CMCHA 2007. The impact of reasons of marked 
similarity connected to judicial reasoning and post-disaster reactive legislation as inhibitors 
of corporate manslaughter reform is considered against existing corporate manslaughter 
                                                        
79 Victoria Roper, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: A 10-Year Review’ (2018) J Crim L 48, 51. 
80 See Appendix Two: Corporate manslaughter convictions pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 from 6 April 2008 to 1 May 2018 in England 
and Wales. The only convictions pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 involved small and medium sized corporations.  
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research to situate the thesis within the literature to address the modest claim of a 
contribution to knowledge. This thesis makes a modest contribution by filling the research 
gap that exists because no detailed analysis considered on the reasons of marked similarity 
connected to judicial reasoning and reactive legislation as inhibitors of the turning points 
of corporate manslaughter reform between 1912 and 1999 when contrasted with the 
effect of disaster case studies. The analytical framework details the doctrinal, historical and 
archival legal methods and methodologies applied to ascertain the turning points of 
corporate manslaughter reform and disaster case studies used in the thesis. The structure 
of the thesis takes into account the turbulence of the period from 1912 to 1999 in that the 
time frames used in the chapters position themselves as being connected to historical 
events, including both World Wars, the establishment of the welfare state, nationalisation 
and privatisation of corporations, and substantive case law connected to corporate 
manslaughter reform.81 
 Justification of the Thesis 
Corporate manslaughter, due to its emotive contents,82 attracted significant attention from 
academics,83 practitioners,84 groups representing the victims of disasters and their 
familiies85 and the Law Commission86 with regard to the common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter by a corporation before the enactment of the CMCHA 2007 on 6 
April 2008, which has led to a large volume of research into the subject matter being 
                                                        
81 The structure of the chapters to consider time frame of 1912 to 1999 influenced by A J P Taylor because his commentary on English 
history referred to a continuous narrative of themes with natural breaks which is similar regarding the historical development of 
corporate manslaughter law. Alan John Percivale Taylor, English History: 1914-1945 (Clarendon Press 1965) preface. 
82 Law Com 1994 (n 1). 
83 Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform: Crime Prevention and Security Management (n 75); Gobert and Punch (n 
65); Celia Wells, ‘Corporate criminal liability: a ten year review’ (2014) 12 Crim LR 849. 
84 Gerald Forlin and Michael Appleby (eds), Corporate Liability: Work Related Deaths and Criminal Prosecutions (1st edn, LexisNexis 
2003). 
85 Bergman, The Case for Corporate Responsibility Corporate Violence and the Criminal Justice System (n 8); Bergman, Where the Law 
Fails: New Agenda for Dealing with Corporate Violence (n 39). 
86 Law Com 1994 (n 1). 
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produced. However, the research undertaken already can be classified as follows: 
commentaries on corporate criminal liability, including a section on corporate 
manslaughter;87 consultation papers, including research on gross negligence manslaughter 
and corporate manslaughter;88 commentaries concerning corporate manslaughter reform 
connected to the achievement of the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform, 
both before and after the CMCHA 2007;89 research regarding the criminological and 
sociolegal aspects of the difficulties connected to corporate criminal liability generally and 
corporate manslaughter specifically;90 and finally, research connected to the development 
of legal mechanisms involving corporate criminal liability before and after the CMCHA 
2007.91 
 The research being undertaken in the thesis is not suggesting a new solution along 
the lines of Gobert’s corporate criminality: four models of fault theory which addressed the 
spectrum of corporate crime offences, including corporate manslaughter,92 or suggesting 
further the comprehensive reform options that had been proposed by the Law Commission 
during the time leading up to the CMCHA 2007.93 Instead, it is argued that the law 
connected to corporate manslaughter as it now stands pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 will 
always be defective unless the reasons of marked similarity connected to judicial reasoning 
and post-disaster reactive legislation which inhibited the turning points of corporate 
manslaughter law reform originally, in the period from 1912 to 1999, can be addressed to 
achieve the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform.94 The ideal doctrine of 
                                                        
87 Leonard H Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law (Littlehampton Book Service Ltd 1969). 
88 Law Com 1994 (n 1); Law Com 1996 (n 7); Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts (Law Com CP No 195, 2010). 
89 Bergman, The Case for Corporate Responsibility Corporate Violence and the Criminal Justice System (n 8). 
90 Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform: Crime Prevention and Security Management (n 75). 
91 Bergman, The Case for Corporate Responsibility Corporate Violence and the Criminal Justice System (n 8). 
92 James Gobert, ‘Corporate Criminality: Four Models of Fault’ (1994) 14 LS 393. 
93 Miriam Peck, Brenda Brevitt and Ed Beale, The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Manslaughter Bill: Bill 220 of 2005-06 (House 
of Commons Library Research Paper 06/46, 6 October 2006). 
94 Criminal Justice Act 1925, s 33(3). 
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corporate manslaughter reform means the successful prosecution of a corporation for 
corporate manslaughter regardless of the size, structure or type of the corporation. The 
legislative process leading to the CMCHA 2007 made no attempt to address the impact of 
judicial reasoning or to consider the inhibiting impact of reactive legislative in the aftermath 
of disasters because the reform pathway leading to the CMCHA 2007 merely codified the 
existing failures of the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter and 
introduced a modified identification doctrine that attached to the senior management of 
the corporation.95 The lack of any successful prosecutions against any large corporations 
pursuant to the CMCHA 200796 demonstrates just how defective the legislation currently 
is, despite the fact that the aim of the introduction of the CMCHA 2007 was ensuring that 
all corporations regardless of size and structure could be successfully convicted of 
corporate manslaughter.97 
 The topicality of the subject matter was heightened in 2017 because of the ongoing 
investigations into corporate manslaughter connected to the fire at Grenfell Tower98 and 
the unlawful killing verdict recorded in the reconstituted Hillsborough inquests.99 Despite 
the unlawful killing verdict of the Hillsborough inquests, no subsequent charges were laid 
against any of the corporations allegedly involved for manslaughter because there was 
insufficient evidence of a criminal offence connected to the controlling mind of the 
corporations and prosecution was deemed not to be in the public interest.100 
                                                        
95 James Gobert, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: Thirteen years in the making but was it worth the 
wait?’ (2008) 71(3) MLR 413, 427-428. 
96 See Appendix Two: Corporate manslaughter convictions pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 from 6 April 2008 to 1 May 2018 in England 
and Wales. 
97 Wells, ‘Corporate criminal liability: a ten year review’ (n 83) 854. 
98 Metropolitan Police (n 78). 
99 Hillsborough Inquest (n 78). 
100 ‘Update: Hillsborough prosecutions’ (CPS, 27 July 2017) <www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/update-hillsborough-
prosecutions/index.html> accessed 19 October 2017. 
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 The outcome of the police investigations into possible corporate manslaughter 
charges pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 connected to the Grenfell Tower fire remained silent 
pending the outcome of the Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry.101 It should also be noted that 
for a charge to stand against the corporations involved in the fire there needs to be 
evidence of a systematic failure beyond accepted industry practices involving senior 
management pursuant to section 1(4)(b) CMCHA 2007, which will be difficult to establish 
if industrial practices were followed in accordance with Building Control Regulations 
2010102 including Fire Safety Approved Document B guidance.103 
 However, the reasons of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning and post-
disaster reactive legislation that inhibited the turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform that occurred from 1912 to 1999 are still relevant today with regard to the outcome 
of any criminal proceedings arising from either the reconstituted Hillsborough Inquests or 
the Grenfell Tower fire because of the reasoning behind the decisions that were made 
initially regarding not to proceed with prosecutions against corporations. decisions that 
were made. The absence of any corporate defendants in the Hillsborough prosecutions 
following the inquest in 2017 and the potential failure to prosecute any large corporations 
connected to the Grenfell Tower fire for corporate manslaughter pursuant to the CMCHA 
2007 can be traced back to the same reasons of marked similarity involving judicial 
reasoning and the use of post-disaster reactive legislation that arose from 1912 to 1999 
that also inhibited corporate manslaughter reform at that time. Unless the reasons of 
marked similarity are addressed, they will continue to inhibit the law of corporate 
manslaughter. The outcome of Hillsborough could have been addressed in the 1990s 
                                                        
101 Metropolitan Police (n 78); Appendix Five: Overview of Grenfell Tower fire disaster. 
102 Building Control Regulations 2010, SI 2010/2214. 
103 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, Fire Safety Approved Document B: Vol 2 Buildings other than 
Dwellinghouses (2006 edition incorporating the 2010 and 2013 amendments) (NBS 2018). 
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through the use of alternative legal mechanisms connected to aggregation which, if 
adopted, could have been integrated into the common law offence of gross negligence.104 
Aggregation allows the acts, omissions amd mental states of more than one employee, not 
necessarily senior managers or directors, to be combined in order to determine the actus 
reus and mens rea of the corporaton.105 Further, if the legislature had wanted to enact a 
statutory intervention to resolve the issues surrounding corporate manslaughter, the 
approaches using aggregation to assess corporate criminal liabiliy could have been enacted 
in the CMCHA 2007. If alternative legal mechanisms such as aggregation had been enacted 
in the CMCHA 2007, it would be more likely, with such statutory intervention, that a large 
corporation involved with the Grenfell Tower fire could be successfully convicted. However, 
the chances of a large corporation being indicted for corporate manslaughter pursuant to 
the CMCHA 2007 for the Grenfell Tower fire, let alone convicted, is highly unlikely because 
of the adaptive use of identification doctrine reasoning in the CMCHA 2007 through the 
‘senior managers test’.106 The position could have been very different, because the turning 
points of corporate manslaughter reform that occurred from 1912 to 1999 resulted in it 
being impossible to use alternative methods to address corporate criminal liability because 
of reasons of marked similarity connected to judicial reasoning and post-disaster reactive 
legislation. Hence, unless the reasons of marked similarity can be addressed now, the ideal 
doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform will never be achieved and the law pursuant to 
                                                        
104 David Bergman, ‘Manslaughter and corporate immunity’ (2000) 150 NLJ 316. 
105 Gobert and Punch (n 65) 65. 
106 See summary of the report which details that the current regulatory system for ensuring fire safety in high-rise and complex 
buildings is not fit for purpose. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Building a Safer Future: Independent Review 
of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Interim Report (Cm 9551, 2017) (‘Hackett Report’). However, therein lies the problem because 
pursuant to section 1(4)(b) CMCHA 2007 in conjunction with section 8 CMCHA 2007 there has to be evidence of a failure so gross that 
it is ‘truly, exceptionally bad’ or ‘so bad that it amounts to a crime deserving of punishment’. Conference 2017 (n 50). If all the relevant 
senior management of the corporations connected to the Grenfell Fire (section 1(4) CMCHA 2007) followed the current regulatory 
regime which is as Hackett Report (n 101) 9-10 stated than there is no exceptionally bad (‘gross’) breach. See Victoria Roper, ‘The 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: A 10-Year Review’ (2018) J Crim L 48, 51 for an overview of the 
unliklihood that a conviction for corporate manslaughter against all the corporations involved in the Grenfell Tower fire will occur. 
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the CMCHA 2007 will remain defective because of judicial reasoning and post-disaster 
reactive legislation. 
 Criminologists107 and sociolegalists108 have considered the conflicting political and 
ideological context of health and safety regulations connected to fatalities to address the 
difficulties involved in successfully prosecuting a corporation for manslaughter under the 
old common law offence109 and the CMCHA 2007.110 Almond’s research concentrated on 
the legitimising of work-related fatalities through the work of the Health and Safety 
Executive (‘HSE’) within the confines of Habermas’s thesis of ‘legitimation crisis’.111 The 
legitimation crisis describes the use of state intervention to manage the economy and 
divert direct conflict away from the economy through regulatory intervention to minimise 
loss.112 A direct conflict within this context means using the common law offence of 
involuntary manslaughter. Hence, the extensive use of health and safety regulatory law to 
protect and manage the economy. Yet the historical tracking of the statutory health and 
safety provisions that apply to fatalities failed to consider the implementation of other 
types of post-disaster reactive legislation not connected directly to health and safety 
legislation, such as the Sports Ground Act 1975, which is used in response to stadium 
disasters.113 The full range of post-disaster reactive legislation needs to be considered to 
gauge the inhibitive impact on the common law offence of involuntary manslaughter on 
corporate manslaughter reform between 1912 and 1999 in order to ascertain the full 
                                                        
107 Hartley (n 74); Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform: Crime Prevention and Security Management (n 75). 
108 Gobert, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: Thirteen years in the making but was it worth the wait?’ (n 
95); Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform: Crime Prevention and Security Management (n 75). 
109 Hartley (n 74); Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform: Crime Prevention and Security Management (n 75). 
110 Gobert, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: Thirteen years in the making but was it worth the wait?’ (n 
95). 
111 Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform: Crime Prevention and Security Management (n 75) 87-90. 
112 Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats  (Surkamp 
1998) 220-221. 
113 Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform: Crime Prevention and Security Management (n 75) 125-134. No reference 
made to other types of reactive legislation such as the Sports Ground Act 1975 beyond historical health and safety legislation. 
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picture rather than a specific slice of it. If the impact of health and safety legislation stands 
in isolation then the use of Habermas’s thesis of legitimation crisis fails to consider the 
other types of reactive legislation introduced and so a complete conclusion cannot be 
drawn. 
 Research conducted by Wells114 and Hartley115 used disaster case studies to explain 
how the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter of a corporation does or 
does not work. The disaster case studies were used as a research framework so that the 
authors could comment on the type of legal processes connected to the disasters, including 
the interaction between inquests, public inquiries, civil claims, statutory legislation 
connected to the HSE and criminal proceedings. The research carried out by Wells in 1995 
included five disaster case studies, which related to the Aberfan (1966), Herald of Free 
Enterprise (1987), Piper Alpha (1988), Hillsborough (1989) and Marchioness (1989) 
disasters.116 Hartley’s research, in 2001, concentrated on disasters in the areas of sport and 
leisure and examined the Hillsborough (1989) and the Marchioness (1989) disasters.117 
 Hartley believed ‘the weaknesses in pre and post-disaster law require a long-term 
and systematic overhaul at the levels of definitions/principle, procedures, access, policy 
and resourcing, rather than tinkering around the edges’.118 The conclusion reached by 
Wells was that institutional resistance in conjunction with an historical over-reliance on 
health and safety law resulted in limited use of criminal law to indict a corporation for gross 
negligence manslaughter.119 Wells stated that ‘in order to explain this institutional 
resistance, it is necessary to remind ourselves that perceptions of crime derive from social 
                                                        
114 Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters (n 6). 
115 Hartley (n 74). 
116 Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters (n 6) 20. 
117 Hartley (n 74) chs 6 and 7. 
118 Hartley (n 74) 324. 
119 Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters (n 6) 166. 
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rather than legal constructions of events’.120 However, that is not always the case; the 
decision in the Cory Bros Case in 1927 was incorrect and went against the strict construction 
of penal statutes that should have been applied to a corporation.121 Both Hartley and Wells 
considered the sociolegal inadequacies of the legal processes connected to corporate 
manslaughter.122 However, the decisions connected to whether to prosecute for corporate 
manslaughter or corporate criminal liability decisions can also be traced to judicial 
reasoning and post-disaster reactive legislation linked to pre-1966 disasters rather than just 
society alone, as the legal mechanisms and procedures needed to indict a corporation for 
gross negligence manslaughter were already in existence by 1926.123 Hence, the use of 
disaster case studies that relate to disasters that occurred between 1912 and 1999 for two 
reasons. 
Firstly, the case law surrounding some of the earlier disasters resulted in a 
corporate manslaughter reform turning point, as evidenced by the Cory Bros Case in 1927; 
this was the first attempt to indict a corporation for the common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter.124 Wells mentioned the Cory Bros Case briefly as an early 
example of a corporate manslaughter case which underlined ‘the essentially political 
character of the criminal justice process’ of the 1920s because the trial judge at the assizes 
was persuaded that a corporation could not be indicted for gross negligence 
manslaughter.125 The type of corporation involved in the disaster was just as important as 
the political character of the criminal judicial process, because the Cory Bros Case involved 
                                                        
120 Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters (n 6) 168. 
121 Peter St John Langan (ed), Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 1969) 238; Cory Bros Case (n 
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the equivalent of a large multinational corporation and was the first failed attempt to indict 
a large corporation for the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter.126 This 
trend would continue to have an impact on later disasters in terms of both the common 
law offence of gross negligence manslaughter and the statutory offence laid down in the 
CMCHA 2007, the legal mechanisms and legal procedures by which the corporations could 
be indicted and the lack of successful prosecutions against large corporations. 
 Secondly, the use of case studies on earlier disasters demonstrated the legacy of 
and reliance on post-disaster reactive legislation beyond an isolated occurrence in addition 
to the effect that health and safety provisions had on the creation of this legislation’ (i.e. 
the post-disaster legislation). Hartley127 and Wells128 both mentioned the amendments 
made to the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 through statutory instruments after the 
Marchioness disaster to indicate the use of post-disaster reactive legislation in response to 
a disaster.129 However, other examples of such use can be found before that are connected 
to earlier disasters and the use of post-disaster reactive legislation before the Aberfan 
disaster of 1966, as evidenced by the legislative response to the Bilberry Dam disaster in 
1853130 and to the Burnden stadium disaster in 1946.131 
 Legal commentators132 have also had very little to say about the influence of judicial 
reasoning as a collective marked reason of similarity that is connected to the turning points 
of corporate manslaughter reform from 1912 to 1999. Pinto and Evans, authors of a book 
                                                        
126 Cory Bros Co, ‘Cory Bros Co Incorporation Documents’ (Glamorgan Archives/DCB/2/GB0214, Cory Bros Co 1888). 
127 Hartley (n 74) 364. 
128 Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters (n 6) 48-49. 
129 The Merchant Shipping (Passenger Counting and Recording Systems) Regulations 1990, SI 1990/659 in conjunction with The 
Merchant Shipping (Emergency Information for Passengers) Regulations 1990, SI 1990/660. 
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132 Leigh (n 87) 30; Pinto and Evans (n 61) 6; Celia Wells, ‘The Reform of Corporate Criminal Liability’ in John de Lacy (ed) , The Reform of 
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on Corporate Criminal Liability, stated that ‘the historical development of judicial thinking 
in this area of the criminal law needs to be examined in order to understand the tensions 
that continue to prevail’.133 Nonetheless, Pinto and Evans presented no specifics beyond 
‘continue to prevail’ to pinpoint the continuing inhibitive impact of judicial reasoning on 
corporate manslaughter reform. However, in 2017 two relevant events occurred: the 
Grenfell Tower fire which in the event of no successful prosecutions pursuant to the 
CMCHA 2007 will question the integrity and purpose of the Act and the indictments for 
gross negligence manslaughter against corporate officers only rather than corporations 
after the the unlawful killing verdicts from the second Hillsborough inquests.134 These 
events highlighted why judicial tension still existed and continues to prevail regarding the 
common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter and the CMCHA 2007 because of 
judicial reasoning and a reluctance to allow the common law to evolve when alternative 
legal mechanisms can be used. Individual references to judicial reasoning connected to 
corporate manslaughter reform have been considered in isolation and connected to a 
single time frame by Winn in 1929,135 Wells in 2001136 and Gobert in 2002.137 
 In 1929 Sir Charles Noel Roger Winn, who was then a practising barrister, wrote a 
detailed critique on the Cory Bros Case for a legal journal and stated that the judge had 
erred as to the facts of the case and that no matter how ‘well founded the decision may 
have been in interpretative grounds … Divergence between legal rules and lay modes of 
thought is always to be avoided where conformity may be secured with no sacrifice of 
                                                        
133 Pinto and Evans (n 61) 6. 
134 Please note the Hillsborough disaster before the enactment of the CMCHA 2007 and any corporation considered to be criminally 
liable would have to be indicted for the common law offence of GNM with corporate criminal liability being detrmined using th e 
‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the indentification doctrine.  
135 Charles Roger Noel Winn, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations’ (1929) 3 CLJ 398. 
136 Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters (n 6). 
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principle or of logical consistency’.138 His comments were directed at Finlay J’s reluctance 
in the Cory Bros Case to consider the broader issue of corporate structure to determine 
whether the corporation had committed involuntary manslaughter despite the legal 
procedures and mechanisms being in place to allow the indictment to stand.139 
 Wells referred to the influence of ‘judicial aversion’,140 which she defined as the 
failure of the judiciary to address clear evidence of corporate grossness to establish the 
common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter; she was writing with reference to 
the gross negligence manslaughter case law connected to the Southall railway crash141 and 
the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry disaster.142 Wells believed that as a consequence of 
judicial aversion corporate manslaughter was ‘destined to be treated as an important 
historic species, to be preserved in their embryonic form, never allowed to develop a bite. 
Thus an opportunity was lost to establish the law of corporate manslaughter on a sound 
basis.’143 However, the concept of judicial aversion which Wells defined in connection with 
the judicial reasoning relating to cases heard in the late 1980s to early 1990s can be traced 
back even further to 1927 and the Cory Bros Case, because Finlay J also hid behind 
perceived legal and procedural obstacles to avert the outcome of a successful conviction 
for gross negligence manslaughter, in a similar manner to his modern judicial 
contemporaries.144 
 Finally, Gobert stated in 2002 that the decision in the Attorney General’s Reference 
(No 2 of 1999) (‘AG Case’)145 ‘amounted to a judicial abdication of responsibility for 
                                                        
138 Winn (n 135) 406-407. 
139 Archbold 1927 (n 123) 9-10. 
140 Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters (n 6) 124. 
141 R v Great Western Trains Co Ltd (CCC, 30 June 1999) (‘Southall Train Crash Case’). 
142 R v P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App R 72 (CCC) (‘P&O Case’). 
143 Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters (n 6) 113. 
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developing the law of corporate manslaughter’146 because at this exact point in time it 
would have been possible to adopt an alternative method to address corporate 
manslaughter beyond the use of the identification doctrine using the model of aggregation. 
Yet that option was not taken, and it is for that reason that Gobert labelled the judicial 
reasoning in the AG Case an abdication of responsibility. 
 On the one hand, the influence of judicial reasoning can be considered to have been 
confined to judicial interpretations that occurred during a specific period of time and 
confined to being based on argument and logic.147 On the other hand, Winn, Wells and 
Gobert148 believed that the influence of judicial reasoning went beyond argument and logic 
and inhibited corporate manslaughter reform because the judiciary failed to adapt to 
reflect the changing corporate structures at decisive corporate manslaughter reform 
turning points. Winn referred to the first attempt to prosecute a corporation for corporate 
manslaughter.149 Wells highlighted the numerous failed attempts to prosecute a 
corporation, regardless of size, for gross negligence manslaughter in the late 1980s to early 
1990s.150 Additionally, Gobert emphasised the final unsuccessful attempt to clarify the 
common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter by a corporation to reflect the 
changing corporate structure of the late 1990s in the AG Case, where the attribution 
doctrine could have been introduced rather than the identification doctrine being 
confirmed as the valid test for gross negligence manslaughter by a corporation.151 All three 
authors referenced individual examples of the same reason of marked similarity connected 
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to the influence of judicial reasoning which inhibited corporate manslaughter reform from 
1912 to 1999.152 
 This same reason of marked similarity connected to judicial reasoning persistently 
inhibited the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform and its impact had become 
extensive by 1999. It is possible to identify seven turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform beyond the three turning points mentioned by Winn, Wells and Gobert. 
Consequently, the claim that this thesis makes a modest contribution to knowledge stems 
from its in-depth study of an eighty-seven-year period connected to seven decisive turning 
points of corporate manslaughter reform with regard to reasons of marked similarity 
connected to both judicial reasoning and post-disaster reactive legislation which inhibited 
reform and still continue to inhibit the law of corporate manslaughter. The thesis 
concentrates on a specific time frame, and a statement made to legal scholars in 1897 by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, a renowned American Supreme Court judge and Harvard law 
professor, can be applied to the thesis. He asked his students to ‘remember that for our 
purposes our interest in the past is the light it throws upon the present’ when they were 
considering an in-depth study of a particular area of the law.153 The thesis considers the 
historical development of judicial reasoning in conjunction with the historical use of post-
disaster reactive legislation, so its findings may be of interest to policymakers and groups 
representing the victims of disasters and their familiies, who may be seeking leverage to 
help present a further argument that the law surrounding corporate manslaughter 
pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 still requires amendments to achieve the ideal doctrine of 
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corporate manslaughter reform to address the imbalance of the complete lack of 
convictions against large corporations. 
 In contrast to the chosen time frame of 1912 to 1999 of the thesis, the work of other 
researchers, including Wells,154 Slapper,155 Gobert,156 Hartley157 and Almond,158 used a 400-
to-600-year time frame or a shorter time frame of between twenty and seventy years and 
concentrated on the sociolegal impact of the disasters of the 1980s and 1990s on corporate 
manslaughter reform leading up to the enactment of the CMCHA 2007. 
 Wells, in the majority of her work, concentrated on the shorter time frame of the 
reform pathway leading to the introduction of the CMCHA 2007, which ran from the 1980s 
to the late 2000s.159 A shorter time frame of twenty to seventy years was also the preferred 
time frame used by criminologists and sociolegal commentators, including Slapper160 and 
Gobert.161 This shorter time frame reflected the researchers’ interest in the changing socio-
legal concepts of corporate blame and legal processes rather than in the doctrinal analysis 
of case law and the use of reactive legislation. However, in 2002 Wells deviated from the 
shorter time frame she had used earlier in a book entitled Corporations and Criminal 
Responsibility in 2002 and divided the history of corporate criminal liability in England and 
Wales into four time frames referred to as the conception of corporate liability citing no 
start; the infancy of corporate liability 1612 to 1900; the childhood of corporate liability 
from 1900 to 1940; and the adolescence of corporate liability from 1940 to 1990.162 The 
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four distinct time frames described by Wells contradict Almond’s loose historical stages, 
called waves, which had been established originally by Habermas.163 The first wave referred 
to regulation and legal personhood (the eighteenth-century bourgeois), while the early 
second wave referred to regulation and the state (the early nineteenth-century 
constitutional state). The late second wave referred to regulation and the public interest 
(the late nineteenth-century democratic constitutional state), while the third wave 
referred to regulation and welfare (the twentieth-century social and democratic 
constitutional state). Habermas made no reference to corporate manslaughter or 
corporate criminal liability and only referred to manslaughter once in his pivotal work 
entitled Faktizität und Geltung164 to explain the contrasting moral-content penalties 
imposed in civil and criminal proceedings. According to Habermas, civil sentencing in the 
form of damages represented moral disapproval, whereas he regarded a criminal sanction, 
which included a fine, as indicating that the culprit is morally reprehensible and should be 
viewed with contempt.165 Habermas’s model reflected the impact of regulation on the 
German legal system, which operated under the influence of codes rather than the legal 
doctrine of the common law system.166 
 The time frame used by Wells was less prescriptive and represented the fluidity of 
the common law compared to the Germanic interpretation. The time frame of 400 years 
could also be considered too wide to establish the specific turning points in detail, while 
using a shorter time frame ranging from thirty years from the disasters of the 1980s to the 
present day (2018) may not allow for consideration of all of the turning points which 
inhibited corporate manslaughter reform. A shorter time frame would not include the 
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creation of the identification doctrine in 1915, which ultimately affected the outcome of 
gross negligence manslaughter case law involving corporations in the 1980s and 1990s and 
even now exists in an adapted version in the CMCHA 2007.167 
 The research undertaken by Gobert, Almond and Wells has supported the notion 
that there are turning points in the development of corporate manslaughter reform that 
are connected to judicial reasoning and the use of regulatory health and safety law. 
However, the turning points have been addressed in isolation, in contrast to research on 
the collective application of marked reasons of similarity over a period of eighty-seven 
years proposed in the thesis. Almond’s research concentrated on the impact of regulatory 
law specific to health and safety legislation over 400 years as a turning point of corporate 
manslaughter reform, but it did not consider the influence of disasters on legislation 
through the use of disaster case studies, consideration of the development of the 
corporation or the impact of post-disaster reactive legislation beyond health and safety 
legislation. Wells used both sets of time frames and disaster cases studies in conjunction 
with a discussion of the sociolegal impact of legal processes on corporate manslaughter 
reform. However, these were not applied within the body of one piece of research. 
 Further, in comparison with the contrasting time frames of 400 and twenty to fifty 
years, the period of eighty-seven years from 1912 to 1999 in the thesis takes into account 
all seven decisive turning points in the evolution of corporate manslaughter reform. Lord 
Cooke of Thorndon stated that a case should be considered to be a decisive turning point 
in the evolution of common law in so far as its ‘sway is undiminished, indeed growing’168 
which occurred with all seven turning points of corporate manslaughter reform. 
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 Previously, the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform have been 
considered from a sociolegal perspective rather than via an in-depth analysis of case law 
and post-disaster reactive legislation arising from disaster case studies. The thesis will 
address the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform from 1912 to 1999 to 
consider the following: the influence of judicial reasoning; the evolution of the corporation; 
post-disaster reactive legislation (this examination is centred around a consideration of 
disasters and their aftermath which inhibited the evolution of the common law offence of 
gross negligence manslaughter by a corportation); and whether the ideal doctrine of 
corporate manslaughter reform can be achieved. 
 Consequently, the impact of reasons of marked similarity connected to the turning 
points of corporate manslaughter reform from 1912 to 1999 is offered as evidence of the 
impact of judicial thinking and the use of post-disaster reactive legislation as inhibitors of 
corporate manslaughter reform. There is no published study that addresses the historical 
position of judicial reasoning and the historical use of reactive post-disaster legislation 
connected to corporate manslaughter reform from 1912 to 1999. The thesis, by using 
disaster case studies in conjunction with the turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform, is firmly grounded in archival research connected to twentieth-century law and the 
corporations involved in it. 
 Analytical Framework, including Methodology 
The research aim of the thesis is to find out whether there are reasons of marked similarity 
which inhibited the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform in England and Wales 
from 1912 to 1999. In order to consider the research aim, the following research outcomes 
have been addressed: 
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1. To find disaster case studies, where relevant, that support and assist the 
pinpointing of corporate manslaughter reform turning points from 1912 to 
1999; 
2. To collate, apply and analyse case law regarding corporate criminal liability 
and corporate manslaughter in England and Wales from 1912 to 1999; 
3. To collate, apply and analyse statutes, including secondary legislation, 
regarding corporate criminal liability and corporate manslaughter from 1912 
to 1999; 
4. To collate post-disaster reactive legislation connected to corporate 
manslaughter fatalities, including statutes, statutory instruments, the 
common law provisions related to deodand, and bills and draft bills from 
1912 to 1999 and to analyse the use of this legislation; 
5. To collate, apply and analyse the Hansard reports from the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords from 1912 to 1999 that include the 
debates concerning corporate criminal liability, corporate manslaughter, 
workplace fatalities and disasters; 
6. To collate, apply and analyse the findings of the reports of the inspectorates 
and subsequent public inquiries connected to factories, railways, shipping 
and mining fatalities from 1912 to 1999; 
7. To collate, apply and analyse commentaries on the criminal law linked to 
corporate manslaughter from 1912 to 1999; and 
8. To collate, apply and analyse the coroner’s inquisitions and proceedings 
from 1912 to 1999 that are connected with a potential corporate 
manslaughter fatality. 
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The analytical framework included the use of three legal research methods and 
methodologies to facilitate the discovery of documents and knowledge that has not been 
accessed before in order to address the legal research aim. The three legal research 
methods and methodologies included doctrinal legal research, historical legal research and 
archival legal research. 
 Doctrinal legal research involves the ‘synthesis of rules, principles, norms, 
interpretive guidelines and values which explains, makes coherent or justifies a segment of 
the law as part of a larger system of law’.169 This is supported by historical legal research, 
which involves the ‘study of the relationships of facts and incidents, of themes or currents 
of social and professional issues that have influenced past events and continue to influence 
the present and future’.170 In addition, archival legal research methods were used to access 
legal records and documents contained in data archives to research aspects of the legal 
system that have not been researched before.171 
 The question remains whether other types of legal research methods could have 
been chosen to answer the legal research aim, for instance sociolegal research. However, 
the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform have to be established initially before 
analysing the impact that the missed opportunities for reform had on the victims’ families 
from a sociolegal perspective, because in the period from 1912 to 1999 alternative reform 
options were available that would have facilitated the successful prosecution of a 
corporation for gross negligence manslaughter. Professor Jeremy Horder believed that ‘for 
those criminal lawyers willing to make the intellectual scholarship leap out of the Marxist 
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moral-political rut in which corporate scholarship has been largely stuck, the rewards are 
considerable’.172 Hence, the research has been positioned to address the inhibitors 
surrounding the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform from an alternative 
perspective by using doctrinal, historical and archival legal research methods. The legal 
research aim was to discover, through the analysis of documents and new knowledge, 
whether there were any reasons of marked similarity which inhibited corporate 
manslaughter reform. 
 In order to ensure continuity regarding the use of disaster cases studies, where 
relevant, that relate to disasters that occurred from 1912 to 1999, four specific elements 
were used with regard to each disaster case study. This involved the mapping of a fatal 
disaster involving a corporation connected to the disaster against the outcomes of the 
following legal and political events in England and Wales: 
1. Inquiry findings after a disaster;173 
2. The inquisition documents of a coroner’s court;174 
3. Hansard, including the Parliamentary Debates;175 and 
4. Civil or criminal proceedings involving the corporation, employees of 
the corporation and the victim’s family.176 
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All of these legal and political events can be traced through the application of specific legal 
research methods and methodologies, and hence they are used as mapping coordinates to 
establish turning points for corporate manslaughter reform. The legal method referred to 
the method and technique used to acquire the evidence.177 Fisher and others define legal 
methodologies as ‘the systematic procedures that a scholar applies as part of an intellectual 
enterprise to systematically solve the research hypothesis and research questions’.178 In 
order to collate the evidence gathered through the public inquiries, coroner’s courts, 
Hansard and legal proceedings, the thesis used three legal research methods and 
methodologies, doctrinal, historical and archival methods, as an analytical framework. 
 According to Hutchinson and Duncan, a doctrinal legal method and methodology 
‘involves first locating the sources of the law’.179 Kraska and Neuman explained that this is 
achieved by locating ‘(1) primary authority (direct legal statutes and case law from 
legislature, courts, and administrative agencies), and (2) secondary authority (commentary 
by legal researchers and scholars on the law)’.180 This is not always accepted within 
academic legal circles; Chynoweth argued that there is no separation between a doctrinal 
method and a methodology because the process of legal interpretation is symbiotic and 
combined.181 However, Hutchinson, Duncan and Gluck argued, to the contrary, that legal 
interpretation and argument is a two-stage process with a legal method and a legal 
methodology.182 For example, the legal researcher had to locate the source, as described 
by Kraska and Neuman. Once located it can then be interpreted through a doctrinal 
                                                        
177 C R Kothari, Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (2nd edn, New Age International 1990) 7. 
178 Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange, Eloise Scotford and Cinnamon Carlarne, 'Maturity and Methodology starting a debate about 
environmental law scholarship' [2009] JEL 213, 226. 
179 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What We Do Doctrinal Legal Research' (2012) 17 Deakin LR 83, 110. 
180 Peter B Kraska and W Lawrence Neuman, Criminal Justice and Criminology Research Methods (Pearson 2008) 447. 
181 Paul Chynoweth, 'Legal Research' in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment 
(Wiley-Blackwell 2008). 
182 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 179) and Abbe R Gluck, 'Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as 'Law' and the Erie 
Doctrine' (2011) 120 Yale LJ 1898. 
60 
methodology through the process of ‘reading, analysing and linking the new information 
to the known body of law’.183 The aim of the analytical framework was to provide clarity 
and to justify the research pathway. This was achieved by breaking down traditional ‘black 
letter law’ into two parts: a doctrinal method and a doctrinal methodology. 
 Consistency within the doctrinal method was maintained by applying five factual 
concepts (who, what, when, where and why) and three legal concepts (legal theory, relief 
sought and procedure).184 They were used to search for primary and secondary authorities 
to establish the outcome of relevant legal proceedings and inquisition documents from the 
coroner’s court. 
 A process of ‘internal evaluation and external evaluation’ also supported the use of 
a doctrinal method.185 The first process involved evaluating the primary or secondary 
authority to determine whether it was relevant to the legal research aim. This was achieved 
on two levels: firstly, by assessing whether the facts were similar to those set out in the 
legal research aim, and secondly, by determining whether the authority was of legal 
significance and would therefore be useful in achieving the legal research aim. 
 An external evaluation was only carried out if the primary or secondary authority 
was considered relevant according to the internal evaluation. The external evaluation 
involved the determination of the current validity of the primary or secondary authority. 
The primary and secondary authorities were collated using online legal research services, 
including Westlaw, Hein Online and Lexis Library, and legal research involving hard-copy 
documents was done during visits to The National Archive (‘TNA’), the British Library 
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(London and Boston Spa), the Law Society Library (London), the National Library of Scotland 
(Edinburgh), Bolton Archives History Centre, Durham County Record Office, Churchill 
College Archives Centre (Cambridge), Glamorgan Archives (Cardiff), Special Collections and 
Archives Cardiff University, Working Class Movement Library (Manchester), Labour History 
Archive and Study Centre: People’s History Museum (Manchester), Whitehaven Archive 
and Local Studies Centre (Cumbria), London Metropolitan Archives and Kirklees Archive 
Services (Huddersfield). 
 Kraska and Neuman defined a historical legal method and methodology as 
‘systematically collecting historical materials and analysing those materials for the purpose 
of constructing a descriptive/theoretical account of what happened in the past’.186 
Historical evidence regarding criminal law can be collated from three types of sources: 
primary, secondary and tertiary sources (including running records).187 
Primary sources refer to the ‘oral or written testimony of eyewitnesses. They are 
original artefacts, documents, and items related to the direct outcome of an event or an 
experience’.188 Primary sources for this thesis included coroner’s inquisitions and 
commentaries, letters, newspaper articles,189 court records, journals and company 
documentation. Secondary sources consisted of the writings of specialist legal 
commentators such as Blackstone,190 Hale,191 Coke,192 Maitland,193 Bacon194 and others, 
who have studied the primary sources extensively. Tertiary sources were also referred to, 
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including running records. Running records are documents maintained by organisations.195 
In relation to this thesis, running records included documents prepared by from 
corporations, mining inspectors’ reports,196 factory inspectors’ reports197 and railway 
inspectors’ reports198 concerning fatalities involving corporations. Once located, the 
sources were evaluated by way of external and internal criticism. External criticism allowed 
the document to be authenticated. This involved establishing ‘the why, where, when, how, 
and by whom the document was created’.199 
Once authenticated, the document was internally criticised to establish 
credibility,200 whether the author witnessed the events or experienced them second hand. 
The document was then read with the context in mind in context to establish any 
underlying tones to the evidence in addition to its face value as evidence. 
Finally, the use of archival legal methods and methodologies allowed the gap in 
knowledge to be filled by the discovery of legal documents that have not been discussed 
or analysed before.201 This is the case with regard to the legal documents referred to in the 
thesis which concern the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform that occurred 
from 1912 to 1999. The records referenced in the thesis include court transcripts; police 
reports; political speeches; court transcripts; internally generated government agency 
reports; and similar documents. Official documents referred to include less obvious and 
sometimes less openly available forms of communications, such as interoffice memos, 
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199 Berg and Lune (n 171) 313. 
200 Berg and Lune (n 171) 315. 
201 Robert J Morris, The New Contribution to Knowledge: A Guide for Research Postgraduate Students of Law  (University of Hong Kong 
2011) 79. 
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printed e-mail messages, minutes from meetings, organisational newsletters and so 
forth.202 
 Structure of the Thesis 
Taking into account the development of corporate manslaughter reform between 1912 and 
1999 and the vast accumulation of case law, statutes, commentaries and archival 
documents to be considered, a further strategy was required to manage the volume of 
documentation in order to consider the reasons of marked similarity which inhibited the 
turning points of corporate manslaughter reform. This was achieved by dividing the 
collated documentation into sections to match the distinct phases of corporate 
manslaughter reform, which were influenced by historical events, including the First and 
Second World Wars, and the historical development of the corporation, including the 
privatisation and nationalisation of corporations involved with disasters. Consequently, 
three phases were used that linked to the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform. 
Chapters 3 to 5 each deal with a particular period within the time frame of 1912 to 1999. 
Within each chapter, the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform in England and 
Wales were addressed to consider whether reasons of marked similarity involving judicial 
reasoning and post-disaster reactive legislation inhibited the attainment of the ideal 
doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform and the indictment of a corporation for 
corporate manslaughter regardless of its structure, type and size. 
 The three phases of corporate manslaughter that were decided on were 
determined by events and case law rather than manufactured, because each phase 
contains two to three turning points of corporate manslaughter reform that inhibited 
corporate manslaughter reform within a set time frame. The three phases were as follows: 
                                                        
202 Berg and Lune (n 171) 285. 
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1912 to 1939 (Chapter 3), which includes the creation of the identification doctrine forged 
from philosophical influences to determine corporate criminal liability203 and the first failed 
attempt to prosecute a corporation for involuntary manslaughter;204 1939 to 1965 (Chapter 
4), which includes the acknowledgement that a corporation could commit the offence of 
gross negligence manslaughter,205 twenty years of failed attempts to prosecute a 
corporation (large, medium or small) for gross negligence manslaughter206 and the second 
failed attempt to prosecute a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter;207 and finally 
1965 to 1999 (Chapter 5), which includes the first successful prosecution against a small 
corporation for gross negligence manslaughter208 and an unsuccessful attempt to clarify 
the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter by a corporation, which aimed 
to reflect the changing corporate structure of the 1990s.209 
Moreover, Chapters 3 to 5 are structured to consider four interrelated 
developments within each phase: the historical development of the corporation in 
conjunction with the development of corporate criminal liability and the development of 
gross negligence manslaughter by a corporation. Finally, where relevant, individual disaster 
case studies or disasters connected to corporate manslaughter case law are also considered 
at the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform within each phase. These issues 
need to be discussed, because it is not possible to understand why corporate manslaughter 
reform pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 still remains defective and will continue to remain 
defective unless one can comprehend the concepts and legal principles that emerged 
                                                        
203 Lennard’s Case (n 45). 
204 Cory Bros Case (n 46). 
205 Archbold’s 1947 (n 35) 2-3; DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146 (KB); R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551 (CCA). 
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involving reasons of marked similarity surrounding judicial reasoning and post-disaster 
reactive legislation from 1912 to 1999 that inhibited corporate manslaughter reform. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 brings together the findings detailed in Chapters 3 to 5 and argues 
that marked reasons of similarity involving judicial reasoning and the use of post-disaster 
reactive legislation inhibited seven turning points of corporate manslaughter reform. The 
limitations presented within the research together with recommendations for further 
research will also be suggested. 
To provide clarity throughout the research, all collated material is referenced using 
the Oxford Standard for the Citation of Legal Authorities (‘OSCOLA’),210 the New Oxford 
Dictionary for Writers and Editors211 and New Hart’s Rules: The Oxford Style Guide.212 
 
                                                        
210 Sandra Meredith, ‘OSCOLA, a UK standard for legal citation’ (2011) 11 LIM 111. 
211 R M Ritter (ed), New Oxford Dictionary for Writers and Editors (2nd edn, OUP 2014). 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO CORPORATE 
MANSLAUGHTER 
 Introduction 
The thesis is a case study of the legal history of corporate manslaughter reform in the 
twentieth century in England and Wales. It concerns eighty-seven years of dialectical legal 
reform of the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter by a corporation. 
Between 1912 and 1999 the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform were 
consistently inhibited by two reasons of marked similarity, the powerful influence of 
judicial reasoning and the subtle use of post-disaster reactive legislation, which prevented 
the attainment of the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform: a successful 
indictment for corporate manslaughter regardless of the size, structure or type of 
corporation involved. 
 Consequently, every time a fatality involving a corporation is mentioned, it involves 
the names of domestic servants, workers or members of the public who lost their lifes 
because of the perceived neglect of a corporation.1 But unfortunately over time the names 
are forgotten. One forgotten name is William Hind, a miner, who died from a head injury 
at the Oughterside Mine in Cumbria in 1734 when a bucket became disengaged from a 
hook on the way down the mining shaft and hit him on the back of the head. A verdict of 
accidental death was recorded.2 Another forgotten name is Susan Harrop, aged twelve 
                                                        
1 See the work of David Bergman regarding negligence of corporations resulting in fatalities. David Bergman, Death at Work Accidents 
or Corporate Crime: The Failure of Inquests and the Criminal Justice System  (WEA 1991). 
2 '.', ‘William Hind Inquest’ (Whitehaven Archive and Local Studies Centre/DLEC/CR/3/43/1R and DLEC/CR/3/43/1V, 21 May 1734) 
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years old, who also died of a head injury when she was crushed under the front wheel of a 
bus in a school car park in Cottingham, East Yorkshire, in March 1985.3 
 The two fatalities might have occurred 250 years apart but they have more in 
common than seems the case at first because both fatalities represented a convergence of 
three types of English law: company law, the law of tort and criminal law. The historical 
origins of all three elements have to be addressed in order to determine when it became 
possible to indict a corporation for the common law offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter. Company law identified the historical development of the corporation from 
an unincorporated joint stock corporation to a limited liability corporation protected by the 
corporate veil that is, shield of protection surrounding the principle of separate corporate 
personality and potential liabilities.4 The historical origins of the law of tort impacted on 
corporate manslaughter reform because the concept of negligence originated from the civil 
law before being used in criminal law to determine the level of grossness required for a 
death to be deemed gross negligence manslaughter. Finally, the historical background to 
the interrelationship between homicide, murder and manslaughter and whether a 
corporation can commit a cime started to emerge in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. 
 Historical Development of the Corporation before 1912 
Insofar that the thesis is concentrating on the effect of reasons of marked similarity on 
corporate manslaughter reform in the twentieth century. The origins of the evolution of 
the corporation as a creation of Parliament  has to be addressed because the tensions that 
                                                        
3 Legal sources including affidavits available on request due to the sensitive nature of the material.  
4 Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co (Great Britain) Ltd  [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) A House of Lords decision where the 
corporate veil was lifted to determine whether a corporation was aiding and abetting the enemy in a time of war. 
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continue to prevail as to how a corporation can be deemed to commit a crime can be traced 
back to key points within the evolution of the corporation before 1912.5 
 Before the seventeenth century an association would be set up as a corporation, 
partnership or trust depending on its intended function. The use of the word corporation 
in the seventeenth century often defined associations with no perceived commercial 
trading functions, such as municipal councils, merchant guilds, universities and other 
academic bodies, hospitals and other ecclesiastical bodies.6 Incorporation occurred 
through the granting of a charter by the Crown.7 Alternatively, a commercial trading 
association could be set up as a partnership, with individual partner liability.8 
 It was not until the expansion of foreign trade in the seventeenth century that an 
alternative means of organising commercial trade was deemed required beyond the use of 
a partnership; the full protection of equity would not be established by the courts until the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.9 Two types of early commercial trading corporation 
emerged: a regulated corporation and a joint stock corporation.10 A regulated corporation 
operated in a similar way to a merchant guild but worked overseas to provide protection 
as a collective whereby ‘each member traded with his own stock and on his own account, 
subject to obeying the rules of the corporation, and incorporation was not essential since 
the trading liability of each member would be entirely separate from that of the company 
and the other members'.11 
                                                        
5 Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 6. 
6 1 Bl Comm 459. 
7 1 Bl Comm 461. 
8 Laurence Cecil Bartlett Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd 1969) 23. Gower detailed the 
setting up of commenda (cross between a partnership and a loan from a financier) and a societas (partnership). 
9 Gower (n 8) 24. 
10 Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization 1720- 1844 (CUP 2000) 40. 
11 Gower (n 8) 24. 
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 However, it is the emergence of the joint stock corporation that is of interest to the 
future discussion of corporate criminal liability and corporate manslaughter because the 
joint stock corporation as a separate legal entity evolved from 1600 to 1912 into what is 
considered to be the modern commercial corporation.12 The joint stock corporation traded 
using one account and all of the members shared the profits and losses. The process by 
which this was achieved left an imprint as to how a corporation could be held liable for its 
criminal actions regarding who could be deemed to be representing the corporation. 
Hence, the starting point for the discussion on the historical development of the 
corporation is 1600 because the English East India Company (‘EIC’), which was set up in 
1600, was recognised as the first commercial association to be incorporated as a joint stock 
corporation.13 The Royal Charter was issued on 31 December 1600; it granted the EIC 
monopolistic trading rights from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan.14 
Following the Glorious Revolution and the empowerment of Parliament, a corporation 
could also be incorporated by statute,15 and the joint stock corporation was expanded to 
domestic trading corporations such as the Bank of England in 1694.16 
 However, charters were still being used by overseas trading corporations such as 
the South Sea Company in 1711 to trade in South America.17 The South Sea Company falsely 
promoted anticipated profits and with government backing proposed a national debt bond 
conversion scheme against South Sea Company joint stock for investors, ‘the theory being 
that the possession of an interest-bearing loan owed by the state was a basis upon which 
                                                        
12 Gower (n 8) 24; Harris (n 10) 40. 
13 Gower (n 8) 24; Harris (n 10) 40. 
14 Kirti Narayan Chaudhuri, The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint Stock Company 1600-1640 (Frank Cass 
Company Limited 1965) 10-14 
15 This refers to the overthrow of James II. EL Jones, 'Agriculture, 1700-80' in Roderick Floud and Donald McCloskey (eds), The 
Economic History of Britain since 1700, Vol 1 (CUP 1981) 74-76 
16 Bank of England Act 1694 (5 & 6 Will and Mary c 20) 
17 Colin Arthur Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company: An Essay in Legal History (HUP 1951) 80-83. 
70 
the company might raise vast sums to extend its trade’.18 The South Sea Company had no 
real trade. However, this imaginative financial scheme funded dividends from the issue of 
new shares and the provision of interest-free loans to buy shares. The value of each share 
represented the demand for shares and illustrated that the company had real value. Hence, 
it is fitting to use the metaphor of bubbles that will eventually burst, because other 
companies adopted the same approach and created mini-bubbles that threatened the 
South Sea Company’s bubble. The South Sea Company requested government intervention 
to prevent a collapse due to the involvement of the smaller schemes.19 
 The government intervened six months20 before the eventual burst of the South Sea 
Bubble with an Act of Parliament entitled ‘An Act for better securing certain Powers and 
Privileges intended to be granted by His Majesty by two Charters, for Assurance of Ships 
and Merchandise at Sea, and for lending Money upon Bottomry; and for restraining several 
extravagant and unwarrantable Practices therein mentioned’, also known as the ‘Bubble 
Act 1720’, in an attempt to prevent the collapse of the South Sea Company.21 The main 
purpose of the Bubble Act 1720 was to prohibit the transfer of shares by associations unless 
they were incorporated by charter or statute.22 The Act had the opposite effect, though, 
because it undermined public confidence in share trading and eventually caused the 
collapse of the share price of the South Sea Company; in turn this was responsible for the 
collapse of the national economy.23 
                                                        
18 Gower (n 8) 28. 
19 Malcolm Balen, A Very English Deceit: The Secret History of the South Sea Bubble and the First Great Financial Scandal (Fourth Estate 
Ltd, 2003). 
20 Frank Evans, The Evolution of the English Joint Stock Limited Trading Company 8 Col L Rev 339, 353 quoting (6 Geo 1 c 18) re the 
original Act was known as the Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporation Act of 1719. 
21 Bubble Act 1720 (6 Geo 1 c 18). 
22 Ss 18-20 Bubble Act 1720 were only used once in R v Cawood (1724) 2 Ld Ray 1361, 92 ER 386. 
23 Balen (n 19). 
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 The collapse of the South Sea Bubble and the subsequent financial fallout 
highlighted both the incredible power that corporations can wield in and the extensive 
damage corporations can cause by their actions to the economy. However, for the purposes 
of the impact on corporate criminal liability in the future, the collapse of the South Sea 
Bubble reduced the use of the joint stock corporations for commercial ventures because 
there was a reluctance to grant Royal Charters and statutory incorporation to associations 
unless they were involved in specific trades such as banking, insurance, canals and water.24 
 Consequently, from 1721 onwards commercial trade corporations (with the 
exception of banks and those involved in insurance, canals and water) preferred to trade 
as unincorporated joint stock corporations, raising capital for their ventures against the 
value of transferable stock. The unincorporated joint stock corporation offered an 
adaptable solution; it utilised a legal hybrid by involving a partnership with assets held in 
trust.25 This enabled the trust to hold the corporation’s assets while also enabling the 
shareholders to hold an equitable interest as beneficiaries using a deed of settlement. 
Further, the trustees acting for the corporation could be litigated against in the Chancery 
Division of the High Court.26 Yet the process of setting up a trust was not always carried out 
and unincorporated joint stock corporations were still fraudulently set up, resulting in 
market crashes.27 In 1802 Lord Eldon LC in Lloyd v Loaring held that ‘it is the absolute duty 
of Courts of Justice not to permit persons, not incorporated, to affect to treat themselves 
as a corporation upon the Record’.28 Section 19 Bubble Act 1720 provided the means to 
indict all persons pretending to act as a corporate body for the offence of public nuisance, 
                                                        
24 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London 1778) Book 5 ch 1 pt 3, 447-448. 
25 Paddy Ireland, 'Capitalism without the Capitalist: The Joint Stock Company Share and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrine of 
Separate Corporate Personality' (1996) J Leg Hist 41, 43-44. 
26 Frederick William Maitland, 'Trust and Corporation' in David Runciman and Magnus Ryan (eds), State, Trust and Corporation (CUP 
2003) 116. 
27 Ireland (n 25) 43. 
28 Lloyd v Loaring (1802) 6 Ves Jun 773, 777; 31 ER 1302, 1304. 
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while section 21 Bubble Act 1720 made brokers dealing in the securities of illegal 
companies liable to penalties. Thus, in R v Dodd,29 in 1808, the Attorney General brought 
criminal proceedings against Ralph Dodd under a charge that two unincorporated joint 
stock corporations, recently set up, were illegal because no party could be accountable for 
more than the sum subscribed. Lord Ellenborough CJ dismissed the indictment because in 
his opinion the corporation had been set up legally and did not contravene any of the 
prohibitions set out in the Bubble Act 1720. However, of interest is the obiter dictum, 
because he described the circumstances under which the Bubble Act 1720 would apply to 
prohibit companies which included companies that would cause grievance, prejudice or 
inconvenience to the public.30 The decision in odd created unease within commerce 
because for decades trading corporations had been established as unincorporated joint 
stock corporations using a settlement of trust. In 1811 Lord Ellenborough CJ resolved the 
uncertainty regarding when an unincorporated joint stock corporation could be deemed to 
be outside the provisions set out in the Bubble Act 1720 in R v Webb and Others when he 
stated 
 that it makes a substantive offence to raise a large capital by small subscriptions, 
 without any regard to the nature and quality of the objects for which the capital is 
 raised, or whatever might be the purposes to which it was to be applied.31 
 
Lord Ellenborough CJ stated that unincorporated joint stock corporations would be 
permitted if shares were restricted to being sold in a particular neighbourhood; there was 
a limited number of shares; shares were only transferable to those undertaking obligations; 
and consent of either the other shareholders or the committee had to be obtained for any 
shares to be sold.32 
                                                        
29 R v Dodd (1808) 9 East 516, 103 ER 670 (‘Dodd’). 
30 Dodd (n 29) 527-528; 673. 
31 R v Webb and Others (1811) 14 East 406, 411; 104 ER 658, 660 (‘Webb & Others’). 
32 Webb & Others (n 31) 421, 664. 
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 However, from 1805 to 1825 numerous actions were still being brought to the 
attention of the court to determine whether a specific unincorporated joint stock 
corporation was legal or illegal. Lord Ellenborough CJ continued to use the criteria raised in 
Webb & Others to maintain a neutral position regarding unincorporated joint stock 
corporations.33 Regulatory reform connected to the incorporation of the unincorporated 
joint stock corporations started to be debated in Parliament,34 and to calm the unrest the 
Bubble Act 1720 was repealed by the Repeal of the Bubble Act 1825.35 The Act reinstated 
the power of the Crown to incorporate unincorporated joint stock corporations.The 
procedure that was followed for the incorporation of unincorporated joint stock 
corporations by the Crown was clarified further with the enactment of the Trading 
Companies Act 1834;36 the Act enabled the Crown to confer by letters patent all of the 
privileges of incorporation (except limited liability) without actually granting a charter. The 
Trading Companies Act 1834 also removed the requirement to incorporate by special 
statutes and enabled companies to be sued or to sue in the names of their officers37 and 
also required the public registration of members.38 The Chartered Companies Act 183739 
was in essence the same as the Trading Companies Act 1834.40 However, by 1834 a 
significant change had occurred regarding corporate criminal liability, because in R v 
Medley the directors of an unincorporated joint stock corporation, which had been 
                                                        
33 Pratt v Hutchinson (1812) 15 East 511, 104 ER 936; Harris (n 10) 240. 
34 HC Deb 2 June 1825, vol 13, cols 1018-1023. 
35 Repeal of the Bubble Act 1825 (6 Geo 4 c 91). 
36 Trading Companies Act 1834 (4 & 5 Will 4 c 94). 
37 Trading Companies Act 1834 (n 25) s 1; Gower (n ) 40-41. 
38 Trading Companies Act 1834 (n 25) s 4. 
39 Chartered Companies Act 1837 (7 Will 4 & 1 Vict c 73). 
40 Chartered Companies Act 1837 (n 39) ss 6-17. 
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incorporated by deed of settlement,41 were found guilty of public nuisance by vicarious 
liability because of the actions of their employees.42 
 Further company law reform was required in the early 1840s because of insurance 
and annuity fraud, which resulted in the first company law reform committee, chaired by 
William Gladstone. The committee recommended the standardisation of the incorporation 
of all joint stock corporations.43 Hence, an act for the Registration, Incorporation, and 
Regulation of Joint Stock Companies 1844 (‘Joint Stock Companies Act 1844’) was 
introduced.44 All corporations with more than twenty-five members had to be registered 
through a two-stage process: (1) registration; and (2) the preparation of a deed of 
incorporation detailing the shareholders. 
 Despite the enactment of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 the courts still 
classified corporations as ‘corporation sole’ or ‘the corporation aggregate’ because the 
trading corporations were only just emerging in response to an expanding economy so the 
need for different names to fit the new types of corporation were not yet needed.45 
Subsequently, the classification of corporations also grew. In 1858 The Student’s Blackstone 
defined a corporation aggregate as a corporation: 
Consisting of many persons united together into one society, and are kept up by a 
perpetual succession of members, so as to continue for ever; of which kind are the 
mayor and commonality of a city, the head and fellows of a college, the Dean and 
chapter of a Cathedral Church.46 
                                                        
41 R v Medley (1834) 6 Car & P 292, 172 ER 1246. 
42 Equitable Gas Light and Coke Company, ‘Deed of Settlement of The Equitable Gas Light and Coke Company’ (London Metropolitan 
Archives/B/EGLC/030/001, 1833) incorporated by Act of Parliament 1842 (5 & 6 Vict c 36). 
43 Gower (n 8) 41-42. 
44 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict c 110) (‘Companies Act 1844’). 
45 Runciman and Ryan (n 26) 9. 
46 William Blackstone, The Student’s Blackstone (Robert Malcolm Kerr (ed), 1858 London) 517. 
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It was possible to separate corporations into three types: ecclesiastical corporations,47 
municipal corporations48 and trading corporations.49 The number and type of trading 
corporations continued to grow, in parallel with the development of the railways and 
manufacturing; soon the trading corporations could be subdivided even further to include 
four different types: corporations incorporated by an Act of Parliament,50 chartered 
corporations,51 banking corporations52 and registered joint stock corporations.53 
 However, the money invested in the corporations by capitalists was frequently lost 
as a result of stock crashes such as the railway mania commercial crisis of 1847 to 1848. 
This ‘demonstrated in the most palpable manner the fertility of invention among the 
promoters of joint stock companies’.54 It was felt by some social reformers and politicians55 
that some form of limited liability should be established to protect members because the 
Joint Stock Companies Act 184456 did not do so. In 1854 a parliamentary select committee 
commissioned a Royal Commission Report into Mercantile Laws and the Law of 
Partnership57 because of conflicting arguments as to whether partnerships should also be 
incorporated as limited liability corporations. The report’s findings resulted in the Limited 
Liability Act 1855.58 However, the those who were against limited liability argued it would 
prevent the owners of the corporations from taking responsibility for the actions of their 
managers for negligent acts.59 This argument was ignored as corporate regulation and 
                                                        
47 Marshall v Graham (1907) 2 KB 112 (KB). 
48 Regulation of Municipal Corporations in England and Wales Act 1837 (1 Vict c 78). 
49 Blackstone (n 46) 548. 
50 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict c 16); Railway Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict c 85). 
51 Charters of Incorporation Act 1834 (4 & 5 Will 4 c 94). 
52 Joint Stock Banks Regulation Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict c 113) followed by Banking Companies Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict c 49). 
53 Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (19 & 20 Vict c 47); Joint Stock Companies Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict c 14); Joint Stock Companies 
(Amendment) Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict 80). 
54 David Morier Evan, The Commercial Crisis 1847-1848: Being Facts and Figures (2nd edn, 1849 London) 33. 
55 HC Deb 27 June 1854, vol 134, col 786. 
56 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict c 110). 
57 Royal Commission, First Report of the Royal Commission on the Mercantile Laws and Amendments to the Law of Partnership British 
(Parliamentary Paper XXVII, 1854) (‘Royal Commission Mercantile Report’). 
58 Limited Liability Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c 133). 
59 Royal Commission Mercantile Report (n 57) 108. 
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corporate protection were considered more important at the time to encourage trade and 
enterprise. The Limited Liability Act 1855 was repealed and incorporated into the Joint 
Stock Companies Act 1856, which provided for the overriding regulation of all business 
activities regardless of the industry concerned.60 Eventually, the Joint Stock Companies Act 
1856 was repealed by the Companies Act 1862, which remained in force in numerous 
amended forms until 1908.61 
Section 6 Companies Act 1862 established the following: 
Any seven or more Persons associated for any lawful Purpose may, by subscribing 
their Names to a Memorandum of Association, and otherwise complying with the 
Requisitions of this Act in respect of Registration, form an incorporated Company, 
with or without limited Liability. 
It should be noted that limited liability for members could only be established by a 
memorandum of association and that the word ‘limited’ had to be the last word in the 
registered title of the corporation.62 The protection provided to shareholders through a 
limited liability corporation was gained through the creation of a separate legal personality. 
The full effect of limited liability was not tested as a point of law until the late 1880s and 
resulted in the House of Lords decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd (‘Salomon Case’).63 
This decision was controversial because the House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal 
judges, who possessed greater commercial experience64 and who were prepared to lift the 
corporate veil in Broderip v Salomon (‘Broderip Case’) by unanimously affirming the 
decision of Vaughan Williams J in the court of first instance.65 
The case involved Aron Salomon, a leather merchant. In 1892 he decided to 
incorporate his business as a limited liability corporation. He and his wife subscribed to the 
                                                        
60 Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (19 & 20 Vict c 47), Part 1. 
61 Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict c 89). 
62 Blackstone (n 46) 558. 
63 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) (‘Salomon Case’). 
64 Gower (n 8) 68-71; Cooke (n 17) 7. 
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memorandum of association, along with his daughter and his four sons, in accordance with 
the Companies Act 1862 to incorporate the business as Salomon & Co Ltd.66 A total of 
20,006 shares were issued, of which 20,000 shares were held by Aron Salomon; the 
remaining six shares were held by the other six shareholders. In February 1893 Salomon & 
Co Ltd borrowed £5,000 from a man called Broderip, secured by a £10,000 debenture. By 
September 1893 Salomon & Co Ltd had defaulted on the interest repayment and Broderip 
called in the receivers; Broderip retrieved his money on the liquidation of the corporations’ 
assets. However, other unsecured creditors were less fortunate as Aron Salomon had 
diverted £20,000, through debentures in his favour, prior to liquidation. The receiver issued 
proceedings against Aron Salomon for the outstanding sums, declaring Salomon & Co Ltd 
to be a sham corporation which merely acted as an agent for Aron Salomon in the guise of 
‘a one-man corporation’.67 
Lindley LJ held in favour of the receiver and said:  
The liability does not arise simply from the fact that he holds nearly all the shares in 
the company … his liability rests on the purpose for which he formed the company, 
on the way he formed it, and on the use which he made of it. 68 
The Court of Appeal was prepared to lift the corporate veil protecting Aron Salomon in 
order to establish that he had committed fraud by pursuing incorporation of the business 
before going into liquidation. Section 18 Companies Act 1862 could set aside incorporation 
for an illegitimate purpose such as fraud. 
The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords was not prepared to consider the criminal aspects of this case because it believed the 
corporation was protected by the corporate veil.69 The evidence presented in the Court of 
                                                        
66 Broderip Case (n 65) 332. 
67 Broderip Case (n 65) 336. 
68 Broderip Case (n 65) 338. 
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Appeal substantiated the argument; Lindley LJ stated in his treatise on section 7 Companies 
Act 1862 that the legislature had never contemplated an extension of limited liability to 
sole traders and went on to comment on the Court of Appeal case, saying that six of the 
members were used by Aron Salomon to order to enable him to continue as a limited 
corporation. Despite the strength of the argument put forward by the Court of Appeal, the 
House of Lords upheld the appeal and Salomon was afforded the protection of the 
corporation. Yet the following question remains: why was the decision reversed? The 
House of Lords could have established a precedent concerning the circumstances under 
which the corporate veil could be lifted for limited liability corporations allegedly involved 
in a criminal act. Yet the unanimous decision of all six law lords reflected a different 
position, ignoring the expertise represented by the Court of Appeal judges and the realities 
of the commercial world70 during the Great Depression that lasted from 1873 to 1896.71 
Lord Halsbury LC held that ‘either the limited company was a legal entity or it was not’,72 
and Lord Herschel held that ‘I am at a loss to understand what is meant by saying that A. 
Salomon & Co Limited is but an “alias” for Aron Salomon.’73 
 The historical development of the corporation from 1600 to 1912 concerned the 
transition of businesses from being unincorporated joint stock corporations to joint stock 
corporations and eventually limited liability corporations. The movement away from 
unincorporated joint stock corporations occurred in response to the bursting of the South 
Sea Bubble, while the creation of the opportunity for businesses in all industries to become 
limited liability corporations was done in response to insurance fraud. Even the decision 
reached in the Salomon Case regarding the need to maintain the corporate veil can be 
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attributed to the difficulties of the Great Depression in Britain from 1873 to 1896, when 
trade and companies required protection to enable the corporations to trade.74 The 
decision reached in the Salomon Case by the House of Lords could be deemed 
understandable in light of everything that was going on at the time because of the 
increasing power of trading corporations; there was a need to protect shareholders from 
perceived risks. It could potentially have been disastrous to lift the corporate veil and 
consider corporate criminal acts, especially after legislating for the creation of the limited 
liability corporation. It would have implied that there was no need for limited liability 
legislation in the first place. However, from 1897 to 1912 the judiciary started to cherry-
pick the circumstances in which the corporate veil could be lifted for certain offences, 
including trespass75 and criminal libel.76 The subsequent effect of the Salomon Case 
became even more relevant to the development of corporate manslaughter in the post-
World War Two era, as the lifting of the corporate veil to impose corporate criminal liability 
for corporate manslaughter would be even harder to establish.77 
 Historical Interrelationship between Criminal Laws and the Law of 
Tort before 1912  
In order to prove the offence of gross negligence manslaughter, the degree of negligence 
demonstrated by the accused had to be a very high degree of negligence and was at the 
heart of criminal liability.78 Therefore, the ordinary civil law principles of the tort of 
negligence had to be proved to the criminal standard in so far as the accused must have 
departed so far from the expected standard of professional practice and the act must have 
been so serious as to amount to a criminal act or omission. Consequently, an 
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interrelationship between criminal laws and tort existed through the common law offence 
of gross negligence manslaughter. However, the interrelationship between criminal laws 
and tort did not occur in isolation because the overlap between criminal and tortious 
actions could also be found in other wrongs such as assault, battery, conspiracy, fraud, 
misrepresentation, defamation, libel, slander, false imprisonment, nuisance, negligence 
and trespass, and this is still the case at the time of writing.79 It was also possible that an 
action in civil law in tort or in criminal law or both might occur from a single wrongful act.80 
Consequently, the emergence of the historical interrelationship between criminal laws and 
tort affected the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform in the period preceding 
1912 in three ways. The first way was the merging, separation and crossover of legal 
terminology used in the civil law of tort and criminal laws that occurred as the common law 
evolved from the medieval ages to 1912.81 The second way was the use of the tort of 
negligence as a distinct tort in the late nineteenth century, which also resulted in the 
repositioning of the law of tort from how it was used during the medieval ages to the way 
in which it was used in response to the emerging harms caused by the industrialisation in 
England and Wales between 1820 and 1914.82 The third way was the application of tort as 
a regulatory tool to address fatalities; this was initially done through the use and then the 
abolition of deodands, and was achieved later by the introduction of the Fatal Accidents 
Act 1846.83 
 By addressing the historical interrelationship between criminal laws and tort in this 
thesis, a contextual platform was created from which to consider the problems faced by 
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both the judiciary and Parliament as they were trying to respond to the new ‘legal harms’ 
and ‘wrongdoings’ of a modern industrial society before the turning points of corporate 
manslaughter reform occurred between 1912 and 1999. Thus, the scene was set to discover 
whether, on the one hand, the historical evolution of the interrelationship between tort 
and the criminals addressed the problems created by a modern industrial society or 
whether, on the other hand, the historical evolution of the interrelationship failed to 
consider other reform possibilities involving the use of criminal law, which in turn went on 
to hinder the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform between 1912 and 1999. 
 The general use of the word ‘wrong’ or the term ‘legal harm’ unites ‘various 
“effects” (invasions of interests) with human behaviour, viewed as cause and thus 
“imputed” to specific actors, whose conduct is “culpable” in light of the defining principles 
of the term’.84 The origins of the interrelationship between tort and criminal laws can be 
found in the medieval ages, when victims wanted a more severe form of vengeance elected 
to prosecute the wrongdoer under criminal law, in contrast to victims who sought 
compensation through a tortious action.85 However, it should be noted that if victims 
decided to pursue a criminal action, it had to be concluded before a civil action could be 
commenced; the two actions could not be concurrent.86 Consequently, in the medieval 
ages four types of legal proceedings could have been taken to address the same wrong; 
these included the following: (1) appeal of felony (criminal);87 (2) action of trespass (tort);88 
(3) indictment of felony (criminal);89 and (4) indictment of trespass (criminal).90 The use of 
the action of trespass excluded taking any additional civil action when the act that was the 
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subject of the action involved homicide.91 Instead, the homicide victim’s family could seek 
redress through a deodand and ‘by this is meant whatever personal chattel is the 
immediate occasion of the death of any reasonable creature; which is forfeited to King and 
applied to pious uses and distributed in alms by his high almoner’.92 For the purpose of the 
thesis the relevance of the historical interrelationship concerns the transition of tortious 
definitions into criminal laws, specifically involuntary manslaughter; for example, the 
medieval definition of ‘fault’ changed to become the crystallised definition of the tort of 
‘negligence’, which involves three elements: a duty to take care; a breach of duty; and a 
resultant loss to the claimant.93 
 Historical Development of Homicide, Murder and Manslaughter 
before 1912 
‘Homicide’ is the legal term for the killing of one human being by another.94 The law 
presumed every homicide to be murder, until the contrary could be proven that the 
homicide was lawful, unlawful or amounted to manslaughter.95 The classic definition of 
murder is from Coke’s Institutes from the seventeenth century, which stated: 
 Murder is when a man of sound memory, and of the age of discretion, unlawfully 
 killeth within any county of the realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura 
 under the king’s peace, with malice fore-thought, either expressed by the party or 
 implied by law, so as the party wounded, or hurt, etc. die of the wound, or hurt, 
 etc. within a year and a day after the same.96 
While the generally accepted modern definition of murder states that murder is committed 
‘subject to three exceptions,97 the crime of murder is committed where a person of sound 
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mind and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature, in being, and under the 
Queen’s peace with intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm’.98 
 The creation of the offence of manslaughter did not occur until the early sixteenth 
century because of the competing reform theories that were put forward by the criminal 
judiciary99 and legal writers.100 The distinction made between manslaughter and murder 
was not based on whether there was premeditation but on whether the killing was 
accidental (chance mêlée) according to common law.101 By the mid sixteenth century 
parliamentary intervention had let to the introduction of the concept of premeditation to 
determine the difference between the two crimes of murder and manslaughter, that is, 
Parliament withdrew the ‘benefit of clergy’ from ‘wilful murder of malice prepensed’.102 
Coke wrote: 
 Some murders be voluntary and not of malice aforethought, upon some sudden 
 falling out, Delinquens per iram provocatus puniri non debet. And this, for distinction 
 sake, is called manslaughter. There is no difference between murder and 
 manslaughter, but that one is upon malice aforethought, and the other upon a 
 sudden occasion, and, therefore, is called chance-medley.103 
Thus, by the late sixteenth century unlawful homicide had developed into two distinct 
offences: murder and manslaughter. Consequently, apart from the intention, the other 
substantive parts of the offence of manslaughter are the same as those of murder. In the 
eighteenth century Blackstone stated that the definition of manslaughter could be divided 
two classes: voluntary and involuntary.104 Voluntary manslaughter occurred when all the 
elements of murder were present, including the mental element known as ‘malice 
aforethought’ (intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm). However, the offence could 
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be reduced to manslaughter by reason of one of the three exceptions, which eventually 
included diminished responsibility, provocation and the existence of a suicide pact.105 
Involuntary manslaughter arose when a human being was killed without there being malice 
aforethought (intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm). Blackstone stated that 
involuntary manslaughter occurred when 
 a person does an act lawful in itself, but in an unlawful manner, and without due 
 caution and circumspection, as when a workman flings down a stone or piece of 
 timber into the street and kills a man … if it were in London, or other populous town, 
 where people are continually passing, it is manslaughter, though he gives loud 
 warning.106 
Blackstone made reference to the first kind of involuntary manslaughter, ‘where a man, 
doing an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, by accident kills another’.107 However, of 
relevance to the thesis is the second type of involuntary manslaughter, which occurs 
‘where a man, by culpable neglect of a duty imposed upon him, is the cause of the death 
of another’108 because a corporation would be eventually charged with this offence. The 
earliest example of manslaughter by culpable neglect emerged through case law in the 
nineteenth century when the judiciary started to define what could be deemed ‘gross 
negligence’,109 most notably in the case of R v Williamson (‘Williamson’) in 1807.110 
Williamson concerned a male man-midwife indicted for manslaughter when he tore away 
the prolapsed uterus of his patient. Lord Ellenborough stated to the jury that a case of 
manslaughter could only stand if he was ‘guilty of criminal negligence and misconduct ... 
through the grossest of ignorance or the most criminal inattention’.111 Williamson was 
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found not guilty as there was no evidence of any lack of attention on his part and it was 
decided that he had exercised due diligence. 
 However, in 1857 the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Hughes (‘Hughes’) affirmed 
the conviction for manslaughter arising from culpable neglect of a banksman who was at 
the top of a shaft at the Tylecock Colliery for a negligent omission because he failed to place 
a stage on the mouth of a shaft, which resulted in a fatality.112 
 Nonetheless, the extended use of manslaughter by culpable neglect, according to 
Andrew Amos, a nineteenth century scholar, ‘only became familiar in modern times, in 
consequence of accidents imputed to railway officials’.113 In 1890 Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen defined culpable negligent manslaughter further:  
The best mode of understanding this subject is to begin by considering what are the 
duties which are imposed by law on persons whose conduct may preserve or 
destroy human life. I think these duties may all be reduced under three heads, 
which, stated in a summary way, are these. It is a legal duty, incumbent on every 
person, who, by law, or by contract, or by act of taking charge, wrongfully or not, is 
in charge of any person, to provide such last mentioned person with the necessaries 
of life, if he cannot provide for himself or withdraw from the care of the person first 
mentioned. It is the duty of everyone who does any act which is or may be 
dangerous to life to employ proper precautions in doing it.114 
Stephen also provided a working example of a case involving the death of railway 
passengers in a crash to explain the degree of negligence needed to establish manslaughter 
by culpable neglect.115 He referred initially to a drunken train driver who caused the deaths 
by omitting to notice the signals. Because of this, in Stephen’s opinion, the train driver 
could be successfully indicted for manslaughter by culpable neglect. However, Stephen 
posed a further scenario whereby the signalman caused the deaths by omitting to give the 
proper signals because he was tired as a result of working long hours and the arduous 
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nature of the work. Stephen argued that under these circumstances ‘his negligence might 
not be considered culpable so as to make him guilty of manslaughter, though both the 
company and he (if he were worth suing) might be liable in damages’.116 
 The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability and 
Corporate Manslaughter before 1912 
In order to address the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform that occurred 
from 1912 to 1999, it is necessary to establish at what point the law considered that a 
corporation could commit a criminal offence, by their corporate name, for a crime and 
manslaughter before 1912. The thesis addresses the reasons of marked similarity involving 
judicial reasoning which inhibited the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform 
from 1912 to 1999, yet, the origins surrounding the prevailing tensions of judicial reasoning 
and corporate criminal liability emerged before 1912. 
2.5.1 Corporations and Criminal Offences 
Under medieval law the first types of organisations to be incorporated included 
ecclesiastical chapters, monasteries and municipal bodies created by Royal Charter, by an 
Act of Parliament or by prescription (such as the City of London Corporation, which had 
existed as a corporation since the Magna Carta).117 The act of incorporation itself granted 
five powers, which included perpetual succession, the right to sue or be sued in the 
corporate name, the ability to purchase lands, the right to have a common seal and the 
power to make by-laws or private statutes.118 On the one hand, medieval law recognised 
the legal personality of the corporation and the capacities that the corporation had to act 
within the five powers. On the other hand, medieval law failed to perceive how such a 
corporation could commit a crime as a corporation could not be seen. This was 
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demonstrated in 1481 in the case of Abbot of St. Benet (Benedict) of Hulme v Mayor and 
Commonalty of Norwich (‘Case of Hulme’): 
The corporation of them is only a name that cannot be seen and does not have 
substance, and it is impossible to commit a wrong (faire un tort) against this name 
or body, as to beat or suchlike, as such a body, unless the wrong is done to every 
member (mesne) of a body as to his own person, and not as the name of the 
corporation (incorporation), nor can it itself as the corporation of mayor, sheriff, 
and commonalty commit a personal wrong (tort) to another, such as to beat or 
wound (battre ou naufre), nor can (it) commit treason nor felony as a corporation, 
nor against any other person who is corporate, nor against a person of the church 
as parson or vicar, because all those as such bodies cannot commit such a wrong. 
(tort faire)119 
By the seventeenth century the position had not changed, as in 1613 Coke CJ also referred 
to a corporation as a soulless entity in Tipling v Pexall and stated that corporations 
[w]ere invisible, immortall, and that they had no soule; and therefore no subpœna 
lieth against them, because they have no conscience nor soule; a corporation, is a 
body aggregate, none can create soules but God, but the King creates them, and 
therefore they have no soules; they cannot speak, nor appear in person, but by 
attorney.120 
The question of whether a corporation could commit a crime had already been addressed 
by Coke CJ the previous year in the Case of Sutton's Hospital, and he had stated that ‘they 
cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have no souls, 
neither can they appear in person, but by attorney’ (sic).121 Stewart Kyd, a barrister at law, 
in his Treatise on the Law of Corporations of 1793 confirmed that a corporation could not 
be guilty of a crime including treason or felony ‘and consequently cannot be subject to the 
punishment of a criminal’.122 Despite the gap of nearly 300 years the position had remained 
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the same: a corporation could not commit a crime, as confirmed in the Case of Hulme and 
affirmed later in Tipping v Pexall and the Case of Sutton Hospital. 
 However, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a type of corporation 
existed that was not created by Royal Charter or by statute and existed as a ‘class of 
corporations which consisted of individuals associated together for the purpose of trade or 
business, and with a view to individual profit’.123 These corporations were called trading 
corporations and were incorporated by a deed of settlement.124 The deed of settlement 
referred to 
 [a] covenant between a few of the shareholders chosen as trustees for the 
 purpose,and others by which each of the latter covenants with the trustees, and 
 each of the trustees covenants with the rest of the shareholders, for the due 
 performance of a series of articles which are set forth.125 
The common law, through Tipping v Pexall and the Case of Sutton Hospital, recognised that 
it could not indict a corporation in its own name for a criminal act committed by that 
corporation. However, it was possible to attribute the criminal act to the individual 
members of trading corporations formed by deed of settlement because ‘the rights and 
liabilities of the members of the members of such bodies, in relation to the public, were 
the same as those of other members of ordinary partnerships’.126 This was established in 
two cases: R v The Mayor of London127 in 1691 and the Anonymous Case128 in 1701. 
 The 1691 case of R v The Mayor of London involved an action to remove the powers 
granted to the municipal by Royal Charter to remedy the abuses carried out by its 
members.129 Holt CJ stated that ‘a corporation is an artificial body, consisting of particular 
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persons, as members constituent thereof, and like unto a natural body to many purposes; 
that which doth unite them, is the liberties and privileges granted for that purpose’.130 It 
was not possible to dissolve the corporation. However, the case established that a member 
could be indicted. The single-line precedent given by Holt CJ in The Anonymous Case in 
1701 stated that ‘a corporation is not indictable, but the particular members of it are’.131 
Kyd provided further clarity in 1793 when he stated that  
 if all the members of an aggregate corporation, under pretence of holding a 
 corporation assembly, were to be guilty of any crime of which a collective body of 
 men be physically capable, the members would, as individuals, be equally subject 
 to punishment, as the person of a sole corporation.132 
The question of corporate criminal liability remaining unchanged until the early nineteenth 
century, where it was held that a corporation incorporated by Royal Charter could be 
indicted  for the breach of a public duty. This was demonstrated in 1811 in the case of The 
King v The Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the Borough of Stratford-Upon-Avon 
(‘Stratford Case’).133 The Stratford Case in the first instance was heard by Wood B at the 
Spring Assizes in Leicester in 1810, where it was held that the municipal corporation at 
Stratford was bound to perform a duty to repair a bridge because it was in the public 
interest. However, the defendants, using a rule nisi, requested that the points of law and 
evidence should be passed to a higher court. Lord Ellenborough CJ, Grose, Le Blanc and 
Bayley JJ upheld the decision of the lower court and precluded a retrial.134 The reasoning 
behind the judgment rested on the interpretation of whether the duty to repair the bridge 
passed to the municipal corporation through the evolution of the earlier boroughs into a 
new municipal corporation. The municipal corporation argued that it was not bound to 
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repair the bridge as there was no documented legal provision forcing it to do so. However, 
despite there being no documented legal provision, the duty of the earlier corporate bodies 
to repair the bridge passed to the municipal corporation. Consequently, the duties of the 
previous corporate bodies bound the municipal corporation to repair the bridge for the 
benefit of the public through prescription. 
 The judiciary in the Stratford Case in 1811 decided law in an era when corporate 
legal personality and the incorporation of large national railway corporations by an Act of 
Parliament were less familiar legal concepts, and members of the judiciary were considered 
by corporations to be ‘the creatures of Parliament’.135 Nonetheless, Lord Ellenborough CJ 
and his fellow judges decided the Stratford Case by applying common law principles which 
involved the strict interpretation of the Royal Charter provisions as contractual obligations 
to the public as a whole that included the repairing of the bridge.136  
 Consequently, the Stratford Case initially established a process of judicial thinking 
that initially concerned corporations incorporated by Royal Charter. However, the process 
of judicial thinking established by the Stratford Case continued to be followed with regard 
to corporations incorporated by statute, as confirmed by the decision of Lord Denning CJ 
in 1839 in R v The Eastern Counties Railway Company (‘Eastern Counties Case’).137 The 
Eastern Counties Case concerned an application for a writ of mandamus to compel the 
railway company to construct a railway line beyond Colchester to Yarmouth, as originally 
empowered by the Act of Parliament that incorporated the company. Lord Denman CJ 
stated: 
 Is there no higher duty cast upon this Court than to exercise a vigilant control over 
 persons entrusted with large and extensive powers for public purposes, and to 
 enforce, within reasonable bounds, the exercise of such powers in compliance with 
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 such purposes; and the more so, as we are not aware of any other efficient 
 remedy.138 
Consequently, by the mid nineteenth century the judiciary continued to hold corporations 
incorporated by statute liable for particular failures to act and used criminal sanctions when 
a corporation committed a nonfeasance.139 A nonfeasance was considered to be a failure 
to act. Following the earlier case law of the Stratford Case and the Eastern Counties Railway 
Case, the judiciary continued to use a strict interpretation to establish whether an omission 
to act contrary occurred contrary to the requirements laid down in a statute. 
 The case of R v The Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Company (‘Birmingham 
Railway Case’) 140 in 1842 confirmed that a corporation incorporated by statute could be 
indicted for a nonfeasance.141 The railway company had failed to abide by the decision of 
the justices that stated that it must place arches in a bridge to connect land that had been 
made inaccessible by the building of the railway by the company. It was held that it was 
possible to indict the corporation for the nonfeasance offence and that the corporation 
could be represented by an attorney. 
 Four years later the case of R v Great North of England Railway Company (‘GNER 
Case’)142 involved a misfeasance offence by the Great North of England Railway Company 
(‘GNER Co’), a corporation incorporated by statute. A misfeasance offence occurs when 
there is a breach of a statute through a positive act by a corporation, as demonstrated by 
GNER Co when it unlawfully placed its railway tracks across a public highway and then 
proceeded to construct a bridge over the railway contrary to statutory provisions.143 The 
distinction between a nonfeasance offence and a malfeasance offence was deemed 
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minuscule as both offences involved the breach of a statute and it was not possible to 
distinguish a positive act (malfeasance) from an omission (nonfeasance). The ratio 
decidendi of the case was that the expansion of corporate criminal liability should include 
misfeasance offences as ‘it is as easy to charge one person, or a body corporate, with 
erecting a bar across a public road as with the non-repair of it: and they may as well be 
compelled to pay a fine for the act as for the omission’.144 
However, it is the obiter dictum of the case that should be considered and was 
relied upon by the courts from 1912 to 1999 to inhibit corporate manslaughter reform 
turning points with regard to whether a corporation could commit involuntary 
manslaughter.145 Lord Denman CJ supported this by stating: 
Some dicta occur in old cases: “A corporation cannot be guilty of treason or of 
felony.” It might be added “of perjury, or offences against the person.’ The Court of 
Common Pleas lately held that a corporation might be sued in trespass; but nobody 
has sought to fix them with acts of immorality. These plainly derive their character 
from the corrupted mind of the person committing them, and are violations of the 
social duties that belong to men and subjects. A corporation, which, as such, has no 
duties, cannot be guilty in these cases: but they may be guilty as a body corporate 
of commanding acts to be done to the nuisance of the community at large.146 
A distinct direction for the future application of corporate criminal liability was implied by 
Lord Denman CJ; his limited comment reaffirmed the position that a corporation as an 
entity could not be guilty of committing acts that violate social duties. The impact of the 
judiciary’s obiter dicta should never be underestimated; one just needs to consider Lord 
Atkin’s obiter dictum in Donoghue v Stevenson147 involving the neighbour principle that 
evolved into a future ratio decidendi in the law of tort to understand this.148 In the GNER 
Case Lord Denman CJ expanded the list of offences referred to in previous dicta cases to 
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include offences against the person. He stated that corporate criminal liability in certain 
criminal offences was contingent upon proving that the corporation had a guilty state of 
mind. This, in effect, called into question whether corporations could be held liable for 
offences against the person which in turn could potentially lead to a charge of involuntary 
manslaughter as a result of the way corporations carried out their undertakings. 
In 1905 Carr confirmed this position by stating that ‘such cases as those against the 
Birmingham and Gloucester Railway and against the Great North of England Railway fix the 
attitude of the criminal law towards corporations’.149 This opened the debate about what 
motivated Lord Denman CJ to make his statement as an obiter dictum; he did not have to 
make the statement at all. The legal realists’ rule skepticism150 assisted by supporting a 
theory of law that says that ‘disjunction exists between the substantive rules of law that 
judges invoke in their decisions and is the real base for their decisions’.151 The motivation 
behind Lord Denman CJ’s belief that a corporation cannot have a guilty mind attributable 
to offences of intent can also be observed in his earlier rulings surrounding the use of 
deodands against corporations to address fatalities.152 He showed contempt towards their 
application when he referred to deodands as ‘a remnant of a barbarous and absurd law’.153 
Nonetheless, Lord Denman CJ’s decision in the GNER Case set a precedent as to the specific 
circumstances by which an indictment could lie against a corporation that was applied into 
the early twentieth century.154 
 Consequently, by the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century the 
courts continued to indict corporations, using their corporate name, for breaches of a duty. 
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The Court of Appeal in R v Tyler and the International Commercial Co Ltd (‘Tyler Case’) 
confirmed this in 1891 after magistrates had refused to issue a summons against the 
corporation for failing to submit its members’ returns as a joint stock corporation under 
section 26 Companies Act 1862.155 The Court of Appeal overturned the decision and held 
that the act of failing to submit the members’ return was a criminal offence committed by 
a corporation pursuant to section 27 Companies Act 1862 and that the corporation could 
be indicted or fined for a breach of duty imposed by the law. Kay LJ. held that 
the Act meant to impose on the company a positive duty, the omission to perform 
which would be in the nature of a criminal offence, and even if the remedy given by 
the Act is the only remedy, as to which I express no opinion, it does not follow that 
the omission to do the Act is any the less a criminal omission on the part of the 
company.156 
Section 2(1) of the Interpretation Act 1889 supported this further by stating: 
In the construction of every enactment relating to an offence punishable on 
indictment or on summary conviction, whether contained in an Act passed before 
or after the commencement of this Act, the expression ‘person’ shall unless the 
contrary intention appears, include a body corporate.157 
By the early twentieth century a legal position had been reached whereby under criminal 
law a corporation could be indicted for a crime. However, the crimes that were recognised 
involved the use of strict liability whereby ‘a person can be convicted of an offence without 
proof of a mental element such as intention or knowledge’.158 The types of offences that a 
corporation could be indicted for under the criminal law expanded to include nuisance159 
and criminal libel.160 Despite the expansion of criminal offences that were relevant, the 
judiciary kept to the common law origins of the law, as set out in the Stratford Case and 
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later the GNER Case, as the judiciary based its decisions on the strict interpretation of 
statutes and an overriding sense of duty to the public. 
2.5.2 Corporations and Workplace Fatalities 
In the period leading up to the turning points of corporate manslaughter that occurred 
between 1912 and 1999, fatalities connected to workers and members of the public still 
occurred. While acknowledging that no indictment for corporate manslaughter had 
occurred before 1912, 161 the courts proceeded to approach corporate fatalities in two 
ways. Initially, this was achieved through the increased use of industry-specific 
inspectorates connected to mines,162 factories,163 and railways164 to pursue statutory 
breaches connected to workplace and public fatalities. Secondly, the mechanism of the 
coroner’s court was used when proceedings were transferred to the assizes if manslaughter 
through negligence was the verdict of the inquest. 
Initially, the powers of the industry-specific inspectorates were limited to an 
advisory capacity with the option to pursue enforcement of offences through the Mining, 
Railway and Factories Acts.165 However, their limited powers were rarely used, as 
governments in the nineteenth century believed that the inspectorates could be more 
effective in an advisory capacity. Hence, Boyd described the mining inspectors as ‘little 
more than scientific assistants to the coroners, and charged with simply recording the 
number of fatal accidents in their yearly reports’.166 
 However, the issue of workplace fatalities was being addressed more radically in 
the factories through the Factory Bill 1832. The bill proposed an alternative means to solve 
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the question of the culpability of the corporations and corporate owners for fatalities in 
factories. Clause 29 Factory Bill 1832 stated: 
 In case of death ensuing from any accident happening in the factory from 
 neglect thereof, the coroner shall summon a jury, upon which no owner or 
 occupier of any mill or factory, or the father, son or brother of any occupier 
 shall be qualified to sit; which coroner and jury are to inspect the mill and 
 machinery where the accident happened, and if the verdict of the coroner’s jury 
 shall be ‘Accidental death by the culpable neglect of the occupier or occupiers of 
 the said mill or factory, in not properly guarding, fencing, or boxing off the 
 machinery therein,’ or words to that effect, the occupier or occupiers shall, by 
 warrant under the coroner’s hand and seal, be forthwith committed to take his 
 or their trial at the assizes ensuing for the county where each offence has been 
 committed.167 
Thus, if a fatality occurred due to the negligence of the owner, they could be committed to 
trial for manslaughter.168 This was advanced further by the levying of high fines of up to 
£100 for other statutory breaches in the bill including the fencing of mahinery.169 However, 
the aggressiveness of the bill worried the factory owners because of the attribution of 
criminal liability and they asked Wilson Patten to intervene by presenting a motion to 
establish a Royal Commission to investigate factory reform further.170 The motion to set up 
the Royal Commission was passed by seventy-four ‘ayes’ against seventy-four ‘noes’.171 The 
Report of the Commissioners on Conditions in Factories (‘The 1833 Report’), written by 
Edwin Chadwick and Thomas Tooke, also agreed with the findings of the Factory Bill 
1832.172 The 1833 Report stated that its authors did ‘not concur in the proposal to relieve 
the manufacturer from responsibility’ connected accidents caused by dangerous or 
defective machinery.173 The idea of responsibility proposed in The 1833 Report was 
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eventually ignored by the House of Commons as the reworked bill proposing factory 
reform, which became the Factory Act 1833, moved away from the idea of factory owners 
being culpable for workplace fatalities connected to unguarded machinery and back to the 
moralistic ideal of the maximum ten-hour working day. The Factory Act 1833 was repealed 
and replaced with the introduction of the Factory Act 1844. Sections 21 and 22 Factory Act 
1844 required that guards should be placed around machinery and accidents that caused 
bodily injury should be reported to the factory inspectorate.174 
 The problematic use of the factory inspectorate also affected other inspectorates, 
including the mining inspectorate with regard to the perceived level of state intervention 
into commerce. In 1872 there was a debate in the House of Commons on whether 
inspectorate powers should be increased by the Coal Mine Regulations Act 1872. Mr 
Whalley, argued: 
The present system of inspection had not tended to prevent accidents, and the old 
law had been far more efficient—that under which the jury had the power of levying 
a Deodand, so as to control the cupidity of mine-owners, and the unwise economy 
which was usually the cause of accidents. A controlling influence of this sort was 
better than anything which could be laid down in Acts of Parliament.175 
However, an alternative solution to address workplace fatalities also emerged with the use 
of the deodand from the early 1830s through to 1846 at the same time that the industry 
inspectorates were being introduced. Elizabeth Cawthorn explained that some juries at the 
Coroners Courts used the deodand as a compensatory and punitive answer to negligence 
for occupational fatalities.176 Originally, the deodand was considered the weapon that 
could be used in a homicide, and this weapon was confiscated by the court. Therefore, 
where a death occurred by misadventure, the deodand causing the death might have been 
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the horse, the cart or a wheel of the car. The coroner’s court gave the deodand a monetary 
value and the defendant originally paid this to the king, but by the 1800s the value of the 
deodand was passed to the victim’s family. 177 This could involve a steamboat178 or a fly 
wheel in a coalmine, for example.179 In 1843 Sewell, commenting on the law of the coroner, 
stated: 
 Hitherto we have considered the law applicable to the killing of man by man, 
 which is either felonious or not felonious … and it is said that the instrument 
 which occasioned the death is, in most cases, forfeited; which forfeiture is, by law, 
 denominated a deodand.180 
An example of the deodand can be seen in the coroner’s report dated 2 November 1719 
regarding the death of Elizabeth Dickinson, a factory girl whose clothing got caught in 
factory machinery. She was working at the Newhouse Mill, a water corn mill, in 
Egremont.181 A verdict of accidental death was recorded and a deodand to the value of two 
shillings imposed against the factory owners. 
 Corporations began to feel threatened as the monetary exchange started to involve 
large sums of money.182 In 1838 the case of the Hull steamer Victoria (‘The Victoria Steamer 
Case’) resulted in a deodand of £1,500 for the death of nine people caused by the defective 
boiler.183 However, the jurors valued the steamer at £14,000 and wanted to punish the 
corporation for its negligence by making it pay that sum instead. It appears that the use of 
a deodand to punish a corporation that killed was a direct and innovative response to 
frustration shown by the public, represented by juries, with regard to the lack of a suitable, 
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alternative legal mechanism to ensure that these corporations were punished for their 
crimes, specifically in regard to railway companies. 
 A good contrast is shown by examining a case in which a fatality occurred, where a 
coroner’s court, a criminal prosecution, an inspectorate inquiry and a Hansard debate were 
all involved. Such a case occurred on 12 November 1840 on the London and Birmingham 
Railway line at Harrow, which resulted in a train collision causing the death of two train 
drivers.184 The coroner’s jury (‘Harrow inquest’) found that ‘great blame is attributable to 
the directors for continuing in their service such a reckless driver as the unfortunate man 
Simpson’.185 The coroner’s jury imposed a deodand of £2,000 against the London and 
Birmingam Railway Co and an indictment of wilful murder against Simpson. The criminal 
prosecution targeted the individual employee directly involved with the fatality, as the 
mindset of the time would always blame the corporate servant, ‘Simpson’ in this case. 
However, of interest is the subsequent case of R v London and Birmingham Railway (‘LBR 
Harrow Case’) that appealed the outcome of Harrow inquest. Mr Wakley commented: 
The case was taken by the defendants into the Court of Queen's Bench, where the 
inquisition was at once declared to be utterly worthless - it was cast aside, and 
treated as almost worse than waste paper. He believed that no inquisition had ever 
been drawn with so much care and attention as that to which he was referring; and 
he thought it was quite clear, from the result, that the law ought not to continue in 
its present state.186 
The outcome of the first Harrow inquest is representative of the use of a deodand by the 
jurors as they tried to hold corporations liable for their negligent actions. The outcome also 
demonstrated, however, the desired result of a movement that wanted to take the 
decision-making power surrounding corporate criminal liability for workplace fatalities 
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away from the coroner’s court. The use of the deodand went further than imposing 
damages to punish the corporation. The law of the deodand commented on the role of the 
corporation’s negligence in two ways that had not occurred before. 
 Firstly, it considered the corporation as an entity with a separate legal personality. 
Using the Harrow inquest as an example, the coroner’s jury examined the role of the 
directors, the guardsman, the drivers and the signalmen to determine the cause of the 
negligence behind the fatality in aggregation. Secondly, even if a criminal indictment could 
not be laid directly against the corporation, the deodand was still commenting on the 
corporation’s criminal liability. The substantial fine levied through the deodand was an 
indicative commentary on the level of negligence of the corporation and the level of its 
liability for the fatality. This was demonstrated on 24 December 1841, when nine fatalities 
occurred at the Sunning-Hill cutting.187 A landslide occurred on the Great Western Railway 
line and fatalities occurred because of the poor construction of the third-class carriages. A 
deodand of £1,000 was levied against the Great Western Railway Company.188 
 The impact of the deodand did not go unnoticed by the judiciary, corporations and 
Parliament as the coroner’s juries were expressing their concerns about public safety in the 
absence of safety regulations and compensation for the relatives of the deceased.189 The 
case of R v Polwart advanced the call for the abolition of the deodand by Parliament.190 In 
this case the criminal nature of the imposition of a deodand was challenged. Lord Denman 
held that where a verdict of murder stood a simultaneous deodand could not stand, and 
Polwart’s deodand of £800 was quashed.191 This was becoming the norm, as other cases 
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involving a deodand were appealed successfully.192 Until the abolition of the deodand in 
1846, a means had been found to hold corporations liable for their negligent involvement 
in fatalities. 
 Lord Campbell introduced a bill to Parliament to enable the relatives of the 
deceased the right to sue in the case of a fatal accident.193 Simultaneously, the Abolition of 
Deodands Act 1846 was presented to Parliament.194 The Attorney General observed: 
of course, the Government could not say what should be done with this Bill, 
without the assent of the honourable Gentleman who had charge of it. It was very 
desirable that the deodand should be made the means of affording some 
compensation to the family of a person killed. There was no difficulty as to the law 
of deodand itself: the difficulty was, whether it should be abolished, or how it 
should be applied.195 
The Attorney General also commented further on the level of the deodand: 
 If there was anything more difficult to fix than another, it was the amount of a 
 deodand, and the cases in which it ought to be levied. The only way he could 
 see of putting the system upon a more satisfactory footing was that of making 
 the deodand recoverable by an action at civil law; and that was the course 
 which the Government intended to adopt.196 
The Abolition of Deodand Act 1846 came into effect on 1 September 1846 and announced 
the death of the deodand. Despite the abolition of deodands in 1846, the coroner must still 
hold an inquest if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the deceased had died a 
violent or unnatural death, or has died suddenly from some unknown cause.197 During the 
inquest, the coroner takes notes and, using the evidence presented, will direct the jury to 
return a verdict as to the cause of death. It was within this process that the jurors were 
able to return a verdict of unlawful killing including manslaughter198 or comment on the 
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negligence of the corporation accused of causing the fatality.199 If the coroner’s court 
returned a verdict of manslaughter, it was then sent to the court of assize and considered 
to be the equivalent of an indictment from a grand jury. 
However, the composition of the jury at the coroner’s court must also be 
considered, as all the jurors resided in the local area and were ‘composed of butchers and 
shoemakers! who, as a matter of course, returned a verdict of accidental death!’200 
Consequently, a verdict of negligent manslaughter was a rarity. George Greaves, a factory 
surgeon in 1858, commented: 
From the mode in which inquests are usually held, the most important question, 
that, viz, whether the accident might have been prevented, is evaded, and a verdict 
of ‘accidental death’ is too often given when one of culpable negligence ought to 
be pronounced.201 
 Conclusion 
By determining the historical legal position of the corporation, the interrelationship 
between criminal laws and tort, and the historical development of the law surrounding 
homicide, murder and manslaughter before 1912; the scene is now set by which to consider 
the legal position after 1926 when it became possible to indict a corporation for the 
common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter.202 Company law identified the 
historical development of the corporation from an unincorporated joint stock corporation 
to a limited liability corporation protected by the corporate veil that is, shield of protection 
surrounding the principle of separate corporate personality and potential liabilities.203 The 
historical origins of the law of tort will continue to affect the common law offence of gross 
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negligence manslaughter because the concept of negligence originated from the civil law 
before being used in criminal law to determine the level of ‘grossness’ required for a death 
to be deemed gross negligence manslaughter. Finally, the historical background to the 
interrelationship between homicide, murder and manslaughter and whether a corporation 
can commit a criminal offence might have emerged as a point of legal debate in the 
nineteenth century. However, the tensions that were created by those initial 
interrelationships still prevailed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries with regard to 
corporate manslaughter reform. Consequently, the interrelationship between 
corporations, tort and criminal law before 1912 provided an historical legal overview by 
which to consider the reasons of marked similarity which inhibited the turning points of 





THE IMPACT OF THE IDENTIFICATION DOCTRINE ON 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CORPORATE 
MANSLAUGHTER FROM 1912 TO 1939 
 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the first two turning points of corporate manslaughter reform, 
that is, the creation of the identification doctrine by Viscount Haldane LC in Lennard’s 
Carrying Co. Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd (‘Lennard’s Case’)1 in 1915 and the first attempt 
to prosecute a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter in R v Cory Brothers and 
Company Limited in 1927 (‘Cory Bros Case’).2 Lord Cooke defined a decisive turning point 
in the evolution of the common law as a case whose sway was undiminishing,3 which could 
also could be used to describe the undiminishing impact of both the Lennard’s Case and 
the Cory Bros Case on the reform of corporate manslaughter law because both cases 
inhibited corporate manslaughter reform for marked reasons of similarity connected to 
judicial reasoning. 
 The first turning point of corporate manslaughter reform involved the creation of 
the identification doctrine whereby a corporation could only be convicted of a criminal 
offence requiring mens rea if it could be proved that a single person could be identified as 
the corporation and committed the criminal offence in question.4 Eventually, the 
identification doctrine created in obiter dictum by Viscount Haldane LC in Lennard’s Case 
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would be applied in the context of corporate manslaughter by 1991.5 Yet the origins of the 
identification doctrine can be traced to a civil law case’s obiter dictum whose eventual use 
by the criminal judiciary would be at the expense of the strict construction of penal statutes 
regarding corporations6 and the use of alternative approaches to attribute corporate mens 
rea.7 
 The second turning point of corporate manslaughter reform in the Cory Bros Case 
concerned a number of firsts: the first attempt to prosecute a corporation for the common 
law offence of gross negligence manslaughter;8 the first time section 33(3) Criminal Justice 
Act 1925 was used in a criminal court to indict a corporation;9 and the first time sections 5 
and 71 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (‘OAPA 1861’) could have been used to fine 
a corporation if it was successfully convicted for manslaughter.10 It was held in the Cory 
Bros Case that a corporation could not be indicted for manslaughter. The incorrectness of 
the decision in the Cory Bros Case was only challenged in 1944 by the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in the case of R v ICR Haulage Co Ltd, which confirmed that a corporation was 
punishable with a fine on conviction for manslaughter and questioned the decision of 
Finlay J in the Cory Bros Case in 1927.11 
 However, both turning points of corporate manslaughter reform connected to the 
creation of the identification doctrine and the decision reached in the Cory Bros Case were 
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inhibited by reasons of marked similarity which can be traced back to the judicial reasoning 
behind the creation of the identification doctrine in Lennard’s Case and the incorrectness 
of the decision in the Cory Bros Case. 
 Viscount Haldane LC, the creator of the identification doctrine in Lennard’s Case, 
was an experienced judge with an in-depth knowledge of German law and philosophy 
which he used to create the identification doctrine.12 Further, by his own admission he 
stated that ‘we are far away here from the continental conception of a judge as a mere 
interpreter of rigid codes’.13 Viscount Haldane LC went beyond mere interpretation with 
the creation of the identification doctrine because he did not want to leave the obiter 
dictum open for future use because, in his own words, he knew the mischief this might 
create because of his knowledge of other legal systems, including the German legal system, 
and the difficulties involved in combining the principles of two or more legal systems.14 
Hence, the identification doctrine had an impact on future corporate manslaughter reform 
because its use would go on to inhibit alternative methods of establishing corporate 
criminal liability throughout the period from 1912 to 1999 and beyond; the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 is now the only method that can be used 
establish corporate manslaughter. 
 The judicial reasoning of Finlay J in the Cory Bros Case was influenced by events 
connected to the General Strike and Great Lock-Out of 1926 in South Wales; it has been 
necessary to look behind the unreported events15 and factual discrepancies16 in the case 
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to explain the judicial reasoning behind the incorrect decision made by Finlay J.17 However, 
other factors influenced his judicial reasoning regarding his reluctance to strictly construe 
penal statutes that apply to corporations which included the following his complete 
disregard for his extensive experience as a treasury barrister and his familiarity with the 
strict construction of tax statutes,18 his inexperience as a criminal judge19 and his 
misdirection of the jury.20 
 The ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform already existed in 1927 
because it was procedurally and legally possible to indict a corporation for the common 
law offence of manslaughter and if successfully convicted the corporation would be fined 
regardless of the size, type or structure of the corporation.21 However, no reference to the 
identification doctrine within criminal law existed because the criminal judiciary strictly 
construed penal statutes that applied to corporations.22 Additionally, if the judiciary was 
required to address any issues regarding corporate criminal liability outside a penal statute, 
which would have been required in the Cory Bros Case, it would look towards the 
instructions given by managers or the ratified decisions of the directors.23 
 However, from 1927 onwards the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform 
was no longer achievable because the first two turning points inhibited corporate 
manslaughter reform because of a reason of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning. 
The open-endedness of Viscount Haldane LC’s the identification doctrine created in dictum 
was different in nature to his other decisions made between 1914 and 1916, which were 
                                                        
17 ICR Haulage Case (n 11) 556; 36. 
18 The Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1921] 1 KB 64, 71 (‘Cape Brandy’). 
19 '.', ‘The Law and Lawyers’ (1924) 158 LT 481, 481 (‘Law Times 1924’). 
20 '.', ‘The Thorne Appeal’ (1925) 60 LJ 365 (‘Law Journal 1925: Thorne’). 
21 ICR Haulage Case (n 11) 556; 36. 
22 Henry Delacombe Roome and Robert Ernest Ross (eds), Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases  (26th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell & Stevens 1922) 10. 
23 Eastern Counties Railway Company and Richardson v Broom (1851) 6 Exch 314, 155 ER 562 and Evans & Co Ltd v London County 
Council [1914] 3 KB 315 (KB). 
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closed and specific.24 The open-endedness of his decision in Lennard’s Case enabled the 
future use of the dictum by the courts, which in turn facilitated the future use of the 
identification doctrine connected to the common law offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter by a corporation that was modified when it was included in the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (‘CMCHA 2007’). The inclusion of the 
identification doctrine in the CMCHA 2007 would ensure that the ideal doctrine of 
corporate manslaughter reform could never be achieved, because in over 100 years since 
the creation of the identification doctrine using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation 
only small to medium-sized corporations have been successfully indicted.25 
 Hence, the importance of the second turning point of corporate manslaughter 
reform that was inhibited by a reason of marked similarity involving the incorrectness of 
Finlay J’s decision in the Cory Bros Case because the ideal doctrine of corporate 
manslaughter reform already existed in 1927 when the case was heard. However, the 
decision to dismiss the corporation from the Cory Bros Case on the grounds that a 
corporation could not be indicted for gross negligence manslaughter was contrary to the 
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 and the OAPA 1861.26 Unfortunately, the case 
was dismissed against the corporation before the issue of corporate criminal liability could 
be addressed directly by the court, which would have involved the criminal judiciary 
looking at the corporate corporate instructions or ratified decisions of the directors, as 
established in Evans Case Limited v London County Council (‘Evans Case’)27 and The Eastern 
Counties Railway and Richardson v Broom (‘Broom Case’).28 Consequently, by incorrectly 
                                                        
24 Leigh (n 14) 99-100. 
25 Appendices 1-4. 
26 Robert Ernest Ross (ed), Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases (27th edn, Sweet & Maxwell & Stevens 1927) 
860 (‘Archbold’s 1927’). 
27 Evans & Co Ltd v London County Council [1914] 3 KB 315 (KB) 318-320 (‘Evans Case’). 
28 Eastern Counties Railway Company and Richardson v Broom (1851) 6 Exch 314, 325; 155 ER 562, 566-567 (‘Broom Case’). 
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stopping proceedings at that point, judicial reasoning inhibited corporate manslaughter 
reform because the approach taken by the criminal judiciary to determine corporate 
criminal liability was disregarded in favour of using the identification doctrine reasoning to 
determine all statutory and common law corporate criminal offences. 
 In order to consider the reasons of marked similarity connected to judicial 
reasoning in both cases as inhibitors of the turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform, four developments pertinent to the evolution of corporate manslaughter reform 
need to be addressed: the development of the corporation from 1912 to 1939; the 
evolution of corporate criminal liability that tracked the criminal judiciary’s use of the strict 
construction of penal statutes from 1912 to 1939; the reasoning behind the decision in the 
Lennard’s Case in conjunction with the influence of judicial reasoning on the reasons 
behind the creation of the identification doctrine; and, finally, the impact of the 
incorrectness of the judicial reasoning in the Cory Bros Case. 
 The Development of the Corporation (1912 to 1939) 
The development of the corporation from 1912 to 1939 affected the turning points of 
corporate manslaughter, and was influenced by two different factors: the 
recommendations of the expert committees appointed by the Board of Trade to advise on 
corporate law resulted in amendments to the Companies Acts and the preoccupation of 
the expert committees with a corporation’s criminal liability for corporate fraud. The 
combined effect of the recommendations of the expert committees and the subsequent 
amendments to the Companies Acts expanded the types of criminal offences a corporation 
could be charged with, which now also included corporate fraud by the corporation. 
Consequently, the amendments made to the Companies Acts provided an insight into the 
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evolution of the corporation and into who could be deemed to be acting or thinking for the 
corporation. 
Every twenty years the Board of Trade appointed an expert committee to review 
company law and make recommendations.29 The resulting recommendations were 
incorporated through a new consolidating act in the form of the ‘Companies Act’. This 
occurred twice between 1912 and 1939; first by the Wrenbury Committee in 191830 and 
later by the Greene Committee in 1926.31 The Wrenbury Committee, chaired by Lord 
Wrenbury, reported back in 1918 with a number of recommendations concerning shares 
and foreign corporations and an amendment whereby the memorandum should state the 
objects of the corporation, not the power of the corporations.32 All the recommendations 
from the Wrenbury Committee were suspended due to World War One and carried over 
to be dealt with by the Greene Committee in 1925. Wilfrid Greene KC was appointed in 
1925 to establish the Greene Committee with the remit of considering the Wrenbury 
Report 1918 and amendments to the 1908 to 1928 Companies Acts,33 which resulted in the 
Companies Act 1929.34 
In 1925 Wilfrid Greene KC stated that ‘the system of company law … has been 
gradually evolved to meet the needs of the community at large and the commercial 
community in particular’35 and in his opinion was still fit for purpose. However, a number 
of small recommendations were proposed in connection with the ‘machinery of company 
                                                        
29 Order of Council 1786 (22 Geo 3 c 82) supported by Board of Trade Act 1782 in conjunction with Board of Trade (Amendment) Act 
1817 (57 Geo 3 c 66) and Board of Trade (Appointment of Secretary of Parliament) Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict c 72) as cited in HC Deb 16 
June 1884 vol 289, col 398-399. 
30 Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee (Cmd 9138 of 1918 HMSO ) (‘Wrenbury Report 1918’). 
31 Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee (Cmnd 2657 of 1926 HMSO) (‘Greene Report 1926’). 
32 With the exception of the paras 53 - 55 Wrenbury Report 1918 (n 30) re the memorandum criticisms all other recommendations 
made in the Wrenbury Report 1918 were implemented by the Greene Report 1926 (n 25). Please note the reasoning for not altering 
‘the objects of the corporation’ was a desire not to limit the operating function of the corporation’ Greene Report 1926 (n 31) para 14. 
33 Greene Report 1926 (n 31). 
34 (19 & 20 Geo 5 c 23). 
35 Greene Report 1926 (n 31) para 6. 
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law’ as emphasised by Gower rather than the concerns of ‘simple and cheap 
incorporation’.36 Gower was well placed to comment as, by 1962, he was appointed to the 
next expert committee.37 The machinery of company law included the proposed tightening 
of legislation connected to the issuing of shares and the use of capital to restrict fraud and 
malpractice through the use of legislation.38 The Greene Committee also commented on 
the role of a director’s liability for negligence with regard to section 279 Companies 
(Consolidation) Act 1908, which stated: 
If in any proceeding against a director, or person occupying the position of a 
director, of a company for negligence or breach of trust it appears to the court 
hearing the case that the director or person is or may be liable in respect of the 
negligence or breach of trust, but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought 
fairly to be excused for the negligence or breach of trust, that court may relieve 
him, either wholly or partly, from his liability on such terms as the court may think 
proper.39 
 
Wilfrid Greene KC commented: 
On the other hand it has been forcibly brought to our notice that under the modern 
conditions of company administration it is in many cases quite impossible for every 
director to have an intimate knowledge of or to exercise more than a quite general 
supervision over the company’s business. Moreover, it often happens that a 
director is appointed owing to some special knowledge of a particular branch or 
aspect of the company’s affairs or because he is in a position to obtain business for 
the company.40 
Despite this interpretation regarding a director’s knowledge of liability for negligent acts 
done under the corporate umbrella, the Greene Committee recommended that a director, 
manager or another officer of the company could be held liable under the general law of 
negligence for a breach of duty. Moreover, they should not be afforded protection against 
a claim of negligence as previously legislated for pursuant to section 279 Companies 
                                                        
36 Laurence Cecil Bartlett Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd 1969) 55. 
37 Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749 of 1962) (‘Jenkins Report 1962’). 
38 Greene Report 1926 (n 31) paras 7-8 and 19-21. 
39 Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (8 Edw 7 c 69). 
40 Greene Report 1926 (n 31) para 46. 
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(Consolidations) Act 1908. However, Wilfrid Greene KC’s original comment on the role of 
the negligent director within a corporation should be considered against the theory behind 
the identification doctrine with regard to the means of establishing corporate criminal 
liability. The identification doctrine established that a responsible officer represented the 
knowledge of the corporation as the ‘directing mind and will’ of the corporation.41 
Nevertheless, Wilfrid Greene KC argued that it was unlikely that a director would have an 
intimate knowledge of every aspect of the operation and therefore could not be seen as 
the as the ‘directing mind and will of the corporation’. In this instance, Wilfrid Greene KC’s 
commercial and Chancery-Division-related awareness of the director’s role within the 
corporation was overlooked.42 The decision was made to amend the Companies Act and 
abolish the protection once offered by the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 to the 
honest inept director, which began to reflect the theory behind the identification doctrine, 
in so far as the actions of the incompetent or negligent director still represented the 
activities and controlling mind of the corporation. 
 A potential source of this influence stemmed from the expert committees’ 
preoccupation with corporate fraud from 1928 to 1939. The recommendations of the 
Anderson Committee43 in 1936 and the Bodkin Committee44 in 1937 resulted in the 
enactment of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939.45 The Prevention of Fraud 
Investments Act 1939 intended to remedy the liberal approach taken previously towards 
white-collar crime. Initially, the issue of share-pushing had been legislated for by section 
356(6) Companies Act 1929, which stated: 
                                                        
41 Lennard’s Case (n 1). 
42 '.', ‘Obiter Dicta’ (1937) 83 LJ 297, 297. Sir Wilfrid Greene appointed as a Lord Justice (1935) and Master of the Rolls (1937).  
43 Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Fixed Trusts (Cmnd 5259, 1936) (‘Anderson Report 1936’). 
44 Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Share-Pushing (Cmnd 5539, 1937) (‘Bodkin Report 1937’). 
45 (2 & 3 Geo 6 c 16). 
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Where a person convicted of an offence under this section is a company (whether 
a company within the meaning of this Act or not), every director and every officer 
concerned in the management of the company shall be guilty of the like offence 
unless he proves that the act constituting the offence took place without his 
knowledge or consent. 
However, the Bodkin Report 1937 recommended that ‘share-pushing cases are of such 
importance that the Police or the Director of Public Prosecutions should where possible 
institute proceedings at public expense and that the consideration of cost should not be 
allowed to prevent the operation of the criminal law’.46 Consequently, the Bodkin Report 
1937 resulted in the enactment of section 18 Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939, 
which stated: 
Where any offence under this Act committed by a corporation is proved to have 
been committed with the consent or connivance of any director, manager, 
secretary or other officer of the corporation, he, as well as the corporation, shall be 
deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and 
punished accordingly. 
The Prevention of Fraud Investments Act 1939 was later amended by the Companies Acts 
of 194747 and 194848 before being replaced by section 13 Prevention of Fraud Investments 
Act 1958.49 
 Between 1912 and 1939 corporate criminal liability continued to reflect the 
meeting of two opposing concepts: the first a creature of Parliament in the form of a 
corporation incorporated by statute;50 and the second, the common law doctrines of 
criminal law regarding the physical act of committing a crime (‘actus reus’) and the state of 
mind required to commit a crime (‘mens rea’).51 Nonetheless, in the period preceding 1912 
the criminal judiciary adapted to the industrialisation and continued to construe penal 
                                                        
46 Bodkin Report 1937 (n 44) 30. 
47 (10 & 11 Geo 6 c 47). 
48 (11 & 12 Geo 6 c 38). 
49 Prevention of Fraud Investments Act 1958 (6 & 7 Eliz 2 c 45) which consolidated the Prevention of Fraud Act 1939 in conjunction 
with Companies Act 1947 and Companies Act 1948. 
50 Henry Parris, Government and the Railways in the Nineteenth-Century Britain (Routledge 1965) 18. 
51 Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (1st edn, Stevens 1979) 29-30. 
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statutes strictly with regard to a breach of the incorporation statute to attribute a criminal 
offence to a corporation.52 The Companies Act 1929 legislated to allow corporate 
incorporation53 and included specific provisions which dealt with breaches of company law 
by the corporation54 and directors.55 
 The definition of ‘director’ pursuant to section 275 (5) Companies Act 1929 stated 
that the use of ‘director shall include any person in accordance with whose directions or 
instructions the directors of a company have been accustomed to act’. Consequently, the 
Companies Act 1929 looked at the practical working structure of the corporation to 
determine corporate liability beyond a sole director, which was contrary to the 
identification doctrine using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation established in 
Lennard’s Case, in which it was stated that a director is ‘somebody for whom the company 
is liable because his action is the very action of the company itself’.56 Subsequently, the 
Companies Act 1929 recognised that the controlling mind of a corporation did not always 
lie with the director recorded with the Registrar of Companies and adopted a realistic 
approach regarding the workings of a corporation. 
 In addition to the extended use of the Companies Acts 1929 to regulate 
corporations, the number of regulatory statutes also increased between 1912 and 1939 in 
response to Parliament’s concerns regarding the use of railways and roads by the public 
and public welfare as it related to corporate responsibilities.57 Consequently, a corporation 
could commit a number of statutory criminal offences because of the increase in regulatory 
                                                        
52 Pearks, Gunston & Tee Ltd v Ward [1902] 2 KB 1 (KB); Chuter v Freeth & Pocock Ltd [1911] 2 KB 832 (KB); and Mousell Bros Ltd v 
London & North Western Railway Co [1917] 2 KB 836 (KB). 
53 Companies Act 1929 (19 & 20 Geo 5 c 23) pt 1. 
54 Companies Act 1929 (19 & 20 Geo 5 c 23) s 365. 
55 Companies Act 1929 (19 & 20 Geo 5 c 23) pt 4. 
56 Lennard’s Case (n 1) 713. 
57 Gower (n 36) 146. 
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statutes.58 The approach initially taken by the criminal judiciary before 1912 was to strictly 
interpret statutes to determine corporate criminal liability involving a breach of the 
corporation’s incorporating Act of Parliament59 or its breach of a statutory public duty.60 In 
response to the introduction of more regulatory statutes, the criminal judiciary continued 
to construe regulatory statutes strictly to address any corporate breaches which could 
result in a statutory criminal offence.61 Any issues regarding the actus reus or mens rea of 
the specific criminal offence rested on the construction of the individual statute breached, 
which the criminal judiciary interpreted strictly within the confines of the legislation to 
decide criminal cases. 
 Corporate Criminal Liability from 1912 to 1939 
Consequently, between 1912 and 1939 the law continued to hold corporations liable for 
public nuisance, including both a common law and a statutory breach,62 criminal libel63 or 
a further statutory breach whereby a criminal offence had been committed.64 However, 
the type of criminal offence committed in conjunction with the specific construction of the 
statute or common law breached by the corporation also determined the mechanism used 
by the courts to attribute corporate criminal liability through either strict liability or 
corporate criminal vicarious liability. This will be addressed by presenting a brief overview 
of key case law from the period between 1912 and 1939 with particular regard to three 
points which need to be considered prior to discussing the first and second turning points 
                                                        
58 Archbold’s 1927 (n 26) 9-10. 
59 R v The Great North of England Railway Company (1846) 9 QB 315, 115 ER 1294 (‘GNER Case’). 
60 R v The Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Company (1842) 3 QB 223, 114 ER 492 (‘Birmingham Case’). 
61 Road and Rail Traffic Act 1933 (23 & 24 Geo 5 c 53) in Cox & Sons Ltd v Sidery [1936] 24 Ry & Can Tr Cas 69; Atkin J in Mousell Bros 
Ltd v London and North-Western Railway Company [1917] 2 KB 836 (KB) 846. 
62 R v Stephens (1866) LR 1 QB 702 (QB) 710 established corporate criminal vicarious liability could be used to determine mens rea as 
affirmed by Lord Blackburn in The Pharmaceutical Society v The London and Provincial Supply Association Limited (1880) 5 App Cas 857 
(HL) 870. 
63 R v Holbrook and Others (1878) 4 QBD 42 (QB). 
64 Mousell Bros Ltd v London and North-Western Railway Company [1917] 2 KB 836 (KB) 846 (‘Mousell Case’). 
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of corporate manslaughter reform because all three points are symbiotically linked to the 
outcome of the first and second turning points of corporate manslaughter reform.65 The 
first point addresses the judicial reasoning concerning corporate criminal liability cases 
from 1912 to 1939 with regard to the approach taken by the criminal judiciary to attribute 
mens rea to a corporation if so prescribed by statute. The second point highlights the fact 
that between 1912 and 1939 the criminal judiciary made no reference to the judgment in 
the Lennard’s Case and the applicability of the identification doctrine to determining 
corporate criminal liability. The third point clarifies the procedural aspects regarding how 
a corporation could be indicted or summoned to appear before the criminal courts from 
1912 to 1939.66 
 In 1912 the statutory rule pursuant to section 2(1) to 2(2) Interpretation Act 1889 
still provided that a corporation could be indicted for a criminal offence, as affirmed by the 
judicial ruling in R v Tyler and International Commercial Co in 1891.67 Bowen LJ stated that 
‘the offending corporation cannot escape from the consequences that would follow in the 
case of an individual by showing that they are a corporation. This seems to me to be good 
sense.’68 
 The criminal judiciary continued to use two methods to establish corporate criminal 
liability: strict liability or vicarious liability. Strict liability was used for breaches of statutory 
duties by corporations, and this facilitated the enactment of legislation in response to a 
changing society, such as the expansion of the road network from 1912 to 1939 to protect 
the welfare and safety of the public.69 The increase in traffic on the roads, including 
                                                        
65 Lennard’s Case (n 1); Cory Bros Case (n 2). 
66 Criminal Justice Act 1925, s 33(3). 
67 R v Tyler and International Commercial Co (1891) 2 QB 588 (CA) (‘Tyler Case’). 
68 Tyler Case (n 67) 594. 
69 Adam Willis Kirkaldy and Alfred Dudley Evans, The History and Economics of Transport (Pitman & Sons 1920) 162. 
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commercial traffic, led to the enactment of Road Traffic Acts and Regulations between 
1912 and 1939, which included the Road Traffic Act 1930;70 the Road and Rail Traffic Act 
1933;71 and the Goods Vehicles (Keeping of Records) Regulations 1935.72 Consequently, a 
statutory breach of one of the traffic statutes by a corporation frequently led to a criminal 
offence, as demonstrated by the case of Cox & Sons Ltd v Sidery (‘Cox & Sons’),73 which was 
dealt with on appeal from the magistrates’ court to the High Court of Justice in 1936. 
 Lord Hewart CJ, Humphreys and Singleton JJ dismissed the Cox & Sons appeal on 
the grounds that a guilty intention of a corporation was not a necessary ingredient for the 
offence of failing to comply with the provisions of section 16 Road and Rail Traffic Act 1933. 
Section 16 of the Act provided that the holder of the relevant licence must keep records 
about hours of work, journeys and loads in respect of every person employed by the licence 
holder. Lord Hewart CJ stated: 
 There have been many ingenious arguments upon the topic of mens rea in relation 
 to the words of the particular statute, but here the words are imperative and plain: 
 ‘The holder of a licence shall keep or cause to be kept’. No words can be clearer 
 and no question of mens rea can possibly arise.74 
The case of Cox & Sons demonstrated the approach taken by the criminal judiciary with 
regard to the corporate breach of a statutory duty because the statute was construed 
strictly. The criminal judiciary continued to interpret the issue of mens rea strictly within 
the confines of the statute regarding a potential corporate breach of a statute should the 
issue of mens rea be raised. 
 The second method used to establish corporate criminal liability involved the use 
of corporate criminal vicarious liability against a corporation for the actions of one of their 
                                                        
70 (20 & 21 Geo 5 c 43). 
71 (23 & 24 Geo 5 c 53). 
72 Goods Vehicles (Keeping of Records) Regulations 1935, SR & O 1935/413. 
73 Cox & Sons Ltd v Sidery [1936] 24 Ry & Can Tr Cas 69 (‘Cox & Sons’). 
74 Cox & Sons (n 73) 71. 
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employees.75 In order to consider whether corporate criminal vicarious liability could be 
applied, the criminal judiciary again strictly construed the statute to ascertain whether a 
master could be held criminally responsible for the acts of his servants for a breach of a 
statute, as demonstrated in the case of Mousell Brothers Limited v London and North 
Western Railway Company (‘Mousell Case’), heard in 1917.76 The Mousell Case involved an 
appeal from the magistrates’ court heard before Viscount Reading CJ, Atkin and Ridley JJ. 
The magistrate had found Mousell Brothers Limited guilty of giving false account with 
intent to avoid the payment of tolls to the London and North Western Railway Company. 
The case involved a breach of section 98 Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, which 
provided that ‘every person being the owner or having the care of any carriage or goods 
passing upon the railway shall, on demand, give to the collector of tolls, at the places where 
he attends an exact account in writing of the goods’.77 Further, pursuant to section 99 
Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, the corporation would have committed an 
offence if such person as stated pursuant to section 98 Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 
1845 gave ‘false account, with intent to avoid payment of any tolls he shall be liable to a 
penalty’. 
 Both Viscount Reading CJ and Atkin J when they were considering who had a duty, 
they aimed to ascertain who carried out the task of caring for the goods carried on the 
railways, and both agreed the task was always carried out by the employee on behalf of his 
corporate master within the scope of his employment.78 Consequently, Atkin J in the 
                                                        
75 Please note the use of corporate criminal vicarious liability was strictly limited to specific common law offences including criminal 
libel or public nuisance as established by case law in the period preceding 1912 or as a result of the construction of the statute. 
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beyond the scope of this thesis. 
76 Mousell Case (n 64). 
77 (8 & 9 Vict c 20). 
78 Mousell Case (n 64) 845. 
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Mousell Case agreed with his two fellow judges that the appeal should be dismissed. The 
reason for this was as follows: 
While prima facie, a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts 
of his servants, yet the legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such 
words as to make the prohibition or the duty absolute; in which case the principal 
is liable if the act is in fact done by his servants.79 
Therefore, ‘the duty which is imposed upon an owner or person having care of the carriage 
or goods was a duty which even in 1845 would ordinarily be performed by a servant of the 
owner or the person having care’.80 Atkin J and his fellow judges construed the statute 
strictly with regard to the interpretation of ‘with intent’ because in their opinion the statute 
provided for the state of mind and there was no requirement that the mens rea should be 
proved against the principal. Thus, pursuant to the construction of the Railways 
Consolidation Clauses Act 1845, the court could use corporate criminal vicarious liability 
against the corporation to establish corporate criminal liability. 
 However, the courts limited the use of corporate criminal vicarious liability to the 
construction of specific statutes, as established in the Mousell Case. The statute in the 
Mousell Case used the description ‘with intent’, while other statutes referred to 
‘knowingly’, or ‘permitting’ or ‘causing’ and the like, which might import intent.81 Yet the 
corporation was absolutely liable regardless of any intent or mens rea because of the 
construction of the statute. The Mousell Case occurred in 1917, but the use of corporate 
criminal vicarious liability continued, as evidenced in 1936 with the case of Sidcup Building 
Estates Ltd v Sidery (‘Sidcup Case’) on appeal from Bromley Petty Sessions before Lord 
Hewart CJ, Du Parcq and Goddard JJ.82 The Sidcup Case involved a breach of section 19 
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81 Road Traffic Act 1930 (20 & 21 Geo 5 c 43). 
82 Sidcup Building Estates Ltd v Sidery Case 24 Ry & Can Tr Cas 164 (KB) (‘Sidcup Case’). 
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Road Traffic Act 1930, which permitted drivers to drive for no more than eleven hours in a 
twenty-four-hour period. The legislation included the wording ‘permitted’, which could 
also be used to interpret the offence through corporate criminal vicarious liability.83 The 
appellants argued that the breach of section 19 Road Traffic Act 1930 was caused by with 
the failure of their driver to follow their instructions regarding resting overnight. However, 
the driver handed in his log book to his employer every day; the log book evidenced the 
driving hours exceeded and, according to the evidence presented to the court, confirmed 
corporate awareness that the driver had exceeded the permitted driving hours.84 The 
employer failed to dismiss the driver after the first instance of exceeding the permitted 
hours contrary to its corporate policies and allowed the driver to exceed permitted hours 
three more times. Therefore, the mens rea attached to the breach of the statute was 
absolute against the corporation. On hearing the appeal of the corporation against 
conviction, Lord Hewart CJ declined to hear the skeleton argument from the respondent’s 
counsel and stated, ‘[I]t really comes to this, that if this case were different from what it is 
he might succeed, but as this case is what it is this appeal must be dismissed.’85 The Sidcup 
Case demonstrated that by 1936, nineteen years after the Mousell Case, the criminal 
judiciary was still relying upon the strict construction of the statute to determine whether 
corporate criminal vicarious liability could be found through adhering to the construction 
of the statute and the intention of Parliament. 
 Consequently, a position had been reached in the period between 1915 and 1939 
which meant that according to the criminal law a corporation could be indicted successfully 
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for a criminal offence relating to the breach of a statutory duty through strict liability or 
through corporate criminal vicarious liability if the construction of the statute meant that 
doing so was appropriate. However, it should also be noted that the criminal judiciary 
made no reference to Lennard’s Case and the identification doctrine to interpret corporate 
criminal liability for statutory offences which required the attribution of mens rea to the 
corporation. 
 Additionally, between 1912 and 1939 a procedural issue arose within the criminal 
courts as to how a corporation could be indicted for a criminal offence for which it needed 
to appear before a magistrates’ court under summons,86 before a court of oyer and 
terminer, at a gaol-delivery session or at sessions of the peace.87 The provisions of the 
Summary Jurisdiction Act 184888 provided for the summoning of corporations before a 
magistrates’ court, which was confirmed in Evans & Co Limited v London County Council 
(‘Evans Case’) in 1914.89 The Evans Case was heard on appeal from the magistrates’ court 
and involved a point of law concerning whether a company incorporated under the 
Companies Act could be made liable under the provisions of a penal statute. The penal 
statute in this case involved a breach of sections 4 and 14 of the Shops Act 1912 as the 
limited company had failed to ensure that the occupiers of the shop closed before one 
o’clock on one weekday every week. The offending limited company was found guilty in 
the first instance.90 
 The appeal argued that the recovery of the fine could not stand against an 
incorporated company pursuant to the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848. Avory, Rowlatt and 
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Shearman JJ dismissed the appeal and held that the fine could be recovered against a ‘body 
corporate’ even though all of the other provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848, 
such as arrest for non-payment of a fine, could not stand against a corporation. The 
reasoning behind the decision rested on there being no contrary intention in the Summary 
Jurisdiction Act 1848 or section 2 Interpretation Act 1889, which defined a ‘person’ as 
including a corporation.91 Avery J stated further that any argument that the corporation 
could not vote for an exception under the provisions of section 4 Shops Act 1912 was also 
incorrect. In his opinion ‘there is certainly nothing which prevents a limited company from 
expressing their wishes as occupiers. They can do so in the ordinary way, either by a 
resolution of the directors, or by the directors authorizing the manager to express their 
views’.92 
 Consequently, the Evans Case demonstrated that the criminal judiciary continued 
to construe penal statutes strictly to determine corporate mens rea. The Evans Case also 
illustrated the approach taken by the criminal judiciary to attribute the actions and intent 
of a corporation outside the scope of the penal statute to the directors through the passing 
of a resolution or evidence of instructions to their manager. Both methods would be 
recorded in the minute books of a corporation or witnessed accordingly.93 
 The criminal judiciary looked at the practical workings of the corporation to 
attribute corporate criminal liability, which followed the earlier decision and the approach 
taken in The Eastern Counties Railway and Richardson v Broom (‘Broom Case’) in 1851.94 
The Broom Case appeared in every subsequent edition of Archbold’s Criminal Pleadings, 
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Evidence & Practice from 1912 to 1962 with regard to the types of criminal offences a 
corporation could be indicted for, including assault.95 The Broom Case attributed corporate 
mens rea for assault committed by a servant and held that ‘an action would lie against a 
corporation, whenever the corporation can authorise the act done, and it is done by their 
authority’.96 The approach taken by the criminal judiciary in the Broom Case to interpret 
the actions and intent of the corporation differed from the decision in Lennard’s Case 
regarding the identification doctrine because corporate mens rea was not attributed to a 
single individual director as the ‘directing mind and will of the corporation’. The actions 
and intent of the directors in the Evans Case and the Broom Case related to the board of 
directors as a collective regarding the attribution of corporate criminal liability. The 
difference is subtle yet important, as the criminal judiciary made no reference to the 
identification doctrine as established in the Lennard’s Case with regard to any corporate 
criminal case reported from 1912 to 1939.97 
 However, despite the increase in the number of statutory criminal offences a 
corporation could be charged with and dealt with accordingly in the magistrates’ court 
pursuant to the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848, it was not possible for a corporation to 
appear before a court of oyer and terminer, or at a gaol-delivery or quarter session 
represented by their attorney.98 The case of R v Puck and Co (‘Puck Case’) in 1912 on appeal 
before Pickford, Avory and Lush JJ questioned the reasoning behind the procedural barriers 
                                                        
95 Archbold’s 1922 (n 22) 10; “… Archbold, which is our standard book on the criminal law”. HL Deb, 20 January 1977, vol 379, cols 498, 
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63, [2006] 2 All ER 257 [36]. 
96 Broom Case (n 28) 325, 566-567. 
97 Lennard’s Case (n 1) is not cited in any Archbold’s between the period 1915 to 1939. Archbold’s 1918 (n 86); Archbold’s 1922 (n 22); 
Archbold’s 1927 (n 26); Robert Ernest Ross and Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler (eds), Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in 
Criminal Cases (28th edn, Sweet & Maxwell & Stevens 1931); and Robert Ernest Ross and Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler (eds), 
Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (29th edn, Sweet & Maxwell & Stevens 1934). 
98 Archbold’s 1918 (n 86) 9; Archbold’s 1922 (n22) 10. 
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which prevented an indictment against a corporation being heard in the Central Criminal 
Court.99 Pickford J said that ‘the point was in some doubt, but they had decided not to 
determine it as it was not necessary to do so. The rule would be absolute, so that the Crown 
Office Rules might apply’100 and the rule nisi for certiorari removed the indictment from 
the Central Criminal Court to the High Court where the corporation could be represented 
by their attorney and be charged.101 
 However, the later decision by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1922 in R v Daily 
Mirror Newspapers Limited (‘Mirror Case’) 102 considered and explained the difference 
between this case and the case of Puck with regard to a corporation being indicted in a 
higher court. The statute breached in Puck involved the non-payment of a fine upon 
conviction.103 In the Mirror Case the corporation was charged with corrupt practices 
pursuant to section 34 Representation of the People Act 1918; conviction resulted in 
imprisonment only.104 The Criminal Court of Appeal quashed the conviction against the 
limited company. Lord Hewart CJ, Shearman and Slater JJ held that a limited company could 
not be committed for trial as there was no representative of the limited corporation and 
the offence upon conviction involved imprisonment, which could not stand against a 
limited company.105 However, the contrasting positions between the Puck Case and the 
Mirror Case highlighted the need for a legislative solution to address the procedural 
problems concerning how a corporation could plead in response to being charged with an 
indictable offence.106 
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 A solution was found through the enactment of section 33(3) Criminal Justice Act 
1925, which stated that a corporation could be indicted to appear before a criminal court 
provided that a certain procedure was followed: 
 Where the grand jury at any assizes or quarter sessions return a true bill against a 
 corporation in respect of any offence, the corporation may, on arraignment before 
 the court of assize or the court of quarter sessions, as the case may be, enter in 
 writing by its representative a plea of guilty or not guilty, and if either the 
 corporation does not appear by a representative or, though it does appear, fails to 
 enter as aforesaid any plea, the court shall order a plea of not guilty to be entered 
 and the trial shall proceed as though the corporation had duly entered a plea of 
 not guilty. 
Meanwhile, the criminal judiciary continued to determine corporate criminal liability 
through the strict construction of penal statutes, as evidenced by the decisions in the 
Mousell Case and the Sidcup Case. The judges attributed strict liability or corporate criminal 
vicarious liability based on the construction of the statute relevant to the case. 
Consequently, as the number of corporate criminal offences enacted through regulatory 
statutes increased, the courts looked to the strict construction of the statute with regard 
to whether a corporation could be indicted and fined upon conviction, as established in the 
Mirror Case in 1922. 
 Further, if the construction of the statute was unclear when determining any issues 
of corporate mens rea, the criminal judiciary looked to the practical workings of the 
corporation to determine the intent of the limited company. Corporate criminal liability 
was established by looking at the resolutions passed by the directors or the work of their 
managers, as cited in the Evans Case107 following the previous decision in the Broom 
Case.108 The criminal judiciary had established its own methods and judicial reasoning to 
consider the problematic issue of corporate mens rea and subsequently made no reference 
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to the Lennard’s Case or the identification doctrine. It is against a background of clear 
criminal judicial reasoning with regard to the strict construction of penal statutes 
connected to corporate criminal liability that the first turning point of corporate 
manslaughter reform occurred in 1915 with the creation of the identification doctrine.109 
 First Turning Point of Corporate Manslaughter Reform: The Creation 
of the Identification Doctrine (1915) 
The identification doctrine was first described in an appeal to the House of Lords in the civil 
law case of Lennard’s Carrying Co. Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd (‘Lennard’s Case’)110 
regarding a maritime trading dispute pursuant to the Merchant Shipping Act 1894.111 The 
identification doctrine referred to the method used by the judiciary to establish who had 
control of the corporation and could be identified as the corporation for the purpose of the 
statute in order to determine whether there was any fault.112 Even though the 
identification doctrine was developed as a civil law statutory tool to aid the interpretation 
of a specific section of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, from 1944 onwards the criminal 
judiciary also relied on the reasoning behind the identification doctrine to decide corporate 
criminal liability cases involving statutory offences and common law offences. However, 
the criminal cases decided in 1944 did not cite Lennard’s Case directly in any of their 
judgments.113 Furthermore, within the context of corporate manslaughter it took a further 
seventy-six years to confirm that the identification doctrine using the ‘directing mind and  
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will’ interpretation should also be applied to determine manslaughter by a corporation, 
which was done in R v P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (‘P&O Case’).114 Hence, Lennard’s 
Case and the judicial reasoning behind the creation of the identification doctrine were 
important with regard to the first turning point of corporate manslaughter reform because 
there were no grounds to substantiate the crossover of the identification doctrine from 
civil law to criminal law which occurred indirectly in 1944 through the use of identification 
doctrine reasoning.115 Further, from 1912 to 1939 the criminal judiciary was already strictly 
construing penal statutes involving mens rea outside the scope of the penal statute to 
determine corporate criminal liability without using the identification doctrine.116 
 Thus, the creation and subsequent use of the identification doctrine using the 
‘directing mind and will’ interpretation to attribute corporate mens rea for corporate 
manslaughter from 1991 blighted corporate manslaughter reform because the only 
successful indictments for gross negligence manslaughter involved small corporations 
where it was possible to identify the ‘directing mind and will of the corporation’ using the 
identification doctrine.117 Consequently, in order to ascertain whether there were any 
reasons of marked of similarity which inhibited corporate manslaughter reform, the facts 
of the Lennard’s Case are considered and there is a critique of the judicial reasoning behind 
the decision to create the identification doctrine. By considering both the facts of the case 
and the judicial reasoning that created the identification doctrine, it is possible to draw the  
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conclusion that the identification doctrine should never have been used outside the 
bounds of the civil law because the identification doctrine created in obiter dictum 
represented the physical and philosophical idealism found in the corporate structures of 
the early 1900s.118 The identification doctrine using the ‘directing mind and will’ 
interpretation represented the concept that corporate decision making only involved an 
individual director, which might have been the case with corporations in the early 1900s. 
However, with the creation of nationalised corporations in conjunction with an increase in 
the number of large limited corporations operating nationally corporate decisions were 
made through corporate policies and procedures.119 
 Furthermore, the specific use of the identification doctrine to determine 
manslaughter by a corporation was only confirmed in 1991 in the aftermath of the 
Zeebrugge Ferry Disaster.120 However, by the 1990s the identification doctrine using the 
‘directing mind and will’ interpretation was no longer fit for purpose because it failed to 
reflect the diverse and complex corporate organisational structures of modern 
corporations.121 Yet still, over 100 years later, the influence and inhibiting impact of a 
solitary maritime dispute case can still be felt within the context of the CMCHA 2007 
because this Act implemented a modified version122 of the identification doctrine using 
‘the directing mind and will’ interpretation in order to establish whether the actions of a 
corporation were so gross as to confirm that it had committed corporate manslaughter.123 
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3.4.1 Facts of the Lennard’s Case 
Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd (‘Lennard’s Co’) was an incorporated limited company and the 
owner of a oil tank steel screw steamer called the Edward Dawson, which was built in 1890 
for the bulk carriage of oil. Lennard’s Co bought the ship in 1907 and then immediately 
paid for a substantial refit. The manager of Lennard’s Co was another incorporated 
company, John M Lennard & Sons Ltd (‘Lennard & Sons’). The managing director of Lennard 
& Sons was Mr John M Lennard (‘Mr Lennard’), who was also the registered managing 
owner of the Edward Dawson. 
 After purchasing the Edward Dawson, Lennard’s Co time chartered out the ship to 
Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co Ltd (‘Anglo-Saxon’). After four years at sea the Edward Dawson 
was overhauled in Liverpool and certified for a further twelve months’ service at sea until 
31 March 1912, subject to the boiler pressure being reduced from 160 to 130 lbs. In 
September 1911 the Edward Dawson, still under the charter of Anglo-Saxon, transported 
2011 tonnes of benzine from a port in Russia to Rotterdam on behalf of the Asiatic 
Petroleum Company (‘Asiatic Co’). While the ship was at sea, the boilers leaked and salted 
up, resulting in the ship losing power. The Edward Dawson then ran aground off the Dutch 
coast in a gale, which caused the benzine tanks to rupture. This resulted in an explosion; 
both the ship and the cargo were lost. 
 Asiatic Co brought an action against Lennard’s Co on two grounds: failure to deliver 
the cargo; and the loss of the cargo owing to the Edward Dawson being unseaworthy by 
reason of defective boilers. Lennard’s Co sought to relieve its liability pursuant to section 
502 Merchant Shipping Act 1894, which stated: 
The owner of a British sea-going ship, or any share therein, shall not be liable to 
make good to any extent whatever any loss or damage happening without his actual 
fault or privity, in the following cases; namely,: (i.) Where any goods, merchandise, 
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or other things whatsoever taken in or put on board his ship are lost or damaged 
by reason of fire on board the ship. 
In the lower court, Bray J held that the Edward Dawson, owned by Lennard’s Co but 
managed by Lennard & Sons, had left the port in an unseaworthy condition owing to 
defective boilers that caused the fire and ultimately sank the ship.124 Within the course of 
the trial, Bray J stated that ‘it is not disputed that the fault of the managing owners 
(Lennard & Sons) is the fault of the owners (Lennard’s Co)’125 and was very clear with his 
definition that the ‘managing owners’ were Lennard & Sons. He made one reference to Mr 
Lennard to confirm that letters were addressed to him directly. However, no evidence had 
been provided to prove that Mr Lennard or the board of Lennard & Sons (the managing 
owners of Lennard’s Co) had assumed any management responsibilities for the Edward 
Dawson. Therefore, Bray J held that because Lennard & Sons (the managing owners of 
Lennard’s Co) had failed to prove that the loss of the cargo was not its fault, it could not 
rely upon the protection of section 502 Merchant Shipping Act 1894 to relieve its 
liability.126 Bray J based his decision on the absence of any witness statements from the 
directors of Lennard’s Co (owner of the Edward Dawson) or Lennard & Sons (managing 
owners of Lennard’s Co) in conjunction with the lack of any further evidence from other 
corporate documents, such as the directors’ minute book, to prove that the managing 
owners (Lennard & Sons) of Lennard’s Co (owner of the Edward Dawson) were not at 
fault.127 
Lennard’s Co appealed against the decision of Bray J in Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd v 
Lennard’s Carrying Company Limited (‘Lennard’s Appeal Case’) on two grounds: firstly the 
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facts of the case were wrong concerning the unseaworthiness of the Edward Dawson; and 
secondly it was contended that section 502 Merchant Shipping Act 1894 should have been 
allowed to relieve the liability for the loss of the cargo.128 The Court of Appeal affirmed the 
decision of Bray J and dismissed the appeal because the managing owners (Lennard & Sons) 
of Lennard’s Co (owner of the Edward Dawson) had knowledge of the defective boilers 
through the actions of Mr Lennard, who failed to give instructions to the captain of the 
Edward Dawson that the ship should not go to sea. 
The difference between the decision made by Bray J and the decision reached in 
the appeal was based on a detailed consideration of the role of Mr Lennard to establish 
whether Mr Lennard was at fault while acting on behalf of the managing owners (Lennard 
& Sons) for the shipowner (Lennard’s Co). Buckley and Hamilton L JJ affirmed the decision 
of Bray J on both grounds. However, Vaughan Williams LJ dissented on the second ground 
because he believed there was no evidence to support the claim that Mr Lennard or the 
shipowners (Lennard’s Co) were aware of the unseaworthiness of the Edward Dawson and 
therefore they were without fault pursuant to section 502 Merchant Shipping Act 1894.129 
Vaughan Williams LJ argued that Mr Lennard and the captain were merely agents of the 
shipowner (Lennard’s Co) because there was no evidence to prove otherwise.130 The same 
point connected to a lack of evidence was made by Bray J in the lower court and and he 
stated that the burden of proof was reversed so Lennard’s Co had to prove that it was 
without fault. However, Buckley and Hamilton L JJ affirmed the judgment of Bray J in so far 
as they agreed that Lennard & Sons were the managing owners and the person acting for 
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them was Mr Lennard, who had the requisite actual fault131 because he was ‘the moving 
spirit’132 between Lennard & Sons and Lennard’s Co. 
An appeal from an order of the Court of Appeal was made by Lennard’s Co to the 
House of Lords in Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd (Appellants) v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd 
(Respondents)133 disputing the Court of Appeal’s affirmation of the judgment of Bray J. The 
appellants argued that the actual fault of Mr Lennard could not be attributed to Lennard’s 
Co because he was an agent and not the alter ego of either Lennard’s Co (owner of the 
Edward Dawson) or the managing owners (Lennard & Sons). Therefore, Mr Lennard’s fault 
could not be the actual fault of either Lennard’s Co (owner of the Edward Dawson) or the 
managing owners (Lennard & Son) because Mr Lennard did not represent them. 
However, the judgment of Viscount Haldane LC134 stated that was not the case 
because the ship’s register for the Edward Dawson named Mr Lennard ‘as the person to 
whom the management of the vessel was entrusted’135 and Mr Lennard ‘appears to have 
been the active spirit in the joint stock corporation (Lennard & Sons) which managed the 
ship for the appellants (Lennard’s Co)’.136 Viscount Haldane LC stated further that 
a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a 
 body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the 
 person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is 
 really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the 
 personality of the corporation. That person may be under the direction of the 
 shareholders in general meeting; that person may be the board of directors itself, 
 or it may be, and in some companies it is so, that that person has an authority co-
 ordinate with the board of directors given to him under the articles of association, 
 and is appointed by the general meeting of the company, and can only be removed 
 by the general meeting of the company.137 
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Viscount Haldane LC then emphasised the position further when he stated, ‘[M]y Lords, 
whatever is not known about Mr Lennard’s position, this is known for certain, Mr Lennard 
took the active part in the management of this ship on behalf of the owners, and Mr 
Lennard, as I have said, was registered as the person designated for this purpose in the 
ship’s register.’138 Yet one paragraph later in his judgment he contradicted his previous 
statement when he stated that ‘Mr Lennard did not go into the box to rebut the 
presumption of liability and we have no satisfactory evidence as to what the constitution 
of the company was or as to what Mr Lennard’s position was’.139 The inference that Mr 
Lennard had a close relationship with both Lennard’s Co and Lennard & Sons was based on 
the statement of Mr Simpson, who was the company secretary for both corporations.140 
However, further details were required to establish whether the close connection between 
Lennard’s & Co and Lennard & Sons was the same for all corporate officers. After all, the 
role of the company secretary was heavily administrative. Therefore, if no evidence was 
provided through either corporate documentation or the calling of directors from both 
corporations then, according to the civil standard of proof of the balance of probabilities 
and the construction of section 502 Merchant Shipping Act 1894, Lennard’s Co could not 
prove it was ‘without fault’ because there was a lack of evidence to do so. Consequently, 
the question of ‘who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego 
and centre of the personality of the corporation’141 was noted in dictum; the provision for 
statutory relief in the Lennard’s Case failed because of a lack of evidence rather than the 
actual role of Mr Lennard that could be identified using the identification doctrine. 
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3.4.2 The Creation of the Identification Doctrine and Judicial Reasoning 
The creation of the identification doctrine proceeded to inhibit corporate manslaughter 
reform, initially regarding general corporate criminal liability, from 1944142 onwards before 
it was directly applied to corporate manslaughter from 1991.143 The creation of the 
identification doctrine acted as an inhibitor because between 1912 and 1939 the criminal 
judiciary had already identified that penal statutes that apply to corporations should be 
construed strictly in the first instance. The open structure of the conclusion reached by 
Viscount Haldane LC implied that he intended the identification doctrine to be used in the 
future by the courts.144 However, it was unclear whether he meant that the identification 
doctrine should also be used in the criminal courts. Nonetheless, this implication regarding 
the future use of the identification doctrine can be tested by contrasting his conclusion in 
the Lennard’s Case with the conclusions in a further two company law cases he heard that 
were based on statutory interpretation: Sinclair v Brougham (‘Sinclair’) in 1914145 and 
Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company v R (‘Bonanza’) in 1916.146 The conclusions written 
by Viscount Haldane LC in Sinclair147 and Bonanza148 were precise and not open-ended, 
which demonstrated the uniqueness of his dictum in the Lennard’s Case which created the 
identification doctrine; in the Lennard’s Case he did not mention any restrictions on the 
future use of the identification doctrine and was content to let the courts do want they 
wanted with the dictum in the future.149 
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 Consequently, in order to address the eventual impact of the identification doctrine 
on future corporate manslaughter reform, the judicial reasoning behind Viscount Haldane 
LC’s creation of the identification doctrine needs to be understood to establish why the 
identification doctrine continued to inhibit future turning points of corporate 
manslaughter reform. In an early draft of his Memorandum of Events between 1906 to 
1915, he said, ‘[L]ong before I went into politics I had been deeply interested in German 
literature and philosophy.’150 His passion for Germany and other systems of law151 in 
conjunction with his lifelong interest in philosophy152 influenced not only his life but also 
his judicial reasoning,153 which can be seen in his creation of the identification doctrine in 
the Lennard’s Case. 
 Influence of Other Systems of Law, in particular German Law 
The first point that needs to be considered is the timing of the Lennard’s Case in March 
1915, because the case was decided three months before Viscount Haldane LC was forced 
to step down as Lord Chancellor because of his perceived German sympathies and personal 
connections to Germany in First World War Britain.154 Soon after Viscount Haldane LC 
resigned as Lord Chancellor,155 he wrote a letter to Viscount Esher156 in which he stated, 
‘[F]or myself I am happy, for I shall now have time to write scientific judgments in the 
Supreme Tribunals, and to turn to other things.’157 However, his scientific approach to 
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judgments was already evident in the Lennard’s Case in that, in his own words, ‘it was easy 
for me to pass from one system of law to another wholly different, grasping what was 
distinctive of the spirit of the jurisprudence with which I was dealing’.158 He used the same 
approach to create the identification doctrine, using a scientific approach to differentiate 
between the agents and the organs of German company law.159 However, although he 
adopted a scientific adaptation of the German system of law within his judgment, he would 
have been aware that corporate criminal liability and corporate manslaughter160 did not 
exist within German criminal law because, as he had said himself, he was capable of passing 
from one system of law to another.161 
 The equivalent of a limited liability corporation in German law is a Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung (‘GmbH’)162. German laws were contained in codifications.163 In 1892 
the law relating to a GmbH was codified using the Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung (‘GmbHG’).164 §6 Abs. 1 GmbHG stated that ‘die Gesellschaft muß 
einen oder mehrere Geschäftsführer haben’.165 The translation of this section, section 6(1), 
is that the corporation had to have one or more leaders of the business. Geschäftsführer is 
a generic term as although it can be translated literally as the leader of the business, it can 
also be interpreted as the CEO or the executive director or quite simply as the general 
manager of the business who is further down the corporate ladder. 
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 However, the point of reference as far as Viscount Haldane LC’s identification 
doctrine was concerned would have been the requirement that according to §§35 to 44 
GmbHG the day-to-day management rested with the Geschäftsführers or, if there was 
more than one, the management board. §39 GmbHG also made it a legal requirement to 
register the name of the Geschäftsführers so that specific names were linked to the 
activities of the business, and a list of directors had to be submitted annually pursuant to 
§40 GmbHG. The influence of German company law could be tenuously linked to Viscount 
Haldane LC’s concept of a directing mind of the corporation in the identification doctrine 
because the provisions of the GmbHG could be linked to a single director. However, 
German law did not recognise a solitary director as the ‘directing mind and will of the 
corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation’166 because a 
German company had two boards: a Vorstand (management board), responsible for the 
day-to-day management of the corporation; and an Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board), which 
was concerned with the appointments to and supervision of the management board.167 
Further, all of the GmbH details had to be registered in a Handelsregister (commercial 
register) that was administered by the Amtsgericht (German court of first instance for civil 
and criminal cases) and that was also open to public inspection. German company law also 
stated that any restrictions connected to the powers of the management board had to be 
registered pursuant to §35 GmbHG and that the commercial register had to be very clear 
to record which director had been given a particular task to undertake and the limitation 
of any restriction imposed on the director’s duties. 
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 Referring back to the facts of the Lennard’s Case, corporate information relating to 
Lennard’s Co and Lennard & Sons would have been recorded within the articles of 
association and the memorandum in English law, which was similar to German company 
law. Yet the level of detail required regarding the management board and specific director 
powers was more precise under German company law; in Lennard’s Case it would not have 
been possible to establish the power of and specific tasks undertaken by all of the 
corporate officers in Lennard’s Co and Lennard & Sons as it would under the GmbHG.168 
English company law did not provide that level of detail because there was no requirement 
to detail the specific powers of certain directors in a commercial register.169 Hence, 
Lennard’s Case was dismissed owing to a lack of evidence, but under German company law 
this would not have happened because the roles and powers of the management in both 
Lennard’s Co and Lennard & Sons would have been established. 
 Further, if Viscount Haldane LC was trying to introduce an element of German 
company law into English law then the specific requirements of German agency law had to 
be addressed too because German agency law was pivotal to German commercial law 
because it was needed to establish liability in German civil law.170 §§164 et seq Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (‘BGB’) set down the basic regime and powers of German agency law. 
However, what was unique to German agency law was the commercial power of the 
‘Prokurist’. The ‘Prokura’ conferred upon the holder, the ‘Prokurist’, general powers to 
execute every kind of transaction associated with the corporation pursuant to §§ 49 to 50 
Handelsgesetzbuch (‘HGB’). The ‘Prokurist’ in a German corporation might have been a 
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senior manager or a director. However, the ‘Prokura’ could be a joint post or an individually 
held post and could also be created as ‘a branch establishment Prokura’ pursuant to the 
provisions of §50 Abs.3 HGB. 
 Consequently, when Viscount Haldane LC created the identification doctrine, he 
referred to ‘who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and 
centre of the personality of the corporation’171 outside the agency role. He disregarded the 
role of the ‘Prokurist’ at branch or company level because under German agency law Mr 
Lennard, rather than being ‘the directing and controlling mind’ could also have been a 
‘Prokurist’ with the requisite specific authorisation to act on behalf of either Lennard’s Co 
or Lennard & Sons as an agent of the corporations rather than the alter ego of the 
corporations. 
 The creation of the identification doctrine attempted to provide a solution to 
address who could be identified as the ‘directing mind and will of a corporation’. But at the 
same time, if it was Viscount Haldane LC’s intention to be influenced by the structure of 
German companies and how they were created, as well as by the powers of the ‘Prokurist’, 
the identification doctrine was always destined for failure because German company law 
and German commercial agency law are symbiotic. Further, the German civil law, in the 
absence of corporate criminal liability in German law, was scientific and precise to pinpoint 
who has responsibility for certain corporate tasks and powers that were done and 
exercised respectively on behalf of the corporation; this is not always the directors because 
branch establishments can also be ‘Prokurists’. Consequently, German company and 
commercial law evolved to reflect future corporate development and changing corporate 
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structures. However, the identification doctrine in English law failed to evolve to keep pace 
with the changing corporate structures; the doctrine continued to seek a single director, 
which was contrary to German law, which recognised the role of management boards in 
large corporations and could evolve as corporations evolved.172 
 Viscount Haldane LC stated that he knew ‘where the facts have to be marshalled, 
brought under principle, and exhibited in the light of varying juridical systems’,173 and the 
creation of the identification doctrine in dictum in the Lennard’s Case most definitely had 
done this: the facts were marshalled to fit within some aspects of German law; they were 
brought under a limited principle of German company and commercial law; and they were 
also exhibited in the light of some of the laws in the German legal system, but not all of 
them. However, the use of the identification doctrine in civil and criminal law was destined 
to fail because in order to work effectively against all incorporated corporations, regardless 
of size, all of the relevant German codes had to be implemented in order to identify an 
individual with the power to act on behalf of the corporation as an agent or as a 
representative of the corporation. Viscount Haldane LC spoke at length about his 
knowledge of and ability to work with other legal systems, and the identification doctrine 
reflected his passion for scientific judgments; he was attempting to provide a clear answer 
through the application of logic. Consequently, a suggestion about how the identification 
doctrine could be used in the future by the courts can be found in Lennard’s Case, but none 
can be found in the two other company law cases he heard.174 Nonetheless, because of his 
legal expertise and lifelong passion for German and other legal systems, he would have 
been aware that the German legal system did not acknowledge corporate criminal liability 
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beyond imposing an administrative fine.175 So perhaps regardless of the implication that 
the courts could do with his dictum whatever they wanted in the future, it was never 
Viscount Haldane LC’s intention to create the identification doctrine so that it could be 
used in the criminal courts in England and Wales. The identification doctrine was already 
pushing limits within the English civil law with the creation of a doctrine , when the statute 
already provided clear guidance.176 
 However, his knowledge of German law was not the only German influence behind 
the creation of the identification doctrine in the Lennard’s Case because Viscount Haldane 
LC, in his Memorandum of Events between 1906 to 1915, wrote that ‘philosophical studies 
have always occupied me very closely, and particularly the study of German idealism’,177 
which included the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.178 
 Hegelian Philosophical Influence and the Lennard’s Case 
Heuston, in Lives of the Lord Chancellors: 1885–1940, stated that Viscount Haldane’s 
‘philosophical training enabled him to deal very convincingly with the problem of corporate 
personality in the Lennard’s Case’.179 His introduction to Hegelian theories of philosophy 
occurred while he was a student at the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen in Germany in 
1874.180 However, when it came to the crossover between legal practice and his 
philosophical training, Viscount Haldane admitted that ‘the only advantage which this line 
of study brought for the purposes of the Bar was the habit it developed of seeking for the 
underlying principles in dealing with facts, however apparently confused and 
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complicated’.181 Viscount Haldane’s passion for Hegelian philosophy remained with him all 
of his life,182 to such a degree that in 1921 he wrote a letter to Professor Pringle-Pattison 
in which he declared, ‘I think, I remain in the main an Hegelian, with Hegel interpreted de 
novo’ (sic).183 Traces of Hegelian philosophy can be found in his judgment in the Lennard’s 
Case that led to the creation of the identification doctrine, which need to be addressed 
because the identification doctrine inhibited future turning points of corporate 
manslaughter reform. 
 Hegel lived from 1770 to 1831 and his main philosophical theories involved ‘an 
analysis of categories, concepts or their justifications’.184 He believed that true freedom 
involved individuals submitting their will to the laws of the state and performing the duties 
dictated by a particular place or role they occupied within society as a whole.185 In 1921 
Viscount Haldane referred to Hegel’s concepts throughout his book entitled The Reign of 
Relativity, in which he stated: 
 There is also a large class of cases which come within the law, but which … may turn 
 on no general principle of law strictly so called. It may depend, not on abstract rules 
 which cannot take account of all the particular considerations that ought to 
 weighed, but on what reasonable men of the world would say that their fellow-men 
 ought in the individual situation have done.186 
Viscount Haldane LC emphasised the use of Hegelian concepts further in a letter to 
Professor Pringle-Pattison in which he explained that he could not ‘give up the notion of a 
fundamental subject-object relation’.187 Viscount Haldane LC used the Hegelian concept of 
the subject-object relation in the Lennard’s Case in that the corporation is the subject.188 
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The Reign of Relativity described the object as what the reasonable man wants to know 
with regard to ‘who is the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and 
centre of the personality of the corporation’189 because English law, through the state and 
the role of the judiciary, provided stability for the reasonable man. Viscount Haldane LC 
confirmed his position on the influence of judicial reasoning when he stated that ‘we are 
far away here from the Continental conception of a judge as a mere interpreter of rigid 
codes’.190 
 The creation of the identification doctrine, which included some of the rules 
contained within German company and commercial law’ and German philosophical ideals, 
inhibited corporate manslaughter reform because the identification doctrine was never 
intended to be used in a criminal court. Perhaps it was Viscount Haldane LC’s intention that 
the open-endness of his conclusion in the Lennard’s Case implied that the courts should 
use the dictum as they saw fit in the future. However, his knowledge of other legal systems, 
in particular his interest in all things German, indicated that he would have been aware 
that corporate criminal liability did not exist in German law. Consequently, the 
identification doctrine was based on his own beliefs, connected to Hegel’s, with regard to 
the role of the state and the individual and was also based on an attempt to apply German 
law principles of company and commercial law in part. Nonetheless, the creation of the 
identification doctrine was a decisive turning point in corporate manslaughter reform. 
 The definition of a decisive turning point in the evolution of the common law that 
had been provided was a case whose ‘sway is undiminished, indeed growing’.191 Viscount 
Haldane LC’s identification doctrine achieved an undiminished influence that can still be 
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felt over 100 years after its creation; its influence grew, and the identification doctrine was 
used from 1991 onwards to establish gross negligence manslaughter and it was included 
in the CMCHA 2007. By 1915 the criminal judiciary was already approaching corporate 
criminal liability independently within the context of the strict construction of penal 
statutes. If the criminal judiciary required further assistance to interpret mens rea outside 
the penal statute, they looked towards the approaches taken in the Evans Case and the 
Broom Case with regard to instructions given by and resolutions passed by the company 
directors. In fact Viscount Haldane LC dismissed the appeal in the Lennard’s Case on the 
very same point, that is, a lack of evidence caused by the non-production of corporate 
documents.192 
 Second Turning Point of Corporate Manslaughter: R v Cory Brothers 
& Co (1927) 
R v Cory Brothers and Company Limited (‘Cory Bros Case’)193 involved the death of an 
assistant collier on 24 August 1926 at Ogmore Vale Colliery, which was owned by Cory 
Brothers and Company Limited (‘Cory Bros Co’), a large incorporated mining and shipping 
company operating in South Wales.194 The assistant collier’s death occurred in the 
aftermath of the Great Strike of 1926 and during the Great Lock-Out of 1926 in South 
Wales.195 A few months earlier, on 3 May 1926 from midnight onwards, a national strike 
had commenced in support of the miners’ request for a living wage. Transport and railway 
workers, in conjunction with printers and workers in other heavy industries and the 
utilities, were all called out to support the miners.196 However, on 12 May 1926 the General  
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Council of the Trade Union Congress (‘TUC’) called off the national strike because of 
proposals put forward for a National Wages Board. But the miners dissented and continued 
with their strike action, which resulted in the Great Lock-Out of 1926.197 Despite 
reconciliation attempts by the government of the day ‘the miners were driven back to work 
by starvation after holding out for six months’.198 In November 1926, when the miners in 
South Wales eventually returned to work, their working conditions were worse than before 
as they accepted longer hours, lower wages and district agreements.199 
 It is against the backdrop of the aftermath of the General Strike and during the 
heights of the Great Lock-Out of 1926 that the Cory Bros Case emerged as the second 
turning point of corporate manslaughter reform. The Cory Bros Case was heard before 
Finlay J at the Glamorgan Assizes between February and March 1927; it was held that a 
corporation could not be indicted for manslaughter. 
 The reasoning behind Finlay J’s decision needs to addressed because the outcome 
impacted not only the second turning point of corporate manslaughter reform but also the 
six remaining corporate manslaughter reform turning points that occurred from 1927 to 
1999 because Finlay J’s decision prevented the criminal judiciary from using its unique 
approach to attributing mens rea to a corporation, as established in the earlier Evans Case 
and Broom Case. Consequently, in order to understand the eventual outcome of the Cory 
Bros Case, it must be appreciated that the case was not just about the removal of 
procedural obstacles surrounding the indictment of a limited corporation for 
manslaughter; it was also about how the common law addressed the issue of whether a 
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corporation could commit manslaughter in the aftermath of the conflict of the General 
Strike and the Great Lock-Out of 1926. 
 An overview of the law of gross negligence manslaughter as it stood in 1927 sets 
the scene prior to a consideration of the facts of the case and an examination of the factual 
and legal discrepancies that can be noted between the committal hearing in the 
magistrates’ court 200 and the Cory Brothers Case hearing at the assizes.201 The judicial 
reasoning behind Finlay J’s decision that a corporation could not be indicted for 
manslaughter demonstrated his inexperience as a judge,202 and his summing up of criminal 
cases highlighted the political and social undertones of his decision and his disregard for 
the strict construction of penal statutes in the Cory Bros Case. Finally, the minute books for 
the Cory Bros Co which recorded the directors’ meetings were conspicuously silent. 
Despite the events of 1926 connected to the General Strike and the General Lock-Out, 
there was no evidence of any corporate management decisions being made because the 
pages of the minute books only recorded the dates of the meetings and confirmation of 
the date of the previous meeting of the directors. The lack of recorded entries was 
significant because the criminal judiciary looked for evidence in the form of corporate 
documents to determine issues of mens rea if these were could not be addressed by the 
strict construction of the relevant penal statute that had been established in the Evans 
Case and the Broom Case.203 
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3.5.1 Brief Overview of Gross Negligence Manslaughter from 1912 to 1939 
In 1927, when the Cory Brothers Case was heard in the Glamorgan Assizes, the case of R v 
Bateman (‘Bateman’)204 was still the leading authority205 for supporting an indictment for 
involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence. The case of Bateman involved an appeal by 
a doctor against his conviction for manslaughter after a woman died following an operation 
he had performed negligently. Lord Hewart stated that in order to establish gross 
negligence manslaughter the following must be established using the Bateman gross 
negligence test, that is, A had caused the death of B: 
1. A owed a duty to B to take care (civil liability); 
2. The duty was not discharged (civil liability); 
3. The default caused the death of B (civil liability); 
4. In addition to points 1 to 3 in order to establish criminal liability the facts 
must be such that in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused 
went beyond a matter of compensation between the subjects and showed 
such disregard for the life and safety of others to amount to a crime against 
the State and conduct deserving punishment.206 
It was recognised that the test was objective. Therefore, in order to establish the degree 
of negligence, the jury had to be satisfied on two points: (1) what could be deemed the 
conduct of the reasonable man or, for our purposes, the reasonable corporation?; and (2) 
could the conduct of the defendant corporation be deemed a gross departure from such a 
standard of care? 
 Between 1912 and 1939 the case of Andrews v DPP (‘Andrews’), heard in 1937 in 
the House of Lords, reconsidered the concept of criminal negligence and how. a defendant 
could be found criminally negligent.207 However, as the involuntary manslaughter charge 
concerned manslaughter while driving that involved recklessness, it was considered to be 
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a subcategory of gross negligence manslaughter, and this continued to be the 
understanding from 1912 to 1939.208 Bateman was still considered the lead case that could 
be used to establish involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence in all other cases.209 
However, Andrews represented the origins of the ‘gross negligence’ versus ‘recklessness’ 
debate that would influence a turning point of corporate manslaughter reform in the 
1980s.210 The term ‘recklessness’ was referred to within Bateman to define negligence in 
so far as ‘a qualified man may be held liable for recklessly undertaking a case which he 
knew, or should have known, to be beyond his powers, or for making his patient the subject 
of a reckless experiment’.211 
3.5.2 The Facts in R v Cory Brothers (1927) 
The facts of the case involved Cory Bros Co, an incorporated corporation ‘registered as a 
trading company on 9 April 1888 for the purpose of carrying on business as colliery 
proprietors, depot owners, coal operators, and merchants’ with John Cory and six other 
family members as the directors and major shareholders.212 Cory Bros Co was the 
proprietary owner of the powerhouse at Ogmore Vale which was used to power its 
collieries nearby. During the Great Lock-Out of 1926 Cory Bros Co erected an electric wire 
fence around the powerhouse to prevent pilfering.213 The company placed notices warning 
the public not to approach to the electrical fences. However, on 24 August 1926 Brynmor 
Edward John (‘Brynmor’), a collier’s assistant aged 16, went ratting with friends within the 
curtilage of the powerhouse that was surrounded by the electric fence. Brynmor was 
allegedly running away from one of the officials, and although the official’s dogs passed 
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unscathed through the wires, Brynmor fell and was fatally electrocuted.214 A few days later 
the coroner at Ogmore Vale recorded a verdict of manslaughter against the person or 
persons responsible for the erection and electrification of the fence.215 
 Despite the return of the manslaughter verdict from the inquest, no further action 
occurred until January 1927 when a private prosecution was brought by George Thomas 
John, Brynmor’s brother, with the financial support of the South Wales Miners’ Federation 
(‘SWMF’),216 against four defendants, including Cory Bros Co, Thomas Hardee (shift 
engineer at the powerhouse), Temple Davies (power engineer) and Robert Illingworth 
(chief electrical engineer) for the manslaughter of Brynmor.217 The SWMF supported the 
private prosecution of Cory Bros Co as it believed as an organisation and trade union that 
it needed to support its members. The reasons it gave were as follows: 
 It is not sufficient to have the law enacted. With our cumbrous legislative methods, 
 the involved phraseology of our laws, and our expensive procedure for 
 administering the laws after they are passed – all weighted against the workers – 
 the individual workman is at a hopeless advantage, compared with the wealthy 
 employers, in attempting to secure what is legally due to him.218 
Further, the death of Brynmor occurred in the immediate aftermath and disappointment 
of the General Strike and Great Lock-Out of 1926 that resulted in the return to an eight-
hour shift and other terms dictated to by the coal owners.219 The SWMF believed progress 
could only be made through its continued engagement in politics and the legislative 
process. Consequently, the SWMF argued that as ‘practically every phase of the miners’ 
industrial life is more or less affected by legislation, and if we are to obtain any 
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improvement in these matters in future, we are compelled to take an active part in 
politics’.220 In order to support this aim, the SWMF spent £73,000 in litigation expenses to 
ensure the protection of its members, which also included providing the financial support 
to pursue the first attempted prosecution of a coal owner’s limited company in the Cory 
Bros Case.221 
 In January 1927 Bridgend Magistrates summoned the four defendants on two 
charges: the setting of a mantrap or other engine calculated to destroy human life or inflict 
grievous bodily harm; and the manslaughter of Brynmor.222 The funds provided by the 
SWMF resulted in instructions being given to Artemus Jones KC, a leading Welsh barrister, 
to privately prosecute the four defendants.223 Cory Bros Co instructed Sir Edward Marshall 
Hall KC (‘Marshall Hall’), the leading criminal Kings Counsel of the day, to defend the 
proceedings for a fee of 500 guineas.224 After a two-day hearing the magistrates committed 
all four defendants to the assizes based on the evidence they had heard and on their 
understanding that a limited corporation could be committed to trial on both charges as 
there was sufficient evidence in conjunction with statutory provisions to support the 
committal to the Glamorgan Assizes.225 
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3.5.3 Factual Discrepancies 
The factual discrepancies were identified between the committal hearing at the 
magistrates’ court and the Cory Bros Case that was heard at the Glamorgan Assizes.226 It 
should be noted at this point that the four law reports only reported the procedural aspects 
of the Cory Bros Case as the assizes dismissed the case before hearing the full facts because 
it held that a corporation could not be indicted for manslaughter.227 The facts of the Cory 
Bros Case were heard in full at the magistrates’ court, however. Consequently, the factual 
discrepancies that were identified between the committal hearing and the outcome of the 
Cory Bros Case went beyond the theory of corporate criminal liability and manslaughter 
because the factual discrepancies represented the dilemma faced by the common law as 
to whether a corporation could commit manslaughter and what, if anything, the common 
law should do to address the issue of manslaughter committed by a corporation in the 
immediate aftermath of the General Strike and Great Lock-Out of 1926.228 
 Firstly, the facts of the case reported in the magistrates’ court evidenced the 
importance of the case because ‘the case was the first to be brought under the recently 
passed Criminal Justice Act, under which an indictment could be brought against a 
corporation, and was therefore highly important’.229 Marshall Hall KC, counsel for the 
defence, stated that ‘prior to that statute (Criminal Justice Act 1925), the proceedings 
against the company would have been impossible’.230 Artemus Jones KC, counsel for the 
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prosecution, concurred when he stated that ‘the statute now provided that a limited 
company could be guilty of a crime where the penalty was such that it could be enforced 
against the company’.231 The defence at this stage was not disputing the validity of the 
indictment pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 1925 and the OAPA 1861 or that their client 
could be indicted for manslaughter, which would have led to a fine upon conviction. 
 Hence, the discrepancies of fact in the case were also important because it was 
hoped by Marshall Hall that the charge of manslaughter would be disposed of at the 
magistrates’ court on the facts alone. Marshall Hall later acknowledged that this would 
have been an impossible task, because 
 when he arrived at Bridgend he found the town seething with indignation against 
 the colliery firm and saw that he would have to tread very warily indeed. It was 
 quite likely that the charge would be amended to one of murder. All that he could 
 do therefore was to prepare the ground for a possible defence at the Cardiff Assizes 
 where the case would be tried before judge and jury.232 
Nonetheless, Marshall Hall mounted a defence on three grounds. Firstly, no employee of 
the company chased Brynmor. Secondly, an alleged conversation between the engineers 
attributing blame to the corporation for the manslaughter never occurred.233 It was alleged 
that Illingworth, the chief electrical engineer, stated, ‘[W]e will put a stop to this [the 
pilfering of coal from the bunkers in the powerhouse]. We will put something up and I’ll 
switch on the juice and let some of them get it in the neck.’234 Thirdly, when Marshall Hall 
cross-examined Sir Bernard Spilsbury (‘the pathologist’), he induced the pathologist to say 
that it was highly unusual for a current of such a low voltage as used in the fence the death 
of someone such as Brynmor.235 Consequently, Marshall Hall argued that if that was the 
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case then there was no case to answer as his client could not have caused the death of 
Brynmor. He was so confident about the evidence and admission of the pathologist that 
when the magistrates asked why Marshall Hall had not addressed the evidence regarding 
Illingworth’s alleged statement, he stated that he believed the bench would not have 
credited the evidence as accurate.236 
 Thus, Marshall Hall declared in his closing speech, ‘[L]et the prosecution have their 
remedy. If they want to proceed with the matter let them present their Bill before the 
Assizes’,237 and entered a plea of not guilty as he believed the evidence presented was 
sufficient to have the case dismissed. This demonstrates the importance of the 
discrepancies concerning the facts in the case. Marshall Hall was a leading criminal 
advocate of the day and presented his defence based on the facts of the case in order to 
establish that there was no case to answer. He made no reference to the fact that a 
corporation could not be indicted for a felony. In fact his position was to the contrary, as 
Marshall Hall at the start of case concurred with the prosecution that a corporation could 
be indicted for manslaughter. If there was such a gigantic error in the law, then Marshall 
Hall would have cited the same ‘old dicta’ used by Finlay J in the assizes to support his 
defence of no case to answer and subsequently would have had the charges dismissed, 
because despite the tensions the law is the law. Marshall Hall made no reference to an 
error in the law and instead was prepared to defend and have the case dismissed on the 
evidence alone. 
 Finally, the discrepancies connected to the facts of the case reflected the political 
and social aftermath of 1926 in that Brynmor’s death and the inquest occurred in August 
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1926, the committal hearing followed in January 1927 and the assizes trial commenced in 
late February, concluding in early March 1927 with the judgment. All of the events took 
place either during the aftermath of the General Strike of 1926 or during the heights of the 
Great Lock-Out of 1926; after these events the mining community in South Wales felt 
disappointed and resentful. The miners in South Wales returned to work in November 1926 
but had to work longer hours than before the strike.238 Hence, Marshall Hall’s speech for 
the defence echoed the political tension still present in South Wales; he suggested that the 
motive for the prosecution was propaganda as the SWMF had financially supported the 
private prosecution. Marshall Hall then proceeded to ‘thank God. We are not all 
Communists yet. The big majority of the working-class on whom we all rely are not 
Communists.’239 Responding to Marshall Hall, Artemus Jones for the prosecution said that 
‘in listening to a part of Sir Edward’s speech he thought he was attending an anti-Socialist 
meeting’.240 The retorts that passed between counsel demonstrated the undertone of the 
issue being dealt with in case: how the common law should handle manslaughter by a 
corporation in the aftermath of the Great Lock-Out of 1926 in the light of ongoing tension 
between the coal owners and the unions. The coal owners sought to capitalise from a 
weakened trade union movement in South Wales following the introduction of the 
Craftsmen’s Union, which had already agreed to work an eight-hour shift and to work with 
the coal owners. The SWMF was referring to this in March 1927 when it said that ‘the 
disruptive forces are still busily at work in parts of this coalfield in an endeavour to get the 
workmen to withdraw their allegiance to the Miners’ Federation’.241 Consequently, the 
                                                        
238 See Arnot, The Miners: Years of Struggle (n 195) ch 15 for a full discussion of the aftermath from the General Strike and Great Lock-
out of 1926 including commentary on the worsening conditions in the mines that occurred for a following ten years.  
239 Cory Magistrates Day 2 (n 225) 4. 
240 Cory Magistrates Day 2 (n 225) 4. 
241 '.', ‘Notes and Comments’ (1927) vol 5(3) The Colliery Workers’ Magazine 41 (WCML/87963/B35) 43. 
155 
committal hearing of the Cory Bros Case reflected the tension between the SWMF and the 
coal owners, as demonstrated by the arguments presented by counsel at the magistrates’ 
court and the underlying issue of how, if at all, could the common law be used to decide 
whether a corporation could commit manslaughter? 
 Nonetheless, the defence still tried to persuade the magistrates that there was no 
case to answer and that the motives behind the private prosecution had been encouraged 
by’rested with Communist propaganda. The defence might have failed to have the charges 
dismissed at the committal stage. However, it should be noted that at the committal stage 
Marshall Hall still believed that the defence mounted in the magistrates’ court based on 
the admissions of the pathologist was sufficient to have the case dismissed at the assizes. 
He made no reference to old dicta or the fact that a corporation could not be indicted for 
manslaughter or fined upon conviction. 
 Hence, the factual discrepancies were important because they highlight the fact 
that validity of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 was not under dispute and in the opinion of 
Marshall Hall, the leading criminal KC of the period, a corporation could be indicted for 
manslaughter and fined on conviction. Marshall Hall mounted the defence based on the 
evidence alone not on the point of law the that a corporation could not be indicted or fined 
upon conviction for manslaughter. Unfortunately, Marshall Hall died before the criminal 
trail; his place was taken by Norman Birkett KC. Birkett followed the same defence that 
Marshall Hall had used at the committal trial in his preparation for the criminal trial based 
on the evidence.242 Two leading criminal defence barristers of the period concurred that 
the best defence involved casting doubt on the evidence to avoid a conviction for Cory Bros 
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Co for manslaughter. Both barristers did not question the use of the Criminal Justice Act 
1925 or that a corporation could be indicted for manslaughter and fined upon conviction. 
Hence, an explanation was sought to explain the judicial reasoning behind the decision of 
Finlay J in the Cory Bros Case. 
3.5.4 Judicial Reasoning and Behaviour in R v Cory Brothers (1927) 
Despite the outcome in the magistrates’ court, the first attempt to prosecute a corporation 
for manslaughter failed in the Cory Bros Case at the Glamorgan Assizes.243 The reasoning 
behind Finlay J’s decision needs to addressed because Finlay J’s decision prevented the 
criminal judiciary from using its unique interpretation of and attribution of mens rea as it 
related to corporations that had been established in the Evans Case and Broom Case. 
 The criminal judiciary proceeded to construe penal statutes strictly with regard to 
corporations as evidenced by the case law precedents that went before the Cory Bros 
Case.244 Yet, Finlay J in the Cory Bros Case failed to construe the provisions of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1925 in conjunction with the provisions of the OAPA 1861 strictly, whereby an 
incorporated company could be indicted for the common law offence of manslaughter and, 
if convicted, fined.245 The use of the strict construction of penal statutes should have been 
second nature to a King’s Counsel specialising in revenue law with over twenty-one years’ 
calling because both penal and revenue statutes were construed strictly.246 Finlay 
demonstrated his ability to construe revenue statutes strictly when he appeared as lead 
counsel in the case of The Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue Commissioners.247 He 
based his arguments on the strict construction of statutes because tax statutes were 
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construed as strictly as penal statutes, so he was well versed with the strict construction 
and application of statutes. 
 Consequently, the only issue that should have been left after reaching a conclusion 
with regard to the procedural aspects of the Cory Bros Case concerned the attribution of 
corporate criminal liability, which was required for the common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter.248 The Evans Case and the Broom Case were significant in this 
respect because guidance had been provided in them with regard to the approach to be 
taken by the criminal judiciary to considering the mens rea of a corporation outside the 
strict construction of penal statutes. To determine the mens rea of a corporation, the 
criminal judiciary looked at company resolutions recorded in the directors’ meetings249 
and/or evidence of instructions given by directors to managers or employees250 rather than 
at the single intentions of a sole director acting as the corporate mind in the identification 
doctrine. 
 The incorrectness of the decision in the Cory Bros Case was only questioned by the 
Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of R v ICR Haulage Co Ltd in 1944, which concerned 
corporate criminal liability for a statutory breach, when Stable J confirmed that 
manslaughter by a corporation was punishable with a fine on conviction.251 Yet the damage 
had already occurred, as the judicial reasoning in the Cory Bros Case proceeded to inhibit 
the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform that already existed – by 1927 a 
corporation could have stood trial for manslaughter both procedurally and legally. So the 
question remained as to what influenced Finlay J in the Cory Bros Case when he 
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disregarded the strict construction of penal statutes involving corporations as well as the 
guidance on corporate criminal liability provided in the Evans Case and the Broom Case. 
 Finlay J cited ‘old dicta’ from the GNER Case and the Birmingham Case heard in the 
nineteenth century to justify the legal position that a corporation could not commit 
manslaughter.252 However, both the GNER Case and the Birmingham Case concerned 
statutory breaches by a corporation, and the judgments in both cases provided clear 
guidance through their ratio that all penal statutes were to be interpreted strictly in 
accordance with the construction of the penal statutes.253 Hence, both corporations in 
both cases were held criminally liable for the statutory breaches. Therefore, by citing both 
cases in his judgment, Finlay J was already aware of the ratio of strict construction with 
regard to penal statutes involving corporations.254 Yet Finlay J stated: 
[I]n my opinion I am bound by authorities, which show quite clearly that as the law 
stands an indictment will not lie against a corporation either for a felony or for a 
misdemeanour of the nature set out in the second count of this indictment.255 
Finlay J made no reference to the Broom Case, which involved the discussion of corporate 
criminal liability regarding assault committed by an employee on behalf of the corporation 
and gave clear guidance with regard to attributing mens rea to a corporation.256 The Broom 
Case could also be found as a precedent among the old dicta cited by Finlay J to support 
the type of offences a corporation could be indicted for; the Broom Case appeared on the 
same page of Archbold’s Criminal Pleading (27th edition)257 that Finlay J cited in his 
judgment to support the position that a corporation could not be indicted for manslaughter 
using old dicta.258 Further, the Broom Case continued to be cited as good law by Archbold’s 
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Criminal Pleadings until the early 1960s, which demonstrated again the significance of the 
case with regard to judicial guidance regarding the attribution of mens rea to a corporation 
indicted for a common law offence outside the construction of a penal statute.259 
 The penal statutes cited in the Cory Bros Case were equally clear in stating that a 
corporation could now be indicted and fined upon conviction for a felony including 
manslaughter pursuant to the provisions of section 33(3) Criminal Justice Act 1925 in 
conjunction with section 5 OAPA 1861, which stated that ‘whosoever shall be convicted of 
manslaughter shall be liable … to pay such fine as the court shall award’ and section 71 of 
OAPA 1861, which stated that ‘the Court may, if it shall think fit, in addition to or in lieu of 
any punishment by this Act authorized fine the offender’. Further, section 33(3) Criminal 
Justice Act 1925 came into effect on 1 June 1926, two months before the death of Brynmor, 
which occurred on 24 August 1926. Therefore, procedurally and legally a limited company 
could be indicted and stand trial for manslaughter.260 
 However, Finlay J cited page nine of Archbold’s Criminal Pleading (27th edition) in 
his judgment to justify the position that the Criminal Justice Act 1925 had not changed the 
substantive law with regard to the old dicta, including the GNER and the Birmingham 
Case.261 Yet the preface of Archbold’s Criminal Pleadings (27th edition) clearly directed the 
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reader to Appendix A, which detailed the provisions of the Criminal Act 1925. In addition, 
Appendix B detailed ‘A Table of the Principal Indictable Offences’, which included the 
heading of manslaughter;262 this cross-referenced the reader to page 860, which in turn 
referred to section 5 OAPA 1861. Section 5 stated that the punishment of manslaughter 
included a fine, and the section also included a postscript to ‘see s 71, post, p 862,263 which, 
pursuant to section 71 OAPA 1861, confirmed that the use of a fine upon conviction of 
manslaughter was good law.264 
 Charles Roger Noel Winn, a barrister of the period, commented on the outcome of 
the Cory Bros Case and ‘submitted that the result is not satisfactory, however well founded 
the decision may have been on interpretative grounds’.265 However, there lies the crux of 
the issue, because the decision reached in the Cory Bros Case was not based on the strict 
construction grounds used by the criminal judiciary with regard to corporations and penal 
statutes. On the contrary, the decision in the Cory Bros Case reflected the judicial reasoning 
of Finlay J; he only started to consider the substantive law after he had quashed the 
indictment against Cory Bros Co and continued to hear the trial against the remaining three 
defendants in R v Illingworth and Others (‘Illingworth Case’).266 Even then, the wording 
Finlay J used in his summing-up speech to the jury in the Illingworth Case reflected his own 
personal judicial reasoning when he stated that ‘our pride would be turned to shame if we 
thought for one moment that a British jury in a case gave a verdict through political 
prejudice’.267 Therefore, in order to put into context whether the statement was impartial 
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with regard to ‘political prejudice’, it is essential to consider other aspects of his judicial 
personality which could have inhibited the decision in the Cory Bros Case.268 
 Judge William Finlay, the presiding judge in the Cory Bros Case, was the son of Lord 
Robert Bannatyne Finlay (‘Lord Finlay’).269 Lord Finlay was a Conservative Member of 
Parliament270 and also held the posts of Solicitor General and Attorney General271 before 
he took the Woolsack as the Lord Chancellor from 11 December 1916 to 13 January 1919 
for Lloyd George’s War Cabinet.272 In 1905 his tenure as Attorney General received severe 
public criticism when, a month before he left office, he appointed his son, William Finlay, 
as junior counsel to the Inland Revenue for four years. In response to this appointment at 
the Inland Revenue, The Solicitors’ Journal commented that ‘for one so young, he can only 
be regarded as singularly fortunate. But I notice, too, that he occupies the same chambers 
as Sir Robert B Finlay.’273 
 The public controversy surrounding the advancement of the legal career of William 
Finlay KC274 continued in 1924 with his appointment to the High Court Bench by Lord Cave, 
who was then Lord Chancellor.275 The public and the legal profession severely criticised the 
appointment because it was felt that ‘at the present time it is essential in the highest 
degree that the best men available should be selected for high judicial office, and there 
should be no repetition of the methods of some 40 years ago’.276 The methods used 
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referred to the political appointment of judges to High Court vacancies, which would have 
been how Sir William Finlay was appointed to the bench.277 
 However, three years later Finlay J presided as a junior judge over a trial of great 
importance which involved the use of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 for the first time to 
indict a corporation in conjunction with the first attempt to prosecute a corporation for 
manslaughter in the aftermath of the General Strike and the Great Lock-Out of 1926.278 
When viewed from a practice perspective, it was surprising that a more senior criminal 
judge was not listed to hear the case because of the precedent that the case would set and 
the inexperience of Finlay J, which was shown when he referred to ‘political prejudice’ in 
his summing-up speech.279 
 On the one hand, the statement made by Finlay J reflected the underlying general 
political and social issues connected to the death of Brynmor in the aftermath of the 
General Strike and Great Lock-Out of 1926 caused by the tension between the coal owners 
and the miners.280 On the other hand, there was no need to use the wording ‘political 
prejudice’ in his summing-up speech because an inference of judicial bias could be raised 
because of the impartiality in his summing-up speech. Further, the remainder of his 
summing-up in the Illingworth Case outlined the original defence proffered by Marshall 
Hall, which used the evidence of Sir Bernard Spilsbury, a leading pathologist for the Crown, 
that it was highly irregular that Brynmor died given the low voltage in the fence.281 
 However, the errors in Finlay J’s misdirection regarding the same pathologist’s 
evidence had also occurred in an earlier murder trial he presided over in 1925 in R v 
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Thorne.282 He singled out the evidence of Sir Bernard Spilsbury at the expense of that of 
other medical witnesses called for the defence.283 Finlay J’s decision in R v Thorne was 
heavily criticised by The Law Journal after Thorne’s appeal284 against conviction and the 
sentence of death failed in so far as ‘Thorne is entitled to feel that he has been condemned 
by a tribunal which was not capable of forming a first-hand judgment but followed the man 
with the biggest name’;285 this criticism was based on Finlay J’s directions to the jury. Two 
years later in the Illingworth Case286 Finlay J also directed the jury along the same lines, 
relying once again on the evidence of Sir Bernard Spilsbury287 in his summing-up and 
demonstrating judicial bias by concentrating on this same evidence in his direction to the 
jury. 
 Further, Pinto and Evans, in their critical commentary on the Cory Bros Case, argued 
that ‘his scrutiny of the law was minimal’288 and that his decision was ‘typical of the uneven 
development of corporate criminal liability. Early judicial opposition to corporate liability 
was couched in terms of procedural obstacles, but the opposition persisted even after 
those obstacles were removed.’289 Finlay J was an inexperienced judge as he has only been 
appointed three years before hearing the Cory Bros Case. Nonetheless, as an experienced 
income tax barrister he was well versed with regard to the strict construction of income 
tax statutes because income tax statutes are interpreted through strict construction in the 
same way as penal statutes.290 Yet his judgment in the Cory Bros Case did not provide a 
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substantive explanation of the law that justified the decision because of the vague opinions 
given in the judgment. 
 Jeffrey Stanton and Georg Vanberg (‘Stanton and Vanberg’) conducted research on 
the judicial reasoning behind vague opinions when it is clear that decisive opinions would 
have provided greater clarity.291 Stanton and Vanberg’s thesis argued that the costs of 
deviating from a clear court decision are higher than the costs of deviating from a vague 
decision (because non-compliance is easier to detect). Thus, the outcome of the Cory Bros 
Case was reached by purposively using penal statutes incorrectly, but the judge neglected 
to consider the case law from the Broom Case, the Evans Case or any of the other 
substantive corporate criminal liability cases heard in the 1900s, which would have 
supported the indictment against a corporation. Consequently, the purposefully vague 
decision in the Cory Bros Case, according to the research of Stanton and Vanberg, reduced 
the impact of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 to a merely procedural statute. Archbold’s 
Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice cited the Cory Bros Case in 1931 and explained 
that section 33(3) Criminal Justice Act 1925 ‘does not alter the substantive law so as to 
render a corporation liable to be indicted where previously it was not so liable. It is a 
machinery to avoid the inconvenience arising from the fact that, previously, a corporation 
could not be indicted at assizes.’292 
 The inhibiting impact of the judicial reasoning in conjunction with the factual 
discrepancies in the Cory Bros Case strengthened the idea that an error in law was made 
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in the case, because legally and factually the corporation should have stood trial for 
manslaughter.293 
3.5.5 Silent Corporate Documents 
Further, the minute books of the Cory Bros Co were conspicuously silent between 1925 
and 1927; if they had contained information, their contents would have been used as 
evidence by the prosecution to attribute corporate criminal liability to a corporation, as 
established in the Evans Case and the Broom Case, to prove the common law offence of 
gross negligence manslaughter. Reverting to the words of Sir Edward Marshall Hall in the 
committal hearing, it is reported that he stated that 
 it was an impossible task to dispose of the Cory Bros Case because of the seething 
 indignation against the Cory Bros Co and that he would have to tread very warily 
 indeed. It was quite likely that the charge would be amended to one of murder. All 
 that he could do therefore was to prepare the ground for a possible defence at 
 Cardiff Assizes where the case would be tried before a judge and jury.294 
Consequently, if the Cory Bros Case had continued to a full trial at the assizes,295 it would 
have been necessary to use the Bateman gross negligence test in order to establish 
whether Cory Bros Co committed the offence of gross negligence manslaughter. The 
following would have been considered: 
1) Cory Bros Co owed a duty to Brynmor to take care (civil liability); 
2) The duty was not discharged (civil liability); 
3) The default caused the death of Brynmor (civil liability); and 
4) In addition to points one to three, in order to establish criminal liability the 
facts must be such that in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the 
accused went beyond a matter of compensation between the subjects and 
showed such disregard for the life and safety of others to amount to a crime 
against the State and conduct deserving punishment.296 
                                                        
293 Three Fraud Cases (n 113). 
294 Hooke & Thomas (n 229) 266. 
295 The full facts of the case were argued at the committal hearing with regard to the evidence connected to the Cory Bros Co.  
296 Bateman (n 204) 10-12. 
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The evidence presented at the committal hearing represented a clear indication of whether 
the points in the Bateman gross negligence test could be proven or defended. For example, 
points one and two would have been established under the common law duty to be 
commonly humane to trespassers,297 because according to the Crown the electric fence in 
the Cory Bros Case was capable of inhumane injury.298 Marshall Hall made no reference to 
points one and two in the defence at the committal hearing in the magistrates’ court.299 
 However, Marshall Hall rebutted points three and four in the defence at the 
committal hearing in an attempt to have the charges dismissed because of a lack of 
evidence.300 The third point related to the default belief that Cory Bros Co had not caused 
the death because of the induced evidence from the pathologist which confirmed that the 
voltage was so low that a death (Brynmor in this case) caused by such a fence should be 
considered to be an extremely rare occurrence.301 However, the prosecution disputed the 
evidence at the committal stage with regard to the voltage because it argued that the 
default caused Brynmor’s death. However, the default argument would have been 
contested at the assizes if the proceedings against Cory Co had gone to a full trial.302 
 The continuing inhibiting factors regarding corporate manslaughter reform 
remained the missed opportunity to apply the criminal judiciary’s approach to attribute 
corporate criminal liability to a corporation to prove there was a disregard for the life and 
safety of others, such as to amount to a crime. Hence, the Evans Case and the Broom Case 
                                                        
297 William James Byrne and Andrew Dewar Gibb (eds), Beven on Negligence, vol 1: General Relations (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1928) 
195 -196 citing Ilott v Wilkes (1820) 3 B & Ald 304, 106 ER 674 and Bird v Holbrook (1828) 4 Bing 628, 130 ER 911 that there was to a 
duty to be commonly humane to trespassers re the setting of spring guns with the intention of injuring. The same duty of care would 
have been owed to Brynmor while ratting because the prosecution with the support of witness statements in the magistrates case 
stated the electrical fence was set up to injure trespassers from looting. 
298 Cory Magistrates Day 2 (n 214) 4. 
299 Cory Magistrates Day 2 (n 214) 4. 
300 Birket who took over from Marshall Hall and used the same defence in R v Illingworth that followed the dismissal of Cory Bros Co 
from the case. 
301 Browne and Tullet (n 283) 424 – 425 
302 Cory Magistrates Day 2 (n 214) 4. 
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were important to point four, as were the lack of entries in Cory Bros Co’s minute books, 
when the criminal judiciary were considering the corporate criminal liability of the offence 
they looked for instructions given to the engineers by the directors at boardroom level303 
or a ratified decision which would also have been recorded in the Cory Brothers & Co 
Limited Directors’ Minute Book No. 5 (‘Minute Book No. 5.’).304 The entries in Minute Book 
No. 5. were conspicuously silent during the period when the directors were making 
operational decisions during the General Strike and the Great Lock-Out of 1926.305 
Further analysis of the entries from 18 January 1910 to 8 April 1920 in Minute Book 
No. 5. showed that Cory Bros Co recorded in detail its operational decisions.306 Examples 
of the operational decisions that were recorded included the purchase of a property 
because of subsidence at Ogmore Vale Colliery;307 a discussion about the Ogmore Vale 
Colliery dispute with the miners;308 the commissioning of an inspection report to resolve 
the Ogmore Vale Colliery dispute with the miners;309 the commissioning of a report on the 
whole of the electric plant and installation at Ogmore Vale Colliery;310 Cory Bros Co’s 
response to 1912 strike;311 acknowledgement of the increased responsibilities falling on 
colliery managers owing to the Coal Mines Act 1911 Act and their devotion to their duties 
                                                        
303 Broom Case (n 28) It could have been demonstrated through the witness statement re the words spoken by the engineers.  
304 Cory Brothers & Company Limited Directors,’Minute Book No. 5.’(Glamorgan Archives DCB 1/4) 1-298 (‘Minute Book No. 5.’). 
Minute Book Number Five recorded the directors meetings in the period from 18 Janaury 1910 to 28 September 1948.  
305 Evans Case (n 27) Resolution from a directors meeting.Cory Brothers & Company Limited Directors’ 8 
306 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 1 to 198. 
307 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 22. Point 14 from meeeting of directors dated 30 August 1910 agreed to pay Hannah Jones £325  
308 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 46. Dispute noted at point 11 meeting of directors dated 19 December 1910. ‘Sir Clifford to discuss with 
Mr W D Wright and if afterwards he thought if he thought it desirable to stop the colliery to do so. 
309 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 52. Meeting of directors dated 20 Feb 1911 point 1 appointment of Mr Galloway for a fee of £10.10 to 
inspect and report back to the board re Ogmore Vale Colliery. 
310 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 66. Meeting of directors dated 1 May 1911 point 20 agreed to give Mr McTaggert a fee of 25 guineas for 
a report upon thewhole of the lectric plant and installation at this colliery.  
311 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 132. Meeting of directors dated 29 Janaury 1912 – discussed point four of meeting detailed re quote for 
all damages which would not be covered under the Riot Act. 
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during the strike;312 a board discussion about the quantities of coal to buy;313 and a 
discussion of the on-going legal proceedings in 1918.314 
However, between 8 April 1920 and 9 January 1928 the only details recorded were 
the dates of the directors meetings; no details was provided of any of the items 
discussed.315 When considering whether the recording of the meeting date only was 
standard practice for the Cory Bros Co, it was possible to compare the entries recorded in 
Minute Book No. 5. for the period after 9 January 1928 and up to 28 September 1948.316 
The entries recorded from 9 January 1928 onwards were consistent with the detailed 
entries made in Minute Book No. 5. from page one to page 198, which recorded entries for 
the period between 18 January 1910 and 8 April 1920. The entries included details 
concerning legal proceedings connected to the collieries317 and the purchase of further 
collieries.318 
In other words, the operational instructions of the directors of Cory Bros Co were 
missing for the period from 1920 onwards, which included World War One, the General 
Strike and the Great Lock-Out of 1926, Brynmor’s death in August 1926 and the legal 
proceedings that followed his death, which included the inquest, the committal hearing 
and the assizes trial. This is important because key operational decisions were made 
between August 1925 and October 1927 and no detailed entries were recorded in 
comparison to the detailed entries before 8 April 1920 and after 9 January 1928. 
                                                        
312 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 145-147. Meeting of directors dated 23 August 1912 point 4 details bonuses given to colliery managers. 
313 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 158. Meeting of directors dated 11 November 1913 point 4 detailed the tonnage of coal bought.  
314 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 179.Meeting of directors dated 5 March 1918 Hebert B Cory and Letters from Holden Wood. Please note 
from 21 August 1914 until 5 March 1918 brief details recorded (p 164 to 179) coincided with dates of World War 1. 
315 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 199 – 223. 
316 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 223 to 298. 
317 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 247. Board meeting dated 18 May1934 recovery of debt owed. 
318 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 287. 
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Two entries recorded in Minute Book No. 5. on 8 April 1920 and 18 August 1920 
provided an explanation with regard to the detailed entries previously recorded in Minute 
Book No. 5. because both entries referred to the existence of a ‘Private Minute Book’ used 
by the directors.319 The entry on the 8 April 1920 stated ‘for minutes of board meeting re 
half yearly issues, held 3 May 1920 see Private Minute Book. Also re bonuses, meeting held 
21 June 1920’.320 The second entry recorded on 18 August 1920 stated ‘for minute of 
meeting held 12 October 1920 re half yearly issues. See Private Minute Book’.321 No further 
entries in Minute Book No. 5. recorded the existence of the Private Minute Book. However, 
the absence of detailed entries after 8 April 1920 to 9 January 1928 in conjunction with the 
evidence of a Private Minute Meeting Book used concurrently by the directors of the Cory 
Bros Co indicated a detailed record of the votes and actions taken by the directors of Cory 
Bros Co existed. 
 The witness statement which confirmed the instructions given to the engineers to 
erect the fence with enough voltage to harm on contact was hearsay and would have been 
harder to rely upon as evidence at the assizes as the reliability of the witness had already 
been questioned at the committal hearing.322 Stronger evidence than this could have been 
recorded in the Private Minute Book;323 it would have proved that the directors ratified the 
decision to erect the fence and agreed on the precise voltage to be used. However, Minute 
Book No. 5. was silent. Marshall Hall was confident he would have the case dismissed at 
the assizes because of a lack of the evidence that was needed to establish points three and 
four of the Bateman gross negligence test. However, the dismissal of the Cory Bros Case 
                                                        
319 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 198- 199. 
320 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 198. 
321 Minute Book No. 5 (n 304) 199. 
322 Archbold 1922 (n 22) 370. 
323 Other sources checked re the location of the Private Minute Book and the location of the Private Minute Book is unknown. 
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occurred because of an error of law, rather than as a result of the evidence presented, 
which was only discussed in detail at the committal hearing and once the Cory Bros Co had 
been dismissed from the Illingworth Case. 
 Winn,324 a barrister in 1929, wrote a detailed critique of the Cory Bros Case and 
stated that ‘in all likelihood a more detailed statement of the circumstances would reveal 
the fact that the moral responsibility for the erection of the fence lay with the directors. 
Probably so important a step was not taken without the sanction of a vote in a directors’ 
meeting.’325 No entry was made in Minute Book No. 5. detailing a vote. However, the 
judicial reasoning of Finlay J prevented a full discussion of the circumstances of the case 
and consideration of the approach already adopted by the criminal judiciary in the Evans 
Case and the Broom Case to attribute corporate criminal liability outside the strict 
construction of penal statutes regarding the actions and intentions of the directors. The 
criminal judiciary would have looked to the recorded entries of Minute Book No. 5. which 
made no reference to the intention of the directors because all the details would have been 
recorded in the Private Minute Book which ran concurrently to Minute Book No. 5. as 
evidenced by the two entries recorded in Minute Book No. 5. Hence, the importance of the 
absent entries because following the Evans Case and Broom Case the criminal judiciary 
were already prepared to look at minute books or instructions to employees to attribute 
corporate mens rea. Hence, the inhibiting influence of the judicial reasoning in the Cory 
Bros Case is important with regard to the second turning point of corporate manslaughter 
reform because the approaches established by the criminal judiciary to attribute corporate 
                                                        
324 Sir Charles Rodger Winn was appointed to the Queen’s Bench Division in 1959 (bencher in 1953) and in 1965 he was appointed Lord 
Justice of Appeal and admitted to the Privy Council. ‘Winn, Sir (Charles) Rodger Winn’ (Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 25 
September 2014) <www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-31846>accessed 
8 March 2018. 
325 Winn (n 278) 405. 
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criminal liability could not be considered in that case and were subsequently disregarded, 
because the next attempt to indict a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter did not 
occur until 1965.326 
 Conclusion 
The development of the corporation into a limited liability corporation should have 
resulted in an era of stability, represented by the consistency of incorporation, because it 
was no longer necessary to determine the method of incorporation to determine the level 
of corporate criminal liability, which had been the case with regard to the previous 
classifications of corporations. This level of consistency should have flowed through to the 
development of corporate criminal accountability and ultimately the reform of the offence 
of corporate manslaughter as it was no longer necessary to attach criminal precedents that 
had been laid down by Royal Charter corporations or trading corporations. Nonetheless, 
by 1927 this had not been achieved, despite the introduction of limited liability 
corporations, the acceptance of corporate criminal liability for statutory breaches and the 
removal of theoretical and procedural obstacles preventing an indictment for the offence 
of corporate manslaughter. 
 Two turning points of corporate manslaughter reform have been identified as 
occurring between 1912 and 1939. The Cory Bros Case should have represented the 
pinnacle of corporate manslaughter reform as the theoretical and procedural obstacles of 
the past no longer existed, and the indictment for corporate manslaughter should have 
stood. Instead, the dicta of old cases referred to in the GNER Case and the Birmingham 
Case still insisted that a corporation could not be indicted for manslaughter, even when 
                                                        
326 R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd The Times, 5 February 1965 (Assizes) 6. 
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the provisions of section 33(3) Criminal Justice Act 1925 in conjunction with section 5 OAPA 
1861, which stated that ‘whosoever shall be convicted of manslaughter shall be liable … to 
pay such fine as the court shall award...’ and section 71 of OAPA 1861, which stated that 
‘the Court may, if it shall think fit, in addition to or in lieu of any punishment by this Act 
authorized fine the offender’. 
 However, the springboard of the reform of corporate manslaughter collapsed for 
several reasons. They included the reluctance of the judiciary and Parliament to accept the 
theory behind the notion of a corporate criminal liability for corporate manslaughter. 
Viscount Haldane LC’s introduction of the identification doctrine might have appeared to 
be an attempted solution to establish corporate liability to determine the intent and 
actions of the corporation. However, the eventual use of the identification doctrine using 
the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation prevented the consideration of other corporate 
criminal liability mechanisms, as demonstrated by Finlay J’s judicial reasoning in the Cory 
Bros Case to explain the reasoning behind why a corporation could not be indicted for 
manslaughter. The criminal judiciary could have used the approaches taken in the Evans 
Case and Broom Case and looked at company resolutions recorded in the directors’ 
meetings327 and/or evidence of instructions given by directors to managers or 
employees.328  However, because judicial reasoning dominated and inhibited corporate 
manslaughter reform, as in the Cory Bros Case, the potential success of alternative 
mechanisms that could account for corporate criminal liability to establish the offence of 
corporate manslaughter also diminished. It is against this background that the influence of 
judicial reasoning continued to dictate the means by which corporate criminal liability and 
                                                        
327 Evans Case (n 27) 318-320. 
328 Broom Case (n 28) 325, 556-567. 
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corporate manslaughter could be determined from 1939 to 1965. The identification 
doctrine using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation became the sole means by which 
to attach corporate criminal liability, despite the developments achieved by the criminal 
judicial in the Evans Case and the Broom Case. 
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 IDENTIFICATION DOCTRINE REASONING, 
DISASTERS AND MISSED TURNING POINTS OF 
CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER REFORM FROM 1939 TO 
1965 
 Introduction 
Chapter 4 will focus on the next three turning points of corporate manslaughter reform, 
which occurred between 1939 and 1965 and which included the Three Fraud Cases heard 
in the 1940s;1 the use of post-disaster reactive legislation in the absence of any gross 
negligence manslaughter prosecutions against a corporation, which was referred to as 
‘manslaughter by culpable neglect of a duty’ (‘culpable neglect manslaughter’), from 1943 
to 1964;2 and the second attempt to prosecute a corporation for culpable neglect 
manslaughter in 1965.3 All three turning points of corporate manslaughter reform that 
occurred between 1939 and 1965 fitted Lord Cooke’s definition of a decisive common law 
event of such undiminished sway as to be deemed a turning point of common law reform, 
each of these three turning points were inhibited from attaining the ideal doctrine of 
corporate manslaughter reform for reasons of marked similarity involving judicial 
reasoning and post-disaster reactive legislation.4 
                                                        
1 DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146 (KB), R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551 (CCA), Moore v I Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 All 
ER 515 (KB) collectively referred to as the ‘Three Fraud Cases’. 
2 Second type of involuntary manslaughter defined as ‘culpable neglect of a duty’ manslaughter in the period from 1934 to 1966 
(‘culpable neglect manslaughter’). See Robert Ernest Ross and Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & 
Practice in Criminal Cases (29th edn, Sweet & Maxwell and Stevens 1934) 876 and Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler and Marston 
Garsia, Archbold Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (36th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1966) 907 para 2468; Appendix One: 
Manslaughter convictions against corporations pursuant to the common law from 1 June 1926 to 5 April 2008 in England and Wales.; 
Three: Unsuccessful manslaughter prosecutions against corporations pursuant to the common law from 1 June 1926 to 5 April 2008 in 
England and Wales. 
3 R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd (Glamorgan Assizes, 4 February 1965) (‘Northern Strip Case’); Confirmed as second 
attempt to prosecute a company for corporate manslaughter in: Gary Slapper, ‘Corporate manslaughter: An examination of the 
determinants of prosecutorial policy’ (1993) 2(4) Social and Legal Studies 423, 424; Celia Wells, ‘The Reform of Corporate Criminal 
Liability’ in John de Lacy (ed), The Reform of the United Kingdom Company Law (Cavendish 2002) 298. 
4 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, The Hamlyn Lectures: Turning Points of the Common Law, (Sweet & Maxwell 1997) 2. 
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 The ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform represented the applicability 
of the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter from 1912 to 1999 to all 
corporations regardless of size, structure or type. This was different to what was illustrated 
in Chapter 3, where there had been a missed opportunity to reform corporate 
manslaughter law: the law found itself in the unique position of being able to state that a 
corporation could be indicted for the offence of gross negligence manslaughter because 
the law recognised that a corporation could commit this offence; human agents of the 
corporation were used to attribute corporate criminal liability5 and to allow the 
corporation to be fined upon conviction.6 
 The legal position in the 1940s was the result of two different judges, presiding over 
two different fraud cases, both commenting in dicta that a corporation could be indicted 
for gross negligence manslaughter because of the error resulting in the quashing of the 
charge against Cory Brothers and Co Limited in 1927.7 In 1943 Hallet J in DPP v Kent and 
Sussex Contractors Co (‘Kent and Sussex Case’) stated the following in obiter dictum: 
With regard to the liability of a body corporate for torts or crimes, a perusal of the 
cases shows, to my mind, that there has been a development in the attitude of 
the courts arising from the large part played in modern times by limited liability 
companies … Similarly, the liability of a body corporate for crimes was at one time 
a matter of doubt, partly owing to the theoretical difficulty of imputing a criminal 
intention to a fictitious person and partly to technical difficulties of procedure. 
Procedure has received attention from the legislature, as for instance, in section 
33 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, and the theoretical difficulty of imputing 
criminal intention is no longer felt to the same extent.8 
                                                        
5 ‘In R v Cory Bros Co & Ltd [1927] 1 KB 810 (KB), it was held that a corporation could not be indicted for manslaughter, or the statutory 
misdemeanour under section 31 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict c 10), s 31, post 979, but the correctness of 
that decision was questioned in R v ICR Haulage Co Ltd [1944] KB 551 (CA), 556; 30 Cr App R 30 (CA)36 - on the ground that both 
offences were punishable with a fine. Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice 
in Criminal Cases (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell and Stevens 1949) 11 (emphasis added) (‘Archbold’s 1949’). 
6 Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases: First Supplement 
to 31st Edition (31st edn, Sweet & Maxwell and Stevens 1947) 2-3 (‘Archbold’s 1947’). 
7 R v Cory Brothers and Company Limited (1927) 1 KB 810 (Assizes) (‘Cory Bros Case’). 
8 DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146 (KB) 157 (‘Kent and Sussex Case’). 
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One year later, Stable J referred to Hallet J’s obiter dictum in R v ICR Haulage Ltd (‘ICR 
Haulage Case’), when he stated that ‘if the matter came before the court today (referring 
to the Cory Bros Case), the result might well be different’.9 Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence 
& Practice in Criminal Cases in 1947 stated that ‘a limited company can, as a general rule, 
be indicted for the criminal acts of its human agents, and for this purpose there is no 
distinction between an intention or function of the mind and any other form of activity’ 
(my emphasis).10 Therefore, the approach taken by the criminal judiciary between 1944 
and 1953 returned to the pre-1927 and pre-Cory Bros Case position,11 in so far as the 
criminal judiciary attached the corporate criminal liability to the human agents acting in 
accordance with the instructions given by the directors to managers12 or in accordance 
with the ratified decisions made by the board of directors; this was in contrast to attaching 
corporate mens rea only to those deemed to be in sole control of the corporation.13 
 However, by 1954 a further change occurred; a limited company could only ‘be 
indicted for the criminal acts of those in control of the company, and for this purpose there 
is no distinction between an intention or function of the mind and any other form of 
activity’ (my emphasis).14 The difference might appear subtle, but the of changing the 
corporate mens rea interpretation from attaching to ‘human agents’ acting on behalf of 
the corporation to only attaching to ‘those in control’ of the corporation would inhibit 
corporate manslaughter reform irrevocably between 1944 and 1954 because there had 
only been a small window of opportunity whereby a corporation could have been indicted 
                                                        
9 R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] 1 KB 551 (CA) 556 (‘ICR Haulage Case’) (emphasis added). 
10 Archbold’s 1947 (n 6) 3 (emphasis added). 
11 Cory Bros Case (n 7) 816 
12 Eastern Counties Railway Company and Richardson v Broom (1851) 6 Exch 314, 325; 155 ER 562, 566-576 (‘Broom Case’); Archbold’s 
1949 (n 5) 12. 
13 Evans & Co Ltd v London County Council [1914] 3 KB 315 (KB) 318-320 (‘Evans Case’). 
14 Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (33rd edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell and Stevens 1954) 12 (emphasis added) (‘Archbold’s 1954’). 
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for corporate manslaughter by establishing corporate criminal liability for gross negligence 
by way of human agents acting for the corporation. However, applying the those in control 
interpretation to identification doctrine reasoning to establish corporate mens rea it made 
it harder to establish corporate criminal liability for gross negligence manslaughter, as 
evidenced in 1965 with the second attempt to prosecute a corporation in the unreported 
case of R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd (‘Northern Strip Case’).15 Streatfeild J 
stated that ‘what the prosecution had to establish was that, through its higher executives, 
the company was guilty of such a high degree of negligence that they would call it a reckless 
disregard for the lives and safety of its employees’.16 The indictment against the Northern 
Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd (‘Northern Strip Co’) was quashed because the those in 
control interpretation linked to corporate criminal liability and the identification doctrine 
reasoning could not be attached to the director of the Northern Strip Co.17 Nonetheless, 
the case demonstrated a subtle shift in emphasis towards the use of identification doctrine 
reasoning in corporate manslaughter cases, even though the use of the identification 
doctrine using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation was not cited directly in the 
Northern Strip Case.18 
 Hence, case law and certain disasters were significant for the next turning points of 
corporate manslaughter reform, because from 1944 to 1954 corporate criminal liability 
could have been attributed to human agents, not just to those deemed to be in control of 
the corporation, and this was later advocated by the application of identification doctrine 
                                                        
15 Northern Strip Case (n 3). 
16 R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd The Times, 5 February 1965 (Assizes) 6. 
17 Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (35th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell and Stevens 1962) 10. Please note the next edition of Archbold’s was published in 1966 Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler 
and Marston Garsia, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (36th edn, Sweet & Maxwell and Stevens 1966) 6. 
Consequently, the copy of Archbold’s which Streatfeild J would have referred to in the Northern Strip Case would have been from the 
35th edition which cited those in control interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning to establish corporate criminal liability. 
18 R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd The Times, 2 February 1965 (Assizes) 8; R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd 
The Times, 4 February 1965 (Assizes) 7; R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd The Times, 5 February 1965 (Assizes) 6. 
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reasoning.19 Consequently, three main arguments will be advanced in Chapter 4 regarding 
the continuing impact of reasons of marked similarity connected to judicial reasoning and 
post-disaster reactive legislation as inhibitors of the three turning points of corporate 
manslaughter that occurred from 1939 to 1965 to establish that the inhibiting impact went 
beyond mere coincidence. 
 The first argument to be considered involves the inhibiting impact of judicial 
reasoning caused by the use of identification doctrine reasoning in the Three Fraud Cases; 
this first argument is relevant to the third turning point of corporate manslaughter reform. 
The decisive interpretation and use of identification doctrine reasoning was left in the 
hands of unelected judges, and the courts still applied the concepts of identification 
doctrine reasoning even though they did not cite any case law to support the use of this 
reasoning.20 However, the position deteriorated further after 1954 because judicial 
reasoning redefined the criteria used to establish identification doctrine reasoning with 
regard to the criminal acts of those in control of the company rather than the criminal acts 
of the human agents acting on behalf of the corporation.21 
 The second argument presented in the chapter considers the inhibiting impact of 
post-disaster reactive legislation as a reason of marked similarity that is connected to the 
fourth turning point of corporate manslaughter reform to explain the lack of corporate 
culpable neglect manslaughter prosecutions between 1944 and 1964. Three fatal disaster 
case studies are used to highlight the effect of post-disaster reactive legislation on the 
following: a private limited corporation and a police force in the Burnden Park stadium 
                                                        
19 Archbold’s 1949 (n 5) 11. 
20 Ministry of Justice, Corporate Liability for Economic Crime: Calls for evidence (Cmd 9370, 2017) 11 (‘Economic Crime Report’). 
21 Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (35th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell and Stevens 1962) 10 (‘Archbold’s 1962’). 
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disaster in 1946;22 a nationalised mining corporation and an explosion at the Eppleton 
Colliery in 1951;23 and a nationalised railway corporation and a railway crash in 
Lewisham.24 Once again there was a small window of opportunity whereby culpable 
neglect manslaughter could have been attributed to the human agents of corporations. Yet 
no corporate manslaughter prosecutions occurred, regardless of the corporation type, 
because of the effectiveness of post-disaster reactive legislation to remedy the aftermath 
of a disaster, which in turn inhibited the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform 
by diverting attention from the defects present in the common law offence of culpable 
neglect manslaughter by using the controlling mind interpretation of identification 
doctrine reasoning.25 
 Finally, the third argument considers the continuing influence of judicial reasoning 
surrounding the second unsuccessful attempt to prosecute a corporation for culpable 
neglect manslaughter in 1965 in the Northern Strip Case. The Northern Strip Case involved 
a corporation with a single director, which at first sight should have enabled the 
prosecution to indict the company successfully through the application of the controlling 
mind interpretation to attribute corporate criminal liability. However, for a reason of 
marked similarity connected to judicial reasoning in the case, Northern Strip Co was found 
not guilty. 
 The continuance of judicial reasoning as an inhibitor of corporate manslaughter 
reform from 1939 to 1965 ruled out the possibility of an isolated occurrence; the inhibiting 
                                                        
22 Home Office, Home Office Enquiry into the Disaster at the Bolton Wanderer Football Ground on 9th March 1946 (Cmd 6846, 1946) 
(‘Moelwyn Hughes Report’). 
23 Ministry of Fuel and Power, Explosion at Eppleton Colliery, Durham: Report on the causes of, and circumstances attending, the 
explosion, which occurred at Eppleton Colliery, Durham, on 6th July 1951 (Cmd 8503, 1952) (‘Eppleton Report’). 
24 Ministry of Transport & Civil Aviation, Railway Accidents Report on the Collision which occurred on 4th December 1957 near St Johns 
Station Lewisham in the Southern Region British Railways (Cmd 86575, 1958) (‘Lewisham Report’). 
25 ‘A disaster can elevate a problem to a crisis, and produce reactive legislation.’ See James Gobert, ‘The Politics of Corporate 
Manslaughter-The British Experience’ [2005] FJLR 1, 26. 
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impact of judicial reasoning had already led to the incorrect quashing of the charges against 
the Cory Bros Co in 1927. Consequently, the inhibiting impact of reasons of marked 
similarity concerning judicial reasoning can be seen in all three turning points of corporate 
manslaughter reform between 1939 and 1965. The continued prevalence of judicial 
reasoning affirmed the position that ‘the historical development of judicial thinking in this 
area of the criminal law needs to be examined in order to understand the tensions that 
continue to prevail’26 because judicial reasoning stopped identification doctrine reasoning 
from being applied to the acts of human agents acting on behalf of the corporation and 
only applied it to those deemed to be the controlling mind of the corporation.27 The use of 
the theory that identification doctrine reasoning attached to the controlling mind went 
against the clear rules of the strict construction of penal statutes involving corporations 
that the criminal judiciary had previously adhered to because existing penal statutes 
already addressed the issue of corporate criminal liability without the need to use 
identification doctrine reasoning.28 
 Another trend also started to emerge between 1939 and 1965 regarding the 
specific use of post-disaster reactive legislation as a legislative and executive response to 
fatal disasters involving corporations.29 Post-disaster reactive legislation was often an 
immediate response to a disaster and was often used in the period before 1939 to 
acknowledge and remedy the cause of the disaster because it was not possible to hold a 
corporation liable for corporate manslaughter until the 1940s.30 However, the use of post-
                                                        
26 Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 6. 
27 Archbold’s 1949 (n 5) 11. 
28 DC Thompson & Co Ld v Deakin and Others [1952] 1 Ch 646 (CA) Please note the spelling in case cited per the law report re ‘Ld’.  
29 Alexandra Veuthey and Lloyd Freeburn, ‘The Fight against Hooliganism in England Insights for Other Jurisdictions?’ (2015) 16 
Melbourne Journal International Law 203, 208; Simon Gardiner, John O’Leary, Roger Welch, Simon Boyes and Urvasi Naidoo, Sports 
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Clauses Act 1863 (26 & 27 Vict c 93) and Reservoirs (Safety Provisions) Act 1930 (20 & 21 Geo 5 c 51) in conjunction with the 
Reservoirs (Safety Provisions) Regulation 1930, SI 1930/1125 in response to the Bilberry Dam disaster in 1853.  
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disaster reactive legislation from 1939 to 1965 demonstrated a different trend. The trend 
involved the symbiotic relationship between post-disaster reactive legislation and 
identification doctrine reasoning that used the controlling mind interpretation; the more 
entangled the controlling mind criteria became with identification doctrine reasoning in 
relation to corporate manslaughter between 1939 and 1965, the greater the reliance upon 
post-disaster reactive legislation to address corporate disasters and fatalities. Post-disaster 
reactive legislation presented a solution to address the root cause of the disaster 
indirectly.31 Hence, post-disaster reactive legislation as a reason of marked similarity had 
an inhibiting impact, because instead of the law trying to reform the ambit of identification 
doctrine reasoning so that it could be used to move away from those in control of the 
company back to the role of human agents to establish corporate criminal liability, there 
was a gradual increase in the use of post-disaster reactive legislation to fill the gap left 
when the common law fell short of achieving the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter 
reform. 
 Development of the Corporation 1939 to 1965 
When three turning points of corporate manslaughter reform occurred between 1939 and 
1965, it was against a backdrop of dramatic social and economic change in England and 
Wales. The involvement of Britian, along with the countries that made up its Empire and 
Commonwealth, in the Second World War resulted in a managed economy that was 
designed to combat inflation during the war. This led to the state control of industrial 
outputs and inputs in conjunction with state control with regard to where individuals 
                                                        
31 Gobert, ‘The Politics of Corporate Manslaughter-The British Experience’ (n 25) 26. 
182 
worked, for whom they worked and what type of work they performed.32 A.J.P. Taylor 
stated: 
Before the war Great Britain was still trying to revive the old staples. After it, she 
relied on new developing industries. Electricity, motor cars, iron and steel, machine 
tools, nylons, and chemicals were all set for expansion, and in all of them output 
per head was steadily increasing. The very spirit of the nation had changed. No one 
in 1945 wanted to go back to 1939. The majority were determined to go forward 
and were confident that they could do so.33 
The economy of 1939 involved mass unemployment, clashes between employer cartels 
and trade unions regarding price mechanisms and a restrictive free market economy that 
also inhibited the free movement of labour and capital.34 In 1945 the newly elected Labour 
government represented the hope for change expected by Great Britain after the war. The 
Labour government reflected this hope of society when it announced an unprecedented 
programme of social and economic change in its first King’s Speech, which included with 
the introduction of social security and a national health service and the nationalisation of 
the coal industry and the Bank of England.35 The dramatic changes that occurred within 
society between 1939 and 1965 were also reflected in the corporate changes that occurred 
with the introduction of nationalised corporate management layers and structures not 
seen before on a national level across multiple industries. Nationalisation also occurred at 
a delicate point in time regarding gross negligence manslaughter reform by a corporation 
because the law had only just recognised in the Kent and Sussex Case and the ICR Haulage 
Case that a corporation could be indicted for manslaughter.36 The number of limited 
liability corporations grew and the nationalised corporation was introduced. 
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 Consequently, three factors affected corporate manslaughter reform between 
1939 and 1965 when the corporation was developing: the recommendations of the expert 
committees appointed by the Board of Trade to advise on company law amendments to 
the Companies Acts; the development of corporate criminal liability and fraud within 
company law; and the creation of nationalised corporations. By focusing on the 
development of the corporation from 1939 to 1965 in the light of these three factors, it is 
possible to address some of the reasons why the law started to recognise that the common 
law offence of gross negligence manslaughter could be committed by a corporation by the 
1940s and also why the development of the corporation, in particular through the 
nationalisation of previously large corporations with a high number of workplace fatalities, 
hindered corporate manslaughter reform. The three factors noted at the start of this 
paragraph that developed corporations took into account the statutory interpretations of 
the Companies Acts to determine corporate criminal liability; they also considered the role 
of the directors regarding the influence of corporate fraud before the nationalisation of 
the railway and mining corporations and later the impact of the nationalised corporations 
on the development of company law. 
 Every twenty years the Board of Trade appointed an expert committee to review 
company law and make recommendations, which were then incorporated into a new 
consolidating Companies Act.37 Two expert committees were convened from 1939 to 1965. 
The first, in 1945, was headed by Cohen J and called the Cohen Committee.38 The Cohen 
Committee led to the Companies Act 1947 and the Companies Act 1948.39 The second 
                                                        
37 Order of Council 1786 (22 Geo 3 c 82) supported by Board of Trade Act 1782 in conjunction with Board of Trade (Amendment) Act 
1817 (57 Geo 3 c 66) and Board of Trade (Appointment of Secretary of Parliament) Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict c 72) as cited in HC Deb 16 
June 1884, vol 289,col 398-399 
38 Board of Trade, Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmnd 6659 of 1945) (‘Cohen Report 1945’). 
39 Companies Act 1947 (10 & 11 Geo 6 c 47); Companies Act 1948 (11 & 12 Geo 6 c 38). 
184 
expert committee appointed Lord Jenkins in 1959 to head the Jenkins Committee.40 The 
Jenkins Committee reviewed the workings of the Companies Act 1948, the Prevention of 
Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 and the Registration of Business Names Act 1916, and this 
culminated in the Companies Act 1967.41 However, it should be noted that none of the 
recommendations of the Jenkins Committee were ever fully implemented because of the 
need to implement European Community directives into primary legislation in preparation 
for joining the European Community in 1972.42 
However, a certain view on the influence of fraud on the expert committees was 
still prevalent because of the continued crossover of expert committee members from the 
earlier Anderson Report 1936,43 the Bodkin Report 193744 and the Cohen Report 1945.45 On 
the one hand, the crossover provided consistency of membership within the expert 
committees. On the other hand, any strong personal influences, in particular with regard 
to views about corporate fraud and the role of the director, would continue with the 
crossover of committee membership because corporate fraud and the role of the director 
dominated the recommendations of the earlier Anderson Report 193646 and the Bodkin 
Report 193747 and continued in the Cohen Report 1945.48 Cohen J in paragraph 41 of the 
Cohen Report 1945 stated: 
As regards criminal prosecutions, we have already mentioned that prosecutions for 
the issue of misleading prospectuses are normally brought in England under section 
84 of the Larceny Act 1861, and in Scotland at common law. As the law stands, the 
onus is on the prosecution not merely to establish the false statement, but to prove 
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a guilty knowledge in the directors that the statement was false. We recognise that 
as a general principle the onus should rest on the prosecution to prove the whole 
of its case, but we think that if a director signs a prospectus containing a false 
statement, the case is exceptional and that once the falsity has been established, 
the onus should be on him to establish that he did not know that the statement 
was false and could not, by taking reasonable precautions, have ascertained its 
falsity.49 
After Cohen J was appointed to the Court of Appeal in 1946,50 the influence of a particular 
view on corporate fraud and the role of the director persisted outside his committee duties 
because it also had an impact on his Court of Appeal decision in 1951 in the case of Candler 
v Crane Christmas & Co (‘Candler Case’).51 The case was heard before Cohen, Denning and 
Asquith LJJ and concerned a negligent misstatement from an accountancy firm which was 
relied upon by a potential investor. The potential investor had no connection to the 
accountancy firm, but was dependent on the firm’s accounts, to his detriment. 
Subsequently, the case was overruled by Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd in 
1963 because it was held that the law had been correctly stated by the dissenting judgment 
of Denning LJ in the Candler Case.52 However, the Candler Case was significant because it 
emphasised the impact of Cohen LJ’s judicial reasoning connected to corporate fraud and 
the role of the director; despite the dissenting judgment of Denning LJ, Cohen LJ stood by 
his corporate fraud stance in the Cohen Report 1945 in so far as he believed that corporate 
fraud had to be attached to a director of the corporation, which followed the same 
approach used by the criminal judiciary when they considered the strict construction of 
penal statutes involving corporations.53 
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 Cohen and Asquith LJJ held in the Candler Case that there was no privity of contract; 
therefore, no action in tort could be taken. Their decision stressed that had a fraudulent 
act been committed, the decision would have been different.54 Denning LJ dissented when 
he stated that a duty of care was still owed regardless of whether fraud could be 
established and cited the provisions of sections 40 and 43 Companies Act 1948 to support 
the position which attributed fault to the directors.55 Denning LJ stated further that the 
‘enactment does not help, one way or the other, to show what result the common law 
would have reached in the absence of such provisions; but it does show what result it ought 
to reach’.56 In response, Cohen LJ referred to the comments of a fellow committee 
member, Professor Goodhart, in the Cohen Report 1945 to counter the argument 
presented by Denning LJ with regard to false statements made in the company prospectus 
under which corporate liability could have been accepted and stated that corporate liability 
could not be based on negligence alone and must have involved fraud to attribute fault.57 
Therefore, there was no liability against the corporation because the directors acting on 
the behalf of the corporation committed no fraudulent act.58 The use of fraud in the 
Candler Case emphasised the continuing impact of fraud in company law and the 
importance of the role of the director in establishing liability; this was also reflected in the 
criminal offence in section 44 Companies Acts 1948 whereby the director could be held 
criminal liable for misstatements in the prospectus. Consequently, a common theme 
started to emerge in the early 1950s regarding the attribution of fault by a director on 
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behalf of the corporation following the judicial reasoning applied by Cohen J in the Candler 
Case59 and the provisions made in the Companies Act 1948 with regard to directors. 
Finally, the introduction of the nationalised railway and mining corporations 
complicated the corporate structure and corporate criminal liability with regard to who 
could be deemed to be acting on the corporation’s behalf because of the multiple layers of 
management that existed within a nationalised corporation.60 The nationalisation of the 
railway corporation can be used as an example to demonstrate the complications regarding 
who was the controlling mind of the corporation for the purposes of identification doctrine 
reasoning.61 
During the First World War, the government took possession of 123 railways under 
the direction of a railway executive committee set up to operate the railways for the war 
effort.62 The Ministry of Transport was set up in 1919 and retained control until 1921, when 
the Railways Act 1921 amalgamated the 123 railway companies into four groups.63 The 
Second World War saw the return of control of the railway corporations to the Ministry of 
Transport from 1939 to 1947 and then under nationalisation from 1948 when the railway 
corporations were nationalised under the Transport Act 1947.64 The Transport Act 1947 
established the British Transport Commission (‘BTC’),65 which comprised a full-time 
chairman and four to eight other members, all appointed by the Minister of Transport, who 
were deemed the owners of the undertakings and responsible for the direction of policy.66 
The BTC launched on 1 January 1948 and appointed seven full-time Railway Executives ‘to 
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assist the Commission in the discharge of their functions’.67 The Railway Executives were 
considered public authorities with their own rights and liabilities and the autonomy to sue 
or be sued in the courts.68 They operated the railway system, which became known as 
‘British Railways’, across six regions: London Midlands; Western; Eastern; Southern; North-
Eastern; and Scottish69 and became the employers of all railway staff.70 Each region then 
operated under a Chief Regional Officer, whereby the layers of the corporate structure 
determined the controlling mind of a nationalised corporation. 
Parliament also maximised the protection afforded to the board of directors of 
nationalised corporations through section 121(3) Transport Act 1947, which provided as 
follows: 
Where an offence against this Act or any regulation or order made thereunder has 
been committed by a body corporate, every person who at the time of the 
commission of the offence was a director, general manager, secretary or other 
similar officer of the body corporate, or was purporting to act in any such capacity, 
shall be deemed guilty unless he proves that the offence was committed without 
his consent or connivance, and that he exercised all such due diligence to prevent 
the commission of the offence as he ought to have exercised having regard to the 
nature of his functions in that capacity and to all circumstances. 
There was a change of government in October 1951, which saw the Conservatives enact 
the Transport Act 195371 and later the Transport Act 1962.72 The Transport Act 1953 
abolished the Railway Executives and required the BTC to set up statutory authorities to 
manage the railway regions.73 The Transport Act 1962 split up the BTC into five new public 
authorities, which included the British Railways Board.74 Therefore, given the prevalence 
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of identification doctrine reasoning using the narrow interpretation of ‘those in control of 
the corporation’ to determine corporate criminal liability in conjunction with the provisions 
made within British Railways through Acts of Parliament from 1948 to 1965 empowering 
the railway companies as corporate bodies, it was even harder to establish who or what 
was the controlling mind of a nationalised corporation because of the corporate 
management layers that had been created by these Acts.75 
 Consequently, the changing corporate structure of private limited corporations and 
the nationalised corporations affected corporate manslaughter reform in three ways. 
Firstly, the use of the Companies Acts to deal with corporate fraud influenced the expert 
committees’ recommendations with regard to changes made to the Companies Acts to 
reflect the role of the director with the aim of being able to attribute criminal liability to 
them, as evidenced by the Candler Case. Secondly, the development of the corporation 
through the Companies Act emphasised the type of criminal offences that could be 
committed by the corporations and the directors acting on its behalf. The nature of the 
amendments reflected a core theme that was also starting to emerge in corporate criminal 
liability, which was that the actions of the directors were often considered to be those of 
the corporation, as demonstrated by section 44 Companies Act 1948, which set out how 
the director’s criminal liability for mis-statements in a prospectus. The onus was on the 
director to establish his innocence through genuine belief that the statement was true to 
avoid prosecution. Finally, the multilayered structure of the nationalised corporations 
represented by the BTC demonstrated a further twist to the development of corporate 
criminal liability with the introduction of identification doctrine reasoning because, based 
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on the use of the human agent interpretation, the multiple layers would have worked to 
attribute corporate criminal liability. However, once the identification doctrine reasoning 
interpretation changed to include only ‘those in control of the company’, the multiple 
management and corporate structures of a nationalised corporation made the process of 
identification more complicated. Consequently, this raises the question of whether the 
judicial reasoning and the timing of the transition of interpretation within identification 
doctrine reasoning occurred by design or was merely an accident. 
 Third Turning Point of Corporate Manslaughter Reform: The Three 
Fraud Cases and Identification Doctrine Reasoning 
By the 1940s the criminal judiciary had established an alternative method to determine 
corporate criminal liability through the introduction of identification doctrine reasoning in 
the Three Fraud Cases.76 However, starting to use identification doctrine reasoning within 
the criminal law as an interpretative tool to developing a test for corporate criminal liability 
was to the detriment of the strict construction of penal statutes involving corporations.77 
Hence, the introduction of identification doctrine reasoning was the third turning point of 
corporate manslaughter reform because the implied use of identification doctrine 
reasoning as the sole means to attribute corporate mens rea to corporate manslaughter 
inhibited the evolution of the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter by a 
corporation because it was a lot easier to identify the controlling mind of a corporation 
with only five employees than controlling mind of a nationalised company with lots of 
management layers because other individuals have control of specific aspects of the 
corporation. 
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 Further, the development of identification doctrine reasoning from a wide 
interpretation involving the ‘criminal acts of its human agents’78 to a narrow interpretation 
involving ‘the criminal acts of those in control of the company’79 had occurred by the mid 
1950s because of a reason of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning. The judicial 
reasoning behind the transition attributing corporate mens rea through identification 
doctrine reasoning from human agents to those in control of the company by the mid 
1950s needs to be addressed because the changes made to the application of identification 
doctrine reasoning directly affected the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform 
and resulted in the identification doctrine reasoning being used to determine corporate 
criminal liability generally and then corporate manslaughter.80 The reasoning behind this 
development will be considered in detail with reference to case law connected to the 
introduction of identification doctrine reasoning and its subsequent use in later case law 
from 1944 to 1964, including in merchant shipping cases. 
 At the same time as identification doctrine reasoning started to emerge to assist 
the criminal judiciary with the interpretation of corporate mens rea, Parliament also 
started to increase the use of statutes to regulate the activities of the private limited 
corporation.81 However, by increasing the number of statutes, it also created problems for 
the criminal judiciary because it struggled to interpret the intention of Parliament with 
regard to statutory offences and the role of mens rea when the criminal offence involved 
a corporation. It was not obvious when mens rea could be considered to be implied by the 
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relevant statutes, or when mens rea should not be considered. Devlin LJ, a Court of Appeal 
judge, commented that consequently, ‘the judges have set themselves in this branch of the 
law to try to frame the law as they would like to have it’ rather than considering the 
intention of Parliament.82 Consequently, the inhibiting impact of a continued reason of 
marked similarity involving judicial reasoning emerged again to inhibit corporate 
manslaughter reform because the personal preferences of the members of the criminal 
judiciary began to influence their decisions. 
 The impact of judicial reasoning was reflected in the two schools of thought that 
emerged in the 1950s to tackle the issue of judicial reasoning regarding corporate criminal 
liability. Edwards83 and Devlin84 argued that the first school of thought was demonstrated 
by the decision reached in Sherras v de Rutzen, in which Wright J claimed: 
There is a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the 
wrongfulness of the act is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that 
presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute and the 
intention creating the offence or by the subject matter with which it deals.85 
It was argued that the mens rea should be construed as implied unless the statute stated 
otherwise. 
 Conversely, the second school of thought argued that the literal rule of statutory 
interpretation should be applied. The literal rule states that ‘the general rule remains that 
the judges regard themselves as bound by the words of a statute when these words clearly 
govern the situation before the court. The words must be applied with nothing added and 
nothing taken away.’86 Consequently, mens rea should be considered only if the statute 
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stated mens rea was required, as evidenced by the decision reached by Kennedy LJ in 
Hobbs v Winchester Corporation.87 It was held that where the statute concerned related to 
what was considered to be a ‘regulatory offence’, a matter of malum prohibitum 
(translated as ‘quasi-criminal offence’), an absolute liability offence or a ‘public welfare 
offence’ the courts would impose strict liability.88 Strict (vicarious) liability offences were 
based on the principles of vicarious liability, whereby the corporation could be found guilty 
through the actions of its employees, representatives or agents without the need to prove 
any fault elements.89 However, if the statute referred to mens rea or an earlier case that 
had established a settled judicial interpretation of the particular words in the statute, strict 
liability would not be imposed.90 
After these developments the Three Fraud Cases were decided between 1943 and 
194691 and introduced an alternative method by which to determine corporate criminal 
liability using identification doctrine reasoning. The identification doctrine reasoning had 
initially established that the mens rea of the corporation was determined through the 
criminal actions of the human agents acting on behalf of the corporation. However, by the 
mid 1950s only ‘the criminal acts of those in control of the company’92 were relevant, so 
this deviated from the original concept of ‘the criminal acts of its human agents’.93 Two of 
the Three Fraud Cases, the Kent and Sussex Case94 and the Moore v I Bresler Ltd (‘Moore 
Case’),95 involved statutory breaches connected to fraud in circumstances where the 
welfare of the public needed to be protected, as both cases took place during the Second 
                                                        
87 Hobbs v Winchester Corporation (1910) 2 KB 471 (CA) 483-484. 
88 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 (HL). 
89 Economic Crime Report (n 20) 17. 
90 Glanville Llewellyn Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (1st edn, Stevens 1978) 958-959. 
91 Three Fraud Cases (n 1). 
92 Archbold’s 1947 (n 6) 3. 
93 Archbold’s 1954 (n 14) 12. 
94 Kent and Sussex Case (n 8). 
95 Moore v I Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 515 (KB) (‘Moore Case’). 
194 
World War. The criminal judiciary in both cases could have construed the penal statutes 
connected to the corporations strictly because the provisions connected to the strict 
construction of penal statutes and corporations were well established; it had been stated 
that ‘the legislature may prohibit a thing absolutely in such a way that the mere doing of 
it, even though there is no mens rea, is an offence’.96 Consequently, using the identification 
doctrine reasoning for the first time in the Kent and Sussex Case, created a judicial 
interpretation of the particular words within the statute, even though specific guidance 
within the regulations had been disregarded with regard to identifying the offences 
committed by the corporation.97 
 The applicability of identification doctrine reasoning introduced the means to hold 
all corporations criminally liable for their actions where mens rea was required. By 
instigating its initial use, the use of identification doctrine reasoning could then be applied 
to the second of the Three Fraud Cases, the ICR Haulage Case, in 1944 and then again in 
the Moore Case to the detriment of the strict construction of penal statutes which was 
already in place. 
The first of the three fraud cases was the Kent and Sussex Case, which was heard in 
1943 but reported in 1944.98 The case was heard on appeal from a Divisional Court before 
Viscount Caldecote LCJ, Macnaghten and Hallett JJ. The DPP argued that a corporation 
could be prosecuted for the act of an agent because the legislation prohibited some acts 
absolutely, in which case the corporation was liable if the act prohibited had been 
committed by one of its servants. The corporation was charged with two offences: (1) 
issuing a false record concerning mileage under the Motor Fuel Rationing (No 3) Rationing 
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Order 194199 and pursuant to regulation 55 Defence (General) Regulations 1939100 
contrary to regulation 82(1)(c) Defence (General) Regulations 1939; and (2) falsifying 
records and furnishing false information contrary to regulation 82(2) Defence (General) 
Regulations 1939. The transport manager submitted the returns in exchange for petrol 
coupons on behalf of the corporation. The transport manager was aware that the returns 
he was submitting were false. However, no reference was made to the role of the transport 
manager acting on the corporation’s behalf in the judgments delivered by the three 
judges.101 Despite this, the decision of the lower court was reversed and the corporation 
was found guilty. Viscount Caldecote LCJ stated: 
Under the Defence (General) Regulations 1939, it is common for offences to be 
created in which certain ingredients are required to be found and the present case 
seems to me to fall within that category. They are offences in which it is not 
material to consider whether there is or is not mens rea, which I understand to 
mean criminal intention, because the ingredients are stated in the regulation 
creating the offence. For instance, in the present case one of the necessary 
ingredients of the second offence charged is an intent to deceive. When that 
intent is stated to be necessary it seems to me idle to inquire whether a mens rea 
is or is not involved.102 
 
The second offence referred to regulation 82(2) Defence (General) Regulations 1939, which 
stated: 
If, in furnishing any information for the purposes of any of these Regulations or of 
any order made under any of these Regulations, any person makes any statement 
which he knows to be false in a material particular, or recklessly makes any 
statement which is false in a material particular, he shall be guilty of an offence 
against that Regulation. 
 
Further to Viscount Caldecote LCJ’s assertion that the offence fell under the scope of the 
Defence (General) Regulations 1939, no reference was made to regulation 91(1) Defence 
(General) Regulations 1939, which offered guidance to clarify the circumstances under 
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which offences committed by corporations could be prosecuted. The judgment made by 
Hallett J referred to the provisions of regulation 99B Defence (General) Regulations 1939 
whereby the provisions of section 2(1) Interpretation Act 1889 were made applicable to 
the Defence (General) Regulations 1939; these provisions confirmed that a corporation fell 
under the remit of a ‘person’.103 However, regulation 91(1) Defence (General) Regulations 
was not mentioned, despite that fact that the regulations definitions included a manager, 
which in the Kent and Sussex Case would have included the transport manager. Regulation 
91(1) Defence (General) Regulations 1939, with the subheading ‘offences by corporations’ 
stated: 
Where an offence under any of these Regulations committed by a body corporate 
is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be 
attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other 
similar officer of the body corporate or any person who was purporting to act in 
any such capacity, he, as well as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that offence 
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 
The following reference made by Viscount Caldecote LCJ raises a number of unanswered 
questions: ‘this special case raises the question whether a limited company, being a body 
corporate, can in law be guilty of the offences charged against the respondents, or whether 
a company is incapable of any act of will or state of mind such as that laid information’.104 
 The first question is why Viscount Caldecote LCJ’s comments made no reference to 
the provisions of regulation 91(1) Defence (General) Regulations 1939, which provided 
clear guidance on the criteria that needed to be fulfilled to establish an offence under the 
Defence (General) Regulations 1939 against a corporation. Regulation 82(2) Defence 
(General) Regulations 1939 stated that in order to establish the offence the transport 
manager must be found guilty of furnishing false records in the first instance. Once this was 
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established, in order to convict the corporation using the Defence (General) Regulations 
1939 it would be necessary to verify that the transport manager was negligent during the 
course of his employment, as stated in regulation 91(1) Defence (General) Regulations 
1939. Viscount Caldecote LCJ made no reference to establishing employee negligence; 
instead he described the relevant offences as follows 
The offences created by the regulation are those of doing something with intent to 
deceive or of making a statement known to be false in a material particular. There 
was ample evidence, on the facts as stated in the special case, that the company, 
by the only people who could act or speak or think for it had done both of these 
things.105 
Viscount Caldecote LCJ used identification doctrine reasoning to explain corporate criminal 
liability in the Kent and Sussex Case because he was trying to identify the person in control 
who could speak for corporation. Despite the implication that he was using identification 
doctrine reasoning in reaching the decision, Viscount Caldecote LCJ did not cite the 
Lennard’s Case as an authority.106 Further, by venturing outside the strict construction of 
penal statutes involving corporations and then introducing identification doctrine 
reasoning in the Kent and Sussex Case, Viscount Caldecote LCJ established a precedent, as 
evidenced by the decision reached in the ICR Haulage Case which followed. 
The second of the Three Fraud Cases was the ICR Haulage Case, heard in the Court 
of Criminal Appeal by Humphreys, Croom-Johnson, and Stable JJ in April and May 1944.107 
The appellant company ICR Haulage Limited (‘ICR Haulage’) was an incorporated company 
with a sole managing director, Mr Roberts. ICR Haulage had a contract with Rice & Sons to 
supply and deliver hardcore and ballast. It was alleged that ICR Haulage, Mr Roberts, two 
ICR Haulage drivers and two Rice & Sons employees had conspired to defraud Rice & Sons 
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by charging the company money in addition to the goods delivered. The common law 
offence of conspiracy could be established if there was ‘an intention to take a risk with 
someone else’s property, or to cause him by fraud to take such a risk, for purposes of one’s 
own’.108 The appellant appealed on the grounds that a company could not be indicted for 
an offence involving mens rea. The appeal was dismissed because it was affirmed that a 
company could be convicted of an offence of conspiracy through the use of identification 
doctrine reasoning. 
The ICR Haulage Case involved a sole director and a common law offence, whereas 
the Kent and Sussex Case involved a statutory breach and several layers of corporate 
officers within the corporation. However, Stable J dismissed the differences between the 
cases in the ICR Haulage Case. He stated that ‘there is a distinction between that case and 
the present, in that there [referring to the Kent and Sussex Case] the offences were 
charged under a regulation having the effect of a statute, whereas here the offence is a 
common law misdemeanour, but, in our judgment, this distinction has no material bearing 
on the question we have to decide’ (my emphasis).109 Instead, the appeal judges affirmed 
the decision reached in the Kent and Sussex Case on this principle and the balance of being 
the latest authority.110 By affirming the decision of Viscount Caldecote LCJ in the Kent and 
Sussex Case, the court in the ICR Haulage Case justified the application of identification 
doctrine reasoning to common law offences. However, the majority of authorities cited by 
Viscount Caldecote LCJ in the Kent and Sussex Case related to statutory breaches by 
corporations. Nonetheless, the ICR Haulage Case involved a common law offence against 
a corporation for conspiracy to defraud. Only two common law criminal cases involving 
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corporations were cited in the ICR Haulage Case: the Cory Brothers Case and Triplex Safety 
Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd (‘Triplex Case’).111 
The Triplex Case was heard by the Court of Appeal in 1939 before Sir Wilfrid Greene MR 
and Du Parcq LJ; Sir Wilfrid Greene MR, while a barrister before his appointment as Master 
of the Roll, had headed the expert committee on company law reform which resulted in 
the Companies Act 1929.112 It was held in the Triplex Case that it was possible for a 
company to claim privilege against self-incrimination regarding a charge of criminal libel.113 
There were several similarities between the Triplex Case and the ICR Haulage Case. Both 
cases involved a common law offence, corporations and individual directors. The Triplex 
Case was important as an authority in the ICR Haulage Case because identification doctrine 
reasoning had not been applied in the Triplex Case to determine corporate criminal liability. 
Stable J in the ICR Haulage Case stated that express malice was part of the mens rea 
required to identify the offence of criminal libel and made reference to the Triplex Case: 
It is plain that the Court of Appeal decided that, whatever the principle may be that 
fixes the line between those offences for which a limited company can and those 
for which it cannot be indicted, it is not the presence or absence in the human agent 
of a particular condition of mind. It would be unreasonable to suppose that a 
limited company can be indicted for a criminal libel only in those cases in which 
express malice is not proved, or that it could defeat a prosecution by proving that 
its duly authorised agent was, in fact, actuated by malice.114 
 
In the Triplex Case, corporate mens rea was clarified by Sir Wilfrid Greene MR and Du Parcq 
LJ: ‘it seems to us, therefore, to be in accordance with principle to hold that a limited 
company may be indicted for libel, and this view has the strong support of the well-known 
dictum of Lord Blackburn in Pharmaceutical Society v London & Provincial Supply 
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Association Ltd’.115 By mentioning the decision and dictum of the Pharmaceutical Case 
during the Triplex Case, Sir Wilfrid Greene MR and Du Parcq LJ provided a strong indication 
that a corporation ‘possesses a competent knowledge of its business, if it employs 
competent directors, managers, and so forth’.116 The relevant knowledge of the firm, 
following Lord Blackburn’s obiter dictum in the Pharmaceutical Case, was not the sole 
domain of a director and was not the sole factor that could be used to establish who 
controlled the corporation. Lord Blackburn stated in the Pharmaceutical Case that express 
malice could not be identified clearly in a company if a ‘corporation that incorporated itself 
for the purpose of publishing a newspaper could not be tried and fined, or an action for 
damages brought against it for libel; or that a corporation which commits a nuisance could 
not be convicted of the nuisance or the like. I must really say that I do not feel the slightest 
doubt upon that part of the case.’117 
 Moreover, Sir Wilfrid Greene MR, who earlier had chaired an expert committee on 
company law, believed that a director might not always be aware of the events that were 
occurring in the corporation.118 He supported the use of Lord Blackman’s obiter dictum in 
the Pharmaceutical Case to reach the same conclusion in the Triplex Case – that the human 
agents of the corporation could act on behalf of the corporation in common law offences. 
 If the only means of identifying corporate mens rea was through identification 
doctrine reasoning, then surely Lennard’s Case should have been cited in both the Tripex 
Case and the ICR Haulage Case to add weight to the use of identification doctrine 
reasoning. The common law principles outlined in the Triplex Case relied on the dictum of 
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the Pharmaceutical Case, which stated that the actions of the corporation could be 
attributed to its human agents rather than just to those deemed to be in control of the 
corporation. However, the weight of the decision by Viscount Caldecote LCJ in the Kent and 
Sussex Case prevented this because Stable J in the ICR Haulage Case stated that he was 
bound by the judgment of Viscount Caldecote LCJ in the Kent and Sussex Case despite the 
difference between the types of offences, one statutory and the other common law, 
because the ‘distinction has no material bearing on the question we have to decide’.119 
 The decision to apply the same identification doctrine reasoning to both common 
law and statutory offences does have a material bearing because until the decisions 
reached in the Three Fraud Cases the criminal judiciary was very clear that should penal 
statutes involving corporations be considered, they should be construed strictly.120 If the 
issue of corporate mens rea needed to be clarified because it was not mentioned in the 
statute then the approach taken in the Triplex Case would apply; that approach looked to 
the human agents of the corporation, not just those in control of the corporation. Viscount 
Caldecote LCJ in the Kent and Sussex Case could have construed the penal statutes strictly 
without the wordy justification used by applying identification doctrine reasoning because 
the rules of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939 were clear and could have been 
construed strictly.121 
 Devlin stated that the judges framed the law as they would have liked it to be in 
this branch of law regarding statutory offences involving corporations.122 The identification 
doctrine was originally created by Viscount Haldane LC in the Lennard’s Case123 as a tool to 
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aid statutory interpretation in a civil law case. The civil law case was not bound by the 
doctrine of malum prohibitum or malum in se to determine corporate mens rea.The 
difference can be seen in dangerous driving that results in a death (malum in se) and driving 
at 72 mph in a 70 mph zone, which results in a statutory breach (malum prohibita).124 The 
two offences are completely different and the means used to interpret whether the 
offence occurred or not required different approaches to reflect the differences. Gobert 
believed that the courts ‘ignored the fact that the identification doctrine was not 
articulated as such until the 1940s, long after the development of the common law was 
well advanced’.125 The development of the common law had already been hindered by the 
quashing of the corporate manslaughter indictment in the Cory Bros Case in 1927, because 
it was not until the 1940s, through the Three Fraud Cases, that the decision was corrected 
and it was found that a corporation could commit manslaughter. The criminal judiciary had 
already developed its own approach to determining corporate criminal liability for any 
common law offence that was based on the instructions given by managers and directors 
acting on behalf of the corporation through the Broom Case, the Evans Case and the Triplex 
Case.126 The Broom Case, in conjunction with the Triplex Case, continued to be cited as an 
authority to aid corporate criminal liability interpretations based on the idea that human 
agents could act on the behalf of a corporation until the mid 1960s.127 By merging the 
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corporate mens rea based on identification doctrine reasoning for both statutory and 
common law offences, the judicial reasoning had an impact on the later decisions 
connected to corporate criminal liability generally and corporate manslaughter specifically. 
The flexibility of the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter by a 
corporation became confined within the bounds of identification doctrine reasoning at the 
expense of the common law approaches that could have been used following the 
approaches already established in the Evans Case and the Broom Case. 
 The final case in the Three Fraud Cases involved the Moore Case, heard in October 
1944 on appeal before Viscount Caldecote LCJ, Humphreys and Birkett JJ.128 The Moore 
Case was also the second of the Three Fraud Cases to be decided by Viscount Caldecote 
LCJ. The case concerned the prosecution surrounding another statutory breach involving I 
Bresler Ltd and two employees; Bresler (company secretary and general manager of the 
Nottingham branch) and Phillips (sales manager of the Nottingham branch). All three were 
indicted under section 35(2) Finance Act 1940 because Bresler and Phillips retained the 
sales profits from handbags that should have been sold by I Bresler Ltd to the public.129 The 
offence occurred when the corporation submitted its tax returns, in which it declared lower 
sales figures than the actual sales figures. Section 35(2) Finance Act (No 2) Act 1940 stated 
that it is ‘an offence for any person, for the purpose of the Act, to make use of any 
document which was false in a material particular with intent to deceive’. Viscount 
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Caldecote LCJ stated that ‘these two men were important officials of the company’.130 
However, Humphreys J in his judgment stated: 
It is difficult to imagine two persons whose acts would more effectively bind the 
company or who could be said on the terms of their employment to be more 
obviously agents for the purpose of the company than the secretary and the 
general manager of that branch and the sales manager of that branch (my 
emphasis).131 
According to the original definition in the Lennard’s Case the alter ego of the corporation 
‘is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the 
personality of the corporation’.132 It was doubtful that a general manager and sales 
manager from a branch operation owned by the corporation could be considered to be the 
corporation. Nonetheless, the corporation was convicted using identification doctrine 
reasoning. 
 Before the decision in the Kent and Sussex Case, there was no need to consider 
identification doctrine reasoning because clear guidance had already been legislated for by 
Parliament, supported by clear statutory guidelines concerning the strict construction of 
penal statutes involving corporations. The regulations in two of the Three Fraud Cases 
already addressed the issue of corporate criminal liability. Viscount Caldecote LCJ chose to 
deviate from established statutory rules of interpretation and used identification doctrine 
reasoning to decide the Kent and Sussex Case without any reference to Lennard’s Case to 
justify the use of this reasoning. Two factors connected to judicial reasoning influenced his 
decision to use identification doctrine reasoning: firstly, the political nature of his 
appointment as Lord Chief Justice and his role in deciding the Three Fraud Cases, and 
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secondly his own personal influences that affected his decisions to use identification 
doctrine reasoning. 
In 1940 Viscount Caldecote LCJ was the first ex-Lord Chancellor to be appointed 
Lord Chief Justice.133 He had already been a Member of Parliament for twenty-nine years, 
and he also served as Secretary of State, Solicitor General, Attorney General and Lord 
Chancellor. His appointment to Lord Chancellor was initially politically motivated, as 
demonstrated by an extract from his diary, in which he stated: 
P.M (Chamberlain) asked me if he were able to offer me the Lord Chancellorship, 
or as an alternative the Lord Presidency, which would I prefer. I said Lord 
Chancellor: it was my own profession. P.M. said that was what he hoped. I imagine 
he wants to put someone else in the War Cabinet than myself (sic) as Dominions 
Secretary. Also he wants to give another vacancy by my going to the Lord 
Chancellorship.134 
The fall of Chamberlain’s government eight months later resulted in a further political 
appointment as Lord Chief Justice. He was all set to retire but was persuaded to accept the 
appointment to steady the judicial ship at the onset of World War Two when his 
predecessor, Lord Hewart, was asked to resign.135 Lord Hewart was very vocal as a Lord 
Chief Justice between 1922 and 1943 regarding the unconstitutional use of delegated 
legislation.136 While Viscount Caldecote LCJ was considered by his peers to be the ‘very 
model and example of what a lawyer in public life should be’, his views on the constitution, 
the role of the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty reflected the centre ground.137 
He voiced his opinion publicly in his inaugural speech at Westfield College in November 
1940, soon after his appointment as Lord Chief Justice, and stated that ‘the success of our 
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legal and Parliamentary institutions cannot be secured if they are not understood and 
esteemed’.138 Viscount Caldecote LCJ used the same reasoning to explain his use of 
identification doctrine reasoning to interpret the delegated legislation in the Kent and 
Sussex Case and the statutory interpretation of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939. 
Viscount Caldecote LCJ’s use of delegated legislation provided stability during World War 
Two and the use of identification doctrine reasoning represented a consistent approach to 
determining corporate criminal liability. The issue of corporate fraud remained an 
important issue because it was important to limit it to aid the war effort and maintain 
public morale; it was legislated for in the Companies Acts 1947 and 1948. The legislature 
and executive committees were preoccupied with corporate fraud prevention during 
World War Two, and regulation was required for state protection. Despite Viscount 
Caldecote LCJ’s recognition of parliamentary sovereignty in his inaugural speech, the 
introduction of identification doctrine reasoning was to the detriment of rules already 
being used by the criminal judiciary to construe statutes and regulations strictly. 
 The second reason behind the introduction of identification doctrine reasoning 
concerned Viscount Caldecote LCJ’s strong personal influences, which affected the 
rationale behind his judgments. It could be argued that it is not possible to remove the 
politician from the lawyer after twenty-nine years as a politician, and it is also claimed that 
those personal influences  cannot be disregarded by a judge when determining a case.139 
After all, his appointment was a political move to counteract the damage inflicted by his 
predecessor. 
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4.3.1 The Use of the Identification Doctrine to Determine Corporate Criminal 
Liability from 1944 to 1965 
By 1944 the Three Fraud Cases140 had established the use of identification doctrine 
reasoning to establish corporate criminal liability in circumstances whereby the director or 
another person appointed by the board of directors to act on behalf of the company could 
be held accountable for the corporation (‘human agents acting on behalf of the company’). 
However, within twenty-one years the concept of the relative position of the officer or 
agent and the other relevant facts and circumstances of the case as established in the last 
of the Three Fraud Cases, the Moore Case, had been disregarded.141 It is noteworthy that 
the wider interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning was subtly replaced with the 
narrow interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning insofar that only those in control 
of the corporation could be attributed to determine corporate criminal liability. Once again 
the influence of the development of the application of the narrow interpretation of the 
identification doctrine reasoning came from civil law; the use of the narrower 
interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning then moved into the criminal arena as 
the narrow definition was conveniently applied to corporate criminal liability generally, 
whether the offence involved a statutory breach or a common law offence. The impact of 
this crossover of the narrow interpretation of the identification doctrine reasoning by the 
mid 1950s subsequently cast a deep shadow on the law of corporate manslaughter reform 
because the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning would be 
impossible to stop. 
 The first subtle hint that a narrow interpretation was going to be applied occurred 
in 1952 in the case of DC Thompson & Co Ld v Deakin and Others (‘Deakin Case’).142 The 
                                                        
140 Three Fraud Cases (n 1). 
141 Moore Case (n 95) 516-517. 
142 DC Thompson & Co Ld v Deakin and Others [1952] 1 Ch 646 (CA) (‘Deakin Case’). Please note spelling in case as reported re ‘Ld’. 
208 
case concerned a breach of contract connected to a trade dispute and was heard on appeal 
before Lord Evershed MR, Jenkins and Morris LJJ. By 1962 Jenkins LJ would also headed the 
expert committee that resulted in the Companies Act 1967, which focused heavily on the 
effects of company swindles and directors’ liabilities.143 However, as an appeal court judge, 
Jenkins LJ’s opinion regarding corporate liability had been developing from 1952 onwards 
with regard to the trade dispute issues in this case and the process by which the actions of 
employees could be attributed to the corporation.144 Lord Evershed MR stated that ‘in the 
case of a company, the approach to or the persuasion of a managing director, or of some 
person having like authority, may be regarded as being in all respects equivalent to a direct 
approach to or persuasion of an individual contractor’.145 The law was still open to the wide 
interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning because the courts were prepared to 
accept that the corporation could be represented by human agents generally and not just 
those in control of the corporation. 
 However, by 1957 the move away from the wide interpretation of the identification 
doctrine reasoning using the human agent interpretation started with the civil case of H. L. 
Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd (‘Bolton Case’).146 The Bolton Case 
was heard on appeal before Denning, Hodson and Morris LJJ. The case involved a landlord 
and tenant dispute regarding the occupation of premises by a corporation for its own 
business whereby it needed to be determined whether the actions and intentions of the 
three directors represented those of the corporation. Denning LJ stated: 
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve 
centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act 
in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company 
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are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and 
cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers 
who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. 
The state of the mind of those managers is the state of mind of the company and is 
treated by the law as such.147 
Denning LJ cited authorities from Lennard’s Case and the IRC Haulage Case to support the 
use of identification doctrine reasoning to determine the intent of the corporation and 
therefor to make a decision regarding the landlord and tenant dispute.148 This was the first 
time that the identification doctrine using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation had 
been cited and had been linked back to Lord Haldane LC’s speech in the Lennard’s Case.149 
Consequently, Denning LJ applied the ‘directing mind and will test’ to the three directors; 
he said that ‘whether their intention is the company’s intention depends on the nature of 
the matter under consideration, the relative position of the officer or agent and the other 
relevant facts and circumstances of the case’.150 The three directors in the Bolton Case held 
an annual board meeting during which they assigned tasks.151 Denning LJ stated that, in his 
opinion, the directors had control and influence over the business and should be regarded 
as the controlling minds. It appears that only a cursory look was sufficient under the 
narrower identification doctrine to establish this point because he did not want to 
investigate or consider the corporate structure that might have been indicated from the 
minutes of the board meeting to establish whether his interpretation was an accurate 
reflection of the corporate structure. 
 The use of the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine continued in John 
Henshall (Quarries) Ltd v Harvey (‘Henshall Case’) in 1965, which was heard on appeal in 
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the Divisional Court from the magistrates’ court before Lord Parker LCJ, Widgery and 
Marshall JJ.152 Burrell was employed by John Henshall (Quarries) Ltd to check the weight of 
the lorries as they left the premises. In this case, Burrell allowed one of the lorries to leave 
the premises despite knowing it exceeded the weight restrictions. The driver was an 
independent contractor and was fined £5 for using the lorry contrary to regulation 68 
Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) (Track Laying Vehicles) Regulations 1955153 and 
section 64 Road Traffic and Roads Improvement Act 1960.154 In the first instance, the 
company was found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring the weight 
violation. The company appealed successfully against the conviction on the grounds that 
Burrell was not the controlling mind of the company and was acting solely as the hands as 
an agent. Lord Parker CJ relied on the Bolton Case to establish the difference when he 
stated that ‘if a master completely hands over the effective management of a business to 
somebody else, then as it is often said he cannot get out of his responsibility by such 
delegation. In those circumstances, he is fixed with the knowledge of his delegate.’155 
However, by relying on the Bolton Case the court was narrowing the scope of the directing 
will and mind test. It must be remembered that the scope of the implied use of 
identification doctrine reasoning in the Three Fraud Cases was interpreted through the 
wide interpretation of the corporate structure including all employees and agents who 
could act on behalf of the corporation, rather than those deemed to be in control the 
corporation. 
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Consequently, the decision in the Henshall Case should be contrasted with the case 
of Arthur Guinness Son and Co (Dublin) Ltd v The Freshfield (Owners) and Others, The Lady 
Gwendolen (Limitation) (‘Lady Gwendolen Case’) heard by the Court of Appeal in 1965, 
because a different outcome was reached that was more in keeping with the realities of a 
developing corporate structure.156 The judges hearing the case were Sellers, Willmer and 
Winn LJJ. Winn LJ, when he was a practising barrister, held adamant views on corporate 
criminal liability which he had already voiced in an article for the Cambridge Law Journal in 
1929.157 He believed that the board acting collectively represented the primary 
representatives of the corporation. Moreover, he argued that the exercise of corporate 
power was ‘performed by the hands or mouth’ of others within the corporation who might 
or might not sit on the board.158 In direct contrast to the arguments proposed in the Bolton 
Case, Winn LJ contended that ‘the significant question is whether he is acting on his own 
initiative or under the direct authority of the board of primary representatives’.159 The 
same beliefs could be observed in the decision reached in the Lady Gwendolen Case, where 
it was held that the corporation as a shipowner was responsible for monitoring how its 
masters navigated its ships. The master of The Lady Gwendolen navigated too fast in the 
fog, collided and sank another boat, called The Freshfield. The owner of The Lady 
Gwendolen had no knowledge of this and argued that all responsibilities were passed to a 
marine superintendent who had no navigational experience as he was an engineer. 
Regardless, the owner of The Lady Gwendolen were found guilty and could not limit its 
liability for a collision pursuant to section 502 Merchant Act 1894.160 The reasoning was 
                                                        
156 Arthur Guinness Son and Co (Dublin) Ltd v The Freshfield (Owners) and Others. The Lady Gwendolen (Limitation) [1965] 3 WLR 91 
(CA) 91 (‘Lady Gwendolen Case’). 
157 Charles Roger Noel Winn, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations’ (1929) 3 CLJ 398. 
158 Winn (n 157) 407-408. 
159 Winn (n 157) 408. 
160 (57 & 58 Vict c 60). 
212 
linked back to the ‘basic lack of administration and of undistributed and undefined 
responsibilities in relation to the navigation of their ships’.161 
 In the Lady Gwendolen Case, Winn LJ looked to the real attitude adopted by the 
board of directors with regard to who had responsibility for the shipping arm of the 
corporation. He supported this position further by considering the corporation’s articles of 
association. Winn LJ, when he was a practising barrister, asked the same question 
concerning corporate criminal liability in his article in 1929, and thirty-six years later Winn 
LJ had the opportunity to answer this question that was posed in the Lady Gwendolen Case. 
He explored the realities of the boardroom and demonstrated that one of the directors 
had direct responsibility for the issue of navigation. Winn LJ’s approach contrasted with 
the approach taken in the Henshall Case, as the Lady Gwendolen Case did not permit the 
owner, or the managers acting on its behalf, to wash its hands of responsibility by arguing 
that it had delegated the task to an employee, because no supporting evidence existed. 
Contrary to what happened in the Henshall Case, there was no examination of boardroom 
competencies to determine whether a director was responsible for the logistics of the 
company. 
Although the introduction of identification doctrine reasoning came at the expense 
of the strict construction of penal statutes, at this particular point in time, in the mid to 
late 1950s, it would still have been possible to reflect the changing corporate structure of 
large corporations with the continued use of the wide interpretation of identification 
doctrine reasoning of the Three Fraud Cases, whereby  corporate liability could be 
determined through the use of human agents. Consequently, the use of identification 
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doctrine reasoning could have been developed further by following the implied use of 
identification doctrine reasoning by Winn LJ in the Lady Gwendolen Case; he suggested 
that the lack of actions and decisions at boardroom level could have been used to 
determine corporate liability because this would also have taken into account the 
delegation of individual acts to a nominated employee or agent of the corporation. On 
these grounds, identification doctrine reasoning could have been adapted to be applicable 
to corporate governance in a post-World War Two Britain because it would have reflected 
the structure of an evolving modern corporate with numerous management layers, as 
could be seen in large multinational corporations or nationalised corporations.162 
Nonetheless, the outcome was to be very different because from the 1950s 
onwards identification doctrine reasoning centred on the narrow interpretation based on 
the those in control of the corporation only rather than the acts of its human agents. 
Further, the development of the narrow interpretation of the identification doctrine 
reasoning protected the nationalised industries from potential criminal prosecutions for 
the harm they caused. Gobert believed that the development of identification doctrine 
reasoning was a result of the judiciary devising ‘their own distinctive model of corporate 
criminal liability’;163 this echoed the position taken by Patrick Devlin, a former judge, forty 
years earlier164 and could be evidenced further by the change in interpretation used, which 
now focused on those in the control of the corporation rather than on the criminal acts of 
its human agents.165 
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Consequently, there was a continuing presence of a reason of marked similarity 
connected to judicial reasoning which led to the complete disregard of the rules 
surrounding the strict construction of penal statutes involving corporations in favour of 
using identification doctrine reasoning to determine corporate criminal liability, including 
manslaughter, regardless of the type of offence. The rationale behind the introduction of 
identification doctrine reasoning might have been the desire to provide a judicial tool to 
aid the criminal judiciary when it became apparent that the criminal judiciary had failed to 
grapple with the theoretical concepts concerning how a corporation could commit the 
offence of manslaughter. However, a reason of marked similarity connected to judicial 
reasoning inhibited the third turning point of corporate manslaughter reform further by 
restricting the use of the wider interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning and 
allowing only the narrow interpretation regarding the concept of the controlling mind. The 
change of criteria became impossible to avoid, as demonstrated by the lack of any 
prosecutions for corporate manslaughter until 1965 and the gradual increase in the 
influence of a new reason of marked similarity that inhibited corporate manslaughter 
reform: post-disaster reactive legislation. 
 Fourth Turning Point of Corporate Manslaughter Reform: No 
Prosecutions for Corporate Manslaughter (1944–1964) 
The fourth turning point of corporate manslaughter reform concerned the lack of 
corporate manslaughter prosecutions from 1944 to 1964 because of a new reason of 
marked similarity: post-disaster reactive legislation, which inhibited corporate 
manslaughter reform. Post-disaster reactive legislation referred to the circumstances 
whereby ‘a disaster can elevate a problem to a crisis and produce reactive legislation’.166 
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Consequently, in the absence of any corporate manslaughter prosecutions from 1944 to 
1964,167 post-disaster reactive legislation started to emerge quietly as a legislative 
response to fatal corporate disasters. The first disaster case study involves a sports stadium 
disaster, thirty-three deaths168 and the enactment of the Safety at Sports Ground Act 
1975.169 The second case study involves a coal mining disaster170 and the enactment of the 
Mines and Quarries Act 1954.171 
 Between 1939 and 1965 the increased use of post-disaster reactive legislation 
emerged as a reason of marked similarity because it enabled Parliament to address 
corporate fatalities in a private and nationalised corporate environment. However, the use 
of post-disaster reactive legislation inhibited corporate manslaughter reform because from 
1939 to 1964 there were no prosecutions for culpable neglect manslaughter by a 
corporation. On the one hand, the use of post-disaster legislation provided a win-win 
situation in so far as it was evidentially hard to convict a nationalised corporation of 
culpable negligent manslaughter using identification doctrine reasoning and the 
controlling mind criteria from the mid 1950s onwards owing to the multiple management 
structures in a nationalised railway corporation. Consequently, the use of post-disaster 
reactive legislation represented a solution to a complex problem because it provided a less 
contentious alternative to criminal proceeding to address the fatalities caused by the 
negligence of corporations involved in disasters.172 
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 On the other hand, the increased use of post-disaster reactive legislation was to the 
detriment of corporate manslaughter reform because a symbiotic relationship emerged 
between post-disaster reactive legislation and the increased use of identification doctrine 
reasoning that used the controlling mind criteria in corporate manslaughter from the mid 
1950s onwards. Post-disaster reactive legislation became Parliament’s first choice of 
response to address the criminal negligence of corporations in the aftermath of 
disasters.173 The final disaster case study, involving the Lewisham train disaster in 1957, 
demonstrated the symbiotic relationship between identification doctrine reasoning and 
the use of post-disaster reactive legislation to address the aftermath of the train crash.174 
4.4.1 The Burnden Park Stadium Disaster in Bolton (1946) 
On 9 March 1946 a Football Association cup tie was due to take place between Bolton and 
Stoke at Burnden Park, Bolton, the home ground of Bolton Wanderers Football Club, at 
2.50 p.m. However, before kick-off, additional spectators gained unauthorised entrance 
through a gate in the north-west corner of the Embankment Enclosure before the police 
closed it.175 The grounds were already at bursting point, with 85,000 trying to gain entrance 
to the ground; it had been estimated that 50,000 would be in attendance. To account for 
the increased number of expected spectators, the police presence was increased from 60 
to 103 officers.176 The increased number of spectators in conjunction with the 
unauthorised access to the grounds created pressure in the stand. The result was a crush 
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that caused the death of thirty-three people. On 23 May 1946 the coroner’s jury returned 
a verdict of accidental death from asphyxia due to suffocation.177 
 In response to the disaster, James Chuter Ede, the Labour Home Secretary (‘Home 
Secretary’), announced in the House of Commons his proposal to set up a Home Office 
Inquiry (an ad hoc inquiry) into the disaster; ‘the purpose of the investigation would be to 
consider whether any general measures should be taken to minimise the danger of similar 
tragedies occurring in the future’.178 On 22 March 1946 the Home Office appointed Sir Ron 
Moelwyn Hughes (‘Moelwyn Hughes’) to lead the inquiry, and he published the formal 
report, the Moelwyn Hughes Report, on 25 May 1946.179 The call for the inquiry into 
Burnden Park was important because it was the first time a government had commissioned 
an inquiry to report on and made recommendations with regard to a sporting disaster 
involving fatalities.180 An inquiry could have been called under the Tribunals of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Act 1921, which would have been led by a senior judge with the same powers 
as a High Court judge to call witnesses and hear evidence.181 However, inquiries under the 
Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 were called for very rarely and were usually in 
response to large national disasters or political issues that caused severe public distress 
and concern.182 Burnden Park occurred just after the Second World War, and at the time 
of the disaster the public were not greatly disturbed by the fatalities.183 Hence, the Burnden 
Park disaster would have fallen outside the remit of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 
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1921 because such an inquiry would not have been considered to be of urgent public 
importance.184 However, the inquiry was called because of the mismanagement of the 
event rather than the poor construction of the stadium, which had been the reason for 
earlier fatalities at sport grounds, following which no inquiries had been held.185 On the 
one hand, the calling of the inquiry represented a first with regard to the fact it was called 
at all. On the other hand, the more likely reason the government called the ad hoc inquiry 
was so the Labour government would be seen to be responding to the disaster. Norman 
Baker, a leading academic on the Burnden disaster,186 stated that the inquiry was ‘just 
enough’ to address the fatalities. These were the reasons behind the choice to hold an ad 
hoc inquiry in the first place to investigate the cause of the disaster rather than an inquiry 
pursuant to the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. 
 During the Moelwyn Hughes inquiry,187 Moelwyn Hughes referred to an earlier 
inquiry carried out by Edward Shortt KC in 1923 in response to the serious injuries at the 
first FA Cup Final in 1923 at Empire Stadium, Wembley; it concerned the arrangements 
made to deal with large attendances at sporting events. The findings were published in the 
Shortt Report in March 1924188 and Shortt recommended the self-regulation of sports 
grounds safety by the Football Association.189 Moelwyn Hughes in 1946 after Burnden Park 
noted the shortcomings of self-regulation and recommended the licencing of sport 
stadiums: 
The preceding safety measures cannot be secured without legislation. A 
Departmental Committee reporting on the crowds to a previous Home Secretary in 
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1924 [‘Shortt Report’] anaemically recommended that adequate provision for 
safety be left to the pressure of the governing bodies in sport.190 
Moelwyn Hughes made a further recommendation that each football ground should also 
be licenced by an appropriate local authority.191 However, in order to be implemented the 
recommendations had to be enforced by the Home Secretary, and as he responded in the 
House of Commons in August 1946, that would ‘involve legislation which clearly could not 
be effective in time for the beginning of the football season. I am not at present in a 
position to announce any decision on the recommendations but I will do as soon as I 
can.’192 
 Following the inquiry and inquest, the wife of one of the victims issued a civil claim 
for negligence and breach of duty against Bolton Wanderers Football and Athletic Co Ltd 
and William James Howard (the Chief Constable of the police, who was the representative 
of the Watch Committee for the County of Bolton).193 Both defendants were considered 
corporations with regard to the proceedings.194 The Moelwyn Hughes Report attributed the 
disaster to poor communication between the club marshals and the police inside and 
outside the grounds in conjunction with an over-reliance on the police to manage the 
crowds generally.195 Despite these criticisms, the Moelwyn Hughes Report emphasised that 
both the club and the police, in the opinion of Moelwyn Hughes, acted within the bounds 
of the legal requirements expected of them.196 However, the solicitors acting for the 
football club and the police were less sure and considered that the points of negligence 
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being raised might lead to a test case because of how the marshalling arrangements were 
made between the police and the club.197 The relevant statutory provisions connected to 
sport grounds in the late 1940s concerned section 37 Public Health Acts (Amendment) Act 
1890198 with regard to the structure of the stands and section 59 Public Health Act 1936199 
regarding points of ingress and egress by the public. The football club argued that it had 
acted in accordance with everything expected of the reasonable football club of the period 
and stated further that it had not breached any duties owed to the victims.200 
Subsequently, no criminal charges emerged against the club, the police or the Watch 
Committee with regard to culpable neglect manslaughter because no evidence was found 
by the inquest or the inquiry to indicate that charges should be made. 
However, an alternative view regarding the level of negligence demonstrated by 
the police and the football club can be gleaned from the correspondence files of the 
defence solicitors acting for the police authority and the local authority.201 The defence 
solicitors for the police authority and the local authority considered the proceedings to be 
a test case with an unclear outcome that could potentially result in multiple claims against 
the police. Consequently, the local authority sought assurances from the Under Secretary 
of State that should damages be awarded it would be reimbursed.202 This was 
substantiated by the notes of the defence solicitors in their instructions to counsel; they 
were also concerned that the arrangement between the club and the police concerning 
marshalling implied that the police had agreed to take responsibility for marshalling inside 
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and outside the club, although this was never formally confirmed in writing.203 Further, the 
defence solicitors expressed their concern to the defence barrister that the evidence 
regarding the police involvement and the events outside the grounds provided by Howard 
(‘Chief Constable’) would not hold up under cross-examination because his solicitor 
believed he ‘ he went too far as to express a definite opinion that the prime and only cause 
of the disaster was illegal entry on a large scale. If this evidence was accepted by the court 
the police would have a great deal to answer.’204 In the end these points were not tested 
because the claim was eventually settled by the football club under a compromise 
agreement in April 1947 that was approved by the court. The court ordered the football 
club to pay the costs of the action of the police and the Watch Committee; to pay £1,655 
in damages to the plaintiff; and to discharge both the police and the Watch Committee 
from any further liability.205 
Nonetheless, the defence and court documents indicated that the police, the 
football club and the Watch Committee were prepared for a legal battle and expected the 
worst both financially and publicly in the aftermath of the disaster because the issue of 
negligence, in the opinion of the defence solicitors and barristers, could be established 
against them all. During the civil proceedings the defence solicitors and barristers were 
surprised that there was no public uproar regarding the claims of negligence. However, 
lack of public concern was attributed to the timing of the Burnden Park stadium disaster, 
which occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War.206 
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The Labour government was elected in 1945 and was in no rush to implement the 
recommendations of the Moelwyn Hughes Report because it already had a heavy 
legislative calendar between 1946 and 1949 regarding the nationalised industries.207 
Consequently, the proposed post-disaster reactive legislative response regarding the 
licencing of sports grounds would have to proceed at a slower pace.208 However, by 1949 
the only progress that had been made was the introduction of voluntary safety certificates 
for stadiums based on a Memorandum on Safety of Spectators and Control of Crowds 
November 1948 distributed by the Football Association209 rather than the proposed local 
authority licencing of all football stadiums recommended in the Moelwyn Hughes 
Report.210 
 The recommendations in the Moelwyn Hughes Report211 were finally addressed 
through post-disaster reactive legislation with the enactment of the Safety of Sports 
Grounds Act 1975, which set up a centralised licencing system for designated grounds and 
provided supporting guidelines with the aim of preventing future fatalities.212 However, it 
took a further two stadium disasters after Burnden Park in 1946 for the recommendations 
made in the Moelwyn Hughes Report to be implemented. Both stadium disasters occurred 
at Ibrox Park (1887–1999), Glasgow, home to Rangers Football Club. The first stadium 
disaster occurred in 1969, with two deaths caused by crushing on Stairway 13,213 and the 
second occurred in 1971, with sixty-six deaths on Stairway 13.214 The deaths of the sixty-
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six fans at Ibrox Park in 1971 resulted in another ad hoc inquiry; the combined 
recommendations of this inquiry and those that had been made in the Moelwyn Hughes 
Report in 1946 resulted in post-disaster reactive legislation being enacted in the form of 
the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975.215 The legislature was using post-disaster reactive 
legislation to promote safety in sports ground, not to attribute blame but to promote safety 
in sports grounds. However, it took a further two disasters after Ibrox Park in 1971 to 
accomplish the original recommendations of the Moelwyn Hughes Report, because the 
provisions of the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 failed to licence all football stadiums 
that were connected to a team in the football leagues.216 Subsequently, on 11 May 1985, 
a fire broke out in the main wooden stand at Valley Park, the home ground of Bradford City 
AFC, leading to fifty-six deaths,217 and on the same day a fan was crushed to death when a 
wall on the terraces collapsed on him at St Andrew’s, the home ground of Birmingham 
FC.218 In addition, post-disaster reactive legislation was enacted to amend the provisions 
of the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 through the Fire Safety and Safety of Places of 
Sport Act 1987 in conjunction with the Safety of Sports Grounds (Association Football 
Grounds) (Designation) Order 1985 to ensure fire and safety provisions at all football 
grounds regardless of the division the relevant team they played in.219 
 The original recommendations regarding post-disaster reactive legislation and 
sports stadium fatalities can be traced back to the Burnden Park disaster in 1946 and the 
Moelwyn Hughes Report. However, the use of post-disaster reactive legislation to address 
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corporate fatalities and inhibit corporate manslaughter reform was not an isolated 
occurrence, because post-disaster reactive legislation was used in other industries too, 
including the recently nationalised coal mine corporation, which was done in the aftermath 
of the Eppleton Mining disaster in 1951. 
4.4.2 The Eppleton Mining Disaster (1951) 
At 2.00 a.m. on 6 July 1951 an explosion occurred in the 69A District of the Busty Seam of 
the Eppleton Colliery, County Durham, resulting in nine deaths.220 Seven men died instantly 
and a further two people died later as a result of their injuries, which led to two inquests. 
The first inquest, which took place on 5 and 6 December 1951, declared that the seven 
men died ‘as a result of the explosion caused by some fault in the electrical equipment of 
the joy loader’.221 However, the jury made a further note that their deaths were a result of 
a ‘lack of supervision with regard to the maintenance and repair of those machines that 
was most alarming and should be rectified immediately’.222 The second inquest, held on 11 
February 1952, declared the deaths of the two men, who later died from their injuries, as 
‘accidental death due to burns received in an explosion underground at Eppleton Colliery 
on 6 July caused by a faulty adaptor box on a joy loader and there was slackness in not 
using a safety lamp for detection of gas’.223 The records also showed that all of the families 
of the deceased were compensated automatically for the miners’ deaths.224 
The inquiry into the disaster was conducted pursuant to section 82 Coal Mines Act 
1911, which authorised a technical inquiry to establish the cause of the disaster, and was 
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commissioned on 24 March 1952.225 Robert Yates, Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines, 
completed the Report into the Explosion at Eppleton Colliery and published his findings in 
April 1952.226 He made a number of recommendations that should be adopted to avoid 
future disasters. This included using flameproof apparatus; having increased supervision of 
the use of electricity in the mines; and keeping detailed and up-to-date reports on faulty 
electrical equipment.227 
His report also referenced the witness statements of Gordon Squires (shift 
electrician) and John Avery (foreman of electrical inspection) to establish the lack of 
supervision and adequate records regarding the maintenance of electrical equipment. The 
witness statement of John Burrows, a deputy in the mine, was also mentioned in the report 
with regard to the repair he made to the ventilation system in the shaft; he had failed to 
report the smell of gas in breach of regulation 7 Coal Mines General Regulations 1938.228 
John Burrow, in his original witness statement, stated: 
I was in No 6 Right when someone came to ask me to go to No 8 Left. When I got 
there I found that about 2 ½ % of gas at roof level at about a yard in bye side the 
crossing girder. I found that the canvas door leading into No 8 right was damaged. 
I repaired this and the gas was quickly cleared. I did not report this at the time 
because I thought it was only a trivial matter but I now know that I should have 
done so (emphasis in original).229 
Robert Graves, the underground enginewright, stated in his witness statement: 
I have known that there was slight trouble with the adaptor plate ever since I had 
anything to do with the examination of joy loaders since November 1950. In any 
particular instance the trouble would get worse as the stud wore slack in its hole 
and until the slides, originally 3/8 inch were replaced by ½ inch (emphasis in 
original).230 
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The sentences in bold in the above two statements were later removed from witness 
statements and the words cited above were taken from the original notes of evidence 
made by Mr H Wilson, HM Inspector of Mines, and Mr Stokoe, who represented the 
National Coal Board and the Lodge Official of the Union.231 The changed witness 
statements demonstrated evidence of neglect shown by the management of the mine in 
that it disregarded life in a way that went beyond mere negligence but could be deemed 
reckless within the scope of culpable neglect manslaughter committed by a corporation 
through the acts of its human agents.232 
 Further, on page 22 of the notes of evidence, it is noted that Wilson stated that ‘we 
had all probably heard rumours after the explosion, about the gas being found in the 
district. Yet, when he tried to pinpoint where, when and by whom it had been found, he 
did not get any evidence.’233 However, the notes concerning the evidence of Mr Wilson 
contradicted the witness statements of Burrow and Graves and the contradictions pointed 
directly to management negligence leading to the explosion. The description of the 
negligence of the management referred to the disregard for statutory procedures put in 
place to report and repair electrical faults.234 Further notes made by Robert Yates, Deputy 
Chief Inspector of Mines, clarified this in greater detail when he stated: 
Since 1948 the mining agent had repeatedly advised the manager to go back to the 
system whereby Mr Avery spent his full time on electrical inspection, eventually 
during May, 1951 the Manager arranged that this should be done, and reported 
accordingly to the Agent that he had done this and that Mr Avery was making 
reports direct to him. On enquiry, it does not seem that this change in arrangement 
was followed up.235 
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In contrast to Burnden Park, there was a statutory breach in the Eppleton disaster pursuant 
to the Coal Mines General Regulations 1938 which, in conjunction with sections 101 to 108 
Coal Mines Act 1911, could have resulted in legal proceedings being taken against the 
owners and managers for disregarding fire damp and the maintenance of electrics in the 
coal mine. Consequently, the main recommendation of the inquiry stated that the National 
Coal Board should revert back to hand hewing and vetoed the use of shuttle cars and joy 
loaders until the proposed electricity regulations could be enacted.236 
 One of the aims behind the nationalisation of the coal mines was to improve the 
working conditions and safety of the miners.237 However, fatalities increased despite the 
nationalisation of the coal mines because of the introduction of mechanisation in the mines 
and the mismanagement and negligence surrounding the introduction of electrical 
equipment in the mines, such as the joy loader that caused the Eppleton disaster.238 The 
Eppleton disaster was one of many coal mining disasters that occurred in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s which were connected to the mismanagement of electrical equipment in 
the mines and which resulted in fatalities.239 The Coal Mines Act 1911 was repealed by the 
Mine and Quarries Act 1954, and five accompanying statutory instruments were passed 
regulating the use of electricity in the mines.240 The Mines and Quarries Act 1954 covered 
all aspects of mine management, control, safety, health and welfare. The use of post-
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disaster reactive legislation in a nationalised corporate environment enabled the 
government of the day to ostensibly respond to the increased number of fatalities through 
mechanisation outside the remit of culpable neglect manslaughter by a corporation. The 
Eppleton disaster occurred in 1951, at a time when culpable neglect manslaughter could 
be attributed through the actions of human agents acting on behalf of the National Coal 
Board. The inquiry commented that the disaster was caused by management negligence 
and the recommendations that followed included the enacting of post-disaster reactive 
legislation through the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 and electricity regulations to prevent 
future mining disasters. 
The impact of post-disaster reactive legislation as a reason of marked similarity in 
the form of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 continued to inhibit direct corporate 
manslaughter reform because corporate fatalities were addressed indirectly to prevent 
future fatalities. Consequently, taking into account the nationalised corporate 
environment, the use of post-disaster reactive legislation achieved the best outcome it 
could at the time in terms of addressing management negligence in the mines that caused 
the fatalities. However, the impact and promotion of post-disaster reactive legislation still 
inhibited the attainment of the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform because 
not all corporations were nationalised between 1944 and 1965, as evidenced by the 
merchant shipping corporations. The law in the late 1940s stated quite clearly that a 
corporation could ‘be indicted for the criminal acts of its human agents, and for this 
purpose there is no distinction between an intention or function of the mind and any other 
form of activity’ (my emphasis).241 Consequently, a reason of marked similarity emerged 
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from the stadium and mining disasters whereby the use of post-disaster reactive legislation 
was used to address corporate fatalities rather than an indictment of culpable neglect 
manslaughter by a corporation because any successful indictment against a nationalised 
corporation would be detrimental to the public purse if the corporation was convicted and 
fined. The protection provided to nationalised corporations and private limited companies 
by proxy was demonstrated by the fact that none of the corporations involved in the 
stadium disasters were prosecuted. However, a corporation being charged with culpable 
neglect manslaughter as opposed to the use of post-disaster reactive legislation was also 
evident in the Lewisham train crash in 1957 because the question of a finding of corporate 
negligence against a nationalised railway corporation was discussed openly in the coroner’s 
court. Further, in contrast to both the Burnden Park disaster and the Eppleton mining 
disaster, a train driver was charged with culpable neglect manslaughter. 
4.4.3 The Lewisham Rail Crash (1957) 
On 4 December 1957, eight-six people were killed instantaneously and a further four died 
of their injuries when two passenger trains, the Ramsgate train and the Hayes train, 
collided in thick fog at Lewisham train station.242 The Ramsgate train was driven by William 
Trew (‘Trew’) and he was accompanied by Derek Hoare (‘the Ramsgate train’s fireman’)243 
and E W Humphries (‘the Ramsgate’s train conductor’), and it had approximately 770 
passengers on board. Trew did not see the red light signal for two reasons: the thick fog 
and the positioning of the signal, which was opposite to the driver’s side of the engine. 
Consequently, the Ramsgate train ran into the back of the stationary Hayes train, which 
was carrying 1,500 passengers, at Lewisham train station. Robert William Reynolds (‘the 
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Hayes train conductor’) lost his life. During the collision the Ramsgate train hit a nearby 
viaduct on which a third train was travelling. The viaduct collapsed, crushing the first two 
coaches of the Ramsgate train. There were numerous deaths and injuries. The following 
day in the House of Commons the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation244 announced 
that he had appointed the chief inspecting officer of railways to hold an ad hoc inquiry into 
the disaster.245 
The inquest was first held on 30 and 31 December 1957. The questions asked at the 
inquest addressed not only the actions of Trew, who had not seen the signal, but also the 
actions of those who had erected the signals, which were not visible from the driver’s side, 
and the role of the British Transport Commission. A strong argument was made that the 
accident would have been prevented if an automatic train control system (‘ATC’) had been 
installed to check the train driver’s actions.246 In order to determine whether there was 
any criminal negligence involved with regard to the accident, the coroner asked the jury to 
consider the following: 
You have to say are these deaths accidental deaths or are the deaths brought about 
by wilful and reckless disregard for human life, no matter on whose part. 
Negligence, criminal negligence to such a degree that is not to be complemented 
for in terms of money and must be punished by the sanctions of the State. If these 
deaths were brought about by criminal negligence you should return a verdict of 
manslaughter and say who should be brought on that charge, not who is 
responsible, and your decision might vary greatly between the driver, the fireman, 
those who put up the signalling or Sir Brian Robertson, Chairman of the British 
Transport Commission, if you think there was criminal negligence by one or all of 
them (my emphasis).247 
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Despite this direction, after thirty-five minutes the jury returned a verdict of accidental 
death caused by gross negligence. The coroner stated that ‘the verdict must be, of course, 
“accidental death”. It is not your job to comment, and I cannot regard that final sentence, 
but you have said it and got it off your chests.’248 The Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) 
made the decision. However, despite the delay in the official report of the inquiry and the 
trail of evidence indicating criminal negligence, the jury decided to indict Trew, the train 
driver, because he displayed the higher degree of negligence, but only for culpable 
negligence manslaughter.249 On 23 April 1958, after the initial trial, the jury was discharged 
because it could not agree on a verdict regarding his negligence. Trew was kept on bail and 
the second trial was listed for 6 May 1958.250 However, during the second trial the 
prosecution and the Attorney General251 concurred that because of Trew’s ill health, it was 
not in the public’s interest to continue with the trial, so it offered no evidence. 
Consequently, the jury in the second trial returned a verdict of not guilty and Trew was 
discharged.252 
 It was only after the conclusion of the criminal trials that the inquiry report was 
published; the advisory notes issued stated that the accident would not have occurred if 
the ATC system had been installed.253 These comments were raised during the coroner’s 
inquest and also in the House of Commons in March 1958. In the House of Commons, the 
joint parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation stated that ‘it 
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is of interest to note that in the judgment of the experts about eleven per cent of these 
accidents could probably have been avoided if ATC of the warning type had been fitted’.254 
 The comments made by the coroner at the inquest addressed the issues of criminal 
negligence, culpable negligence manslaughter as they related to corporations because the 
coroner did not discount a charge of manslaughter against the railway corporation (called 
the British Train Commission in this case).255 However, the British Railway Commission was 
not mentioned as an individual entity because the coroner referred to the British Transport 
Commission by using the term the ‘Chairman of the British Transport Commission’.256 
During the inquest the coroner recognised the use of the narrow interpretation of 
identification doctrine reasoning whereby gross negligence manslaughter of a corporation 
could only be established if the corporation was ‘indicted for the criminal acts of those in 
control of the company’.257 
 However, the coroner also asked the jury to consider whether the deaths were 
accidental or whether criminal negligence could be attributed to the driver, fireman, signal 
installers or the chairman of the British Transport Commission. Criminal negligence could 
have been attributed to the British Transport Commission if it was possible to establish that 
the non-implementation of the ATC system represented a complete disregard for the life 
and safety of others. The indictment of the corporation did not occur following the inquest 
because it was believed that the negligence of the driver was higher. However, evidence 
existed that the British Transport Commission was aware that the implementation of an 
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ATC system would have prevented the Lewisham train by using the term of the British 
Transport Commission.258 
 Peter Tatlow, an independent railway researcher with expertise regarding the 
Lewisham train crash, believed that ‘the government would see little point in penalising 
what, with nationalisation, had now become the people’s property, as any financial penalty 
would ultimately lead to either a deterioration of service or the cost made good out of the 
public purse’.259 Hence, an indictment against the British Transport Commission for 
culpable neglect manslaughter was avoided because even if the commission was convicted 
it would be deemed an unnecessary burden on the public purse. The issue of railway 
disasters would eventually be alleviated by the widespread introduction of the ATC system. 
However, the following was noted by Lord Winster in the House of Lords in 1959: 
In 1948 the railways were nationalised. The new authorities raised a series of 
objections to automatic train control, in spite of the reports by railway officials on 
the cause and prevention of accidents … it is the opinion of the chief inspectors who 
have been called upon to examine the causes of the crashes and report upon them. 
They have given the verdict that automatic train control would have prevented the 
crashes into which they were inquiring.260 
Three very different types of fatalities and involving the negligence of corporations had the 
same outcome: a reluctance to hold the corporations accountable for the harm they 
caused beyond civil damages and out-of-court settlements. The outcome of the Burnden 
stadium and the Eppleton mining disaster also saw the intro 
                                                        
258 British Transport Commission, Re-appraisal of the plan for the modernisation and re-equipment of British Railways (Cmd 813, 1959) 
33. ‘Following approval to the system by the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation in 1957, a five-year plan for the provision of a 
standard system of Automatic Warning Control on the most important passenger lines, at an estimated cost of some £10 million, was 
begun in 1958’. 
259 Peter Tatlow, St John’s Lewisham 50 Years on Restoring the Traffic (Oakland Press 2007) 148-149; John Braithwaite, Regulatory 
Capitalism: How it works, ideas for making it work better (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2008) 15. 
260 HL Deb 17 December 1959, vol 220, col 567. 
234 
However, in 1965 a second attempt was made to indict a corporation for gross negligence 
manslaughter in R v Northern Strip Mining Company Ltd.261 
 Fifth Turning Point of Corporate Manslaughter Reform: R v Northern 
Strip Construction Co Ltd (1965) 
On the one hand, a change in the law connected to corporate criminal liability and the 
introduction of identification doctrine reasoning in the Three Fraud Cases provided a 
consistent approach to account for corporate criminal liability and corporate manslaughter 
because identification doctrine reasoning provided consistency. After all, identification 
doctrine reasoning established a long-needed working theory, which the whole of the 
judiciary could understand and which could be applied to all corporate crimes, including 
mala prohibita and mala in se offences. Welsh stated in 1946 stated that ‘the effect of the 
three decisions [referring to the Three Fraud Cases] may therefore be described as 
revolutionary’ (my emphasis).262 However, the revolution had a consequence that would 
inhibit corporate manslaughter reform in the future, because the identification doctrine 
was originally intended to be used as a tool of statutory interpretation only for the civil 
courts.263 The use of the identification doctrine for all common law offences was done at 
the expense of the original methods used by the criminal judiciary to interpret corporate 
mens rea in the Evans Case and Broom Case.264 
 Initially, from 1944 to 1954, the criminal judiciary started to use identification 
doctrine reasoning widely to attribute corporate mens rea whereby a limited company 
could ‘as a general rule, be indicted for the criminal acts of its human agents,’ and this 
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included gross negligence manslaughter.265 However, from the mid 1950s onwards 
identification doctrine reasoning transitioned to apply a controlling mind interpretation, 
which was then considered by the courts to be the preferred theory that could be used to 
support corporate criminal liability and gross negligence manslaughter whereby a limited 
company could only be indicted for ‘the criminal acts of those in control of the company’.266 
 Gobert and Punch commented on the law of corporate criminality in England and 
Wales after the Three Fraud Cases and stated that ‘building on this foundation, the English 
judges devised their own distinctive model of corporate criminal liability’.267 However, 
‘their own distinctive model’ occurred during the Second World War and was created in 
response to the widespread concern regarding corporate fraud, as demonstrated in the 
Companies Acts and the Three Fraud Cases.268 Consequently, once the use of identification 
doctrine reasoning was recognised as the only method by which corporate mens rea could 
be attributed, the only positive act that followed was the continued use of the wide 
interpretation of the identification doctrine reasoning that allowed for human agents 
acting on behalf of the corporation, and this carried on until the mid 1950s. However, once 
there was a movement away from ‘human agents’ towards ‘those in control’ regarding 
identification doctrine reasoning, another school of thought believed that it would be 
highly unlikely that an indictment for culpable neglect manslaughter would be brought 
against a nationalised corporation after a disaster. Even if a nationalised corporation was 
sufficiently negligent to the criminal standard such that it could be convicted and fined, the 
only purse to suffer would be the public purse.269 Indeed, the second attempt to prosecute 
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a corporation for culpable neglect manslaughter involved a private limited company, in the 
Northern Strip Case in 1965.270 
4.5.1 Brief Overview of Gross Negligence Manslaughter Law (‘Culpable 
Neglect Manslaughter’) from 1939 to 1965 
In 1963 Glanville Williams cited the Cory Bros Case and stated that ‘in 1927 a judge refused 
to allow a corporation to be convicted of manslaughter, but in ICR Haulage it was intimated 
that this point would be decided otherwise’.271 Williams did not elaborate further as to 
whether he believed identification doctrine reasoning should be applied, commenting only 
that ‘there is now little restriction on the range of crimes for which corporations may be 
held responsible. They may be convicted of crimes at common law, as ICR Haulage shows, 
or by statute.’272 
 However, in order to establish manslaughter from culpable neglect (the epithet 
used for gross negligence manslaughter in 1965) a death must have occurred ‘in 
consequence of a negligent act, it would seem that to create criminal responsibility the 
degree of negligence must be so gross as to amount to recklessness’.273 The leading case 
in 1965 was Andrews v DPP (‘Andrews’) heard in 1937 before the House of Lords where an 
appeal against conviction for manslaughter caused by dangerous driving was dismissed.274 
However, the decision established a general rule applicable to all charges of manslaughter 
by gross negligence that used the epithet ‘reckless’ to describe the high degree of 
negligence required to prove the offence when explaining the test to the juries.275 Further, 
in order to establish criminal liability the negligence must also go beyond a mere matter of 
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compensation and it must be shown that there was a disregard for the life and safety of 
others as to amount to a crime against the state. The death must also be the direct and 
immediate result of the personal neglect or default of the accused.276 Further, in 1965, 
when it came to attributing corporate mens rea, the law looked to those deemed to be in 
control of the corporation to establish the corporate criminal liability of the corporation 
through the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning.277 
 However, the legal position had not been tested or affirmed in case law since the 
first attempt to prosecute a corporation for manslaughter in 1927 in the Cory Bros Case.278 
Even then the outcome was not ideal because Finlay J in the Cory Bros Case quashed the 
indictment when he held that a corporation could not commit manslaughter.279 
4.5.2 The Facts of R v Northern Strip Mining Company (1965) 
The Northern Strip Mining Company Limited (‘Northern Strip Co’) had its tender accepted 
to demolish three bridges that crossed the River Wye for £6,000. Harry Camm (‘Camm’), 
the managing director, a team of workmen (all Northern Strip employees) and Douglas 
Newby Robinson, Camm’s foreman (‘foreman’) had already completed the demolition of 
the first two bridges without incidence. However, on 5 July 1964 a problem occurred when 
the third bridge collapsed, throwing all those working there into the River Wye and 
resulting in the death by drowning of Glanville Charles Evans, a welder burner. Northern 
Strip Co was indicted with unlawful killing and entered a written plea of not guilty on the 
company’s behalf. Using the Andrews criteria, the prosecution argued that Camm had 
instructed his foreman to start the demolition in the middle of the bridge. His foreman was 
inexperienced in demolition, having only gained experience from the previous two bridge 
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demolitions over a period of five weeks.280 Further, Camm had been absent from the site 
from the Thursday until the Sunday, saying that he would return on Monday. The bridge 
collapsed on the Sunday morning. The foreman instructed the workmen to work from the 
middle of the bridge outwards based on the instructions he had received from Camm. He 
then left the site to attend the demolition of another bridge and, like Camm, was also 
absent when the bridge collapsed.281 The prosecution submitted that the fault lay with 
Camm as he provided the instructions to his foreman. Camm denied giving these 
instructions, stating that his foreman was culpable as he had disregarded his instructions 
to start cutting the cords from the tops and to work towards the middle, not start from the 
middle. The defence argued that the death occurred because the foreman had not 
followed instructions; therefore, Camm had not expressed disregard for the life of the 
drowned man.282 The defence referred to the criteria in Andrews that cited the Bateman 
gross negligence test and the fourth criterion that concerned the reckless disregard for life: 
surely being off site and leaving an inexperienced foreman in charge at a key time could be 
argued to be a true disregard for the lives of Camm’s employees? 
 Unlike in the Cory Bros Case, Streatfeild J gave directions to the jury with regard to 
dealing with negligence in a criminal sense. He stated that, ‘what the prosecution had to 
establish was that, through its higher executives, the company was guilty of such a high 
degree of negligence that they would call it a reckless disregard for the lives and safety of 
its employees’.283 The jury found the Northern Strip Co not guilty of culpable negligent 
manslaughter and also returned a formal verdict of not guilty at the coroner’s inquisition. 
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The Northern Strip Co was committed in the first instance by the coroner’s jury. The 
verdicts were based on the grounds of no evidence because it could not be proven that 
Camm instructed the foreman to start cutting the cords in the middle of the bridge. Camm 
maintained that he told his foreman to start from the ends of the bridge, leaving the 
upstream girders intact.284 
4.5.3 Judicial Reasoning in R v Northern Strip Corporation Limited 
The company’s application to recover costs amounting to £4,000 was dismissed by 
Streatfeild J, as he believed he could not award costs in this case. A costs order would 
typically be granted in favour of a successful defence. However, Streatfeild J’s decision not 
to award costs might reflect his opinion that an element of culpability lay with the 
corporation. Streatfeild J sat permanently at Glamorgan Assizes as a senior judge. 
Consequently, his comments as the Chair of the Report of Interdepartmental Committee 
on the Business of the Criminal Courts in 1962 hinted that it was inevitable that his judicial 
reasoning was influenced by personal feelings when he stated: 
Moreover, the exposed position of a judge permanently sitting in a superior 
criminal court in a provincial town can not only lead to staleness but also aggravate 
its ill effects. As things are, there is inevitably a considerable personal element in 
sentencing and attitudes of a full-time judge sitting permanently in the same court 
necessarily becoming matters of common knowledge and discussion in the 
locality.285 
However, for the purpose of tracking the development of the law surrounding corporate 
manslaughter and reasons of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning, the wording of 
his closing speech to the jury should be considered and contrasted with the comments of 
the coroner‘s closing speech in the Lewisham disaster because both comments 
substantiated the transition from ‘human agents’ to ‘those controlling’ in identification 
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doctrine reasoning. Streatfeild J stated that the required corporate criminal liability for 
culpable neglect manslaughter by a corporation could only be established through ‘reckless 
disregard for life’. In the Lewisham train crash, it was referred to as ‘wilful and reckless 
disregard for life’, and the liability of the corporation was attached only to the chairman of 
the British Transport Commission using the narrow interpretation of the identification 
doctrine. Regardless of this, the Northern Strip Case was firmly reverting to the concept of 
the pre-Three Fraud Cases stance which said that corporate liability rested with the ‘higher 
executives’ rather than a single figurehead, such as a chairman, which reflected the wider 
interpretation of the identification doctrine. Although Camm was the sole director of 
Northern Strip Mining Company Ltd, Streatfeild J’s directions could have highlighted Camm 
directly, similarly to the Lewisham example, when the coroner directly referred to the chair 
of the BTC. However, Streatfeild J’s directions referred to the actions of the ‘higher 
executives’ to decide corporate criminal liability. The use of ‘higher executives’ would 
include all members of the board, rather than merely the chair or the managing director. 
 Further, a development that introduced ‘recklessness’ as a qualifying factor to 
determine involuntary manslaughter by negligence was seen in both the Lewisham and the 
Northern Strip disasters. The influence for this development stemmed from the decision in 
Andrews. Both of these developments started to complicate what could have been a very 
clear definition of the constituent parts that needed to be established to indict a 
corporation for involuntary manslaughter by culpable neglect. By allowing the 
intermingling of terms such as recklessness and neglect or the use of the narrow 
interpretation of the identification doctrine rather than the wider one, a new 
understanding of the problems caused by the doctrine started to emerge that had an 
impact on the development of the law surrounding corporate manslaughter. 
241 
 Conclusion 
Between 1939 and 1965 three turning points of corporate manslaughter reform occurred, 
which were the Three Fraud Cases, which used identification doctrine reasoning; the lack 
of culpable neglect manslaughter prosecutions in the aftermath of disasters involving 
corporate neglect; and the not guilty verdict for culpable neglect manslaughter by a 
corporation in the Northern Strip Case. The three turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform occurred against a backdrop of social and economic change that was taking place 
during World War Two and its aftermath. The evolution of the corporation reflected the 
concerns raised during World War Two regarding corporate fraud, which influenced the 
amendments made to the Companies Acts from 1939 to 1965. 
 The issue of fraud continued to be a dominant theme and pervaded the use of 
identification doctrine reasoning used in the Three Fraud Cases to determine corporate 
criminal liability generally and corporate manslaughter specifically at the expense of 
common law approaches used to apply corporate criminal liability. In the period leading up 
to the 1940s the criminal judiciary was already well versed with the use of the strict 
construction of penal statutes involving corporations and outside the scope of statutory 
constraints already took account of the actions of human agents within the corporation to 
determine corporate criminal liability. Two of the Three Fraud Cases involved statutory 
breaches, which could have been interpreted through the strict construction of penal 
statutes. Yet the criminal judiciary pursued an alternative approach in the Three Fraud 
Cases by using identification doctrine reasoning, which was to the detriment of existing 
criminal judicial practice. Unfortunately, two contrasting approaches regarding the use of 
identification doctrine reasoning evolved from 1939 to 1965: the wide interpretation, 
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based on the human agents of the corporation; and the narrow interpretation, based only 
on those in control of the corporation. 
 The debate surrounding the issue of the thinking behind the application of 
identification doctrine reasoning escalated further when it was stated in dicta and affirmed 
later that identification doctrine reasoning could be applied to all corporate criminal 
liability cases, including both statutory and common law offences. Gobert believed that the 
development of identification doctrine reasoning was a result of the judiciary devising 
‘their own distinctive model of corporate criminal liability’,  which echoed the position 
taken by Patrick Devlin, a former judge, forty years earlier  and could be evidenced further 
by the change in the interpretation involving identification doctrine reasoning from it being 
possible for criminal acts to be committed by human agents to it only being possible for 
such acts to be committed by those controlling the corporation. 
 The wider interpretation looked to the workings of the board of directors acting 
through human agents, as applied in the Lady Gwendolen Case, where it was held that 
the fact that the directors delegated acts to others did not excuse corporate criminal 
liability. The narrow interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning used in the Bolton 
Case looked purely to those in control of the corporation to determine corporate criminal 
liability. 
 Initially, the damage caused by the use of identification doctrine reasoning could 
be limited from the mid 1940s to the mid 1950s because the criminal judiciary applied the 
wider interpretation to determine corporate criminal liability. The wider interpretation, 
even though it should never have been used within criminal law, still used the concept of 
a human agent acting on behalf of the corporation, which followed the same approach 
established by the criminal judiciary before the decision reached in the Cory Bros Case in 
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1927. However, by the mid 1950s the inhibiting impact of judicial reasoning led to a change 
of interpretation, because identification doctrine reasoning and corporate criminal liability 
had to be connected to those deemed to be in control of the corporation only. Again, the 
motive for such a change can be traced back to the inhibiting impact of judicial reasoning 
and the changing corporate structure that was being influenced by the nationalisation of 
corporations. 
 The transition from the use of the wide interpretation of identification doctrine 
reasoning also signalled the subtle use of another reason of marked similarity, this one 
connected to the use of post-disaster reactive legislation to respond to fatal disasters. The 
narrow interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning, which only considered those 
deemed to be in control of the corporation, became evidentially harder to prove with the 
creation of large nationalised corporations. The next attempt to indict a corporation for 
culpable neglect manslaughter did not occur until 1965, and even then it involved a small 
corporation. Disasters still occurred, and fatalities were caused by the neglect of private or 
nationalised corporations. The industries most exposed to fatal disasters were nationalised 
corporations such as the mines, railways and other heavy industries. A successful 
prosecution of a nationalised corporation for culpable neglect manslaughter would result 
in a fine, notwithstanding the impossibility of establishing the controlling interpretation to 
prove corporate criminal liability in the first place. The fine would be paid out of the public 
purse, which would affect the public. Post-disaster reactive legislation was a response to 
disasters that aimed to remedy the cause of the fatality. Two of the three disaster case 
studies involved nationalised corporations: the mining disaster at Eppleton and the railway 
crash at Lewisham. The enactment of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 was carried out in 
response to the increased number of mining deaths, represented by the Eppleton disaster, 
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that had occurred after the nationalisation of the mines because of the increased use of 
mechanisation. The response to the Lewisham railway crash saw the introduction of the 
AWS system, which aimed to help prevent future railway disasters. The use of post-disaster 
legislation was not the perfect answer, as demonstrated by the response to the Burnden 
Park stadium disaster, which saw the eventual enactment of the Safety of Sports Grounds 
Act 1975; the contents of the Act were influenced by the findings from the ad hoc inquiry 
commissioned immediately after the disaster. Nonetheless, the Burnden Park stadium 
disaster demonstrated the inhibiting impact of the use of post-disaster reactive legislation 
on the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform because further post-disaster 
reactive legislation needed to be enacted after the Bradford fire at Bradford Football Club 
and the collapse of the wall at Birmingham Football Club. The continued use of post-
disaster reactive legislation represented a reason of marked similarity which inhibited 
corporate manslaughter reform, because instead of implementing direct corporate 
manslaughter reform, there was an increase in the use of post-disaster reactive legislation, 
which mirrored the increased use of the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine 
reasoning use of post-disaster reactive legislation. 
 The inhibiting impact of a reason of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning 
on corporate manslaughter reform can also be demonstrated by considering the second 
failed attempt in 1965 to indict a corporation for culpable neglect manslaughter in the 
Northern Strip Case. The use of identification doctrine reasoning to establish culpable 
neglect manslaughter by a corporation had not been affirmed in any previous cases. The 
35th Edition of Archbold: Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases, which would 
have been used in the Northern Strip Case, stated that ‘a limited company can, as a general 
rule, be indicted for the criminal acts of those in control of the company, and for this 
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purpose there is no distinction between an intention or function of the mind and any other 
form of activity’.  Nonetheless, Streatfeild J used the narrow interpretation of identification 
doctrine reasoning by citing ‘higher executives’ when he directed the jury in his closing 
speech. The jury returned a not guilty verdict against the Northern Strip Co. Even though 
the Northern Strip Co only had one director, the control interpretation could have been 
established to prove culpable neglect manslaughter by a corporation because he gave the 
original instructions and had control of the company. However, the directions given to the 
jury were not clear and were camouflaged by the use of the description ‘higher executives’ 
even though there was only one director. This illustrates the inhibiting impact of judicial 
reasoning; Streatfeild J had previously stated in his own words that senior judges presiding 
too long in the same court could not help but be influenced by the local environment in 
which they worked, which in his case was a declining coal mining area in 1960s South 
Wales. The local influences on the judge were reflected in the lack of clarity in his directions 
to the jury, resulting in a verdict of not guilty. 
 Reasons of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning and the use of post-
disaster reactive legislation inhibited the three turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform between 1939 to 1965 beyond coincidences and isolated occurrences, because a 
position had been reached whereby judicial reasoning and the introduction of post-
disaster reactive legislation created a decisive model that suited the judges but prevented 
the attainment of the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform. 
 
246 
 RISE OF POST-DISASTER REACTIVE 
LEGISLATION FROM 1965 TO 1999 
 Introduction 
Celia Wells believed that ‘the tipping point - literally and metaphorically - came in 1987 
when a car ferry left the Belgian port of Zeebrugge with its doors open and capsized with 
the loss of nearly 200 lives’.1 However, regardless of the catalyst, the outcome remained 
the same: another missed opportunity to reform the law of corporate manslaughter. 
Further, the Zeebrugge disaster was not the only tipping point of corporate manslaughter 
reform to occur between 1965 to 1999. Chapter 5 will focus on the next two turning points 
of corporate manslaughter reform, which occurred between 1965 and 1999: this includes 
the first successful attempt to prosecute a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter 
in R v OLL Ltd Kite and Stoddart (‘Lyme Bay Case’),2 and the decision in the Attorney-
General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) (‘AG Case’)3 that represented the last opportunity to 
reform the law of corporate manslaughter to reflect the complex structures of modern 
corporations after the Southall train disaster.4 Both turning points of corporate 
manslaughter reform fitted Lord Cooke’s definition of a decisive common law event of such 
undiminished sway as to be deemed a turning point of common law reform as both turning 
points were inhibited from attaining the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform 
for reasons of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning and post-disaster reactive 
legislation.5 
                                                        
1 Celia Wells, ‘Hillsborough 23 Years On’ (Corporate Responsibility Network, 15 October 2012) < 
http://www.corporateresponsibilitynetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/HillsboroughReportComment_Celia%20Wells.pdf> accessed 13 
November 2016. 
2 R v OLL Ltd Kite and Stoddart (Winchester Crown Court, 8 December 1994) (‘Lyme Bay Case’). 
3 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2. of 1999) [2000] QB 796 (CCA) (‘AG Case’). 
4 John Uff and Lord Cullen PC, The Southall and Ladbroke Joint Inquiry into Train Protection Systems (HSE Books 2001). 
5 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, The Hamlyn Lectures: Turning Points of the Common Law, (Sweet & Maxwell 1997) 2. 
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 The common law recognised that a corporation could be indicted and found guilty of 
the offence of involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence.6 However, while attempts 
were made to bring prosecutions, both private and public,7 only one successful prosecution 
for gross negligence manslaughter occurred between 1965 and 1994, against a small 
corporation with one director.8 The law surrounding corporate manslaughter required a 
specific director or senior manager to be aware of the gross negligence that resulted in the 
deaths within the scope of the identification doctrine using the directing mind and will 
interpretation.9 
 By the late 1980s fatal disasters were viewed through live television broadcasts over 
the family breakfast table (Zeebrugge disaster in 1987) or in the living room on a Saturday 
afternoon (Hillsborugh disaster in 1989). Moreover, the brutality of the disasters stirred 
public consciousness, especially when corporations escaped prosecution for gross 
negligence manslaughter.10 Groups representing the victims of disasters and their 
familiies,11 the media,12 politicians13 and trade unions14 alike questioned why a constant 
stream of fatal disasters involving large corporations with complex multi-layered 
                                                        
6 Leonard H Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law (Littlehampton Book Service Ltd 1969) 59; R v Northern Strip 
Construction Co Ltd (Glamorgan Assizes, 4 February 1965) (‘Northern Strip Case’). 
7 Appendix Three: Unsuccessful manslaughter prosecutions against corporations pursuant to the common law from 1 June 1926 to 5 
April 2008 in England and Wales. 
8 Appendix One: Manslaughter Convictions against Corporations pursuant to the common law from 1 January 1965 to 5 April 2008 in 
England and Wales. 
9 P J Richardson, Stephen Mitchell, and D A Thomas (eds), Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 1992, vol 2 (44th edn, 
Sweet and Maxwell 1995) para 17.33 confirmed ‘in deciding which of the officers or servants of a corporation are to be identified with 
it so that their guilt is the guilt of the corporation affirming the use of the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the identification 
doctrine. (‘Archbold 1992’)  
10 David Bergman, The Case for Corporate Responsibility Corporate Violence and the Criminal Justice System (Disaster Action 2000). 
11 Stuart Crainer, Zeebrugge Learning from Disaster: Lessons in Corporate Responsibility (Herald Charitable Trust 1993) 92. 
12 James Gobert, ‘The Politics of Corporate Manslaughter-The British Experience’ [2005] FJLR 1, 21. 
13 Labour Party, ‘Ambitions for Britain Labour’s Manifesto 2001’ (HH Associate 2001) 33. 
14 TUC, ‘Paying the Price for Deaths at Work: The TUC Response to the Law Commissions’s Consultation on Involuntary Manslaughter  
(Law Commission Consultation Paper No 135) supporting the creation of an offence of ‘manslaughter at work’. 
(WCML/35000509/Trade Unon Congress/Box 13, Spring 1994). (‘TUC Comments’). 
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management structures did not result in any successful prosecutions at the expense of 
public safety.15 
 Nevertheless, the opportunity to reform the law connected to corporate 
manslaughter was missed, even when evidence presented at coroners’ inquests or public 
inquiries found the corporation’s negligent actions responsible for the deaths. These points 
will be addressed by tracking the development of the corporation from 1965 to 1999 and 
the development of the law surrounding corporate criminal liability and corporate 
manslaughter by considering four fatal disasters: the Aberfan disaster in 1966; the Herald 
of Free Enterprise disaster in 1987; the Lyme Bay disaster in 1994; and the Southall train 
disaster in 1997. The impact of these disasters will be considered in detail to establish 
whether reasons of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning and the use of post-
disaster reactive legislation affected the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform 
 Development of the Corporation from 1965 to 1999 
By 1979 Gower believed the laws concerning companies in England and Wales were in a 
‘greater disarray than at any other time this century, both in content and in form, and likely 
to remain so’.16 Such disorder was the product of two factors. The first involved the 
continued influence of corporate nationalisation followed by a period of restructuring that 
focused on large-scale private enterprises operating in a deregulated trading environment 
because of privatisation. The second was a result of joining the European Community, 
which forced companies to implement law directives through a series of Companies Acts 
from 1980 to 1989 as temporary fixes. Calls for the reform of the Companies Act came from 
Europe and at home had a direct impact on corporate criminal liability generally and 
                                                        
15 Appendix Two: Corporate manslaughter convictions pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 from 6 April 2008 to 1 May 2018 in England and 
Wales. 
16 Laurence Cecil Bartlett Gower, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (4th edn, Stevens 1979) 56. 
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corporate manslaughter specifically because the reform of the Companies Act yielded 
further discussions around what could be deemed a corporate personality and who could 
be deemed to represent the actions of the corporation.17 Once the debate surrounding 
corporate criminal liability was resurrected regarding the redefining of identification 
reasoning from the narrow controlling interpretation18 to the identification doctrine using 
‘the directing mind and will’ criteria’,19 the present started to mirror the past again because 
the identification doctrine originated as a civil law tool of statutory interpretation. Against 
this backdrop, the development of the corporation will be considered from 1965 to 1999 
with regard to its impact on the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform. 
 Changing corporate policies and multi-layered management structures affected the 
development of the corporation during this time frame because of the expansion of private 
corporations in the 1980s. Nationalised industries still existed in the 1960s and involved 
coal mines, railways and utilities.20 In the 1970s nationalisation was expanded by the 
Labour governments of 1964 to 1970 and 1974 to 1979 to include shipbuilding, aerospace 
and steel (2nd).21 The Conservative government of 1970 to 1974 also nationalised Rolls-
Royce and the water utilities.22To encourage trade and increase manufacturing, the Labour 
government also intervened in private industry to encourage the promotions of mergers 
with the aim of creating large corporations. With a view to advancing the modernisation 
of corporations, the Labour government created the Department of Economic Affairs 
(1964-1969), the Ministry of Technology (1964-1970) and in October 1970 merged with the 
                                                        
17 Gower (n 16) 56. 
18 Ministry of Justice, Corporate Liability for Economic Crime: Calls for evidence (Cmd 9370, 2017) 11-1 (‘Corporate Crime Paper 2017’) 
19 Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Limited [1957] 1 QB 159 (CA) (‘Bolton Case’); Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass [1972] 
AC 153 (HL) (‘Tesco Case’). 
20 Leslie Hannah, 'The economic consequences of the state ownership of industry, 1945-1990’ in Roderick Floud and Donald McCloskey 
(eds), The Economic History of Britain since 1700 Volume 3: 1939-1992 (2nd edn, CUP 1994) Table 6.2; 171. Nationalisation of coal 
mines (1948); railways (1948); utilities (1948) (‘Hannah Nationalisation Table’) 
21 Iron and Steel Act 1967; Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977. Hannah Nationalisation Table (n 20) 171. 
22 Hannah Nationalisation Table (n 20) 171. Nationalisation of water (1974); Rolls-Royce (1971). 
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Board of Trade to form the new Department of Trade and Industry.23 However, the change 
of corporate structure affected corporate criminal liability because it became difficult to 
establish precisely who could be considered the ‘directing mind and will’ of a large 
corporation with complex management structures.24 Even in circumstances where it could 
be established that there was a collective failure at boardroom level, corporate criminal 
liability could not be attributed to a specific individual.25 The disasters that occurred from 
1965 to 1999 primarily involved corporations that had been nationalised, multinational 
PLCs or large corporations.26 This was complicated even further from 1979 to 1994 when 
the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major encouraged the 
sector specific deregulation and privatisation of all the companies nationalised.27 
Thatcherism believed in not intervening in the corporate world, and this correlated with a 
reluctance to hold these newly privatised corporations liable for the harm they caused.28 
The maintenance of the corporate veil continued to hinder corporate accountability 
because of the similar corporate structures of both the nationalised and the large private 
corporations.29 Both corporate types hindered the application of the identification doctrine 
to establish corporate liability because it would have been difficult to identify the directing 
mind of a corporation because of the multilayered corporate structures. 
 In 1973, when the United Kingdom joined the European Community, there was a 
requirement to implement corporate European Directives into domestic law, which would 
                                                        
23 Ministry of Technology (TNA/HF/Records of the Ministry of Technology/1956-1982). 
24 Corporate Crime Paper 2017 (n 18) 13. 
25 Tesco Case (n 19). 
26 Appendix Three: Unsuccessful manslaughter prosecutions against corporations pursuant to the common law from 1 June 1926 to 5 
April 2008 in England and Wales. 
27 Conservative government: Thatcher (1979-1983) privatised Bristish Aerospace, including the nuclear research company and half of 
Cable and Wireless; Conservative government: Thatcher (1983-1987) British Telecom, British Gas, Rolls Royce and British Airways. 
Conservative government; Thatcher (1987-1990) National Electricity Grid, Girobank, regional electricity and water companies; 
Conservative government: Major (1990-1992) Electricity generation; Conservative government: Major (1992-1997) British Rail. House 
of Commons Library Privatisation research Paper 14/61 20 November 2014. P 6. 
28 James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths 2003) 62. 
29 Corporate Crime Paper 2017 (n 18) 16-18. 
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result in amendments to existing company laws.30 This requirement resulted in the 
introduction of the Companies Act 1980,31 the Companies Act 1981,32 the Companies Act 
198533 and the Companies Act 1989.34 Nevertheless, it should be noted that section 716(1) 
Companies Act 1985 enacted a provision, previously legislated for in the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844, which stated that an association with twenty or more persons 
engaged in business must be registered as a company.35 The constant amendments to the 
legislation in such a piecemeal manner supported the argument that corporate legal 
reform was needed on a large scale. However, that would not be implemented until the 
Companies Act 2006. 
 Pathway to the Sixth Turning Point of Corporate Manslaughter 
Reform (1965–1994): A Miss, an Attempt and Success at Last 
5.3.1 Overview of the Law on Corporate Criminal Liability and Culpable 
Neglect Manslaughter (1965-1969) 
The correctness of the decision reached in R v Cory Bros & Co Ltd36 (‘Cory Bros Case’) that 
a corporation could not be indicted for manslaughter or for breaching section 31 Offences 
against the Person Act 1861 was still questioned in R v ICR Haulage Case Co Ltd37 (‘ICR 
Haulage Case’) because both offences were punishable by fines. However, after the second 
attempt to indict a corporation for culpable neglect manslaughter in R v Northern Strip Co 
                                                        
30 First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of 
members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the 
Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community [1968] OJ L68/41. 
31 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of 
members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the 
Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital , with a view 
to making such safeguards equivalent [1977] OJ L77/1. 
32 Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types 
of companies [1978] OJ L 222/11. 
33 Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts  [1983] 
OJ L193/1. 
34 Eighth Council Directive 84/253/EEC of 10 April 1984 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the approval of persons responsible 
for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents [1984] OJ L126/12.5. 
35 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict c 110). 
36 R v Cory Brothers and Company Limited (1927) 1 KB 810 (KB) (‘Cory Bros Case’). 
37 R v ICR Haulage Case Co Ltd [1944] KB 551, 556; 30 Cr App R 31, 36. 
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Ltd (‘Northern Strip Case’),38 Leigh wrote in 1969 that ‘it now seems clear that corporations 
may be held liable for manslaughter’.39 Thus, a corporation could ‘be indicted for the 
criminal acts of those in control of the company, and for this purpose there is no distinction 
between an intention or function of the mind and any other form of activity’.40 Streatfeild 
J in the Northern Strip Case used the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine 
reasoning to consider the issue of corporate mens rea when he referred to considering 
‘higher executives’ to determine who controlled the corporation.41 
 In order to establish involuntary manslaughter by culpable neglect of a duty,42 the 
death must have been the result of a negligent act, and in order ‘to create criminal 
responsibility the degree of criminal negligence must be so gross as to amount to 
recklessness’.43 To determine whether the negligence in a particular case amounts to the 
crime, the facts must be such that, in opinion of the jury, the negligence of a corporation 
went beyond having the remedy of paying compensation to a subject and showed 
disregard for the life and safety of others such that it amounted to a crime against the state 
and deserves punishment.44 Additionally, it must appear that the death was the direct and 
immediate result of the neglect or default of the corporation.45 Consequently, when the 
Aberfan disaster occurred in 1966, in order to prove culpable neglect manslaughter against 
those in control of the National Coal Board, all the constituent parts of the offence as 
                                                        
38 R v Northern Strip Construction Co Ltd (Glamorgan Assizes, 4 February 1965) (‘Northern Strip Case’). 
39 Leigh (n 6) 59 f/n 37; Confirmed as second attempt to prosecute a company for corporate manslaughter in: Gary Slapper, ‘Corporate 
manslaughter: An examination of the determinants of prosecutorial policy’ (1993) 2(4) Social and Legal Studies 423, 424; Celia Wells, 
‘The Reform of Corporate Criminal Liability’ in John de Lacy (ed), The Reform of the United Kingdom Company Law (Cavendish 2002). 
40 T R Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia (eds), Archbold Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (36th edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 1966 (‘Archbold 1966’) para 22. 
41 R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd The Times, 2 February 1965 (Assizes) 8 (‘Northern Strip: Day One’): R v Northern Strip 
Mining Construction Co Ltd The Times, 4 February 1965 (Assizes) 7 (‘Northern Strip: Day Two’); R v Northern Strip Mining Construction 
Co Ltd The Times, 5 February 1965 (Assizes) 6 (‘Northern Strip: Day Three’). 
42 Archbold 1966 (n 40) para 2468. Two types of involuntary manslaughter: (a) unlawful and dangerous acts and (b) culpable neglect of 
a duty. 
43 Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576 (HL) 593. 
44 R v Bateman (1927) 19 Cr App R 8 (CCA) (‘Bateman’). 
45 Archbold 1966 (n 40) para 2531. 
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described had to be established and it was necessary to be able to prove corporate mens 
rea through the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning. 
5.3.2 Facts of the Aberfan Disaster (1966) 
On the morning of 21 October 1966, 144 people died when a waterlogged coal tip from the 
Merthyr Vale Colliery, owned by the National Coal Board (‘NCB’), slid down the 
mountainside into the village below at Aberfan, engulfing a farm cottage and the village 
school. Of the 144 fatalities, 116 were children. Harold Wilson, the Labour prime minister, 
announced in the House of Commons that an inquiry pursuant to the Tribunals of Inquiry 
(Evidence) Act 1921 would be established and would be chaired by Lord Justice Edmund-
Davies and two of his colleagues.46 An inquiry set up under the Act had inquisitorial powers 
and mandatory powers to call witnesses and produce evidence.47 Two days after the 
disaster, Lord Robens, chairman of the NCB, declared in a press statement that ‘it was 
impossible to know that there was a spring at the heart of this tip which was turning the 
centre of the mountain into a sludge… I am the Chairman of the Board and these people 
were under the directions of the Board, and I am the “Secretary” responsible for all that 
takes place’.48 The findings of the tribunal reported otherwise.49 It found that the disaster 
was caused by the negligence of the NCB on two counts: (1) poor internal communication 
and management structure within the NCB, particularly at board level;50 and (2) the lack of 
a coal mine tip policy.51 The tribunal held that if both of these points had been addressed, 
the disaster might have been prevented. Despite these findings and the naming and 
                                                        
46 HC Deb 25 October 1966, vol 734, col 839. 
47 House of Lords and House of Commons, Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the Disaster at Aberfan on 21 October 1966  
(HC 553, 1967) (’Aberfan Report’). 
48 Treasury Solicitor’s Department, Transcript of Interview with Lord Robens, Chairman of the National Coal Board, by Gerald Seymour 
of ITN recorded by TWW outside Broadcast Unit at Aberfan’ (TNA/COAL 73/2/Part 1, 23 October 1966). 
49 Aberfan Report (n 47) 131-132. Part V. 
50 Aberfan Report (n 47) para 74; para 188. 
51 Aberfan Report (n 47) para 66; para 70. 
254 
shaming of nine members of the management and board held directly responsible for the 
catastrophe, no further action was taken as it was felt they ‘must carry the burden of 
knowing that their neglect played an unmistakable part in bringing about the tragedy’.52 In 
other words, the NCB emerged legally unscathed because the remaining means to 
attribute negligence to the NCB, one through the civil law (claims under the doctrine of 
Rylands v Fletcher)53 and one through the criminal law (committal by a coroner if a verdict 
of unlawful killing was recorded),54 were both silenced by the outcome of the inquiry. 
 The inquest heard by Mr B Hamilton, the coroner, took place after the inquiry on 
28 September 1967 at Merthyr Tydfil.55 A verdict of accidental death was recorded after a 
four-minute hearing. Mr Gwyn Bowns spoke on behalf of the Parents and Residents’ 
Association after the verdict and stated that ‘the board should have been castigated at the 
inquest and some parents felt the verdict should have been manslaughter’.56 The coroner 
justified the verdict of accidental death when he stated that it was not for him ‘to decide 
any question of civil liability as far as criminal liability was concerned, the whole matter had 
been investigated very thoroughly. The tribunal assessment was tantamount to a finding 
of accidental death in each case.’57 The coroner complied with rules 33 and 34 Coroners 
Rules 1953.58 Rule 33 stated that no reference to civil liability should be addressed by the 
coroner in the verdict, and rule 34 addressed the use of riders in the verdict. Thus, rule 34 
Coroners Rules 1953 allowed the coroner to cite the outcome of the Aberfan inquiry within 
                                                        
52 Aberfan Report (n 47) para 207. 
53 Aberfan Report (n 47) para 74; Rylands v Fletcher [1868] L R 3 HL 330; AG v Cory Bros & Co Ltd (1921) 1 AC 521 (HL). The House of 
Lords in this case rendered Cory Brothers liable for the consequences of their tipping through the doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher. The 
doctrine stated that a landowner had absolute liability, in other words, must pay compensation even if they took every possible care 
to prevent the material escaping. 
54 Section 3(1) Coroners Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict c 71) as amended by the Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926 (16 & 17 Geo 5).  
55 R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd The Times, 5 February 1965 (Assizes) 6 (‘Northern Strip: Day Three’). 
56 Northern Strip: Day Three (n 55). 
57 Northern Strip: Day Three (n 55). 
58 (SI 1953/205). 
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his inquisition59 because, as stated in rule 34, ‘the coroner shall not record any rider unless 
the rider is, in the opinion of the coroner, designed to prevent the recurrence of fatalities 
similar to that in respect of which the inquest is being held’.60 The coroner complied with 
the rider provision by citing the outcome of the Aberfan inquiry. The Aberfan inquest 
occurred when it was still possible to commit a person, or in this case a corporation, to 
stand trial for manslaughter pursuant to section 25(1) Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926.61 
However, by allowing the inquiry to be heard first and by adjourning the coroner’s hearing, 
it was possible to avert a manslaughter verdict and committal to a full trial in circumstances 
similar to those in R v Cory Bros (‘Cory Bros Case’) in 192762 and allowed the coroner to use 
the rider provisions in the Coroners Rules 1953. 
 Further, the civil claims for the deaths of the children were settled out of court for 
£500 before the outcome of the inquiry was known, thus avoiding a civil trial and any 
discussion of negligence.63 Consequently, the two alternative modes of attributing either 
both civil and criminal negligence to the NCB had been avoided. The only means to 
attribute criminal neglect to the NCB to be deemed culpable neglect manslaughter would 
have been through the outcome of the inquiry, which had already ruled out any criminal 
action. 
 In the period after the Aberfan disaster, an indictment for culpable neglect 
manslaughter could stand against a corporation following the decision in the Northern Strip 
                                                        
59 T R Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia (eds), Archbold Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (35th edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 1962) para 379 (‘Archbold 1962’). An inquisition consists of three parts: the caption; verdict; and attestation. 
60 Archbold 1962 (n 59) para 375.  
61 (16 & 17 Geo 5 c 59). 
62 Cory Bros Case (n 36). 
63 Letter from Morgan Bruce & Nicholas Solicitors (Solicitors acting for Deceased Families) to NCB re Aberfan Disaster: Claims under 
the Law Reform (Misc Provisions) Act 1934 (24 & 25 Geo 5 c 41) (TNA/COAL 73/2/Part 1, 2 June 1967). 
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Case in 1965.64 Yet no criminal action was taken against the NCB. The underlying reasons 
why no criminal action was taken against the NCB for culpable neglect manslaughter 
should be considered because they were indicative of a continuing trend involving state-
owned corporations and a reluctance to take criminal action against them, as 
demonstrated previously with regard to the Eppleton coal mine disaster in 195165 and the 
Lewisham train disaster in 1957.66 
 Professor Iain McLean published a report entitled ‘Corporatism and Regulatory 
Failure: Government Response to the Aberfan Disaster’, funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council, in 2000. The report concluded that ‘the failure to hold anybody 
responsible was rooted in the high politics of the 1960s and 1970s’.67 ‘High politics’ referred 
to the ‘proposed elitist arguments about the “closed” nature of the political world and 
reductive arguments about the irrelevance of ideas to political behaviour’.68 McLean 
believed the influence of high politics was the reason why no criminal proceedings were 
brought against the NCB; he blamed this on ‘the corporatist climate in the 1960s, in which 
the NCB was virtually a government department, blinded civil servants to the enormity of 
its behaviour and blunted attempts to hold it responsible’.69 He used the word ‘corporatist’ 
to define the interaction between the Labour government and the management regarding 
the running of the NCB. McLean also stated that the appointment of Lord Alfred Robens,70 
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a former politician, also reflected the corporatist nature of the NCB because of his dogmatic 
management approach to the NCB and his close connections to the Labour Party.71 
However, the file notes made by the Treasury Solicitor’s Department, who were advising 
the government during the aftermath of the disaster, highlighted other reasons beyond 
high politics and corporatism with regard to why no criminal action was taken. The other 
reasons included the use of the narrow interpretation when applying identification 
doctrine reasoning regarding the involvement of the NCB board in conjunction, the 
relationship between the National Union of Mineworkers (‘NUM’) and the NCB and the use 
of post-disaster reactive legislation. 
 The narrow interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning required that a 
corporation could ‘ be indicted for the criminal acts of those in control of the company, 
and for this purpose there is no distinction between an intention or function of the mind 
and any other form of activity’ (my emphasis).72 The ‘those in control’ interpretation was 
still applicable when the Aberfan Inquiry was heard; the narrow interpretation had not yet 
been replaced by the ‘directing mind and will of the corporation’ interpretation which was 
being used by 1973.73 The solicitors and barristers representing the NCB board tried 
repeatedly to restrict the evidence regarding the corporate structure of the NCB that they 
presented at the inquiry because corporate criminal liability through the narrow 
interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning could be attributed to those deemed to 
be in control of the corporation including ‘higher executives’ as cited in the Northern Strip 
Case.74 Hence, the solicitors representing the NCB employees at the inquiry wrote to Lord 
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Robens asking that the NCB’s counsel raise technical points in cross-examination against 
its employees to draw attention away from the corporate structure because ‘counsel feels 
that the Board will be somewhat unlikely to be willing to criticise its own organisational 
shortcomings, and we do not want to do this in any detrimental fashion to the Board’.75 
 A document entitled ‘Memorandum Headquarters Statement to Inquiry’ 
(‘Headquarters Memo’) detailed the management structure of the NCB and its legal duties 
pursuant to the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, which were discharged by means 
of ‘line and staff organisation’.76 Consequently, the main NCB board used direct 
management to control the operations of the NCB and any questions about general 
principles involving policies were answered by the main board first unless the NCB board 
delegated control through written instructions.77 The NCB board gave written instructions 
to divisional board members, area general members and group managers and to all mining 
engineers  and other technical workers including the Production Department whose 
responsibilities involved them in performing duties related to statutory provisions 
pursuant to section 1 Mines and Quarry Act 1954 (the general duties of mine and quarry 
owners) and common law duties.78 The Welsh Office noted ‘that there was no legislation 
governing the safety of tip heaps … However, it is fair to point out that the Board had a 
duty at common law to take reasonable care to ensure the safety of their tip heaps – the 
absence of legislation did not relieve them of this.’79 The NCB board specifically delegated 
issues of coal production policies including the control of the tips and safety to the 
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Production Department.80 In order to establish the offence of culpable neglect 
manslaughter by a corporation it must be proven that the neglect of a duty (the common 
law duty to take reasonable care) was so gross that it could be deemed reckless through a 
complete disregard for life. Further, the death was the direct and immediate result of the 
neglect or default by the those deemed to be in control which included the NCB Board and 
the Production Department using the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine 
reasoning. Letters and notes from meetings regarding the tip safety from November 1947 
to June 1965 demonstrated the NCB board and the Production Department were aware of 
the safety issues involving the tips in breach of their common law duty of reasonable care.81 
 Paragraph 14 of the Headquarters Memo referred to a letter dated 19 November 
1947 from the Production Department to divisional production directors about the 
planning of colliery tips following conversations with the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning.82 The recommendation referred to underground storage or dumping at sea as 
the preferred options rather than the use of tipping pits. Paragraph 35 referred to a 
meeting on 15 April 1957 between the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Power, the Forestry Commission and the NCB with 
regard to tipping pits in South Wales. The meeting resulted in a resolution being handed to 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government demanding planning controls for tips. The 
NCB stated that the proposal was based ‘on a rather superficial examination and did not 
take account the difficulties of doing any work to an active tip … the estimates of costs 
[were] far too low...The Board emphasised that they could not undertake to spend money 
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on non-productive schemes’.83 Further, a letter dated 29 June 1965 from the NBC to the 
Ministry of Power stated that the money would only be spent if the local authorities 
expressed an interest; ‘it is obvious, for example, that in South Wales, there is no great 
interest by local authorities in the improvement of pit heaps’.84 The Headquarters Memo 
concluded that ‘it will be seen that the National Board, and more particularly the 
Production Department at Headquarters, have since nationalisation devoted a great deal 
of time and thought to the problems of rubbish disposal’.85 In the period leading up to the 
inquiry a solicitor from the Treasury Solicitor’s Department sent a letter dated 19 January 
1967 to the NCB in response to the Headquarters Memo with their comments and 
questioned the NCB’s denial that the local authority had sought assistance regarding 
stability of the colliery tip eventhough its Headquarters Memo referred to the local 
authority request. The solicitor from the Treasury Solicitor’s Department stated, ‘I thought 
that the Merthyr Tydfil local authority had raised questions regarding the stability of the 
tips in their district. But this is a matter of fact and you may wish to check’.86 The evidence 
clearly indicated that those in control of the NCB, including the NCB board and the 
Production Department, were aware of the risk to life. However, the Aberfan Inquiry 
diverted their attention away from the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine 
reasoning and attributed fault to individual NCB employees.87 Thus, the NCB avoided the 
issue of culpable neglect manslaughter and the narrow interpretation of identification 
doctrine reasoning because the named NCB employees were ‘human agents’ acting on 
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behalf of the corporation rather than those in control of the NCB being found to be 
responsible. 
 Another underlying reason for the lack of criminal action against the NCB for the 
Aberfan disaster rested with the relationship between the NCB and the National Union of 
Miners (‘NUM’). Will Paynter became the general secretary of the NUM in 1959 and retired 
in 1969. He led the NUM’s response to the pit closures in South Wales during the 1960s 
and also represented the NUM the day after the Aberfan disaster when he attended the 
scene with the union safety engineer.88 His comments also indicated why there were no 
criminal proceedings against the NCB, in his opinion the NUM was not free from blame; he 
stated, ‘[W]e frequently condemned these heaps as monstrous eyesores, but we failed to 
realise their potential danger. Although we can plead that we are not specialists in such 
matters, I believe that union leaders must accept some responsibility for the failure to 
anticipate and take action to avert this terrible disaster.’89 Paynter’s comments regarding 
not being specialists contradicted the evidence provided by the NUM for the Aberfan 
Inquiry. The Aberfan Inquiry defended the NUM’s inaction to address the risk to life from 
the tip slides by agreeing that this was due to the lack of NUM specialists.90 The NCB took 
the same stance in the Aberfan Inquiry – that the risk was unknown because no experts 
had ever flagged the risk of fatalities from the tips.91 Yet the Aberfan Inquiry confirmed 
that five tip incidents had occurred in South Wales between 1939 and 1965.92 Further, in 
July 1967 the Production Department produced a document entitled ‘A List of Various Coal 
Tip Slides in South Wales’ which detailed eight tip slides that had taken place from 1924 to 
                                                        
88 Wills Paynter, My Generation (George Allen & Unwin Ltd 1972) ch 9. 
89 Paynter (n 88) 130. 
90 Aberfan Inquiry (n 47) paras 252-256. 
91 Aberfan Inquiry (n 47) paras 66-70. 
92 Aberfan Inquiry (n 47) Section A - History. 
262 
1965. 93 Later research recorded that twenty-three non-fatal tip incidents had occurred in 
South Wales from 1879 to 1965 which resulted in injuries and damage to property.94 
However, a fatal tip slide had occurred in 1909 at the Old Pentre Colliery in the Rhondda 
Valley and killed a child when the tip slide engulfed four houses.95 The coroner Mr R J Rhys 
recorded a verdict of accident death and stated the tip slide occurred due to heavy rain.The 
number of earlier tip incidents in South Wales confirmed Will Paynter’s earlier comments 
that the NUM should have taken action to prevent the disaster. If the evidence relating to 
all the previous tip slides had been introduced into criminal proceedings, the role of the 
NUM and NCB would have been questioned. But the full extent of the evidence was absent, 
so criminal proceedings were avoided. 
 Finally, the third reason why no criminal action was taken against the NCB involved 
the use of post-disaster reactive legislation in the immediate aftermath of the Aberfan 
disaster. The Mines and Quarries Act 1954 had been a response to the increased number 
of employee fatalities in mines due to mechanisation. The NCB was only bound to ensure 
the safety of the public to the extent that disused mines and quarries, pursuant to Part XIII 
Mines and Quarries Act 1954,96 had to be fenced off. One of the recommendations of the 
Aberfan Inquiry was extending the ambit of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 to include 
provisions for the safety of the public near any mine, not just disused mines.97 The Ministry 
of Power stated that ‘to do so would be a major departure from long-standing practice in 
relation to industrial safety legislation and serious practical enforcement would arise on 
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enforcement’.98 ‘Long-standing practice’ referred to the enactment of post-disaster 
reactive legislation specific to industries and employees. The Ministry of Power cited the 
correlation between the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 and the Factories Act and that it 
would ‘be difficult to depart from the fundamental principle of safeguarding employees in 
one of the Acts and not the other’.99 The aim of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 was to 
protect the safety, health and welfare of all employees working in the mines and any 
amendments to include the public would depart from the fundamental principles of the 
Act.100 
 Consequently, the Coal Division stated that ‘the Government should announce at 
the earliest opportunity that it accepts the principles of the Tribunal’s recommendations 
and that it proposes new legislation’.101 Thus, the introduction of the first example of post-
disaster reactive legislation aimed at the protection of the public occurred with the 
enactment of the Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act 1969 inconjunction with the Mines and 
Quarries (Tips) Regulations 1971.102 The legislation imposed clear responsibilities on 
owners and management for tip stability and on the Inspectorate of Mines for 
enforcement. The introduction of specific post-disaster reactive legislation also enabled 
the government ‘to implement the recommendations of the Tribunal in principle and avoid 
the creation of a new and embarrassing precedent in mining safety legislation that the 
Inspectorate should be given responsibilities for the safety of the general public’.103 
Consequently, the use of post-disaster reactive legislation in response to the Aberfan 
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disaster continued to be a reason of marked similarity inhibiting corporate manslaughter 
reform for two reasons: firstly, despite clear indications of negligence by the NCB for the 
fatalities, the only legal response involved the enactment of post-disaster reactive 
legislation as a solution; and secondly, the use of post-disaster reactive legislation drew 
attention away from the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning to 
establish that those in control through the corporate structure of the NCB were responsible 
for the fatalities. However, the inhibiting impact of reasons of marked similarity on 
corporate manslaughter reform were not confined to the aftermath of one disaster case 
study. 
5.3.3 Overview of the Law on Gross Negligence Manslaughter and 
Corporate Criminal Liability (1969–1990) 
Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978 defined ‘person’ as including ‘a body of persons 
corporate or unincorporate’. Further clarity was provided in Schedule 2, paragraph 4(5) of 
Part 1, which provided ‘the definition of a “person” so far as it included bodies corporate 
applies to any provision of an Act whenever passed relating to an offence punishable on 
indictment or on summary conviction’. Consequently, a limited corporation in 1987 could 
‘as a general rule, be indicted for the criminal acts of those in control of the company, and 
for this purpose there is no distinction between an intention or function of the mind and 
any other form of activity’ (my emphasis).104 However, unlike in previous decades, when 
the ambit of interpreting ‘those in control’ had been left to judicial reasoning, as evidenced 
in the Northern Strip Case,105 the position had now changed. The initial change was caused 
by the statement made by Lord Denning MR in Bolton (Engineering) Co v Graham (‘Bolton 
Case’), when he stated that ’some of the people in the company are mere servants and 
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agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent 
the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and 
will of the company.’106 Lord Denning MR’s statement referred to Viscount Haldane LC’s 
original definition of the identification doctrine of ‘the directing mind and will of the 
company’ that he provided in Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co (‘Lennard’s 
Case’) in 1915.107 Thus, the Bolton Case represented the initial movement away from the 
wide interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning towards the narrower one that 
referred to ‘those in control’. The type of identification doctrine reasoning used to 
interpret corporate criminal liability had changed again by the early 1970s owing to further 
restrictions being placed on the use of the narrow interpretation of the ‘those in control’; 
these were introduced by way of further guidance provided to the criminal judiciary to 
enable it to answer the ‘question of who are those in control of the company for this 
purpose’.108 Further guidance was provided as a result of the House of Lords decision in 
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass (‘Tesco Case’).109 The Tesco Case involved a prosecution 
pursuant to section 11(2) Trade Description Act 1968 that: 
 If any person offering to supply any goods gives, by whatever means, any 
 indication likely to be taken as an indication that the goods are being offered at a 
 price less than that at which they are in fact being offered, he shall, subject to the 
 provisions of this Act, by guilty of an offence.110 
The prosecution was brought by the local weights and measures inspector after a customer 
complained he could not buy a box of washing powder at the advertised discounted price. 
The offence provided Tesco with a statutory defence pursuant to section 24(1) of the Trade 
Description Act 1968: 
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 In any proceedings for an offence under this Act it shall, subject to subsection (2) 
 of this section, be a defence for the person charged to prove – (a) that the 
 commission of the offence was due a mistake or to reliance on information 
 supplied to him or to the act or default of another person, an accident or some 
 other cause beyond his control; and (b) that he took all reasonable precautions 
 and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of such an offence by 
 himself or any person under his control. 
Tesco argued that the branch manager should not be considered the ‘directing mind and 
will’ representing the corporate person. The company appealed to the House of Lords and 
it was held that a corporation could be held criminally liable for the acts once the ‘directing 
mind and will’ of the corporation was identified if 
 he was acting as the company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of 
 the company. There is no question of the company being vicariously liable. He is 
 not acting as a servant, representative, agent, or delegate. He is the embodiment 
 of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the personal of 
 the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the 
 company. If it is a guilty mind, then that guilt is the guilt of the company.111 
Diplock LJ defined who could be deemed the ‘directing mind and will’ of the corporation 
as ‘those natural persons who by the memorandum and articles of association or as a result 
of action taken by the directors, or by the company in general meeting pursuant to the 
articles , are entrusted with the exercise of the powers of the company’.112 Pearson LJ 
emphasised that the shop manager could not be identified with the company’s ego nor 
was he an alter ego of the company, but an employee in a relatively subordinate 
position.113 
 Glanville Williams criticised the decision, stating that ‘there is no absolute right and 
wrong about this, but the practical effect of Tesco appears to confine the identification 
doctrine to the behaviour of a few men meeting, say, in London, when the activities of the 
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corporation are country-wide or even world-wide’.114 He argued in the above quotation 
that this reasoning could be considered a defect in the law when considering corporate 
criminal liability and negligence because if this reasoning was followed it would mean that 
a branch manager at a local level could not be considered to be a representative of the 
corporation. The point being raised by Williams demonstrated the impact of using an even 
narrower interpretation of the identification doctrine to establish corporate criminal 
liability with the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation; any opportunity to use the 
identification doctrine in relation to multilayered national corporations such as Tesco or 
existing nationalised corporations had been lost.115 
 The case of R v Andrews Weatherfoil Ltd and Others (‘Andrews Case’),116 heard in 
the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1971, demonstrated the use of the even narrower 
interpretation of the identification doctrine when the court followed the Tesco Case and 
stated that ‘it is not every “responsible agent” or “high executive” or “manager of the 
housing department” or “agent acting on behalf of a company” who can by his actions 
make the company criminally responsible’.117 It had to be established whether the natural 
person or persons in question had the status and authority which in law made their acts 
the acts of the corporation so that in turn the natural person was to be treated as the 
company itself. The Andrews Case found that it was necessary for the judge to invite the 
jury to consider whether or not the natural person could be established based on the facts 
that the judge decided as a matter of law were necessary to identify the person with the 
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corporation.118 Gobert summarised the changes to the identification doctrine that 
introduced ‘the directing mind and will’ interpretation when he stated that ‘it propounds 
a theory of corporate liability which works best in cases where it is needed least (’small 
corporations’) and works worst in cases where it is needed most (‘large corporations’)’ 
(my emphasis).119 It was not needed because the creation, application and variation of the 
identification doctrine involved statutory breaches of penal statutes which could have 
been construed strictly by the criminal judiciary. Thus, after the Tesco Case the criminal 
judiciary no longer used identification doctrine reasoning to determine corporate criminal 
liability; it used the original ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the identification 
doctrine created by Viscount Haldane LC in the Lennard’s Case.120 But this was even less 
likely to succeed, because in a large nationalised corporation or national corporation with 
multiple management layers, it would be evidentially difficult to establish, especially where 
the common law offence of involuntary manslaughter caused by a grossly negligent act or 
omission occurred involving a corporation.121 A corporation could only be found guilty if a 
person who could be considered to be a ‘directing mind and will’ of the corporation was 
also found guilty of manslaughter. Thus, in order for a corporation to be indicted for 
manslaughter, a director or someone deemed to be the ‘directing mind’ had to be 
prosecuted at the same time.122 
 The 1982 edition of Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence & Practice stated that ‘the 
law has gone through a process of development. It was formerly held that there was a 
doctrine of constructive manslaughter whereby death resulting from any unlawful act, 
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whether intrinsically likely to injure or not was manslaughter, but this has ceased to be the 
law’.123 Involuntary manslaughter could only be established if the killing was: (1) the result 
of a grossly negligent (though it may be otherwise lawful) act or omission by the accused; 
or (2) the result of his unlawful act (though not an unlawful omission), where the unlawful 
act is one, such as assault, which all sober and reasonable people would inevitably realise 
must subject the victim to the risk of some harm resulting therefrom. 
 However, in the period between R v Seymour (‘Seymour’) in 1983124 and R v 
Adomako (‘Adomako’)125 in 1994, there were doubts as to whether gross negligence 
manslaughter could survive because the ruling law for involuntary manslaughter from 1983 
to 1994 used the recklessness test of the House of Lords in R v Caldwell (‘Caldwell’).126 On 
the same day as Caldwell, the case of R v Lawrence,127 also in the House of Lords 
unanimously applied the Caldwell test of recklessness to the offence of causing death by 
reckless driving contrary to section 1 Road Traffic Act 1972. The counsel for the defence in 
the Hillsborough Stadium disaster clarified the position further in his advice to his 
instructing solicitors in 1990 when he stated: 
Involuntary manslaughter is committed when a person causes the death of another 
either (1) intending to do an act which, whether he knows it or not, is unlawful and 
dangerous in that it is likely to cause direct personal injury (‘an unlawful and 
dangerous act’) or (2) intending to do an act which creates an obvious and serious 
risk of causing personal injury (a) not giving thought to the possibility of such risk 
or (b) having recognised that there was some risk involved, nonetheless going on 
to take it (‘recklessness’ as defined by Lord Diplock in R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510) 
…. The law is at present uncertain whether gross negligence still exists as a separate 
head of liability, two recent authorities having held that the earlier cases where 
manslaughter is defined in terms of negligence should not be followed and that 
Lord Diplock’s test should be applied universally.128 
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Another House of Lords decision in Seymour in 1983 affirmed the recklessness test as the 
correct test to be used to establish involuntary manslaughter. It was held in Seymour that 
in order to establish involuntary manslaughter, and by implication all subsequent cases 
that might be considered gross negligence manslaughter, it must be established that a 
person was reckless if: (1) he performed an act that created an obvious and serious risk of 
injury to the person or of substantial damage to property; and (2) when he performed the 
act, he either had not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or 
had recognised that there was some risk involved.129 This position was supported 
subsequently by the comments of Lord Roskill sitting in the Privy Council in Kong Cheuk 
Kwan v R (‘Kong’) in 1985, whereby he confirmed the decision in Seymour that there was 
no longer a separate test for gross negligence in manslaughter cases.130 The question of 
whether gross negligence manslaughter existed as an offence was only resolved by the 
House of Lords in 1994 in Adomako, when the Bateman negligence test was reaffirmed as 
the definitive test rather than the Caldwell recklessness test.131 
 Unfortunately, the issue of corporate manslaughter had to be addressed in relation 
to the third attempt to indict a corporation for involuntary manslaughter, which occurred 
in response to the deaths of 193 people on the MS Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987132 at 
a time when the ruling law for involuntary manslaughter was the recklessness test of 
Caldwell and Seymour.133 
  
                                                        
129 Seymour (n 124) 220-221. 
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5.3.4 Facts of the MS Herald of Free Enterprise Disaster (1987) 
On 6 March 1987, the MS Herald of Free Enterprise (‘the Vessel’), owned and operated by 
Townsend Thoresen Ltd (‘Townsend’), set sail from the Belgian port of Zeebrugge and 
headed towards Dover.134 On board were eighty crew, approximately 459 passengers, 
eighty-one passenger cars, and forty-seven freight vehicles. The vessel left the mouth of 
the harbour under the command of Captain David Lewry (‘Captain’). Four minutes later, 
the vessel capsized as a result of the bow doors being left open. It was standard practice 
for the Assistant Bosun, Mark Stanley (‘Stanley’), to close the bow doors. However, he had 
taken a short break and fallen asleep. A backup procedure was in place, which involved the 
first officer remaining on the main deck until the doors were closed. Chief Officer Leslie 
Sabel (‘Sabel’) thought he saw Stanley heading towards the control panel that closed the 
bow doors. Believing things were progressing normally, he climbed to the bridge to take 
his post for departure. The bow doors were out of the sight of the Captain and other 
officers. As the vessel increased speed from fifteen to eighteen knots, water began to enter 
the car deck through the open doors. Not all of the water had been pumped out of the 
ship’s bow ballast tanks, and the bow was two or three feet lower in the water than usual. 
The water continued to flood in the car deck. At 6.25p.m., the ferry rolled over onto a 
sandbank less than one mile from the harbour. Only its starboard half remained above the 
water, and within seconds, half of the vessel was under water. A total of 193 people lost 
their lives, including thirty-eight crew members and 155 passengers; the youngest was 
twenty-three days old and the oldest was seventy-eight.135 
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 Questions were asked about why the Herald of Free Enterprise had capsized. Four 
proceedings being initiated to answer these questions: a full formal investigation was 
ordered by the Secretary of State for Trade;136 an inquest, which included a commentary 
by Sir David Napley;137 an application for judicial review was made by family members of 
the deceased in R v Coroner for East Kent, ex parte Spooner and Others (‘Spooner’);138 and 
there was an eventual criminal prosecution in R v Stanley and Others (‘Stanley’),139 later 
reported as R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (‘P&O Case’).140 
 The Sheen Inquiry 
On 9 March 1987, John Moore, the Secretary of State for Transport, ordered a formal 
investigation pursuant to section 55 Merchant Shipping Act 1970. Sheen J, an admiralty 
judge, was appointed to be the commissioner for the investigation and four other assessors 
were appointed to sit with him.141 Four months later the Sheen Inquiry held that the 
‘capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise was partly caused or contributed to by serious 
negligence by the Captain, Sabel and Stanley, and partly caused or contributed to by the 
fault of Townsend Car Ferries Limited’.142 The Captain and Sabel’s merchant shipping 
certificates were suspended and Townsend was ordered to pay £400,000 in costs.143 Sheen 
J stated: 
 A full investigation into the circumstances of the disaster leads inexorably to the 
 conclusion that the underlying or cardinal faults lay higher up in the Company. The 
 Board of Directors did not appreciate their responsibility for the safe management 
 of their ships.144 
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Sheen J was referring to Mr A.P. Young (Operations Director), Wallace Ayres (Director and 
Head of Technical Department) and the marine superintendents (Jeffrey Devlin, the Chief 
Superintendent and John Alcindor, his deputy, who were responsible for the safe operation 
of Townsend’s fleet) who had contributed to the disaster.145 Sheen J highlighted the 
pressure that was placed on the crew and officers (Sabel) by Townsend not wanting to 
waste time when it was departing from ports.146 Five previous occasions when the bow 
doors were left open were highlighted; the management knew about all five instances.147 
There was a reluctance to install bow and stern door remote indicators and high-capacity 
ballast pumps, despite insistence from the captains of other vessels.148 During the inquiry, 
the following question was asked and answered: 
 Q. Was the capsize of the ‘Herald of Free Enterprise’ caused or contributed to by 
 the fault of any persons or persons and, if so, whom and in what respect? 
 A. Yes. 
 By the faults of the following: - 
 1. Mr. Mark Victor Stanley 
 2. Mr. Leslie Sabel 
 3. Captain David Lewry 
 4. Townsend Car Ferries Limited at all levels from the Board of Directors through 
 the managers of the Marine Department down to the Junior Superintendents (my 
 emphasis).149 
The findings of the formal investigation attached the fault for the disaster to Stanley, Sabel 
and the Captain but, more importantly, to the corporation for the failings of the directors 
acting on behalf of the company. In Sheen J’s opinion, a corporation’s negligence in an 
indictment of involuntary manslaughter was defined through the actions of the controlling 
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mind of the corporation. Consequently, Sheen J believed that the failings of the directing 
mind did not absolve the directors of their responsibility for involuntary manslaughter. 
Moreover, considering the level of his maritime experiences, as an admiralty court judge 
and former royal navy captain, he was well positioned, in conjunction with the other 
experts, to establish what could or could not be considered a causative management failing 
by the controlling mind of a maritime corporation that contributed to the disaster. 
 The Inquest 
After the publication of the Sheen Inquiry Report, the inquest into the Zeebrugge disaster 
took place from 8 September 1987 to 8 October 1987 at Dover Town Hall, Kent, and was 
presided over by Dr Richard Sturt (‘Coroner’). Sir David Napley (‘Napley’) represented the 
Zeebrugge disaster families. Stuart Crainer (‘Crainer’) was employed by the Herald 
Charitable Trust to record all of the legal events on behalf of the Zeebrugge families, 
including a detailed note of the inquest.150 The Coroner stated that ‘it would be a radical 
and dramatic direction for me to give to the jury, that a company could be so directed [for 
corporate manslaughter]. I therefore intend to direct the jury that the concept of 
manslaughter is unknown at present to the law.’151 Nonetheless, the jury returned a verdict 
of unlawful killing for all but one of the victims. Section 56 Criminal Law Act 1977 had 
abolished the function of the coroner’s jury of naming in its inquisition any person whom 
it found to be guilty of manslaughter and had also abolished the coroner’s duty to commit 
for trial any person so named.152 Thus, the Coroner directed the jury that in order to decide 
upon a verdict of unlawful killing, 
 [t]hey should be satisfied that an act or omission of an individual was a substantial 
 cause of the death, creating a serious and obvious risk of causing physical injury. 
                                                        
150 A charity set up by the Families of Victims of the Zeebrugge Disaster which operated between 1990 and 2006. 
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152 Edward Griew, The Criminal Law Act 1977 (Sweet & Maxwell 1978) 46; 56-45; 57. 
275 
 Furthermore, the individuals (unnamed) did so either without giving any thought 
 to the possibility of that risk, or having recognised that the risk existed, decided to 
 take that risk.153 
After the inquest, Napley commented on his strategy and stated that in order ‘to find 
criminal negligence for corporate manslaughter it has to be shown as negligence which is 
more than normal negligence. Reckless is the nearest term.’154 The law that arose from the 
Andrews Case confirmed that a person had recklessly caused a person to die if, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that person had ‘created an obvious and serious risk to injury’ to the 
person who had died and either ‘gave no thought to the possibility of risk’ or alternatively 
‘having recognised there was a risk decided to take it’.155 Napley explained further that he 
was ‘fighting against everyone else, saying there was such a thing as corporate 
manslaughter. The purpose of the argument was that I was trying to persuade the Coroner, 
he then called the senior officials of P & O so that they could be questioned and examined 
to see what part, if any (the senior officials), they had played’ (my emphasis).156 He 
compared Stanley with a tea boy, whom he considered to be the hands of the company 
while the directors represent the mind. Napley explained that both Stanley and Sabel 
should be indicted for involuntary manslaughter. However, he was also of the opinion that 
 [i]f the Managing Director does something, then you can prosecute the company 
 because he is the mind of the company and what he does in the name of the 
 company with his authority runs through to corporate responsibility. It emerged 
 that the higher levels had received warnings quite recently as one ship had been 
 set sail with its doors open. A series of letters showing that the warning system to 
 the Captain that the doors were closed had not been implemented. Various things 
 which raised a good case against the people that were in charge of the company 
 despite what the Coroner said.157 
                                                        
153 Crainer (n 151) 93. 
154 Sir David Napley, Draft Verbatim Account of Meeting with Sir David Napley commenting on the Zeebrugge Disaster Inquest  
(Hillsborough Independent Panel/ DRA000000170001, 2 October 1990).   
155 Stephen Mitchell and P J Richardson (eds), Archbold: Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases (43rd edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 1988) para 20-49 (‘Archbold 1988’); David Bergman, The Perfect Crime? How Companies Escape Manslaughter Prosecutions 
(HASAC 1994) 15. 
156 Napley (n 154) 7. 
157 Napley (n 154) 7-8. 
276 
Napley referred the coroner to the Northern Strip Case decided in 1965. In response, the 
Coroner stated that 
 had the facts been, as in Glamorgan Assizes (where the instruction allegedly, had 
 been given by the Managing Director, to demolish a bridge starting in the middle), 
 that the company brains had given instructions to go out to sea with the bow doors 
 open, at full speed, when trimmed by the head, that would be a wholly different 
 set of facts.158 
The Coroner confirmed the use of the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the 
identification doctrine regarding the common law offence of involuntary manslaughter by 
a corporation. The Northern Strip Case failed because it could not be established whether 
the order that resulted in the welder’s death came from the managing director while he 
was acting in the name of the company. It did not fail because the indictment of involuntary 
manslaughter by gross negligence by a corporation did not exist.159 Although the 
Zeebrugge disaster involved causative fault at board level at P&O, this was not the same 
as an order to sail with the bow doors open, because a maritime corporate board would 
never issue such an order. Hence, the P&O Case encountered similar difficulties to those 
surrounding the single act of a managing director in the Northern Strip Case, but in the P&O 
Case the problem was a collective management failure, as supported by Sheen J and 
Napley. However, the evidence could also establish that the managing director was aware 
of the failings, as discussed by Napley. All Napley requested was the chance to question, 
under oath, the managing director and others on the board regarding the causative failings 
at board level. Napley, acting on behalf of the families, therefor applied for a judicial review 
of the Coroner’s decision not to allow the directors to be called at the inquest. 
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 Judicial Review of the Coroner’s Decision 
Three bereaved families applied for judicial review in Spooner, arguing on 18 and 19 
September 1987 that the Coroner should have aggregated the negligence of individual 
directors and management so that all of the negligent acts together constituted the 
controlling mind of the corporation.160 The application was made three days before the 
verdict of the coroner’s court was due to be meted out as a means to call the P&O directors 
to the inquest. This tactic aimed to secure a jury verdict of unlawful killing, regardless of 
the Coroner’s directions. Napley explained: 
 With regard to corporate responsibility it is not necessary in deciding whether or 
 not there was reckless conduct, merely to find that any particular individual who 
 was the mind of the company has been guilty of reckless conduct, you can say if 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) was guilty of neglect then the company is guilty of gross neglect.161 
In order to establish manslaughter against the corporation, a successful indictment against 
a person deemed to be ‘the directing mind and will’ of the corporation also had to be 
established, and this could not be achieved without the directors being called as witnesses 
at the inquest in the first place. Bingham LJ, sitting with Mann and Kennedy JJ in the 
Divisional Court in Spooner, stated: 
 A company may be vicariously liable for the negligent acts and omissions of its 
 servants and agents, but for a company to be criminally liable for manslaughter on 
 the assumption I am making that such a crime exists – it is required that the mens 
 rea and the actus reus of manslaughter should be established not against those who 
 acted for or in the name of the company but against those who were to be 
 identified as the embodiment of the company itself.162 
However, Bingham LJ stated further that ‘a case against a personal defendant cannot be 
fortified by evidence against another defendant. The case against a corporation can only 
be made by evidence properly addressed to showing guilt on the part of the corporation 
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as such.’163 Consequently, he argued that the theory of aggregation did not apply to an 
indictment of corporate manslaughter. The argument raised by Bingham LJ with regard to 
the existence of an indictment for involuntary manslaughter in conjunction with his 
insistence that the mens rea and actus reus of the offence had to be established to apply 
to those acting on behalf of the corporation still needed to be tested in the criminal arena. 
 The Criminal Trial: Judicial Reasoning and Legislative Response 
In November 1987 the Director of Public Prosecutions, Allan Green QC, ordered the chief 
inspector to conduct a criminal investigation as a result of the unlawful killing verdict 
reached in the coroner’s court.164 In June 1989 P&O, in conjunction with seven individuals 
– Ayres, Devlin, Alcindor, John Kirkby (‘Senior Master’), the Captain, Sabel and Stanley 
(‘Stanley’) – were indicted for involuntary manslaughter.165 The criminal trial began at the 
Old Bailey on 10 September 1989 and collapsed twenty-seven days later at the close of the 
prosecution case.166 The court only saw sixty-six prosecution witnesses out of 138 that 
were listed to give evidence.167 Turner J agreed with defence submissions that there was 
insufficient evidence and acceded that there was no case to answer. He acquitted all eight 
defendants, including Townsend (now P&O) and stated: 
 That if it be accepted that manslaughter in English Law is the unlawful killing of one 
 human being by another human being (which must include both direct and indirect 
 acts) and that a person who is the embodiment of a corporation and acting for the 
 purposes of the corporation doing the act or omission which caused the death, the 
 corporation as well as the person may also be found guilty of manslaughter.168 
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Turner J based his decision on what a reasonable, prudent person with industry expertise 
would do in those circumstances.169 He referred to this as ‘obvious and serious’, and 
concluded: ‘there is no evidence that reasonably prudent marine superintendents, chief 
superintendents, or naval architects, would or should have recognised that the system 
gave rise to an obvious and serious risk of open-door sailing’.170 
 In Exploring Sport and Leisure Disasters: A Socio-Legal Perspective, Hartley 
reasoned that this conclusion was unsurprising because the sole expert witness called was 
from within P&O and lacked external knowledge.171 Turner J ruled that the findings of the 
Sheen Inquiry, an inquiry by marine experts, and the inquisition of unlawful killing were not 
relevant to the criminal proceedings. However, the definition of recklessness in the findings 
of Sheen J was relevant given his technical knowledge of a maritime corporation regarding 
the risk to life and limb of a person and the expectations of the board of a marine 
corporation. Crainer explained that by not calling independent expert witnesses, Sheen J 
excluded critical questions that could have influenced the result, had they been permitted: 
 1. Did the known propensity of ro-ro ferries to capsize rapidly with dreadful 
 consequences when water enters the car deck call for special care in designing the 
 door-closing system and ensuring it was rigidly enforced? 
 2. Should the risk of a technically primitive system breaking down have been 
 obvious to persons responsible for running a passenger transportation system of 
 this magnitude?172 
If an independent expert witness had been called by the prosecution, the failings at board 
level, to quote Turner J’s phrase, would have been ‘serious and obvious’ for all to see.173 
Turner J prevented the legal reform of corporate manslaughter by applying the ‘directing 
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mind and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine. Nonetheless, the inhibiting 
impact of a reason of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning continued. It was clear 
that the jury at the inquest had absorbed some of the maritime knowledge of Sheen J when 
the jury returned a verdict of unlawful killing, contrary to the coroner’s instructions. 
However, the reinforcing effect of using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the 
identification doctrine was affirmed by Turner J in the P&O Case and he held that criminal 
liability could not be established by aggregating the acts of individuals.174 
 The discussion regarding recklessness was cited alongside a lack of causative 
evidence to support the indictment.175 But why should this prevent a successful 
indictment? DiMatteo argued that the decisions of the court seldom followed the rules set 
out and that, more often than not, the judge concerned relies on the underlying facts of 
the case to reach a decision176 rather than on facts such as those indicated by the expert 
witnesses from the Sheen Inquiry, which indicated that corporate neglect fell within the 
definition of recklessness that endangered life.177 So, taking this argument forward, Turner 
J could have considered the basic facts of the case, that is, a major corporation with a board 
of directors acted recklessly in the company’s name and this resulted in the Zeebrugge 
disaster, as confirmed by the Sheen Inquiry. Unfortunately, the law applicable to corporate 
manslaughter was sidetracked by the introduction of the ‘directing mind and will’ 
interpretation of the identification doctrine. Throughout the proceedings, there was a 
reluctance to call the board members to the witness stand. In fact, the Operations Director, 
Young, was not indicted in the P&O Case. In the Sheen Inquiry Sheen J cast the net of 
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corporate liability even further when commenting on a similar disaster that occurred in 
1984 and involved the European Gateway, a sister ship to the Herald of Free Enterprise, in 
which six people perished. Quoting a statement from the Treasury Solicitor’s Department, 
he cited that ‘from that defensive position there can easily develop what appears to the 
public, probably erroneously, to be a cover up’.178 The evidence concerning the earlier 
fatalities was not even mentioned in the P&O Case. The fatalities from the earlier disaster 
suggested that a reasonable and prudent person in the position of P&O already knew about 
the risk but failed to act. The fact that no expert independent evidence was used by the 
prosecution in the P&O Case was considered extraordinary because evidence from 
independent experts would have stated that the defendant, P&O, should have known that 
the risk it was exposing its own crew and members of the public to was ‘obvious and 
serious’.179 
 A reason of marked similarity concerning judicial reasoning influenced the outcome 
of the criminal trial because if all of the evidence presented at the Sheen Inquiry had been 
admitted in the criminal trial, it might, in conjunction with the calling of expert independent 
witnesses and members of the P&O board and the aggregation of the acts of individuals, 
have led to the successful indictment of P&O for manslaughter. In the face of this 
insurmountable obstacle connected to judicial reasoning which inhibited corporate 
manslaughter reform, another reason of marked similarity emerged that could be used to 
hold corporations criminally liable for fatalities caused by their negligent actions in the 
form of the enactment of post-disaster reactive legislation in the aftermath of the 
Zeebrugge disaster. 
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 The history of corporate responsibility for the safety of merchant shipping can be 
traced back to a series of Merchant Shipping Acts in the nineteenth century, the first being 
the Mercantile Marine Act 1850.180 The Mercantile Marine Act 1850 provided for the 
improvement of working conditions for the merchant shipping service and gave the Board 
of Trade wide-ranging regulatory powers to supervise safety at sea through a system of 
certificates. The Board of Trade was then given statutory powers of investigation to 
investigate the cause of ship wrecks with the enactment of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1854.181 The Merchant Shipping Act 1894 provided a defence to limit civil claims against 
shipowners.182 However, no corporate criminal liability was legislated for until the 
enactment of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988. The corporate shipping structure of the 
1980s was very different to the corporate shipping structure of the late 1890s. Shipping 
corporations were no longer one-ship corporations, as demonstrated by the corporate 
structure of P&O in relation to the Zeebrugge disaster. The change in corporate shipping 
structures and the aftermath of the Zeebrugge disaster resulted in the enactment of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1988. Section 31(3) Merchant Shipping Act 1988 made the owner 
of a ship criminally liable for the breach of a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that 
the ship was operated in a safe manner. Forlin and Appleby stated that ‘section 31 
Merchant Shipping Act 1988 was a legislative response to the Herald of Free Enterprise 
disaster designed to impose criminal responsibility on a shipowner for the unsafe operation 
of a ship outside Great Britain’.183 
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 Until the decision in the P&O Case, where it was held that only the ‘directing will 
and mind’ interpretation of the identification doctrine would be used to determine 
corporate manslaughter, it would have been possible to consider alternative mechanisms; 
the identification doctrine using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation had only been 
used to interpret statutory breaches committed by corporations.184 The decision reached 
in the Northern Strip Case185 used the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine 
reasoning to determine corporate criminal liability and made no reference to either the 
Lennard’s Case or the Bolton Case, which would have allowed a reference to use the 
‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine. The decision reached 
in the P&O Case involved a reason of marked similarity concerning judicial reasoning 
because the use of the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation had only been used to 
interpret statutory breaches until the decision in the P&O Case.186 Thus, after 1991 no 
alternative methods could be used to attribute corporate criminal liability, such as the 
aggregation of the failures of all senior managers and directors and negligent company 
safety policies, which, when added together, could have been used to establish involuntary 
manslaughter by a corporation. A corporation could therefore have been found guilty of 
involuntary manslaughter without an individual director having to be prosecuted. Thus, the 
impact of judicial reasoning as a reason of marked similarity continued to inhibit corporate 
manslaughter reform by excluding alternative methods of addressing corporate 
manslaughter in a changing corporate environment and by adopting the ‘directing mind 
and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine. 
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 Yet judicial reasoning was not the only reason of marked similarity that inhibited 
corporate manslaughter reform, another reason of marked similarity was the use of post-
disaster reactive legislation in the aftermath of the Zeebrugge disaster. The Merchant 
Shipping Act 1988 held shipowners criminally liable for unsafe ships; which was a response 
to the desire to hold negligent corporations accountable for the fatalities they caused. The 
use of post-disaster reactive legislation might not originally have been intended to be used 
to address corporate criminal liability for fatalities caused by corporate negligence. 
However, the continued use of such legislation after the Burnden stadium disaster, the 
Eppleton mining disaster, the Aberfan disaster and now after the Zeebrugge disaster 
demonstrated that the use of post-disaster legislation was not an isolated occurrence and 
represented a normative response to a disaster. The continued use of post-disaster 
reactive legislation acted as a reason of marked similarity inhibiting corporate 
manslaughter reform because the enactment of such legislation drew attention away from 
actual corporate manslaughter reform and the attainment of the ideal doctrine of 
corporate manslaughter reform. The ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform 
represented the successful indictment of a corporation for involuntary manslaughter 
regardless of size, structure or type of corporation. Corporate manslaughter reform would 
not be possible when the only solution being presented was a continued over-reliance on 
using post-disaster reactive legislation to pacify public concerns for their safety. 
5.3.5 Overview of the Law on Gross Negligence Manslaughter and 
Corporate Criminal Liability (1990–1994) 
The impact of reasons of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning and post-disaster 
reactive legislation still continued to inhibit the turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform even after the first successful prosecution of a corporation for gross negligence 
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manslaughter in 1994 in the R v OLL Ltd Kite and Stoddart (‘Lyme Bay Case’).187 Six 
months188 before the first successful prosecution of a corporation for gross negligence 
manslaughter in the Lyme Bay Case the law regarding gross negligence manslaughter was 
radically changed by the House of Lords judgment in R v Adomako (‘Adomako’), when the 
Bateman gross negligence test was reaffirmed as the definitive test required to establish 
gross negligence manslaughter rather than the recklessness test which was used to decide 
manslaughter in the P&O Case.189 
 The P&O Case was significant for two reasons: firstly, the trial judge ruled that as a 
matter of English law a corporation may be found guilty of manslaughter;190 and secondly, 
that the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine had to be 
applied in order to establish manslaughter against a corporation.191 
 In Adomako, an anaesthetist lost his appeal against conviction in a case involving 
his failure to spot a disconnected oxygen tube during a routine eye operation, resulting in 
the patient succumbing to a fatal cardiac arrest. Lord Mackay LC stated that the ordinary 
principles of the law of negligence should be applied.192 Moreover, in order to establish 
gross negligence manslaughter, the prosecution would have to ascertain the following: 
 (1) The defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased; 
 (2) The defendant was in breach of that duty; 
 (3) The breach of duty was a substantial cause of death; and 
 (4) The breach was so grossly negligent that the defendant can be deemed to 
  have had such disregard for life of the deceased that it should be seen as  
  criminal and deserving of punishment by the state.193 
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Consequently, following Adomako and the P&O Case, in order to successfully indict a 
corporation for gross negligence manslaughter, an individual who represented the 
‘directing mind and will’ of the corporation had to be identified and all the points in the 
Adomako gross negligence test had to be established. 
5.3.6 Facts of the Lyme Bay Case (1994) 
The Lyme Bay Case involved OLL Ltd (‘OLL’), whose trading name was Active Learning and 
Leisure Limited. OLL operated a leisure centre at St Alban’s Centre in Lyme Regis. Peter 
Bayliss Kite (‘Kite’) was the managing director of OLL and Stoddart was the appointed 
manager of the leisure centre. In March 1993 eight sixth-form students, a teacher and two 
instructors (Mr Mann and Miss Gardner) embarked on an open-sea canoeing trip in Lyme 
Bay. The teacher experienced difficulties and was attended to by one of the instructors (Mr 
Mann). Miss Gardner (an inexperienced instructor) stayed with the students. The students 
drifted out to sea, and four of the students drowned when their canoes capsized. OLL, Kite 
and Stoddart were indicted for gross negligence manslaughter. The CPS argued that 
Stoddart was responsible for the disaster on the day because he was negligent. The jury 
disagreed, however, and the CPS elected not to proceed further against Stoddart.194 
Despite Kite’s pleading at the trial that he was responsible only for policy and financial 
matters, the CPS at the trial presented his involvement as a hands-on managing director 
who took all the company decisions and  acted as the directing mind of OLL. Using the 
Adomako gross negligence test all four elements could be established: 
 (a) Kite as the managing director of OLL and OLL owed a duty of care to those who 
 took part in the outdoor leisure activities operated by OLL to take  reasonable care 
 for their safety; 
                                                        
194 R v Peter Bayliss Kite [1996] 2 Cr App R (S) 295 (CCA) 296 (‘Kite Case’). Please note the Lyme Bay Case (n ) was unreported. 
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 (b) In breach of that duty Kite and OLL failed to take reasonable care for the safety 
 of [the deceased], by: 
 (i) Failing to devise, institute, enforce and maintain a safe system for the execution 
 of an outdoor leisure activity, namely canoeing, by students attending the St 
 Alban’s Centre, Lyme Regis, Dorset; 
 (ii) Failing to heed, either adequately or at all, the content of an undated letter sent 
 to OLL by Pamela Joy Cawthorne and Richard Retallick in or about late June 1992 
 (‘employees of OLL’); 
 (iii) Failing to supervise the manager of the centre (namely Joseph Thomas 
 Stoddart) so as to ensure that canoeing was being safely taught at the Centre; 
 (c) The aforesaid breach of a duty amounted to gross negligence by Kite and OLL; 
 and 
 (d) The aforesaid negligence was a substantial cause of the death of [the 
 deceased] by Kite and OLL (my emphasis).195 
The timing of this case should also be noted. The Lyme Bay Case was heard in December 
1994, which is significant because it was heard six months after the House of Lords decision 
in Adomako. Adomako clarified the law surrounding gross negligence manslaughter insofar 
as it stated that the Bateman gross negligence test should be applied to determine whether 
a corporation was negligent and removed the recklessness requirements previously 
established in Caldwell and Seymour. 
 Once Kite was found guilty of gross negligent manslaughter and was deemed to be 
the ‘directing mind and will’ of OLL then his actions become the actions of OLL. So OLL 
could then be found guilty of gross negligence manslaughter through not supervising and 
organising the trip in accordance with British Canoe Union standards. The letter sent to 
Kite by Cawthorne and Retallick in June 1992 stated ‘at present we are walking a very fine 
line between “getting away with it” and having a very serious incident … We would also 
like to know why we do not get supplied with a first-aid kit and tow-line … It's unsafe and 
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not organised’.196 The evidence presented in the letter established that Kite as the 
‘directing mind and will’ of OLL provided no emergency equipment despite being aware of 
the issue. Consequently, OLL and Kite were convicted by a majority verdict on four counts 
of gross negligence manslaughter. OLL was fined £60,000, which equated to all of the 
corporation’s assets. Kite was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on each count; the 
sentences were to run concurrently. On appeal, Kite’s sentence was reduced to two years 
for each count, as Swinton Thomas LJ stated that he was convicted in respect of his 
negligence as he had no criminal intent.197 
 Nevertheless, two factors become apparent: firstly, OLL was a small corporation 
with a sole director; secondly, the judge in the first trial found evidence of the breach of a 
duty of care in the failure to maintain a safe system of work, the failure to respond to a 
letter concerning safety concerns and the failure to supervise Stoddart. However, the 
managing directors in the P&O Case were guilty of the same breaches of duty. Kite 
(managing director in OLL) and Young (operations director of P&O) were not there in 
person when the breach of duty occurred. Nevertheless, the managing director of the small 
corporation was found guilty, whereas the operations director of the larger corporation 
escaped prosecution. Young, the operations director in the P&O Case, was also aware of 
safety issues involving the procedures for the roll on roll off ferries, as evidenced by Napier 
and the defence team.198 However, like Kite, Young failed to act on the information and did 
not supervise the relevant employees. Regardless of the similarities, only OLL and Kite were 
found guilty of gross negligence manslaughter. 
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 Forlin and Appleby believed that ‘identifying the directing mind in a small company 
is one thing (there will necessarily be few decision-makers and less need for a complex 
decision-making structure), but identifying the directing mind in larger corporations, where 
responsibility for the company’s acts will be spread amongst a number of corporate officers 
or other senior personnel, may be entirely different’.199 Even so, if the relevant managing 
directors were not included in the indictment in the first place, as demonstrated in the P&O 
Case, this point becomes irrelevant as the managing directors has to be included on the 
indictment.200 Judicial reasoning in the Lyme Bay Case ensured that all the evidence was 
presented, yet evidence that could have established a causal link to the ‘directing mind and 
will’ of the corporation in the P&O Case was not included. Owing to the influence of judicial 
reasoning in the P&O Case and the success of the Lyme Bay Case, a precedent was 
established regarding the type of corporation that could be indicted successfully for the 
offence of gross negligence manslaughter, which was needed because successful corporate 
manslaughter prosecutions had all been against small companies because of the use of the 
‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine.201 A small corporation 
has fewer corporate layers, the directors are easier to identify as the ‘directing mind and 
will’ of the corporation and they are more likely to be operational and present when the 
disaster occurs, as demonstrated by Kite in the Lyme Bay Case. 
 Even though the corporation in the Lyme Bay Case became the first English legal 
history to be successfully convicted for gross negligence manslaughter, the successful 
prosecution case against OLL Ltd was still to the detriment of the ideal doctrine of 
corporate manslaughter reform whereby a corporation, regardless of its size, structure or 
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type, could be prosecuted successfully for gross negligence manslaughter. Another reason 
of marked similarity was also present when post-disaster reactive legislation was enacted 
in the aftermath of the Lyme Bay disaster. The Adventure Activities Licensing Authority 
(‘AALA’) was established in 1996 through the enactment of the Activity Centres (Young 
Persons’ Safety) Act 1996 in response to the four fatalities in the Lyme Bay Case.202 The 
Adventure Activities Licensing Regulations 2004 detailed who had to hold a licence, the 
procedure that must be followed to obtain a licence to run an activity centre and the safe 
management systems that should be in place to run an activity centre.203 The Activity 
Centres (Young Persons’ Safety) Act 1996 provided a legislative solution to address all the 
failings that had caused the Lyme Bay disaster. 
 The Lyme Bay Case resulted in the first successful indictment of a corporation for 
gross negligence manslaughter; post-disaster reactive legislation was enacted in the form 
of the Activity Centres (Young Persons’ Safety) Act 1996, which addressed the licensing and 
management of activity centres. Further, pursuant to section 2 (1) to 2(2) Activity Centres 
(Young Persons’ Safety) Act 1996, any breach of the Act or the Adventure Activities 
Licensing Regulations 2004 would lead to a criminal offence punishable by a fine on 
conviction. However, the use of post-disaster reactive legislation was different to the use 
of such legislation in the Aberfan and Zeebrugge disasters, where it represented the only 
solution available to protect the public from corporate negligence and the reoccurance of 
similar fatal disasters in the future. The successful indictment in the Lyme Bay Case had a 
different effect; it meant that if a similar disaster occurred involving a large corporation, it 
would be unlikely that the corporation would be successfully indicted for gross negligence 
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manslaughter. It would not have been possible to establish the ‘directing mind and will’ 
interpretation required for the identification doctrine in a large corporation because of the 
multi-layered corporate management structures.204 
5.3.7 Post-Disaster Reactive Legislation and the Health and Safety at Work 
etc Act 1974 
Post-disaster reactive legislation continued to be used to address future fatal disasters 
caused by negligent corporations regardless of their size, structure and type. Nonetheless, 
acknowledging the effectiveness of post-disaster reactive legislation in addressing 
corporate negligence to prevent future disasters was to the detriment of corporate 
manslaughter reform because post-disaster reactive legislation was being enacted to 
create a criminal offence to avoid direct corporate manslaughter reform. In addition to the 
use of post-disaster reactive legislation in the aftermath of disasters as a response to the 
fatalities, the 1970s saw the introduction of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 
(‘HSWA 1974’)205 that aimed to address the ‘haphazard mass of ill assorted and intricate 
detail’ of existing legislation which addressed health and safety in the workplace.206 HSWA 
1974 is a proactive piece of legislation whose purpose is to secure the health, safety and 
welfare of employees at work and to protect the public from the activities of a 
corporation;207 it is supported by regulations208 and non-statutory codes of practice.209 
There is a crossover between the use of post-disaster reactive legislation and HSWA 1974 
because both sets of legislation were intended to: prevent future workplace fatalities;210 
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secondly, any successful convictions using HSWA 1974 or post-disaster reactive legislation 
are not regarded as truly criminal offences in the public’s eyes because the offences only 
involve statutory breaches and are not considered serious compared with the common law 
offence of gross negligence manslaughter.211 The interaction with the common law offence 
of gross negligence manslaughter and the reasoning behind the enactment of HSWA 1974 
need to be addressed because from the late 1990s the CPS started to include HSWA 1974 
offences with an indictment against a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter 
onwards before post-disaster reactive legislation was passed in response to fatal disasters 
involving corporations.212 
 Industry-specific safety legislation had been enacted as a solution with the aim of 
preventing a solution linked to workplace fatalities since the Health and Morals Act of 
Apprentices and others Act 1802.213 This Act was the forerunner to the Factory Acts (1833 
to 1961), Mining Acts (1842 to 1954) and the Railway Acts (1845 to 1954). Workplace 
fatalities of the 1970s, that took place in factories, railways and mines were investigated 
by applying the povisions of these Acts, and there was, a plethora of additional statutory 
provisions that regulated other working environments, such as office premises, railway 
buildings, and shops.214 The piecemeal nature of the legislation needed addressing to take 
into account the widely held opinion215 that the regulation of health and safety laws and 
workplace fatalities should be removed from criminal sanction as this hindered the growth 
of industry; instead it should be monitored by internal regulation and discipline.216 In 1970 
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a committee was set up to make recommendations about the regulation of health and 
safety and to report its findings. The appointment of the chair seemed to have a Homeric 
aspect with the appointment of Lord Robens, who supposedly was keen to make amends 
for his failing after the Aberfan disaster. The report recommended the enactment of a 
single Act to regulate health and safety in the workplace that would ensure the health and 
safety of employees and members of the public.217 HSWA 1974 was introduced to achieve 
this. 
 HSWA 1974 placed the onus on employers to implement health and safety through 
the enactment of a number of general duties placed upon employers and employees in 
sections 2 to 7 HSWA 1974.218 The two main sections are sections 2 and 3 HSWA 1974. 
Section 2(1) HSWA 1974 provides that ‘it shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so 
far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of all employees’. 
Further, section 3(1) HSWA 1974 provides that ‘it shall be the duty of every employer to 
conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, that 
persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not exposed to risks to 
their health or safety’. Previous industry safety legislation, such as the Factories Acts, 
protected employees only or related to a specific industry, such as the Mining Acts and the 
Railway Acts. However, taking on board the lessons from the Aberfan disaster, the 
provisions of section 3 HSWA 1974 protected the health and safety not only of the general 
public but also of contractors (their employees), visitors, customers, the emergency 
services, neighbours, passers-by and possible trespassers if ‘reasonably practicable’. HSWA 
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1974 enabled the prosecuting authorities219 to prosecute offending corporations 
successfully for a lesser offence as there was no requirement to establish corporate 
criminal liability through the identification doctrine insofar as senior managers or directors 
did not have to expose employees or the public to the risk of harm.220 It only had to be 
proven that the company had failed to comply with the general duties of HSWA 1974 or 
any requirement imposed by regulations made under HSWA 1974 to establish the breach 
of a statutory duty.221 
The role of sections 2 and 3 HSWA 1974 became the ineffective fall-back position 
that could be used to hold corporations liable for their negligent actions when an 
indictment for gross negligence manslaughter failed or was never considered in the first 
place. The corporation would be charged with a breach of section 2 and/or section 3 HSWA 
1974. This was demonstrated in the Clapham train disaster in December 1988 in which 
thirty-five people died as a result of a collision between three trains that was due to a faulty 
signal that had not been repaired correctly. The independent inquiry into the accident 
stated that ‘the errors go much wider and higher in the organisation than merely to remain 
in the hands of those who were working that day’.222 However, British Rail pleaded guilty 
to a breach of section 2 and section 3 HSWA 1974 and were fined £250,000.223 The use of 
post-disaster reactive legislation represented the only means to prove that the corporation 
was accountable for the harm it had caused. 
Until 1995 the defence teams representing the corporations would have advised 
their client to plead not guilty to the lesser charges of breaches of sections 2 and 3 HSWA 
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1974 as it would have been possible to plea bargain the corporation out of both charges.224 
This changed in 1995 when the Court of Appeal in R v British Steel PLC affirmed that section 
3(1) HSWA 1974 (duty owed to a person not in the company’s employment) was based on 
strict liability and that the offence could be established through corporate criminal 
vicarious liability.225 By altering the method by which the courts interpreted sections 2 and 
3 HSWA 1974, it seems that the introduction of HSWA 1974 had corrected a wrong that 
had allowed the introduction of the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the 
identification doctrine into criminal law. It achieved this by providing the legislative means 
to hold a corporation liable for the harm it caused. Despite this development, the position 
remained the same; it was still acceptable to plead guilty to the lesser criminal offence to 
avoid a charge of gross negligence manslaughter.226 
At the same time HSWA 1974 was being used to hold corporations liable for 
breaches of the general duties and associated regulations that were introduced in the 
aftermath of fatal disasters, post-disaster reactive legislation was also being used after 
disasters that occurred between 1966 and 1995 with the aim of preventing future 
disasters, as demonstrated in Figure 5.1 below. 
Name of Disaster (Year) Number of Fatalities Post-Disaster Reactive 
Legislation 
Aberfan Slag Heap227 
 (October 1966) 
144 Mines and Quarries (Tips) 
Act 1969228 
Birmingham Stadium Crush 
(July 1971) 
1 Safety of Sports Ground Act 
1975229 
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28 Control of Industrial Major 
Hazards Regulations 1984 
and Control of Major 
Accident Hazards 
Regulations 1999231 
Bradford Stadium Fire232   
(May 1985) 
49  Fire Safety and Safety of 
Places of Sports Act 1987233 
Birmingham Stadium Crush 
(May 1985) 
1 Fire Safety and Safety of 
Places of Sports Act 1987 
Manchester Airport Runway 
Disaster234 
(1985) 
55 Art 14(5)(b),(c) Air 
Navigation Order235 
Herald of Free Enterprise 
Capsizing236 
(March 1987) 
193 Merchant Shipping Act 
1988237 
 
King’s Cross Fire238 
(November 1987) 
31 The Fire Precautions (Sub-
Surface Railway Stations) 
Regulations 1989239 
Piper Alpha Explosion 
(July 1988) 
(Scottish Case) 
 Offshore Safety Act 1992240 
 
 
Kegworth Air Disaster241 
(January 1989) 





96 Football Spectators Act 
1989244 
Purley Train Crash 
(March 1989) 
5 ‘Double blocking’ to signal 
T168. 
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51 The Merchant Shipping 
(Passenger Counting and 
Recording Systems) 
Regulations 1990 in 
conjunction with The 
Merchant Shipping 
(Emergency Information for 
Passengers) Regulations 
1990246 
Lyme Bay Drownings247 
 (March 1993) 
4 Activity Centres (Young 
Persons’ Safety) Act 1995 
and Aventure Activities 
Licensing Regulations 
2004248 
Figure 5.1: Overview of Disasters and Post-Disaster Reactive Legislation (1965-1999) 
HSWA 1974 and the use of post-disaster reactive legislation were two very different types 
of legislative responses to fatal disasters. The use of HSWA 1974 represented the legislative 
equivalent of a fail-safe mechanism to address corporate criminal liability because when a 
corporation could not be successfully prosecuted for gross negligence manslaughter by 
way of the common law offence, using HSWA 1974 would succeed in doing so.249 The use 
of post-disaster reactive legislation, however, represented a continual knee-jerk reaction 
to address the legislative gaps after a disaster with the sole aim of preventing similar 
disasters in the future. Hence, there is a difference in the effectiveness of HSWA 1974 and 
post-disaster reactive legislation. HSWA 1974 has stood firm since its enactment and still 
acts as the legislative fail-safe mechanism today when corporations are indicted for 
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corporate manslaughter under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007.250 The use of post-disaster reactive legislation increased between 1965 to 1999 with 
the adoption of the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine 
that was used to attribute corporate criminal liability to a corporation to establish gross 
negligence manslaughter; this had a dramatic impact on corporate manslaughter reform 
during this time frame. Using post-disaster reactive legislation in the immediate aftermath 
of a disaster meant that there was no need to address corporate manslaughter reform if 
such legislation established an indirect means of holding corporations liable for the harm 
they caused because the corporation was already being punished for its actions and future 
disasters were being prevented. 
Three disasters involving three different industries had the same outcome reliance on 
post-disaster reactive legislation to address the corporate negligence behind the deaths 
when a prosecution for corporate manslaughter was pursued but failed. The Aberfan 
disaster resulted in the implementation of the Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act 1969 with 
regard to the management of mining tips to prevent further coal tip slides and fatalities.251 
Meanwhile, the Zeebrugge Disaster resulted in the introduction of section 31 Merchant 
Shipping Act 1988, which provided that a shipowner could be held criminally liable for the 
unsafe operation of a ship; the fine could be up to £50,000 or two years’ imprisonment.252 
 Seventh Turning Point of Corporate Manslaughter Reform (1994–
1999): Last Chance to Reform the Common Law Offence of Gross 
Negligence Manslaughter by a Corporation 
5.4.1 Overview of the Law on Corporate Criminal Liability (1994–1999) 
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From 1994 to the time of writing (2018),253 society’s perception of corporate criminal 
liability changed from seeing corporate illegality, as acceptable organisational behaviour 
that was necessary to achieve corporate goals to finding such behaviour abhorrent.254 
Society started to demand corporate accountability for the harm a corporation caused 
when it ‘appeared to escape prosecution or conviction on a technicality’.255 During this 
period, corporations were responsible for fatal railway crashes through their negligence256 
as well as financial scandals such as the collapse of Barings Bank (1995).257 The Law 
Commission in 1994 proposed that the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the 
identification doctrine should be abandoned in favour of an investigation of how the 
company operated to prevent death or injury within the common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter.258 Despite the recommendations by the Law Commission, the 
legislature was still reluctant to change the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the 
identification doctrine as the sole means of establishing corporate criminal liability due to 
the upset it would cause to the recently privatised companies already struggling to trade 
in new regulated environments.259 This aspect of the development of corporate criminal 
liability reform can also be noted in the decision made by the Privy Council in Meridian 
Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission (‘Meridian’) in 1995.260 In this 
case, a special rule of attribution was proposed to establish corporate criminal liability 
through the use of construction rather than metaphysics, which was used by the ‘directing 
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mind and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine to address corporate criminal 
liability. The rationale behind such reluctance to apply alternative methods to establish 
corporate mens rea will be considered next as the judicial reasoning behind such 
reluctance inhibited the seventh turning point of corporate manslaughter reform. 
 By 1994 corporate criminal liability was firmly established as a legal concept,261 
whereby a corporation could be indicted for a crime, as long as legislation had created the 
offence and made express provision for corporate mens rea262 or the common law had 
determined the offences a corporation could be convicted for (such as conspiracy to 
defraud but not murder).263 Two routes could be used to establish corporate criminal 
liability.264 Firstly, it could be established vicariously through an absolute offence (HSWA 
1974 offence), in that corporate criminal liability was not required.265 Secondly, the 
corporation could be held criminaly liable through the identification doctrine, if the natural 
person who performed the prohibited act with the requisite state of mind was considered 
to be the ‘directing mind and will of the corporation’.266  
 In 1995 a special rule of attribution was suggested by Lord Hoffman in Meridian: 
the court must look to the construction of the statute, structure and roles of officers in the 
corporation together with general principles of agency and vicarious liability to deremine 
corporate criminal liability. Meridian was being heard by the Privy Council on appeal from 
the Court of Appeal in New Zealand; clarification was being sought that Meridian Global 
Funds Management Asia Ltd (‘Meridian’) was not liable for the actions of Mr Koo, its chief 
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investment officer. Mr Koo failed to give notice to the New Zealand Securities Commission 
for a share transaction pursuant to section 20(3) New Zealand Securities Amendment Act 
1988. Both the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal held that for the purposes of 
section 20(3) New Zealand Securities Amendment Act 1988 his actions could be attributed 
to Meridian. Section 20(3) New Zealand Securities Amendment Act 1988 stated: 
 Every person who, after the commencement of this section, becomes a substantial 
 security holder in a public issuer shall give notice that the person is a substantial 
 security holder in the public issuer to-(a) the public issuer; and (2) any stock 
 exchange on which the securities of the public issuer are listed. 
Mr Koo had stepped down as the managing director and Mr Armour had recently been 
appointed as the managing director. However, Mr Koo still had Meridian’s authority to 
trade on the corporation’s behalf without seeking permission from the board of directors 
or Mr Armour as a de facto director.267 The appeal to the Privy Council by Meridian argued 
that Mr Koo was not the ‘directing mind or will’ of the corporation and therefore Meridian 
was not liable under the Act. Lord Hoffman stated: 
 This is always a matter of interpretation: given that it (the Act) was intended to 
 apply to a company, how was it intended to apply? Whose act (or knowledge, or 
 state of mind) was for this purpose intended to count as the act etc. of the 
 company? One finds the answer to this question by applying the usual canons of 
 interpretation, taking into account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and its 
 content and policy (my emphasis).268 
Lord Hoffman held that Mr Koo, for the purposes of the statute in question, acted as the 
‘directing mind and will’ of the corporation and as such Meridian should be held liable for 
failing to submit notice as required by the Act.269 
 The special rule of attribution created by Lord Hoffman in Meridian represented a 
movement away from the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the identification 
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doctrine insofar that the court looked first to the construction of the statute to determine 
corporate criminal liability and then looked towards the employees and agents whose acts 
counted as the acts of the company by a combination of agency law and vicarious liability 
in tort. By fashioning a special rule of attribution, the rule could be applied to a modern 
corporation because in similar circumstances to Meridian the acts of the large company 
might not always be recorded by the resolution of the board because important policies 
and decisions are often made on a regional level rather than a national level.270 The special 
rule of attribution used in Meridian could have been used to determine corporate criminal 
liability regardless of the size, structure or type of corporation. Further, the use of the rule 
enabled the criminal judiciary to return to the strict construction of penal statutes to 
interpret corporate criminal liability, which was already being used before the creation of 
identification doctrine reasoning in the Three Fraud Cases with regard to either the wide 
interpretation attached to human agents acting on behalf of the corporation or the narrow 
interpretation involving those deemed to be those in control of the corporation.271 The 
criminal judiciary before the 1940s looked at the company resolutions recorded in the 
directors’ meetings272 in conjunction with the evidence of instructions given by directors 
to managers or employees,273 rather than a sole director acting as the ‘directing mind and 
will’ in the identification doctrine. Nonetheless, the creation of the special rule of 
attribution offered a potential reform opportunity, if the ‘directing mind and will’ 
interpretation of the identification doctrine could be removed in favour of the special rule 
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of attribution then the attainment of the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform 
becomes possible. 
 However, Lord Hoffman’s view regarding the special rule of attribution was 
complicated when he added a caveat to the conclusion of his judgment in Meridian, which 
stated that: ‘[I]t is a question of construction in each case as to whether the particular rule 
(‘special rule of attribution’) requires that the knowledge that an act has been done, or 
the state of mind with which it was done, should be attributed to the company’ (my 
emphasis).274 Thus, the decisive sway of the seventh turning point of corporate 
manslaughter reform because the aftermath of the Southall train crash represented the 
last opportunity to reform the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter 
where the use of Lord Hoffman’s special rule of attribution or the rule of aggregation could 
have been used to establish corporate criminal liability. 
5.4.2 Facts of the Southall Train Crash (1997) 
On 19 September 1997 at 1.15 p.m., the 1032 High Speed Train (‘HST’) from Swansea to 
Paddington, operated by Great Western Trains Co Ltd (‘GWT’) and driven by Larry Harrison 
(‘Harrison’), passed through a red light and collided with a goods train operated by English, 
Welsh and Scottish (‘EWS’) just outside Southall (‘Southall train crash’). Seven people lost 
their lives, and 151 were injured. The Southall train crash involved a coroner’s inquest,275 
a public inquiry276 legal proceedings,277 and it was a constant presence during debates in 
Parliament.278 
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 In the aftermath of the accident, two theories surfaced as to its cause. The first was 
connected to Harrison and implied that when the train was ten minutes away from its 
destination station of London Paddington, he had taken his eye off the track ahead to pack 
his bag; as a result of this he had not seen the red light and could not stop the train, thereby 
causing the crash. The second reason involved a report that the accident occurred while 
because the Automatic Warning System (‘AWS’)279 was not working and nor was the 
Automatic Train Protection system (‘ATP’).280 Harrison took over the driving at Cardiff from 
James Tunnock (‘Tunnock’). Tunnock had reported a fault on the AWS and had switched 
the unit off. He had also turned off the ATP unit as he had received no training in its 
operation. Later, it was concluded that the accident occurred primarily because of 
Harrison’s negligence in missing the red light. However, the operational decisions made by 
GWT with regard to the use of the AWS and ATP also contributed to the accident. If both 
systems had been switched on, the crash could have been prevented.281 
 On 24 September 1997, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions announced in the House of Commons that a public inquiry would be 
established to determine the cause of the accident.282 The public inquiry was constituted 
by the Health and Safety Committee (‘HSC’) pursuant to section 14(2)(b) HSWA 1974 in 
conjunction with the Health and Safety Inquiries (Procedures) Regulations 1975 and 
formally opened on 24 February 1998; it was chaired by Professor Uff (‘Uff Report’). On 19 
December 1997, before the inquiry or any legal proceedings commenced, it was agreed at 
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a meeting attended by prosecuting counsel, the inquiry team, HSC, the British Transport 
Police and the coroner ‘that the Inquiry hearing should await first, any decision to bring 
manslaughter proceedings and secondly, (if brought) their conclusion’.283 The inquiry was 
adjourned until September 1999. On 17 April 1998 Harrison was arrested and eventually 
charged with seven counts of gross negligence manslaughter. The CPS charged GWT with 
two offences on 1 December 1998. The first was gross negligence manslaughter and the 
second was a breach of section 3(1) HSWA 1974, whereby ‘every employer is under a duty 
to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far is reasonably practicable, that 
persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not exposed to risks to 
their health and safety’. Simultaneously, the CPS charged Harrison with a second offence 
for a breach of section 7(1) HSWA 1974 for failing ‘to take reasonable care for the health 
and safety of himself and others who may be affected by his acts or omissions at work’.  
 A month before criminal proceedings began against Harrison and GWT, Southwark 
Coroner’s Court returned a verdict of ‘unlawful killing’.284 On 21 June 1999 the court 
proceedings commenced, only to be halted on 30 June 1999 when Scott Baker held the 
following in a preliminary ruling: 
 The Crown could not advance its case against GWT. It was necessary to identify a 
 directing mind in GWT in relation to the alleged breach of duty. In the instant case 
 that person was the Managing Director responsible for matters of safety and it 
 was apparent that a breach of duty could not be established against him. If he was 
 not liable for negligence in the civil context, he could not be liable for gross 
 negligence under the criminal law.285 
On 2 July 1999 GWT pleaded guilty to a breach of section 3(1) HSWA 1974, at which point 
the Crown dismissed all charges against Harrison and the judge directed the jury to enter 
                                                        
283 Uff Report (n 275) para 8.3. 
284 Uff Report (n 275) paras 4.14-4.15. 
285 GWT Case (n 277). 
306 
not guilty verdicts. Scott Baker J fined GWT £1.5 million and ordered GWT to pay the costs 
connected to the HSWA breach. A transcript of his sentencing remarks noted that ‘a 
substantial contributory cause was the fact that the defendant company permitted the 
train to run from Swansea to Paddington at speeds of up to 125 mph with AWS isolated’.286 
 The accident was the first to occur after the privatisation of the railway industry 
between 1994 and 1997 and prompted allegations of treating corporate profit as more 
important than public safety.287 Scott Baker J believed that was not the case, as ‘the thrust 
of the complaint is that Great Western Trains did not have in place a system for preventing 
a high-speed train operating with the AWS isolated and no alternative in place. That in my 
judgment is a serious fault of senior management.’288 
 In order to establish the offence of gross negligence manslaughter against the 
corporation, the Crown had to identify Richard George, the Managing Director for Safety, 
as grossly negligent. Scott Baker J believed that was not possible, even though he was a 
passenger on the train when it collided. There was no evidence connecting him to the 
grossly negligent breach of the duty of care for the safety of the passengers through the 
turning off of the ATP and for the lack of maintenance of the AWS as the ‘directing mind 
and will’ of the corporation using the identification doctrine. However, a significant 
difference is apparent between the evidence presented in the Uff Report and Scott Baker 
J’s comments in his sentencing remarks. The evidence used in the Uff Report was included 
within the court documents disclosed by the same investigating authorities that later 
decided not to proceed with the prosecution for gross negligence manslaughter. In his 
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closing statement, Scott Baker referred to an engineering report that was commissioned 
by Railtrack, which stated: 
 In the absence of ATP there is predicted to be a 26% chance of an ATP 
 preventable accident involving a GWT train during the next ten years. The political 
 considerations and the very real requirement for senior management effort that 
 such an accident would bring cannot be disregarded.289 
According to the Uff Report, this was not seen by GWT until after the crash. However, an 
evidence trail within the Uff Report indicates that the level of awareness and subsequent 
negligence by Richard George as the managing director of safety could demonstrate a level 
of culpability and should not have been dismissed quite so quickly by Scott Baker J. Richard 
George, within his remit as the managing director for safety, was aware of poor audit 
reports recorded by GWT concerning safety. The safety review process involved Richard 
George, who gave evidence that ‘GWT had turned a corner in 1997 and that the Third Stage 
Audit showed their commitment to safety and to compliance with their Safety Case’.290 
However, in June 1997, an audit reported concern over documents, data control, the 
quality control records and training. In August 1997, a month before the train crash, the 
new GWT audit system had been turned off.291 The audit included reference to the AWS 
and the ATP. Further, a member of the safety management team reporting directly to 
Richard George kept inflating the training figures involving the amount of training that the 
ATP drivers had supposedly had. Surely a reasonable and competent managing director of 
safety should have had a grasp of the situation and it was bordering on negligence not to 
be aware of the situation. The Uff Report stated that ‘GWT management must bear 
responsibility for the omissions or errors which allowed the situation to occur’.292  
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 To prove the offence, as cited by Lord Mackay LC in Adomako, it had to be 
established by the Adomako gross negligence test that there was proof of a duty of care, 
there was a breach of that duty, and the breach could be considered grossly negligent and 
a crime.293 GWT met these criteria. There was evidence that the fault of Richard George as 
an individual could have been identified as part of the ‘directing mind and will’ 
interpretation, and thus the case would have fallen within the scope of the identification 
doctrine. However, his absence in the indictment did not aid this route and instead 
contributed to the dismissal of the charge against the corporation despite a causal link. 
5.4.3 Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) 
It is against this backdrop that the Attorney General, pursuant to section 36 Criminal Justice 
Act 1972 sought the Court of Appeal’s opinion on two questions that arose from the ruling 
of Scott Baker J: 
(1) can a defendant be properly convicted of manslaughter by gross negligence 
in the absence of evidence as to that defendant’s state of mind? 
(2) can a non-human defendant be convicted of the crime of manslaughter by 
gross negligence in the absence of evidence establishing the guilt of an 
identified human individual for the same crime?294 
The judges presiding were Rose LJ, Potts and Curtis JJ. The first question was answered in 
the affirmative, drawing the court’s attention to the objectiveness of the Adomako gross 
negligence test. However, the second question posed a greater problem as the answer 
would determine the applicability of the offence of gross negligence manslaughter to a 
large corporation. Lord Justice Rose paid particular reference to the decision reached in 
the Tesco Case and the doctrine of identification when he stated that ‘the authorities on 
statutory offences do not bear on the common law principle in relation to 
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manslaughter’.295 Yet the original misinterpretation and application of the identification 
doctrine stemmed from a statute and was applied subsequently to a common law offence 
that disregarded the original provisions of Parliament, as stated in the Acts that were 
relevant in the Three Fraud Cases.296 
 Despite the gateway left open by Meridian, the Court of Appeal answered the 
second question in the negative and held that ‘in our judgment, unless an identified 
individual’s conduct, characterisable as gross negligence, can be attributed to the 
company, the company is not, in the present state of the common law, liable for 
manslaughter’.297 Further, justification for the answer to the second question referred to 
the Law Commission’s analysis of the law in its Report on Legislating the Criminal Code: 
Involuntary Manslaughter (‘Law Commission Report No 237’) in 1996.298 It emphasised in 
the report that the state of the current law was as stated by their answer to question 
two.299 The commission further submitted that if the law was incorrect, as stated by the 
Crown, insofar as the Court of Appeal should have considered the influence of aggregation, 
there would be no need for the Law Commission’s report.300 However, using this strand of 
the argument, surely the involvement of the Law Commission indicates that the law as it 
stood was incorrect. Indeed, the likelihood of a successful prosecution would stand only 
against a small corporation. 
 The Law Commission Report No 237 advocated the creation of a new offence called 
‘corporate killing’, whereby a corporation could be found guilty of the death if it was caused 
by a failure in the way in which the corporation’s activities were managed or organised and 
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those activities related to ensuring to ensure the health and safety of persons employed in 
or affected by those activities.301 The Meridian Case would have aided this approach 
through the application of the special rules of attribution that considered the roles of all 
the employees to determine corporate criminal liability. Nevertheless, it was noted that 
the novel arguments were advanced before the trial judge and failed and, although they 
were partly successful on Appeal, at the end of the day the Court of Appeal, effectively 
refused to usurp the function of Parliament and said ‘the identification principle remains 
the only basis in common law for corporate criminal liability for gross negligence 
manslaughter’.302 
 One of the limitations of this rationale is that it does not explain why the 
opportunity to reform the law surrounding corporate manslaughter was not pursued. 
Previous judges and their decisions, ranging from Lord Haldane’s in the Lennard’s Case or 
Viscount Caldecott’s in the Three Fraud Cases, did not seem quite as worried about the 
intentions of Parliament when they deviated from these intentions with their subsequent 
decisions to introduce their interpretation of the law. This was evident in the Three Fraud 
Cases, where the use of identification doctrine reasoning originally attached to statutory 
offences was applied to all corporate criminal common law offences. The strong arguments 
for change in Meridian referred to using aggregation to establish corporate criminal liability 
through corporate culture rather than the identification doctrine. This suggestion was 
dismissed by arguing that it would have been against the intentions of Parliament. At this 
point judicial abstinence rather than interference surfaces this time as an external factor 
preventing a reform of the law connected to gross negligence manslaughter by a 
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corporation; previously the judiciary had had no qualms about manipulating the law to 
advocate its disdain for the concept of corporate criminal liability generally and corporate 
manslaughter specifically. 
 Moreover, the setting of the Southall train crash must be considered with regard to 
the type of corporation involved. The Southall train crash was a direct result of a post-
nationalised railway industry in chaos. A strong argument exists that GWT should have 
been found guilty of gross negligence manslaughter as there was an evidence trail that 
could have established gross negligence against the managing director of safety by 
comparing his actions with the benchmark for the reasonable managing director of safety. 
 Regardless of these possibilities, potential reform opportunities became victim to 
what Professor John Braithwaite, a leading criminologist, referred to as reciprocal 
causation, whereby the regulatory state creates mega-corporations through which the 
large corporations enable the regulatory state.303 The example given by Braithwaite 
alluded to the Bhopal gas disaster in India in December 1984, which resulted in the deaths 
of 2,259 people. The Bhopal gas disaster can be equated with the Southall train crash 
insofar as there was public outrage. Inevitably, such outrage leads to the naming of a 
scapegoat; in a railway accident it is usually the train driver, who receives a prison 
sentence, but sometimes it is the corporation itself, which might be given a fine. The 
outcome is the same every time, as the reciprocal causation that occurs is incapable of 
addressing the cause of the train crash. Subsequently, unless the underlying cause of a 
disaster can be addressed, the cycle of reciprocal causation will recur indefinitely, as 
demonstrated in the Southall train crash. 
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 This concept continued to be relevant because of the reliance on post-disaster 
reactive legislation to address the harm a corporation caused through its negligence. 
Eventually, GWT was fined £1.5 million for a breach of section 3(1) and section 33 HSWA 
1974. The reliance on alternative legislation was demonstrated by the eighteen attempted 
prosecutions of large corporations for gross negligence manslaughter that occurred 
between 1995 and 2008.304 Only one of the cases were dismissed altogether, while the 
evidence in the remaining seventeen was considered to be too weak for the case to 
continue with a charge of gross negligence manslaughter. Thus, the charge was dismissed 
in favour of pursuing a successful prosecution under sections 2, 3 or 37 HSWA 1974. This 
pattern could also be demonstrated in the aftermath of the next three train disasters at 
Ladbroke Grove (1999), Hatfield (2000) and Potters Bar (2002), which proceeded along the 
same lines: in each case a fine was imposed for the breach of HSWA 1974. A public inquiry 
was only constituted for the Ladbroke Grove disaster.305 The government considered that 
it would have been counterproductive for the remaining two train disasters to be the 
objects of inquiries in the light of five previous public inquiries, because the outcome was 
likely to be the same: corporate negligence. 
 Despite these findings pointing once again to corporate negligence, all were in vain 
because of the impact of the AG Case and the reluctance of the courts to consider the 
Meridian proposal; this resulted in the dismissal of every indictment attempted against a 
large corporation. The defects in the law were noted by the judges in their summing up. 
Mackay J, after dismissing the gross negligence manslaughter charge in the Hatfield Case, 
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stated that he was ‘obliged by the existing law in my judgment to make these rulings. This 
case continues to underline the pressing need for the long-delayed reform of the law in 
this area of unlawful killing.’ 306 The AG Case represented the last opportunity to reform 
the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter by a corporation through whch 
to achieve the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform, that is, the successful 
indictment of a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter regardless of size, structure 
or type. A reason of mark similarity involving judicial reasoning through the reluctance of 
the judiciary to consider the special rule of attribution created in Meridian continued to 
inhibit corporate manslaughter reform. 
 Conclusion 
Against this background, it is pertinent to consider reasons of marked similarity involving 
judicial reasoning and post-disaster reactive legislation which inhibited the sixth and 
seventh turning points of corporate manslaughter reform and the attainment of the ideal 
doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform, that is; a successful prosecution for corporate 
manslaughter regardless of the structure, type or size of the corporation. 
 The sixth turning point of corporate manslaughter reform involved the first 
successful prosecution of a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter in the Lyme Bay 
Case. It should have represented a pinnacle of success. However, the success confirmed 
the position that had always been known since the adoption of the ‘directing mind and will’ 
interpretation of the identification doctrine, which was that the only corporation that 
might be successfully prosecuted would be a small company. Therefore the success was 
hollow, given the hundreds of lives lost in disasters involving large corporations.307 Even 
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before the success of the Lyme Bay Case, a trend had appeared whereby large corporations 
escaped prosecution for gross negligence manslaughter including P&O. The multilayered 
structures of large corporations ensured it was nigh on impossible to identify the ‘directing 
mind and will’ attributable to a director on the board to establish the corporate criminal 
liability using the identification doctrine. 
The transition of the corporation from a nationalised one to a large private 
corporation should have indicated a shift away from state protectionism. But the power 
and influence of state protectionism was evident in the wake of the Aberfan disaster with 
the reluctance to action criminal proceedings for corporate negligence connected to the 
disaster despite the findings of the Aberfan Inquiry, beyond the enactment of post-disaster 
reactive legislation. In addition, the introduction of the privatised corporation and disasters 
resulted in the public asking that such corporate negligence should be addressed. It should 
be remembered that the nineteenth century had seen a vast number of disasters in the 
mining, railway and shipping industries. However, the period from 1966 to 1994 
represented an era in which several disasters were linked to members of the public going 
on holiday, watching a football match, partying on the Thames or simply going about their 
everyday business. 
When it became apparent that the identification doctrine using the ‘directing mind 
and will’ interpretation would act as a protective shield for large negligent corporations, a 
more worrying trend emerged at a level not seen before with regard to the use of post-
disaster reactive legislation. Post-disaster reactive legislation was enacted after major 
disasters that occurred from 1966 to 1999 as a legislative response, when it became 
apparent that the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter applying the 
‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine would only apply to 
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small corporations. The continued use of post-disaster reactive legislation acted as a 
reason of marked similarity inhibiting corporate manslaughter reform because the 
enactment of such legislation drew attention away from actual corporate manslaughter 
reform and the attainment of the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform. 
 The role of judicial reasoning camouflaged the shortcomings of the ‘directing mind 
and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine established in the P&O Case and later 
used in the Lyme Bay Case. However, even if the criminal courts used the ‘directing mind 
and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine, the prosecution stood a chance of 
succeeding if the correct defendants and a reliable trail of evidence could be presented 
during the trial. Despite the difficulties of having to prove recklessness and negligence, 
evidence of the former always had to be included in the first place. Indeed, if this evidence 
was not presented correctly, this would hinder any successful prosecution, as 
demonstrated in the P&O Case. 
 By 1995 it was recognised that it would be difficult to successfully indict a large 
corporation for gross negligence manslaughter using the ‘directing mind and will’ 
interpretation of the identification doctrine in conjunction with the Bateman gross 
negligence manslaughter test, as affirmed in Adomako. However, options were still 
available, as demonstrated by Meridian, in which the Privy Council were prepared to 
examine the operational mechanics of a corporation rather than the actual management 
titles to determine who could be deemed the corporation’s ‘directing mind and will’. This 
could have been considered in the GWT Case with regard to the level of culpability that 
existed within the Health and Safety Department, as evidenced in the Uff Report. The GWT 
Case involved a recently nationalised corporation and was dropped, regardless of evidence 
that could have been presented by the prosecution. In addition, the persuasive authority 
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of Meridian could have been considered in the subsequent AG Case when the judge 
requested clarification of the law surrounding gross negligence manslaughter by a 
corporation. 
 Against this background, it is pertinent to consider the reasons of marked similarity 
involving judiical reasoning and the use of post-disaster reactive legislation that inhibited 
the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform. Contrary to the position in previous 
periods, via its decision in the AG Case, that it was not its place to alter the intentions of 
Parliament. In this case, it would have been possible to continue using the identification 
doctrine via the Meridian approach to accommodate the corporate structure of a large 
corporation.  
 The inadequacies of the law and the persistent examples of negligent corporations 
connected to corporate manslaughter were also highlighted by public inquiries and 
industry-led inquiries. Despite the strong evidential links establishing the negligence of 
corporations in the aftermath of fatal disasters, their actions were consistently offset by 
the reliance on post-disaster reactive legislation to appease the public, the media and the 
families of the victims of the disasters, which was not accompanied by the corporations or 
legislature being forced to tackle head-on the issue of corporate manslaughter. In the wake 
of a disaster during this period, it was the norm for post-disaster reactive legislation to be 
enacted to hold the corporation liable for the fatalities it had caused. 
 It became apparent to the public, the media, academics, lawyers and groups 
representing the victims of disasters and their familiies that the present state of the law 
connected with the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter could not 
continue in its current state because large corporations were escaping prosecution for 
gross negligence manslaughter. The AG Case represented the last opportunity to reform 
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the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter by a corporation and the 
attainment of the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform. Once the AG Case held 
that ‘the identification principle remains the only basis in common law for corporate 
criminal liability for gross negligence manslaughter’;308 the only solution that remained was 
a legislative response by Parliament. However, the position, but for, the reasons of marked 
similarity involving the persistent use of post-disaster reactive legislation and judicial 
reasoning could have resulted in the attainment of the ideal doctrine of corporate 
manslaughter reform. 
By 1997 the discrepancies in the law surrounding corporate manslaughter had become 
part of the Labour Party’s election manifesto, and on 6 April 2008 the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (‘CMCHA 2007’) was enacted; it 
represented the opportunity to truly reform the law connected to corporate manslaughter. 
Therein lies the problem though that the inhibiting impact of reasons of marked similarity 
involving judicial reasoning and the extensive use of post-disaster reactive legislation were 
left unaddressed with the enactment of the CMCHA 2007. Judicial reasoning affirmed the 
use of the identification doctrine using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation through 
a modified version using ‘senior management’ in the CMCHA 2007. Other methods of 
attribution to determine corporate mens rea were presented constantly from 1912 to 
1999, such as the special rule of attribution in Meridian or the the model of aggregation 
highlighted in the AG Case. In 2017 the faults of using even a modified identification 
doctrine were highlighted in the latest call to evidence made by the Law Commission with 
                                                        
308  AG Case (n 125) 816[E]. 
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regard to corporate liability for economic crime due to concerns that the doctrine 
encouraged bad corporate culture aand practice.309   
 
                                                        




The thesis set out to establish that reasons of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning 
and the use of post-disaster reactive legislation inhibited the turning points of corporate 
manslaughter reform in England and Wales between 1912 and 1999. The argument that 
was considered, was that, seven turning points of corporate manslaughter reform could be 
identified using Lord Cooke’s definition of a turning point in the evolution of the common 
law: each was a decisive common law event of such undiminished sway as to be deemed a 
turning point of common law reform, and each of these turning points were in turn 
inhibited from attaining the ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform for reasons 
of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning and post-disaster reactive legislation.1 The 
ideal doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform represented the applicability of the 
common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter to all corporations regardless of 
size, structure or type. 
 Hence, Chapter 1 identified the seven turning points of corporate manslaughter 
reform which included the following: the creation of the identification doctrine, which was 
forged from philosophical influences to determine corporate criminal liability;2 the first 
failed attempt to prosecute a corporation for gross negligence manslaughter;3 
acknowledgement that a corporation could commit the offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter;4 the second failed attempt to prosecute a corporation for gross negligence 
                                                        
1 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, The Hamlyn Lectures: Turning Points of the Common Law, (Sweet & Maxwell 1997) 2. 
2 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL) (‘Lennard’s Case’). 
3 R v Cory Brothers and Company Limited (1927) 1 KB 810 (Assizes), 96 LJKB 761 (Assizes), 136 LT 335 (Assizes), 28 CCC 346 (Assizes) 
(‘Cory Bros Case’). 
4 T R Fitzwalter Butler and Stephen Mitchell, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases: First Supplement to 31st 
Edition (Sweet & Maxwell and Stevens 1947) 2-3 (‘Archbold’s 1947’); DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146 (KB); R v ICR 
Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551 (CCA). 
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manslaughter;5 a further thirty years of failed attempts to prosecute a corporation (large, 
medium or small)6 for gross negligence manslaughter;7 the first successful prosecution 
against a small corporation for gross negligence manslaughter;8 and finally, an unsuccessful 
attempt to clarify the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter by a 
corporation that was intended to reflect the changing corporate structure of the 1990s.9 
The use of doctrinal, archival and historical legal research also provided a framework that 
was used to address the disaster cases studies within the context of the seven turning 
points of corporate manslaughter reform to determine whether reasons of marked 
similarity inhibited corporate manslaughter reform. Chapter 2 provided an overview of the 
historical development of the corporation with regard to corporate criminal liability in 
conjunction with a brief overview of the offences of homicide, murder and manslaughter 
and the interrelationship between criminal offences and tort. While Chapters 3 to 5 
identified the seven decisive turning points of corporate manslaughter reform that 
occurred from 1912 to 1999 and marked reasons of similarity involving judicial reasoning 
and the use of post-disaster reactive legislation that consistently inhibited corporate 
manslaughter reform. 
 An overview of the findings of the thesis will be presented in this chapter alongside 
a recapitulation of the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 3 to 5 facilitate a 
discussion of the findings regarding their relationship to previous research that has been 
undertaken in the area of corporate manslaughter reform. The inhibiting impact of reasons 
                                                        
5 R v Northern Strip Construction Co Ltd (Glamorgan Assizes, 4 February 1965) (‘Northern Strip Case’). 
6 Companies Act 2006, ss 382(3) and 465(3) in conjunction with the Companies Act 2006 (Amendment) (Accounts & Reports) 
Regulations 2008 (2008/393). 
7 Appendix Three: Unsuccessful manslaughter prosecutions against corporations pursuant to the common law from 1 June 1926 
through to 5 April 2008 in England and Wales. 
8 R v OLL Ltd Kite and Stoddart (Winchester Crown Court, 8 December 1994) (‘Lyme Bay Case’). 
9 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796 (CCA) (‘AG Case’). 
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of marked similarity on corporate manslaughter reform will also be considered alongside a 
discussion of the limitations experienced within the research. Finally, recommendations 
will be put forward considering the implications of the research presented. 
 Recapitulation of purpose and findings 
The aim of the thesis was to explore whether there were reasons of marked similarity 
involving judicial reasoning and the enactment of post-disaster reactive legislation which 
inhibited the seven turning points of corporate manslaughter reform in England and Wales 
between 1912 and 1999.  
 Two turning points of corporate manslaughter reform occurred between 1912 and 
1939 in Chapter 3. In 1915 Viscount Haldane LC created the identification doctrine using 
the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation, as confirmed by the House of Lords in the civil 
law case of Lennard’s Carrying Co. Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd (‘Lennard’s Case’).10 It was 
established originally as a doctrine that was used to interpret a statutory defence involving 
a civil merchant shipping dispute. The identification doctrine using the ‘directing mind and 
will’ interpretation would later be used from 1991 onwards to establish corporate mens 
rea for the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter to determine the 
necessary ‘grossness’ for the offence.11  
 By 1915 the criminal judiciary was already approaching corporate criminal liability 
independently within the context of the strict construction of penal statutes. If the criminal 
judiciary required further assistance to interpret mens rea outside the penal statute, they 
looked towards the approaches taken in the Evans Case and the Broom Case with regard 
to instructions given by and resolutions passed by the company directors or others acting 
                                                        
10 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 (HL) (‘Lennard’s Case’). 
11 R v P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App R 72 (CCC) 84 (‘P&O Case’). 
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on behalf of the corporation.12 In fact Viscount Haldane LC dismissed the appeal in the 
Lennard’s Case on the very same point, that is, a lack of evidence caused by the non-
production of corporate documents.13  
 The creation of the identification doctrine, which included some of the rules 
contained within German company and commercial law’ and German philosophical ideals, 
inhibited corporate manslaughter reform because the identification doctrine was never 
intended to be used in a criminal court. Perhaps it was Viscount Haldane LC’s intention that 
the open-endness of his conclusion in the Lennard’s Case implied that the courts should 
use the dictum as they saw fit in the future. However, his knowledge of other legal systems, 
in particular his interest in all things German, indicated that he would have been aware 
that corporate criminal liability did not exist in German law. Consequently, the 
identification doctrine was based on his own beliefs, connected to Hegel’s, with regard to 
the role of the state and the individual and was also based on an attempt to apply German 
law principles of company and commercial law in part. Nonetheless, the creation of the 
identification doctrine was a decisive turning point in corporate manslaughter reform 
because it would be used in the future to determine all aspects of corporate mens rea. The 
inhibiting effect involving the judicial reasoning that created the identification doctrine 
hindered the attainment of the ideal doctrine of coporate manslaughter reform as the only 
corporations to be successfully indicted would involve small corporations only. 
 The second turning point of corporate manslaughter reform involved the decision 
reached in the R v Cory Brothers and Co Ltd (‘Cory Brothers Case’).14 The judicial reasoning 
                                                        
12 Evans & Co Ltd v London County Council [1914] 3 KB 315 (KB) 318-320 (‘Evans Case’); Eastern Counties Railway Company and 
Richardson v Broom (1851) 6 Exch 314, 325; 155 ER 562, 566-567 (‘Broom Case’). 
12 Cory Bros Case (n 3). 
13 Lennard’s Case (n 1) 714. 
14 Cory Bros Case (n 3). 
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of Finlay J prevented a full discussion of the circumstances of the case and consideration 
of the approach already adopted by the criminal judiciary in the Evans Case and the Broom 
Case to attribute corporate criminal liability outside the strict construction of penal 
statutes regarding the actions of the directors. The criminal judiciary would have looked to 
the recorded entries of the Cory Bros & Co Directors Meeting Minute Book No. 5. which 
made no reference to the intention of the directors during the General Strike and Great-
Lockout of 1926. No reference was made because all details would have been recorded in 
the Private Minute Book which ran concurrently to Minute Book No. 5. as evidenced by the 
two entries recorded in Minute Book No. 5. Hence, the importance of the absent entries 
because following the Evans Case and Broom Case the criminal judiciary were already 
prepared to look at minute books or instructions to attribute corporate mens rea. 
 The inhibiting influence of the judicial reasoning in the Cory Bros Case is important 
with regard to the second turning point of corporate manslaughter reform because the 
approaches established by the criminal judiciary to attribute corporate criminal liability in 
the Broom Case and Evans Case could not be considered in that case and were 
subsequently disregarded, because the next attempt to indict a corporation for gross 
negligence manslaughter did not occur until 1965.15 
 However, from 1939 to 1965, in Chapter 4, there was a unique position regarding 
the three turning points of corporate manslaughter reform. In R v Northern Strip Mining 
Construction Co Ltd (‘Northern Strip Case’) it was confirmed that an indictment for gross 
negligence manslaughter could stand against a corporation.16 First impressions are 
                                                        
15 R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd The Times, 5 February 1965 (Assizes) 6 (‘Northern Strip Case’). 
16 R v Northern Strip Construction Co Ltd (Glamorgan Assizes, 4 February 1965 (‘Northern Strip Case’) in conjunction with ss 18, 56, 70 
and 73 Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo 5 c 49). Gary Slapper, ‘Corporate manslaughter: An 
examination of the determinants of prosecutorial policy’ (1993) 2(4) Social and Legal Studies 423, 424. 
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deceiving, and, despite this advancement, three further turning points of corporate 
manslaughter reform still occurred and were also inhibited by judicial reasoning. A further 
reason of marked similarity which inhibited corporate manslaughter reform also emerged 
quietly from 1939 to 1965 involving the use of post-disaster reactive legislation to address 
corporate fatalities. 
 The third turning point involved the application of identification doctrine reasoning 
as the only tool available to determine corporate criminal liability, as established in the 
Three Fraud Cases.17 Two contrasting interpretations emerged, the wide and the narrow, 
of identification doctrine reasoning. Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal 
Cases in 1947 stated that ‘a limited company can, as a general rule, be indicted for the 
criminal acts of its human agents, and for this purpose there is no distinction between an 
intention or function of the mind and any other form of activity’ (my emphasis).18 
However, by 1954 a further change occurred; a limited company could only ‘be indicted 
for the criminal acts of those in control of the company, and for this purpose there is no 
distinction between an intention or function of the mind and any other form of activity’ 
(my emphasis).19 The changing structure of the corporation should also be addressed when 
considering the timing of the transition away from the use of human agents that reflected 
the pre-1927 legal position.  
 The fourth turning point of corporate manslaughter reform stemmed from the role 
of the nationalised corporation, large corporations and disasters, which could be seen in 
the Burnden Park stadium disaster (1946), Eppleton coal mine disaster (1951) and the 
                                                        
17 DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146 (KB), R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551 (CCA), Moore v I Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 All 
ER 515 (KB) collectively referred to as the ‘Three Fraud Cases’. 
18 Archbold’s 1947 (n 6) 3 (emphasis added). 
19 Theobald Richard Fitzwalter Butler and Marston Garsia, Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (33rd edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell and Stevens 1954) 12 (emphasis added) (‘Archbold’s 1954’). 
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Lewisham train crash (1957). The turning point point of corporate manslaughter reform 
occurred from the fact that although it would have been possible to attribute corporate 
liability directly to the nationalised corporations or large corporations on the basis of the 
evidence from the inquiries and archival documents, no action was taken against them. 
Hence, the gradual introduction of post-disaster reactive legislation as a tool to address 
corporate negligence connected to fatal disasters: all three disaster case studies resulted 
in the enactment of post-disaster reactive legislation to prevent future accidents. 
 The inhibiting impact of a reason of marked similarity involving judicial reasoning 
on corporate manslaughter reform can also be demonstrated by considering the second 
failed attempt in 1965 to indict a corporation for culpable neglect manslaughter in the 
Northern Strip Case regarding the fifth turning point of corporat emanslaughter reform. 
Streatfeild J used the narrow interpretation of identification doctrine reasoning by citing 
‘higher executives’ when he directed the jury in his closing speech. The jury returned a not 
guilty verdict against the Northern Strip Co. Even though the Northern Strip Co only had 
one director, the control interpretation could have been established to prove culpable 
neglect manslaughter by a corporation because he gave the original instructions and had 
control of the company. However, the directions given to the jury were not clear and were 
camouflaged by the use of the description ‘higher executives’ even though there was only 
one director. This illustrates the inhibiting impact of judicial reasoning; Streatfeild J had 
previously stated in his own words that senior judges presiding too long in the same court 
could not help but be influenced by the local environment in which they worked, which in 
his case was a declining coal mining area in 1960s South Wales. The local influences on the 
judge were reflected in the lack of clarity in his directions to the jury, resulting in a verdict 
of not guilty. 
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 In Chapter 5 the volume of fatal disasters increased between 1965 and 1999, unlike 
previous disasters involving miners or factories, the victims during this later period were 
members of the public. This shift was highlighted in the Aberfan disaster (1966), the 
Zeebrugge disaster (1987) and the Lyme Bay disaster (1994). The sixth turning point of 
corporate manslaughter reform involved the first successful prosecution of a corporation 
for gross negligence manslaughter in the Lyme Bay Case. It should have represented a 
pinnacle of success. However, the success confirmed the position that had always been 
known since the adoption of the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the 
identification doctrine, which was that the only corporation that might be successfully 
prosecuted would be a small company. Therefore the success was hollow, given the 
hundreds of lives lost in disasters involving large corporations.20 Even before the success 
of the Lyme Bay Case as the sixth turning point of corporate manslaughter reform, a trend 
had appeared whereby large corporations escaped prosecution for gross negligence 
manslaughter including P&O.21 The multilayered structures of large corporations ensured 
it was nigh on impossible to identify the ‘directing mind and will’ attributable to a director 
on the board to establish the corporate criminal liability using the identification doctrine. 
 The last chance to reform the law of corporate manslaughter emerged with the 
seventh turning point of corporate manslaughter reform with the decision reached in the 
AG Case which affirmed the use of the ‘diecting mind and will’ interpretation of the 
identification doctrine to determine corporate mens rea. The judgment also held that a 
successful indictment against the corporation for gross negligence manslaughter could 
only be achieved if mirrored by a successful prosecution against a director of he 
                                                        
20 Appendix Three: Unsuccessful manslaughter prosecutions against corporations pursuant to the common law from 1 June 1926 to 5 
April 2008 in England and Wales. 
21 P&O Case (n 11). 
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corporation that could be deemed to be representing the ‘directing mind and will’ of the 
corporation. Following the AG Case the likelihood of a successful conviction of a large 
corporation would be impossible as demonstrated by the fact that only small corporations 
were sucesfully indicted. 
 Consequently, judicial reasoning as a reason of marked similarity consistently 
inhibited the use of alternative methods to attribute corporate criminal liability, such as 
the model of aggregation22 or the use of the special rule of attribution.23 Both alternative 
methods would have facilitated the attainment of the ideal doctrine of corporate 
manslaughter reform involving the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter 
by a corporation; it would have reflected the changing structures of large corporations and 
would have attributed corporate criminal liability on the basis of the combined negligence 
of all corporate employees not just those deemed to be the ‘directing mind and will’ of the 
identification doctrine.24 
A further reason of marked similarity also inhibited corporate manslaughter reform 
through the use of post-disaster reactive legislation. Post-disaster reactive legislation can 
be can be considered a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the use of post-disaster 
reactive legislation could hold a corporation accountable for the harm it had caused; it 
would otherwise not be found liable. Yet on the other hand, in 2018 post-disaster reactive 
legislation is still being used in to address corporate negligence in the aftermath of fatal 
disasters, as demonstrated by the recent proposals to enact new building and fire 
regulations to address the legislative shortcomings that led to the Grenfell Tower fire.25 A  
                                                        
22 Use of the principle of aggregation to extend the identification doctrine connected to the AG Case supported by James Gobert and 
Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths 2003) 83 
23 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500 (PC) (‘Meridian’). 
24 David Bergman, ‘Manslaughter and corporate immunity’ (2000) 150 NLJ 316. 
25 Victoria Roper, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: A 10-Year Review’ (2018) J Crim L 48, 51. 
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conviction pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 will be evidentially difficult to establish against all 
the corporations involved whose combined corporate negligence led to the fire and 
seventy-one deaths. 
 Relationship to previous research and limitations 
Although the findings of the thesis are generally compatible with the corporate 
manslaughter research of Wells,26 Gobert,27 Slapper28 and Almond,29 insofar that the 
research of the named researchers considered the individual examples of reasons of 
marked similarity involving judicial reasoning and the use of disaster cases studies. The 
main area in which the findings of the thesis differs from the work of these authors involves 
the collective use of marked reason of similarity connected to seven turning points of 
corporate manslaughter reform from 1912 to 1999 involving judicial reasoning and the use 
of post-disaster reactive legislation. Pinto and Evans, authors of a book on Corporate 
Criminal Liability, stated that ‘the historical development of judicial thinking in this area of 
the criminal law needs to be examined in order to understand the tensions that continue 
to prevail’.30 Nonetheless, Pinto and Evans presented no specifics beyond ‘continue to 
prevail’ to pinpoint the continuing inhibitive impact of judicial reasoning on corporate 
manslaughter reform. However, in 2017 two relevant events occurred: the Grenfell Tower 
fire which in the event of no successful prosecutions pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 will 
question the integrity and purpose of the Act and the indictments for gross negligence 
manslaughter against corporate officers only rather than corporations after the the 
                                                        
26 Celia Wells, Negotiating Tragedy: Law and Disasters (Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 166-167. 
27 Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008). 
28 Gary Slapper, ‘Corporate manslaughter: An examination of the determinants of prosecutorial policy’ (1993) 2(4) Social and Legal 
Studies 423, 423 
29 Paul Almond, Corporate Manslaughter and Regulatory Reform: Crime Prevention and Security Management (Palgrave Macmillan 
2012). 
30 Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008)) 6. 
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unlawful killing verdicts from the second Hillsborough inquests.31 These events highlighted 
why judicial tension still existed and continues to prevail regarding the common law 
offence of gross negligence manslaughter from 1912 to 1999  and the CMCHA 2007 
because of judicial reasoning and a reluctance to allow the common law to evolve when 
alternative legal mechanisms can be used as demonstrated by the findings involving the 
seven turning points of corporate manslaughter reform. Individual references to judicial 
reasoning connected to corporate manslaughter reform have been considered in isolation 
without the consideration of the overriding impact of the use of post-disaster reactive 
legislation which the findings of the thesis has addressed.  
 Recommendations 
A legal solution for corporate manslaughter reform cannot be considered until the reasons 
of marked similarity involving the use of post-disaster reactive legislation and judicial 
reasoning are resolved because both reasons of marked similarity have had such an 
undiminished sway in terms of inhibiting reform of the common law offence of gross 
negligence manslaughter by a corporation on the seven turning points of corporate 
manslaughter reform from 1912 to 1999. Subsequently, a modest claim of a contribution 
to knowledge is substantiated by the argument that if the reasons of marked similarity 
involving judicial reasoning and the enactment of post-disaster reactive legislation are still 
left unaddressed in 2018, the corporate manslaughter law as it currently stands, with the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (‘CMCHA 2007’) in force, will 
continue to be perpetually defective.  
                                                        
31 Please note the Hillsborough disaster before the enactment of the CMCHA 2007 and any corporation considered to be criminally 
liable would have to be indicted for the common law offence of GNM with corporate criminal liability being detrmined using th e 
‘directing mind and will’ interpretation of the indentification doctrine.  
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 The CMCHA 2007 was originally enacted to be the embodiment of the ideal 
doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform: it aimed to enable a successful indictment for 
corporate manslaughter reform against any corporation regardless of its structure, size or 
type.32 To date there have been no successful indictments against a large corporation for 
corporate manslaughter pursuant to CMCHA 2007 for two reasons. The CMCHA 2007 
included a modified version of the identificication doctrine using the ‘directing mind and 
will’ interpretation within the umbrella of ‘senior management’33 as a requirement to 
establish coporate manslaughter. Further, the criminal judiciary are still reluctant to use 
the provisions of CMCHA 2007 because of judicial reasoning and the tensions that continue 
to prevail. Since the enactment of the CMCHA 2007 in April 2008 only twenty successful 
prosecutions have occurred; each successful prosecution was against a small or medium 
corporation.  
Second, there is still an over-reliance on the role of post-disaster reactive legislation to over 
compensate for the defects in the old common law offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter using the ‘directing mind and will’ interpretation from 1912 to 1999 and now 
with the CMCHA 2007. The aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire is still unfolding and the 
central theme will still be the enactment of post-disaster reactive legislation through new 
building and fire regulations to address the negligence of the corporations involved. This is 
the same response that led to the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 after the Burnden 
Park disaster (1946) or the Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act 1969 after the  Aberfan disaster 
(1966). The disasters are different but the response is the same and it is to the detriment 
of corporate manslaughter reform. However, therein lies the problem because the use of 
                                                        
32 CMCHA 2007, s 1(4)(b). 
33 Appendix Two: Corporate manslaughter convictions pursuant to the CMCHA 2007 from 6 April 2008 to 1 May 2018 in England and 
Wales. 
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post-disaster reactive legislation also increased in response to the use of ‘directing mind 
and will’ interpretation of the identification doctrine to address the negligence of 
corporations in the aftermath of disasters when corporate manslaughter will fail from 
1912-1999.  
 Both reasons of marked similarity could have been addressed at the seven turning 
points of corporate manslaughter reform from 1912 to 1999. Unfortunately, that was not 
the case and the inhibiting impact of both reasons of marked similarity involving judicial 
reasoning and post-disaster reactive legislation are still present and inhibit corporate 
manslaughter reform. Consequently, both reasons of marked similarity need to be 
addressed to remedy the defects in the CMCHA 2007 and the attainment of the ideal 
doctrine of corporate manslaughter reform which is still possible: a successful indictment 
for corporate manslaughter against a corporation irrespective of size, structure or type. 
 The potential impact of this research and the implications of the findings of the 
thesis in the aftermath of Grenfell Towers becomes very relevant to policymakers, disaster 
action groups, such as the Friends of Grenfell or lobbyists acting on their behalf because 
the flaws surrounding the method of attributing corporate criminal liability through the 
‘senior management’ test in the CMCHA 2007 still needs to be addressed as the reasons of 
marked similarity involving judicial reasoning and the use of post-disaster reactive 
legislation are still inhibiting corporate manslaughter reform. The criminal judiciary 
through judicial reasoning look towards HSWA 1974 rather than the CMCHA 2007 to fine 
corporation for fatalities. Further, instead of addressing the flaws of the existing corporate 
manslaughter laws directly; Parliament enacts further post-disatster reactive legislation as 
a solution. Grenfell Towers is the first major fatal disaster to occur since the enactment of 
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the CMCHA 2007 and post-disaster reactive legislation involving new building and fire 
regulations will be enacted. 
 The reasons of marked similarity involving judicial resoning and the use of post-
disaster legislation inhibited the turning points of corporate manslaughter reform from 
1912 to 1999. However, workplace fatalities also occurred in the nineteenth century and it 
is proposed that the corporate manslaughter demands concentrating once again on the 
use of post-disaster reactive legislation and the role of the judiciary are addressed for this 
time frame also. Both reasons of marked similarity have to be addressed to establish 
whether the impact of judicial reasoning and the use of post-disaster reactive legislation 
were equally as inhibitive in the nineteenth century as they were in the twentieth century 
or alternatively were other reasons of marked similarity present which inhibited corporate 
manslaughter reform.  








APPENDIX 1: MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTIONS AGAINST CORPORATIONS1 PURSUANT TO THE COMMON LAW FROM 1 
JUNE 19262 to 5 APRIL 20083 
No. Date 



















R v OLL Ltd & Peter Kite and Joseph Stoddart 





Convicted of gross negligent manslaughter 
and fined £60,000. 
 
R v Kite [1996] Cr App Rep (S) 295 – Peter 
Kite appealed against a 3year sentence and it 
was reduced to 2 years. 




R v Jackson Transport (Ossett) Ltd & Alan Jackson 
(Bradford CC, 26 September 1996) 
 
Small 
Convicted of gross negligent manslaughter 
and fined £22,000. Jackson sentenced to 12 
months and fined £1,500. 
3 June 1999 1 
July–August 
2001 
R v English Brothers Ltd & Melvyn Hubbard 
(Northampton CC, 30 July 2001) 
Small 
Fined £30,000 and ordered to pay £12,500 in 
costs after pleading guilty to charges of gross 
negligence manslaughter. Also pleaded guilty 
to breach of section 3(1) HSWA 1974.  
4 April 2000 1 
February 
2003 
R v Teglgaard Hardwood (UK) Ltd & William and 
John Horner (Hull CC, 28 February 2003) 
Small 
Company fined £25,000. One of the directors 
sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment 






R v Dennis Clothier & Sons & Julian Clothier 
(Bristol CC, 23 October 2002) 
Small Company fined £4,000 and managing 
director sentenced to a 240-hour community 
order. 
                                                        
1 Source HSE and Centre of Corporate Responsibility. 
2 Criminal Justice Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo 5 c 86) s 33 effective date 1 June 1926. 
3 Source HSE and Centre of Corporate Responsibility. 
4 Defintion of company size pursuant to section 382(3) and section 465(3) Companies Act 2006 as amended by The Companies Act 2006 (Amendment) (Accounts & Reports) Regulations 2008 (2008/393). 
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No. Date 














1 July 2004 
R v Nationwide Heating Services Ltd & Alan James 
Mark (Exeter CC, 28 July 2004), [2004] EWCA 
Crim 2490 
Small 
Company found guilty and fined £90,00. 








R v Keymark Services Haulage Ltd & Melvyn Spree 




Company fined £50,000 for both 
manslaughter and health and safety 
offences. 
 
Director convicted of manslaughter and 
conspiracy to falsify driving records and 





R v I C Roofing Ltd & Colin Cooper (Hove CC, 22 
January 2009) 
Small Company fined £10,000 and ordered to pay 
costs of £20,000. Managing direcror 
sentenced to 12 months in prison. 
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APPENDIX TWO: CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTIONS5 PURSUANT TO THE CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER AND 


















1 15 February 
2011 
R v Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings 
Ltd) (in Liquidation) [2012] 1 Cr App 




Convicted of corporate manslaughter after 
trial and fined £385,000, to be paid in equal 
instalments over ten years. Also charged 
under section 2(1) HSWA 1974. 
NI 1 November 
2010 
1 8 May 2012 (1st Northern Ireland Conviction) 
 
R v JMW Farms Ltd [2012] NICC 17 
Small  Guilty plea resulted in a 25% reduction in the 
fine, originally £250,000. Fined £187,500, 
payable in 6 months and ordered to pay 






2 May 2008  1 3 July 2012 R v Lion Steel Equipment Limited 
(Manchester CC, 3 July 2012) 
Medium Charges against directors dropped for GNM 
and breach of section 37(1) HSWA 1974 in 
return for a guilty plea in response to the 
charge of corporate manslaughter. Company 
fined £480,000 payable over 4 years. Fine 
reduced from £600,000 because of guilty 
plea and mitigation. Also ordered to pay 
£84,000 in costs to be paid over 2 years. 
                                                        
5 Sources HSE and Centre of Corporate Accountability. 
6 Corporate Manslaughter Corporate Homicide Act 2007 effective date 6 April 2008. 

















NI 2 February 
2012 
1 7 October 
2013 
(2nd Northern Ireland Conviction) 
 
R v J Murray & Son Ltd [2013] NICC 
15 
Small Guilty plea re corporate manslaughter and 
fined £100,000, payable over five years. Fine 
reduced by one third because of guilty plea. 
Costs of £10,450 also payable. 
 
Gross negligence manslaughter charge was 
dropped against the director in return for 






R v Prince’s Sporting Club Ltd 
(Southwark CC, 22 November 2013) 
Small Fined £134,579.69 (equal to all the 
corporation’s assets) payable in 28 days plus 
costs of £100,000, payable within 28 days, 
and a publicity order. 
4 March 
2012 
1 26 February 
2014 
R v Mobile Sweepers (Reading) Ltd 
(in Liquidation) (Winchester CC, 26 
February 2014) 
Small Company convicted of corporate 
manslaughter and fined £500,000. However, 
the company had already gone into 
liquidation. £8,000 paid and £4,000 payable 
in costs. 
 
A gross negligence manslaughter charge 
against the director was left to lie on file. 
Director was convicted pursuant to section 
37 HSWA 1974. Following a guilty plea the 
director was fined £183,000 and disqualified 


























R v Cavendish Masonry Limited 
(Oxford CC, 22 May 2014) 
Small 
 
Company convicted of corporate 
manslaughter during trial in May 2014. The 
company had already pleaded guilty to a 
breach of section 2(1) HSWA 1974. 
 
The company was fined £150,000 and 




1 7 November 
2014 
R v Sterecycle (Rotherham) Limited 
(in Liquidation) (Sheffield CC, 7 
November 2014) 
Small Company convicted and fined £500,000. 
However, the firm went into liquidation and 
the judge acknowledged that little, if any, of 
the fine would be paid. 
 
Section 7 HSWA 1974 charges withdrawn 
against one director and two managers 
during the trial. 









(3rd Northern Ireland Conviction) 
 
R v A Diamond & Son (Timber) Ltd 
(Antrim CC, 17 December 2014) 
Small Guilty plea resulted in fine of £75,000 
payable over 5 years and ordered to pay 
£15,832 in costs. 
 
The company pleaded guilty. The low fine 
recognised the fact that at the time of 



























R v Peter Mawson Ltd (Preston CC, 
19 December 2014) 
Small Guilty plea entered by corporation with 
regard to corporate manslaughter charge. 
Fined £220,000 plus costs of £31,504.77. 
 
Publicity order to be added to the company 
website for a set period of time and also 
ordered to take out half-page spread in local 
newspaper pursuant to CMCHA 2007. Also 
fined £20,000 for breach of section 2(1) 
HSWA 1974. 
 
Director pleaded guilty for breach of section 
2(1) HSWA 1974 and was sentenced to 8 
months in prison suspended for 2 years. 




1 12 January 
2015 
R v Pyranha Mouldings Ltd 
(Liverpool CC, 12 January 2015), 
[2015] All ER (D) 292 MAR 
Small Company convicted of corporate 
manslaughter and fined £200,000 and 
ordered to pay £90,000 costs. 
Technical director found guilty of breach of 
section 37(1) HSWA 1974. Director 
sentenced to 9 months in prison suspended 
for 2 years and fined £25,000. Director and 
company ordered to pay £90,000 costs 
between them. 
 
Charges against other senior individuals in 

















NI 4 February 
2012 
1 12 March 
2015 
(4th Northern Ireland Conviction) 
 
R v DIECI Ltd and Nicole Enterprises 
Newry CC 
 
Small Company pleaded guilty to corporate 
manslaughter and was sentenced to a fine of 
£100,000. 
 
It received a further fine of £2,000 following 
its plea relating to health and safety charges 
and was ordered to pay prosecution costs. 
 
The company’s managing director was 
charged with gross negligence 
manslaughter. The company Nicole 
Enterprises pleaded guilty. The managing 
director himself and the company Dieci Ltd 
pleaded not guilty. 
 
The charges against Dieci Ltd were left on 
file and the managing director was acquitted 




1 28 April 
2015 
R v J&P Scaffolding t/a Kings 
Scaffolding (Preston CC, 28 April 
2015) 
Small Company pleaded guilty and fined £300,000 

























1 14 July 2015 R v Huntley Mount Engineering Ltd 
(Manchester CC, 14 July 2015) 
Small Convicted and fined £150,000, payable over 
6 years. 
 
The company was also fined £75,000 for 
health and safety offences and ordered to 
pay £25,000 costs. 
 
The company director was sentenced to 8 
months’ imprisonment and disqualified from 
being a company director for 10 years. 
 
An employee of the company was sentenced 
to 4 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 
12 months, ordered to carry out 200 hours 




1 24 July 2015 R v (1) CAV Cambridge (in 
liquidation) and (2) CAV Aerospace 
Ltd (Parent Company) (CCC, 24 July 
2015) 
Large CAV Aerospace was convicted following a 
trial and fined £600,000. Also convicted 
pursuant to section 2(1) HSWA 1974 and 
fined £400,000. Further, ordered to pay 






R v Linley Developments (St Albans 
CC, 24 September 2015) 
Small Company pleaded guilty to CM and fined 
£200,000, to be payable over 5 years, and 
was ordered to pay £25,000 in costs. 
 

















13 June 2010 1 17 
November 
2015 
R v Cheshire Gates & Automation Ltd 
(Manchester CC, 17 November 
2015) 
Small Company pleaded guilty and fined £50,000, 
allowed to be paid in instalments of £8,000 
per year. 
 
Also sentenced to a publicity order following 
the death of a 6-year-old girl who died after 












R v Baldwins Crane Hire Ltd 
(Preston CC, 1 December 2015) 
 
Large Company convicted of corporate 
manslaughter and breaches of section 2(1) 
and 3(1) HSWA 1974 following trial and 
sentenced to a fine of £700,000 and all of 
the CPS costs along with half of the HSE 
costs (£200,000). 
 
A publicity order was also made which 
stated that the company must place the 
incident on its website for 6 months and put 
a notice in the trade magazine Construction 






















1 3 December 
2015 
R v Sherwood Rise Ltd (Nottingham 
CC, 3 December 2015) 
Small 1st Company sentenced under new 
sentencing guidelines. 
 
Company pleaded guilty and was sentenced 
to a fine of £300,000 and ordered to pay 
£41,500 costs. 
 
A company director was sentenced to 3 
years and 2 months’ imprisonment and 
disqualified from being a company director 
for 8 years after pleading guilty to gross 
negligence manslaughter. 
 
A manager was also sentenced to 
imprisonment for 1 year, suspended for 2 
years, and disqualified from being a 
company director for 5 years for a breach of 
sections 3 and 37 HSWA 1974. 
 
This was the first case in which a company 
was found guilty under the CMCHA 2007 
























2 27 June 
2016 
R v Monavon Construction Ltd (CCC, 
27 June 2016) 
Small Company pleaded guilty to two counts of 
corporate manslaughter following the 
deaths of two passers-by who died after 
falling 4 metres through a building site’s 
perimeter hoarding. Company was fined 
£550,000 (£250,000 for each of the deaths). 
Ordered to pay £23,653 costs within 6 
months. 
 
Company fined £50,000 for failing to 
discharge its duty to persons other than 
employees pursuant to section 3 HSWA 
1974. 
16 June 2012 1 16 August 
2016 
R v Bilston Skips Ltd 
(Wolverhampton CC, 16 August 
2016) 
Small Bilston Skips Ltd was charged with one 
charge of corporate manslaughter and 
convicted in its absence. Company fined 
£600,000. 
 
Also found guilty pursuant to section 2 
HSWA 1974. Company fined £600,000. 
  
The manager (not a director) also found 
guilty of gross negligence manslaughter and 
sentenced to 2 years in prison, suspended 
for 2 years. Pleaded guilty to section 37 
HSWA 1974 and ordered to pay £10,000 and 




















1 16 March 
2017 
R v SR and RJ Brown Ltd and MA 




SR & RJ Brown Ltd  
Company pleaded guilty to corporate 
manslaughter and fined £300,000, reduced 
by 25% because of a guilty plea and the 
offence was categorised as a category A. The 
fine was within the appropriate range 
(£270,000–£800,000) but below the starting 
point of £400,000. Ordered to pay £15,833 
in costs and had a publicity order imposed. 
 
Also pleaded guilty to breach of Work at 
Height Regulations 2005. No separate fine. 
 
Charges relating to section 2(1) and section 
3(1) HSWA 1974 not proceeded with. 
 
Individual directors imprisoned for HSWA 
1973 offences and perverting the course of 
justice. Each received 20 months. 
 
MA Excavations (Principal Contractor) 
 
Company guilty of breach of section 3(1) 
HSWA 1974 and fined £150,000. Director of 
principal contractors also sentenced to 12 



















18 April 2015 1 19 May 
2017 
R v Ozdil Investments Ltd and 
Koseoglu Metalworks Ltd 
(Chelmsford CC, 19 May 2017) 
Small 
(Both) 
Ozdil Investments Ltd  
Company convicted after trial of corporate 
manslaughter and fined £500,000. Also 
ordered to pay £53,115.34 in costs. 
 
Company fined £160,000 for breach of 
section 2 HSWA 1974. 
 
Firat Ozdil imprisoned for 12 months for 
breach of section 2 HSWA 1974. Also 
disqualified from being a director for 20 
years. Ozgur Ozdil imprisoned for 10 months 
for breach of section 2 HSWA 1974. Also 
disqualified from being a director for 10 
years. 
  
Koseoglu Metal Works Ltd  
Company pleaded guilty to corporate 
manslaughter and fined £300,000. Also 
ordered to pay £21,236 in costs. 
 
Company also fined £100,000 for breach of 
section 3 HSWA 1974. 
 
Director (Kose) admitted a section 3 HSWA 
1974 breach; imprisoned for 8 months and 




















2 19 May 
2017 
R v Martinisation (London) Ltd (CCC, 
19 May 2017) 
Small Company convicted of corporate 
manslaughter. Fined £1.2 million and 
convicted of breaching section 2(1) HSWA 
1974 and fined £650,000 for all breaches. 
 
Director convicted for breaches of sections 
33(1) and 71(a) HSWA 1974. Director 
sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment for 
each of the deaths, to run concurrently, and 
disqualified for being a company director for 






1 30 October 
2017 
R v Master Construction Products 
(Skips) Ltd (Birmingham CC, 30 
October 2017) 
Small The company pleaded guilty to corporate 
manslaughter and was fined £255,000. 
Director ordered to pay £11,500 in costs. 
The director was also given a 12-month 
sentence suspended for 2 years and 300-
hours’ community service. He was also 
disqualified from becoming a company 
director for 8 years. 
 
Company pleaded guilty to breach of section 
2(1) HSWA 1974. 
 
Sole director also pleaded guilty to HSWA 
1974 offences. 
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APPENDIX THREE: UNSUCCESSFUL MANSLAUGHTER PROSECUTIONS8 AGAINST CORPORATIONS PURSUANT TO THE 


















R v Cory Brothers & Co Ltd [1927] 
1KB 810 
Large Not guilty Not applicable  
2 July  
1964 
1 February 1965 R v Northern Strip Mining 
Construction Co Ltd (Glamorgan 
Assizes, February 1965) 
 
Small Not guilty Not applicable 
3 March 
1987 
193 June  
1990 
R v P&O European Ferries (Dover) 










R v South Coast Shipping Ltd 
Lloyd’s List 12 April 1995 
 
R v Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrates & Another, 
ex parte South Coast Shipping Co 




Large Dismissed due 




                                                        
8 Sources HSE and Centre of Corporate Accountability. 
9 Criminal Justice Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo 5 c 86) s 33 effective date 1 June 1926. 
10 Corporate Manslaughter Corporate Homicide Act 2007 effective date 6 April 2008. 
11 Defintion of company size pursuant to section 382(3) and section 465(3) Companies Act 2006 as amended by The Companies Act 2006 (Amendment) (Accounts & Reports) Regulations 2008 (2008/393). 
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No. Date 














R v Great Western Trains Co Ltd 
(CCC, 30 June 1999)  
 
(Southall Train Crash) 
Large  Dismissed 
 
Company fined £1.5 million for a 
breach of section 3 HSWA 1974. 
 
Pre-trial hearing as no one acting 
as directing mind had been 
charged. 
 
AG’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) 
[2000] 2 Cr App Rep 207 
6 April 1998 1 November 
2001 
R v Euromin Ltd (CCC, 29 
November 2001) 
Small Acquitted R v DPP, ex p Jones (Timothy) 
[2000] IRLR 273 (QB) Judicial 
Review Application regarding 
DPP’s decision not to prosecute 
for gross negligence 
manslaughter. 
 
The court ruled that the CPS 
decision not to prosecute the 
corporation for gross negligence 
manslaughter was ‘irrational’. In 
November 2001 the company 
was acquitted of gross negligence 
manslaughter. Company 
convicted of breaching section 2 
HSWA 1974 and fined £50,000. 
 
                                                        





















R v IMCO Plastics Ltd (Bristol CC, 5 
November 2003) 
Medium Acquitted Company fined £75,000 pursuant 









R v HJ Lea Oakes Ltd & Oakes 
Millers Ltd (Manx CC, 20 June 
2001) 
 
Small Acquitted Each company fined £50,000 
pursuant to section 3(1) HSWA 
1974 and ordered to pay £5,000 
in costs. Manslaughter charges 






R v Jack Robinson (Trawlers) Ltd 
(Manx CC, 18 May 2005) 
 
Small Acquitted Moran QC decided, as a matter of 
law, that he had a duty to stop 
the case from proceeding further 
and directed the jury to return 







                                                        




















R v Factory Cover Ltd (Teeside CC, 
May 2002) 
Small Acquitted Fine imposed for breach of 








R v (1) Philip Services (Europe) Ltd 
(2) Haden Drysis International 
Limited (3) Ford Motor Co 




Acquitted Charges of gross negligence 
manslaughter dropped against 
company (1). 
 
Two directors from company (1) 
each fined £5,000 for breach of 
section 2(1) HSWA 1974. 
Company (2) fined £25,000 and 








                                                        






















R v (1) Network Rail (formerly 
Railtrack) (2) Balfour Beatty Rail 
Infrastructure Services Ltd (CCC, 1 
September 2004) 
 
(Hatfield Train Disaster) 
Large Dismissed Fined for breach of section 3 
HSWA 1974: (1) £10 million (2) 
£3.5 million. 
 
 R v Balfour Beatty Rail 
Infrastructure Services Ltd [2007] 
Bus LR 77 fine reduced to £7.5 
million by CoA because of 
disparity of sentence between its 




1 February 2003 R v Alan Swift Roofing Contracts 
Ltd (Maidstone CC, 21 March 2003)  
Small Dismissed Director fined £2,500 and £7,500 
for breaching Regulations 29 and 
6 Construction (Health and Safety 
& Welfare) Regulations 1996. 
Company fined £5,000 and 
£15,000 for breaches of same 
statute and ordered to pay 






R v Clearserve Ltd (Chelmsford CC, 
11 September 2003) 
Small Acquitted Directors fined £1,500 and £6,000 
for HSWA 1974 breach and 
company fined £32,000. 
 
 
                                                        














Convicted under HSWA 1974 
15 August  
2002 
7 August 2006 R v Barrow BC & Beckingham 
(Preston CC, August 2006) 
R v Beckingham [2006] EWCA Crim 
773  
 
(Cumbria Legionnaires Deaths) 








end of second 
trial. 
Barrow BC pleaded guilty to a 
breach of section 3(1) HSWA 
1974, was fined £125,000 and 
ordered to pay £90,000 costs. 
Beckingham charged with a 
section 7 HSWA 1974 offence 
after two trials and fined £15,000 
for the breach. 
 
 
16 March  
2005 
1 October 2007 R v Lakeland Leisure Estates Ltd 
(Bradford CC, 26 October 2007) 
Small Acquitted. 
Gillick J 
informed jury to 
return not guilty 
verdict as 
evidence did not 
amount to a 
gross breach of 
duty. 
Company fined £47,000 pursuant 
to HSWA 1974 plus costs.  
17 September 
2005 
1 August 2008 R v Reliance Scrap Metal 
Merchants (Winchester CC, 24 




Small Acquitted Company pleaded guilty and 
fined £60,000 pursuant to 
sections 2 and 3 HSWA 1974. 
Director (1) jailed for three years 
and fined £1,000. Director (2) 
jailed for 15 months for 
perverting the course of justice. 
                                                        















Convicted under HSWA 1974 
18 April 
2004 
1 February 2007 R v Constructional & Vehicles 
Welders Ltd (Basildon CC, 15 
February 2007) 
Small Dismissed Company fined £5,000 with costs 
of £20,000 for breach of section 
2(1) HSWA 1974. Director fined 






1 August to 
September 
2010 
R v Deeside Metal Co Ltd and Jeyes 
UK Ltd [2011] EWCA Crim 3020; 
[2012] 2 Cr Ap R (S) 29 






GNM charge mishandled. On 10 November 2011 
DPP apologises to family for botched investigation. 
DPP reconsidered case 4 years later and decided 
manslaughter charges should be made. Court ruled 
that the delay meant any subsequent trial would be 
an ‘abuse of power’. 
 
Held: Jeyes Limited fined £330,000 pursuant to 
section 3(1) HSWA 1974, to be paid within 56 
months plus £50,000 costs. Deeside Metal Co Ltd 
fined £100,000 plus costs of £10,000 pursuant to a 
breach of section 2(1) HSWA 1974 and Regulation 
3(1) MHSWR 1999. 
 
On 2 December 2011 Deeside Metal Co Ltd 
appeared at the Court of Appeal to appeal against 
the £100,000 fine to be paid over 4 years. Sentence 
reduced to £50,000 to be paid over 5 years. 
 
                                                        




















R v Translact Ltd (Winchester CC, 24 
September 2008) 
Small Dismissed GNM charge against the company 
dismissed due to causation on 3 
August 2009. Parent company 
charged as Taymix Transport 
Limited went into liquidation. 
Company fined £10,000 for 
breaching section 2(1) HSWA 
1974 and £30,000 for breaching 
section 3(1) HSWA 1974. 
Translact directors all fined, 






R v Edward Day T/A E J Construction 
Ltd (Maidstone CC, 24 March 2010) 
Sole-
trader 
Dismissed GNM charge dismissed against 
company. Company fined 
£20,000 for breaching section 
2(1) HSAW 1974 and Regulation 











                                                        




















R v Austin and McLean Limited and 
Esso Petroleum Company Limited 
(Winchester CC, 28 June 2013) 
Small and 
large  
Dismissed  Austin charged with GNM and a 
breach of section 2 and 3 HSWA 
1974. GNM charge discontinued 
because of lack of evidence. 
Company pleaded guilty to a 
breach of section 3 HSWA 1974 
and was fined £60,000 plus 
£30,000 costs. Section 2 HSWA 
1974 breach to lie on file.  
 
Esso charged with breaches of 
section 2, 3, 4, 5 and 9 pursuant 
to HSWA 1974. All other charges 
dismissed when Esso pleaded 
guilty to breach of section 5 
HSWA 1974. Fined £100,000 plus 
ordered to pay £50,000 in court 
costs. 
 
                                                        
19 Definition of company size pursuant to section 382(3) and section 465(3) Companies Act 2006 as amended by The Companies Act 2006 (Amendment) (Accounts & Reports) Regulations 2008 (2008/393). 
20 http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/esso_austen_plead_guilty/CPS considered that the conduct in relation to the incident occurred prior to this date. 
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MANSLAUGHTER AND CORPORATE HOMICIDE ACT 2007 FROM 6 APRIL 2008 TO 1 MAY 2018 









Convicted under HSWA 1974 
1 July 2010 1 April 2014 R v PS & JE Ward Ltd  Small Acquitted at 
trial 
Company convicted for a breach of section 2(1) 




4 June 2014 R v MNS Mining Ltd  Small Acquitted Not guilty of corporate manslaughter. 
NI 
Case 
July 2013 1 March 2015 R v G & J Crothers Small Not guilty CM offence left to lie on file. Company admitted 




1 2016 R v Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust 
Large Not guilty Pleaded guilty to health and safety breach and 
fined £18,279 including costs. 
NI 
Case 
April 2013 1 March 2015 R v McGoldrick Enterprises 
Ltd  
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